While much of the world recoiled at the Trump administration’s tariff ultimatums, Beijing pushed back and emerged from 2025 largely unscathed. The lessons were simple but consequential: Trump is now far more unrestrained, less predictable, and more willing to wield the U.S. economy as a weapon than during his first term. Yet even the sharpest U.S. pressure could be bent, blunted, and occasionally reversed.
Three lessons stand out. First, Trump’s maximalist threats rarely stick. Headline-grabbing tariffs, sanctions, and tech bans often yielded to market pressures, lobbying, or the president’s appetite for any deal he could call a victory. Second, China’s accelerated trade diversification gave it room to absorb U.S. pressure and avoid signaling weakness. Third, targeted retaliation against U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities and politically sensitive constituencies proved far more effective than broad counterstrikes.
While much of the world recoiled at the Trump administration’s tariff ultimatums, Beijing pushed back and emerged from 2025 largely unscathed. The lessons were simple but consequential: Trump is now far more unrestrained, less predictable, and more willing to wield the U.S. economy as a weapon than during his first term. Yet even the sharpest U.S. pressure could be bent, blunted, and occasionally reversed.
Three lessons stand out. First, Trump’s maximalist threats rarely stick. Headline-grabbing tariffs, sanctions, and tech bans often yielded to market pressures, lobbying, or the president’s appetite for any deal he could call a victory. Second, China’s accelerated trade diversification gave it room to absorb U.S. pressure and avoid signaling weakness. Third, targeted retaliation against U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities and politically sensitive constituencies proved far more effective than broad counterstrikes.
Even more revealing was China’s execution of a playbook refined during Trump’s first-term trade war and informed by nearly a decade of experience navigating U.S. export control regimes. Beijing has refined its own export control regime and tested it against Washington by restricting exports of critical minerals and other upstream inputs—not just symbolically but with teeth. The results confirmed what Chinese officials may have long suspected: The U.S. supply chain is brittle. Price spikes, manufacturer complaints, and lobbying pressure offered tangible proof. Trump’s reversal to allow shipments of Nvidia H200 chips to China was not goodwill; it was evidence that Beijing’s calibrated pressure has worked.
The United States’ latest National Security Strategy (NSS) reinforces this reading. Analysts noted its downgrading of geopolitical struggle, instead framing China primarily as an economic and technological competitor. The document does not promise détente, but it confirms the battlefield: economic and technological leverage—the very arena where China had just proven its hand.
This experience hardened another lesson: As the Trump administration approaches the midterm elections, the need to energize core supporters could make it even less institutionally anchored, more transactional, and more focused on short-term political wins. Trump may thus be even more susceptible to targeted pressure. He might be willing to make trade or regulatory concessions that benefit China—easing various tariffs, adjusting technology licensing rules, or allowing specific Chinese firms into U.S. markets—while framing the moves as victories: a successfully negotiated “deal,” a “win” on the trade deficit, or China stepping back from some of its retaliation. Even if Trump’s concessions do not immediately compromise core U.S. national security interests, they could create accumulated vulnerabilities that China may exploit over time.
Beijing’s posture for 2026 is clear. It will pursue narrow, transactional deals that allow Trump to claim victories while conceding little. It will deepen ties with Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Gulf states to dilute U.S. leverage and accelerate domestic technological autonomy. Volatility is now structural; even Trump’s planned April visit will not be able to repair the erosion of stability and trust. China does not expect détente, only time: time to test U.S. vulnerabilities, fortify its own system, and ensure that Washington’s coercions increasingly lose their bite. Patience, precision, and calibrated leverage have become Beijing’s defining arsenal of statecraft.