Cleodie Rickard is trade campaign manager at Global Justice Now, a UK-based organisation working for a global economy where people come before profit.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u201cCritical minerals\u201d is a buzzword in discussions about the green transition. But across industry reports, NGO communications and the media, the same claim is repeated: achieving net zero \u201cinevitably means more mining<\/a>\u201d. Rarely is it backed with evidence. \u00a0<\/p>\n In this context, campaigners opposing extractive harm \u2013 mostly in the Global South, often on Indigenous lands \u2013 are frequently misconstrued as opposing climate action. Meanwhile, mining companies claim a social licence to ramp up mining, framing themselves as planetary saviours.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Amid rising geopolitical tensions, the fog of war is clearing the greenwash: governments are increasingly justifying their scramble for minerals in terms of defence and \u2018national security\u2019. This lays bare how \u201ccritical minerals\u201d is a political rather than a scientific term, defined differently relative to countries\u2019 interests. It can therefore be contested.\u00a0<\/p>\n Trump follows the minerals trail \u2013 but for weapons not clean energy?<\/a><\/p>\n To cut through the noise, we need a clearer picture of the specific industries different minerals serve \u2013 and in what amounts. And, crucially, the public must decide what kind of transition we are needing to resource.\u00a0<\/p>\n Critical for whom?\u00a0<\/p>\n Our new research<\/a> at Global Justice Now examines the UK\u2019s list of 33 minerals defined as \u201ccritical\u201d. Using International Energy Agency (IEA) data, we analysed how much of each mineral\u2019s current production is used for green technologies \u2013 or other ends \u2013 and how much is needed to meet the IEA\u2019s 2040 transition scenario.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n We found that one in five of these minerals play no role in the IEA\u2019s green pathway. Another 15 \u2013 almost half \u2013 would require only a small proportion of current global production by 2040, suggesting their \u2018criticality\u2019 is not driven by green goals. \u00a0<\/p>\n Only seven minerals require significant uplifts \u2013 and mostly for electric vehicles (EVs), not energy generation. The defence and aerospace sector is after five of the UK\u2019s non-transition minerals and eight transition-relevant ones.\u00a0<\/p>\n This raises important questions. Do we need a mining boom? Should the military sector be getting priority access to those minerals that are in high demand for green goals? Should the transition rely on a model of private EV ownership?\u00a0<\/p>\n Mining for transition minerals can be responsible with joint push, experts say<\/a><\/p>\n Political choices shape material needs. Our research suggests renewable goals can largely be met within existing mineral production, if we make small reallocations of supply across sectors \u2013 slicing the mineral pie differently, rather than growing it.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Instead, the UK government has announced<\/a> financing for mineral importers to specifically benefit \u201cdefence, aerospace and EV battery makers\u201d, and a \u00a36-billion ($8bn) increase in annual defence spending.<\/p>\n Wind turbines, not bombs \u00a0<\/p>\n Instead of pouring public money into weapons with a hollow claim of growth and jobs, the moment demands a proactive green industrial strategy.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Given the mineral-intensiveness of EVs, we need improved public transport, shared mobility and less car-centric planning. For grid storage, we need research into things like pumped hydro and flow batteries \u2013 which must be government-led and well-funded, with knowledge held in the public domain rather than enclosed by corporations to tout false solutions.\u00a0<\/p>\n Does the world need a global treaty on energy transition minerals?<\/a><\/p>\n