From McCain to H.R. 4624: How Congress Spent 26 Years Trying to Fix Boxing and Ended Up Here<\/p>\n
By Larry Goldberg and Boxing Insider Staff<\/p>\n
The Muhammad Ali American Boxing Revival Act passed the House on March 24, 2026<\/a>. The Senate passed boxing reform bills unanimously twice before, in 2004 and 2005, but the House never voted on either one. H.R. 4624 is the first boxing reform bill to pass the House since the original Ali Act<\/a> became law in 2000. It now sits with the Senate Commerce Committee, chaired by Ted Cruz.<\/p>\n But between 2000 and now, Congress tried to update boxing law repeatedly. None of those bills became law. And what they tried to do is very different from what the House just passed.<\/p>\n This is a guide to what Congress wanted for boxing, what it could not get done, and what the Senate is being asked to approve instead.<\/p>\n The Six Bills That Failed<\/p>\n There were additional committee-level efforts in 2002 and 2007-2008 that never advanced beyond the Senate Commerce Committee. These are the six that got the furthest.<\/p>\n 2004: S.275 (bill text<\/a>) Senator John McCain proposed creating a federal boxing commission. As introduced, the bill placed it in the Department of Labor and called it the United States Boxing Administration. The Senate Commerce Committee amended it, moving the commission to the Department of Commerce. The Senate passed it unanimously. The House never voted on it. The bill was opposed by state commissions on both ends of the spectrum<\/a>. Strong commissions like New Jersey and Nevada did not want a federal agency overriding the systems they had already built. New Jersey\u2019s SACB had already withdrawn from the Association of Boxing Commissions. Marc Ratner, executive director of the Nevada State Athletic Commission, said \u201cI don\u2019t believe in a one-man federal boxing czar. There are states\u2019 rights issues here.\u201d Weak commissions like Tennessee did not want federal oversight for the opposite reason: they had almost nothing in place and did not want anyone checking. Tommy Patrick, the director of the Tennessee Boxing and Racing Commission, called federal oversight \u201ca bureaucratic nightmare.\u201d Tennessee did not have an independent athletic commission at the time. New York\u2019s State Athletic Commission supported the bill. The result was that both sides, for opposite reasons, helped kill the same legislation.<\/p>\n 2005: S.148 McCain tried again with the same basic bill. The Senate passed it unanimously. The House voted on a companion bill, H.R. 1065. It passed by voice vote but failed the recorded roll call. The bill died.<\/p>\n 2009: S.38 (committee report<\/a>) McCain introduced the bill again, now called the United States Boxing Commission Act, with the commission in the Department of Commerce. The Senate Commerce Committee reported it favorably. It never reached a floor vote. Rep. Peter King filed a companion bill in the House (H.R. 523). Both died in committee.<\/p>\n 2014: H.R. 5395 Rep. Peter King introduced the Professional Boxing Amendments Act. No Senate companion bill was ever filed. Died in committee.<\/p>\n 2016: H.R. 5365 (bill text<\/a>) Rep. Markwayne Mullin, a former MMA fighter, introduced the Muhammad Ali Expansion Act. Instead of creating a federal commission, this bill tried to extend the Ali Act\u2019s protections to MMA fighters. The UFC hired Washington lobbying firms to oppose it. No Senate companion bill was ever filed. Died in committee.<\/p>\n 2017: H.R. 44 Mullin reintroduced the same bill with over 50 co-sponsors. No Senate companion bill was ever filed. Died in committee.<\/p>\n What Those Bills Would Have Done<\/p>\n The McCain bills all shared the same idea: boxing needed a federal referee.<\/p>\n The proposed commission would have had the power to investigate, subpoena records, suspend licenses, and enforce national standards. It would have created a licensing system for everyone in the sport, not just boxers, but trainers, managers, promoters, physicians, and ring officials. It would have built two national databases: one tracking every boxer\u2019s medical history, brain injuries, and suspensions, and another tracking competitive records and licensing status across all 50 states.<\/p>\n On the business side, the commission would have set mandatory contract minimums for bout agreements, promotional contracts, and boxer-manager deals. It would have required objective ranking criteria. And it would have monitored state boxing commissions to make sure they were actually enforcing the law. A 2003 GAO report<\/a> found many of them were not.<\/p>\n The Congressional Budget Office estimated<\/a> the whole thing would cost about $34 million over five years.<\/p>\n The Mullin bills took a different approach. They did not try to create a new federal agency. They tried to give MMA fighters the same protections boxers already had under the Ali Act: the ban on coercive contracts, the requirement that promoters disclose financial arrangements, the firewall between promoters and managers, and objective ranking standards. All three died without a Senate companion.<\/p>\n What Boxing Would Look Like Today If Any of Them Had Passed<\/p>\n If the McCain bills had become law, boxing today would have a federal commission with staff, a budget, and enforcement authority. Every promoter, manager, trainer, and ring official in the country would be federally licensed. A fighter knocked out in New Jersey would have his medical records in a national database accessible to every state commission before he could get licensed to fight in Florida three weeks later.<\/p>\n Rankings would be based on published criteria instead of sanctioning fee payments. Contracts would have federally enforced minimums. State commissions that were not doing their jobs would have a federal regulator looking over their shoulders.<\/p>\n If the Mullin bills had passed, MMA fighters would have the same business protections boxers have. Contract clauses that allowed promoters to extend deals indefinitely would be unenforceable. Fighters would be entitled to financial disclosures from their promoter. The firewall between promotion and management would apply to every combat sport in America.<\/p>\n None of it happened. The House never voted on the first McCain bill and voted down the second. The Mullin bills never got a Senate companion. Boxing went 26 years without a federal update.<\/p>\n What H.R. 4624 Does Instead<\/p>\n The Muhammad Ali American Boxing Revival Act<\/a> takes a completely different approach. No federal commission. No national licensing system. No medical database. No subpoena power. No federal enforcement staff.<\/p>\n Instead, the bill creates a new kind of entity called a Unified Boxing Organization, or UBO. A UBO is a private company that combines promotion, rankings, titles, and sanctioning under one roof. One organization controls who fights, when they fight, how they\u2019re ranked, and what belt is on the line.<\/p>\n The bill also raises safety and pay standards for all of professional boxing: a $200 per round minimum, $50,000 in medical coverage per bout, $15,000 in accidental death coverage, certified ringside physicians, and drug testing for title fights.<\/p>\n Those improvements are real. But they amend the same law that the GAO found<\/a> state commissions were already enforcing inconsistently, and the bill creates no new federal mechanism to make sure the rules are followed.<\/p>\n The CBO estimated<\/a> the total federal cost of implementing the entire bill at less than $500,000 over five years. Compare that to the $34 million the CBO estimated for the McCain commission.<\/p>\n What the Bill Bypasses<\/p>\n Here is where it gets complicated.<\/p>\n The existing Ali Act<\/a> protects fighters in three specific ways: it bans coercive contracts, it requires promoters to disclose financial arrangements, and it prohibits the same entity from acting as both promoter and manager. Those protections apply to \u201cpromoters\u201d and \u201csanctioning organizations.\u201d<\/p>\n A UBO is legally defined as neither. It is a new category: \u201can association, a league, or a centralized industry organization\u201d that operates \u201cwithout reliance on a sanctioning organization.\u201d<\/p>\n Under Section 24(a) of the bill<\/a>, a UBO is \u201cdeemed to be in compliance\u201d with the Ali Act if it meets its own set of conditions. Those conditions cover safety, medical standards, drug testing, and contract minimums. They do not include the three core business protections listed above.<\/p>\n