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<\/p>\nThe LIV Golf rollercoaster is hoping to take a new turn after filing for bankruptcy in September. Once court proceedings are done, one question will remain: can it survive without Saudi money?\u00a0<\/p>\n
For all the noise that has surrounded LIV Golf since its arrival, perhaps the most revealing number is not $US5 billion, the estimated amount Saudi Arabia\u2019s Public Investment Fund has poured into the project since its launch. It is 2027. That is the year LIV Golf now needs to reach.<\/p>\n
On September 8, the league filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in New Jersey, beginning a court-supervised restructuring that is designed to carry LIV into what its chief executive Scott O\u2019Neil calls its \u201cnext phase\u201d. At the same time, LIV announced a Restructuring Support Agreement with BC Partners Credit, a private investment firm that is expected to provide the financial backing for a radically different version of the league.<\/p>\n
The headline from LIV was deliberately optimistic. This, the organisation insists, is not the end of LIV Golf but the beginning of LIV 2.0. The reality is more complicated.<\/p>\n
LIV has not shut down. It intends to continue operating while the bankruptcy process runs its course, with the aim of emerging in early 2027. The league has also secured an agreement from PIF for $US49.6 million of debtor in possession financing, subject to court approval, to keep the business functioning during the restructuring. BC Partners and other potential minority investors are expected to provide exit financing once the process is complete. But the filing lays bare the financial challenge that LIV now faces.<\/p>\n
The company lists assets of between $US100 million and $US500 million and liabilities between $500 million and $1 billion. Among its largest unsecured creditors are some of the very players recruited to make the league a global force. Jon Rahm is listed with an unsecured claim of about $US7.5 million, Bryson DeChambeau $5.7 million, Dustin Johnson $5.5 million and Aussie Ripper GC star Cameron Smith $4.8 million. Fourteen of LIV\u2019s 30 largest unsecured creditors are players.<\/p>\n
Those figures do not necessarily represent the total value of the players\u2019 contracts. They are the claims recorded in the bankruptcy filing and reflect amounts presently due. Some of the players have contracts worth tens of millions of dollars more over their remaining terms.<\/p>\n
That distinction is important because the next version of LIV is unlikely to look much like the one that signed them.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
THE SAUDI EXPERIMENT<\/p>\n
When LIV arrived in 2022, its proposition was simple enough. Give the best players enormous financial incentives to leave the PGA Tour, take professional golf into new markets and build a team-based league around a shorter, more accessible format.<\/p>\n
The money was the engine. The PIF, which owns 100 per cent of LIV according to the bankruptcy petition, provided more than $US5 billion in funding, according to independent reporting. That allowed LIV to absorb the enormous costs of building a new sports property from scratch while offering signing bonuses and contracts that established tours could not or would not match. The result was one of the most disruptive periods in golf.<\/p>\n
Phil Mickelson, Brooks Koepka, Johnson, Smith, DeChambeau and Rahm were among the major names who made the jump. Golf\u2019s established order fractured, the PGA Tour suspended defectors, and the sport spent years discussing a civil war that ultimately proved far more complicated than either side initially imagined. But the economics were always difficult to ignore.<\/p>\n
LIV was attempting to establish a global sports league with enormous operating costs, significant prize purses and some of the richest player contracts in professional golf, while simultaneously developing a commercial audience and building broadcast, sponsorship and ticketing revenue. That was possible while PIF was willing to fund the experiment.<\/p>\n
It becomes a different proposition when the fund decides it no longer wants to.<\/p>\n
PIF announced in April that it would end its financial support after the 2026 season. In the months since, LIV has cancelled events, reduced prizemoney and cut its workforce dramatically, almost entirely. The league informed most of its employees in August that their jobs would be terminated, just days after the 2026 season concluded in Indianapolis. That event itself was also reduced in scale after LIV cancelled its planned season finale in Michigan. The era of spending first and worrying about the business model later was over.<\/p>\n
ENTER B.C. PARTNERS<\/p>\n
The intriguing part of the latest development is what replaces it. BC Partners is not PIF. It is a private investment business, and private equity does not typically operate on the basis of building a prestige sporting property regardless of the cost.<\/p>\n
That could prove to be the most significant change of all. The proposed transaction would see BC Partners Credit and other potential investors provide financing while the reorganised LIV becomes majority owned by its players. The precise ownership structure has not yet been finalised and remains subject to negotiations and court approval.<\/p>\n
LIV describes it as a player-first model. The concept is straightforward. Rather than simply being highly paid employees or contracted assets, players would have an ownership stake in the league they are helping to build. O\u2019Neil has described the ambition as creating a structure in which players share directly in the value they create, while LIV\u2019s 13 teams develop into enduring sports businesses.<\/p>\n
It is an attractive proposition. It is also untested. For the first time, LIV\u2019s players must decide whether they believe in the business rather than simply the contract. And there is a very big difference between the two.<\/p>\n
Perhaps the most consequential part of the bankruptcy filing is what it means for LIV\u2019s existing player agreements. The restructuring process gives LIV the opportunity to address those legacy obligations as it attempts to build a financially sustainable business.<\/p>\n
Reporting has indicated the league is seeking court approval to terminate existing player contracts as part of the restructuring. That creates an extraordinary situation. The players who were once the most valuable assets in LIV\u2019s business are now also among its largest creditors. And some are potentially free to decide whether the new LIV is worth joining.<\/p>\n
Rahm has already been asked about his future. His response, in essence, has been that time will tell. He has previously indicated he has more than $US100 million remaining on his LIV contract, although the precise treatment of such obligations under the restructuring process remains to be determined.<\/p>\n
For Smith, the question is even more pertinent from an Australian perspective. The Queenslander is listed among LIV\u2019s biggest unsecured creditors [see page 68], while his Ripper GC team has become one of the league\u2019s strongest examples of the local connection LIV has been trying to establish.<\/p>\n
Then there is dual US Open winner and YouTube sensation DeChambeau, whose profile has arguably grown during his time with LIV, and Johnson, whose decision to join in 2022 was one of the biggest early statements of intent.<\/p>\n
Will they accept reduced financial terms in exchange for equity? Will they be prepared to become genuine owners? Will they believe that equity in LIV Golf will ultimately be worth more than the guaranteed money they were originally promised? Those are very different questions from the ones players were being asked four years ago.<\/p>\n
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<\/p>\n
ADELAIDE\u2019S LIV DILEMMA<\/p>\n
For Australian golf, the survival of LIV matters. LIV Golf Adelaide is the league\u2019s marquee tournament, attracting crowds of more than 100,000 across the week and creating something that was largely unexpected when LIV arrived: a genuinely important event on the Australian sporting calendar, with an identity and atmosphere distinctly its own.<\/p>\n
The 2027 edition is scheduled for March 18-21 at Kooyonga Golf Club, before the event moves to the redeveloped North Adelaide Golf Course in 2028. Adelaide is contracted to remain LIV\u2019s Australian home until at least 2031. But whether that agreement ultimately means five more years of LIV in South Australia is now far less certain.<\/p>\n
In July, LIV sought an extension on a payment to Kooyonga, prompting questions about whether the 2027 tournament would proceed. At the time, SA premier Peter Malinauskas sought to reassure fans and stakeholders that the government remained confident in the event. But his more recent comments, after LIV\u2019s Chapter 11 filing, offered a revealing insight into the government\u2019s thinking. Malinauskas told ABC Radio Adelaide that LIV had alerted the government to its plans and that he appreciated the league\u2019s transparency throughout the process.<\/p>\n
\u201cThey alerted us to the fact that they were planning to do this, and I appreciate their transparency around that. They continue to tell us they intend to be here next year,\u201d Malinauskas said before offering an important qualification: \u201cBut as I said to you a couple of weeks ago, whenever it was, I\u2019m alive to the fact that I\u2019m reading everything everyone else is, and I\u2019m not banking on the fact that they will be.\u201d<\/p>\n
It is a remarkably pragmatic position. LIV has not cancelled Adelaide. The tournament remains on its 2027 schedule and the league continues to promote the event. But the South Australian Government is clearly not taking anything for granted. And, crucially, Malinauskas says the state is protected if LIV does disappear.<\/p>\n
\u201cAll I know is that if they\u2019re not, it doesn\u2019t cost us anything. In fact, the opposite is true,\u201d he said. That is because South Australia now has another powerful card to play. The PGA Tour and DP World Tour\u2019s renewed commitment to the Australian Open means Adelaide is no longer as dependent on LIV to deliver high-level professional golf to the state.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe\u2019re very grateful to be so committed now from the PGA, both in Australia but also internationally, to have the Australian Open here, which suits our purposes as well,\u201d Malinauskas said.<\/p>\n
In other words, Adelaide would prefer LIV to survive, but South Australia is not betting the house on it. That distinction could become increasingly important if LIV 2.0 is materially different from the league that arrived in Australia in 2023.<\/p>\n
UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH<\/p>\n
LIV\u2019s messaging is understandably focused on the future. O\u2019Neil\u2019s letter to fans is strikingly optimistic. He points to what LIV has achieved in four years, from taking team golf to a global audience to attracting younger fans and establishing events in markets the established tours had largely overlooked.<\/p>\n
\u201cFans 20 years younger than golf\u2019s traditional viewership showed up on-site and through our content,\u201d O\u2019Neil wrote. \u201cWe brought world-class players and teams to new markets. We welcomed major global broadcast and marketing partners.\u201d<\/p>\n
But then comes the admission that matters most: \u201cPut simply, this process is designed to build a stronger and
more sustainable future for LIV Golf.\u201d<\/p>\n
That word \u2013 sustainable \u2013 is doing plenty of work. For much of its existence, LIV presented itself as the alternative to professional golf\u2019s established order. Now, with the original financial model no longer viable, its chief executive is talking about sustainability, alignment and becoming part of a broader ecosystem. Indeed, O\u2019Neil says his belief that LIV\u2019s role should be to \u201ccomplete, not compete\u201d is stronger than ever.<\/p>\n
It is a significant change in tone, and perhaps the most revealing element of LIV 2.0. Because disrupting professional golf is one thing. Building a sustainable sports business is another.<\/p>\n
For four years, LIV had the luxury of thinking differently because its enormous backer could absorb the cost of doing so. That luxury is now gone. The next version must stand on its own feet. And that brings us to perhaps the most fascinating element of the proposed restructure: the players.<\/p>\n
LIV was created by an enormous sovereign wealth fund and built by offering players some of the biggest guarantees professional golf had ever seen. Now those same players are being offered the opportunity to become owners of what comes next. O\u2019Neil describes it as \u201cdeeper alignment between players and the league\u201d.<\/p>\n
That could ultimately prove to be LIV\u2019s most interesting experiment. If the players really do become owners, they will have something considerably more meaningful than a guaranteed contract riding on the league\u2019s success. They will have skin in the game. And that changes the equation.<\/p>\n
A player who is simply being paid to turn up can walk away when the cheque stops making sense. An owner has to think differently. He must care about the product, the audience, the teams, the commercial model and the value of the competition itself. Whether LIV can make that transition work remains one of the great unanswered questions.<\/p>\n
There is, however, no shortage of ambition in O\u2019Neil\u2019s vision. He wants LIV to continue across five continents, including Australia, expand to 75-player fields, introduce a cut and create new pathways into the league through mechanisms such as Monday qualifiers.<\/p>\n
Most revealing of all, perhaps, is where O\u2019Neil sees LIV fitting into the sport that it once set out to disrupt.<\/p>\n
\u201cI know that the next phase of LIV Golf will be an important part of a healthier global golf ecosystem,\u201d he wrote. \u201cIt will create more opportunity for players, bring elite golf to more parts of the world, and give teams and players a real stake in the future they are building.\u201d<\/p>\n
That is a very different proposition from the one LIV first presented. And perhaps that is the point. LIV 1.0 was built to challenge golf\u2019s establishment. LIV 2.0 must convince that establishment, and perhaps more importantly its own players and fans, that it has a legitimate place within it.<\/p>\n
WHAT IS LIV 2.0?<\/p>\n
First and foremost, the competitive product is changing. O\u2019Neil has given the clearest indication yet of what LIV 2.0 could look like in 2027.<\/p>\n
Fields are expected to expand to 75 players. Cuts will be introduced. New pathways into the league will be created, including Monday qualifying. National identities will be emphasised further, while the teams remain central.<\/p>\n
The proposed 75-player field creates a more open ecosystem. Instead of a relatively closed shop, aspiring players could have a defined route into the league. That could be important for the next generation. It could also be an admission that LIV needs more competitive tension if it is going to attract a broader audience.<\/p>\n
O\u2019Neil insists the music, culture and energy will remain. So will the team format. But the competitive product is evolving. And that evolution is being driven as much by economics as by sporting philosophy.<\/p>\n
The easiest interpretation is that LIV has failed. It spent billions, fractured professional golf, struggled to establish a conventional commercial model and has now sought bankruptcy protection less than five years after its arrival. There is truth in that. But it is not the whole story.<\/p>\n
LIV has also achieved things that seemed improbable before 2022. It attracted some of the world\u2019s best players. It established events in markets men\u2019s pro golf had rarely visited. It created a team-based professional golf product and developed a young audience that the traditional game has struggled to reach.<\/p>\n
O\u2019Neil points to fans 20 years younger than golf\u2019s traditional audience, the growth of social content and events across five continents. Some of those claims are difficult to quantify independently. But the league undeniably created a new audience proposition and forced the PGA Tour and its partners to rethink the economics and presentation of elite professional golf.<\/p>\n
The question now is whether any of that can survive without Saudi money. The Chapter 11 filing gives LIV time, while BC Partners potentially gives it capital. The players may give it ownership but none of those things guarantee success. The new league will have to operate with discipline, persuade its biggest names to stay, convince investors there is a commercial future and demonstrate that fans will continue to turn up when the novelty of the breakaway league has worn off.<\/p>\n
At the time of publication, LIV Golf survives. That is not the same thing as saying it has succeeded, nor is bankruptcy necessarily the death sentence its critics will portray it as. Chapter 11 is designed to give troubled companies a path to restructure and continue operating. LIV is attempting to use it precisely that way. The difference is that the next LIV will not have an unlimited cheque book sitting behind it. It will have investors expecting returns, players being asked to become owners and a golf audience that has already seen the original experiment. That makes LIV 2.0 a much more interesting proposition than LIV 1.0 ever was. The first version asked whether enough money could change professional golf. The second has a much harder question to answer.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Who\u2019s owed what
A list of creditors who have the 30 largest unsecured claims<\/p>\n
RankCreditorNature of claimStatusUnsecured claim ($US)1 Jon Rahm; Rahm, LLC Player Participation Agreement $7,472,527.472Bryson DeChambeau; BAD Enterprises, Inc.Player Participation AgreementC$5,769,230.773Dustin Johnson; Dustin Johnson Enterprises, Inc.Player Participation AgreementC\/U\/D$5,489,010.994Cameron Smith; Golf Dude Enterprises, LLCPlayer Participation Agreement$4,835,164.845Adrian MeronkPlayer Participation Agreement$4,436,813.196Tyrrell Hatton; Tyrell Hatton Golf LimitedPlayer Participation Agreement$3,373,626.377Gerry L WatsonPlayer Participation Agreement$3,324,389.108IMG Media LTD; IMG Singapore PTE Ltd; IMG Media Korea, LLCTrade Vendor$3,200,000.009Abraham Ancer; Abraham Ancer Golf, LLCPlayer Participation Agreement$2,651,098.9010Byeong Hun (Ben) An; BENA Golf, Inc.Player Participation Agreement$1,811,010.6811United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesGrant AgreementC$1,717,000.0012Brooks Koepka; Brooks Koepka Golf LLCAgreement$1,681,278.5413MDLBEAST CompanyTrade Vendor$1,645,707.5014Ming Entertainment GroupWorkforce Solutions$1,593,474.8415Havoc Live LLCTrade Vendor$1,462,512.8816Rick Shiels Media LimitedBrand Partnership Agreement$1,398,300.0017Caleb SurrattPlayer Participation Agreement$1,331,116.7618Joaquin Niemann; Joaquin Niemann, LLCPlayer Participation Agreement$1,307,692.3119GSE WorldwideTrade Vendor$1,287,500.0020State of LouisianaAgreement$1,220,000.0021Fresh Tape Media LLCTrade Vendor \/ LitigationC\/D$1,208,860.1522Asian Tour LtdAgreementC$1,018,542.732389 Blocks Holding LLC (dba EverWonder Studio)Trade Vendor$1,014,280.2624Lucas HerbertPlayer Participation Agreement$1,012,204.9525Fantasy Interactive, Inc.Trade Vendor \/ LitigationC\/D$992,870.7526Outlyr, LLCTrade Vendor$983,625.0027Thomas McKibbinPlayer Participation Agreement$973,109.8928World Golf Group Limited and Premier Golf LeagueLitigationC\/U\/D29Stonehill Estate Co.LitigationC\/U\/D30Kobalt Music Publishing America, Inc.; BMG Rights Management GmbH 2025; Concord Music Group, Inc.LitigationC\/U\/D<\/p>\n
Photographs by LIV Golf\/Mateo Villalba\/Chris Trotman<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The LIV Golf rollercoaster is hoping to take a new turn after filing for bankruptcy in September. Once…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":903086,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[566],"tags":[64,63,755,402997,85],"class_list":["post-903085","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-golf","tag-au","tag-australia","tag-golf","tag-october-2026","tag-sports"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/903085","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=903085"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/903085\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/903086"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=903085"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=903085"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/au\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=903085"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}