In the wake of the United States\u2019 capture of Venezuela\u2019s then-President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, questions have arisen over the country\u2019s democratic future. This brazen act of foreign intervention also raises further topics that are critical to Canada and the world order, including issues surrounding natural resource production, breaches of international law and principles of state sovereignty.<\/p>\n
In a statement following the United States\u2019 intervention, Prime Minister Mark Carney affirmed Canada\u2019s support for a peaceful, Venezuelan-led transition while calling on all parties to respect international law. Yet the potential implications for Canada are significant. Venezuela possesses the world\u2019s largest crude oil reserves, leading to concerns that Canadian crude may be threatened if Venezuelan production increases. Further, given President Donald Trump\u2019s repeated \u2018suggestion\u2019 that Canada become the 51st state, the operation in Venezuela heightens concerns about the United States\u2019 intentions for Canada and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Trump\u2019s remarks about \u201crunning\u201d Venezuela<\/a> post-Maduro further complicate the picture, and widespread confusion remains surrounding the fate of Venezuela and a world in which the United States is a dominant actor.<\/p>\n The Ubyssey spoke with Dr. Maxwell A. Cameron for his insights on the situation in Venezuela and its impact on Canada. Cameron specializes in comparative Latin American politics and is jointly appointed to the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs and department of political science at UBC. He has been a touchstone for media sources in light of political unrest in Venezuela.<\/p>\n Here\u2019s what he had to say \u2014 edited for length and clarity.<\/p>\n What is the significance of the United States\u2019 intervention in Venezuela\u2019s affairs? How does it affect how we understand sovereignty in 2026?<\/p>\n The intervention in Venezuela really only makes sense in the context of the recent national security strategy document released by the Trump administration, calling itself the \u201cTrump Corollary\u201d of the Monroe Doctrine. Going back to the beginning of the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine has been a source of irritation for many Latin American countries precisely because it doesn’t respect the principle of equal sovereignty.<\/p>\n It sets the United States up as the country that can police and intervene in the affairs of other countries in the Western Hemisphere to protect its own interests. So the intervention in Venezuela is a return to the past in an unfortunate way \u2014 it\u2019s a return to a world of spheres of influence in which the United States positions itself as the dominant player in the hemisphere. You can’t have a dominant player and equal sovereignty at the same time.<\/p>\n What do you think the implications are of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro\u2019s former vice president, Delcy Rodr\u00edguez, assuming the role of interim president rather than opposition leader Mar\u00eda Corina Machado?<\/p>\n Well, for me, there were several surprises in this military operation that led to Maduro being kidnapped. Perhaps the biggest surprise was the decision to leave Rodr\u00edguez in office as a substitute for Maduro, as opposed to insisting on regime change. You might have imagined that Trump would have attempted to install Machado, who is by far the most popular democratic politician in Venezuela. Yet Trump essentially threw her under the bus in the press conference on the day of the intervention and embraced Rodr\u00edguez.<\/p>\n I think the reason for doing this was based on the fear that if you tried to topple the Maduro regime, there would be real instability in Venezuela. This decision reinforces that what Trump cares about above all else is stability, American primacy and access to resources.<\/p>\n The United States has intervened in Latin American politics before (Panama in 1989, Chile in 1973). How does the current situation compare to these?<\/p>\n In 1973, the United States deposed a democratically-elected president in Chile and then installed a military dictatorship that lasted for 17 years. In some respects, what has happened in Venezuela resembles a coup more than an invasion. They didn’t go in and establish a military presence. They went in and removed the leader, and that’s what happens in a coup. So it was a bit as if it were a coup, but it was executed by the United States military. It’s a very anomalous kind of situation.<\/p>\n I think that the closer precedent is Panama. While I do believe that the United States was guided by the belief that it could do something in Venezuela like what it did in Panama, I think it\u2019s important to also recognize the fundamental differences between the two countries. Venezuela is a much bigger, more complicated country with an entrenched regime that is clearly hostile to the United States. In the case of Panama, they had a dictator who the United States alleged was involved in drug trafficking. They had a military presence on the ground around the Canal Zone and were able to extract him with minimal loss of life to civilians and others. In the case of Venezuela, a much more forceful but briefer intervention was required. And now the question is: Panama, subsequent to the overthrow of Noriega, became more democratic. What will happen in Venezuela? That we just don’t know.<\/p>\n Venezuela has the world\u2019s largest crude oil reserves, according to 2023 data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Donald Trump has spoken about taking control of the country\u2019s oil and recruiting American companies to invest in its industry. How do you think the United States\u2019 interests in these reserves will impact Canada\u2019s economy?<\/p>\n I don\u2019t think that there will be any immediate impact due to the significant time it will take to rebuild Venezuela\u2019s petroleum sector. This is a badly eroded industry \u2014 the level of production is very, very low. It’s going to take massive infusions of new capital to get the country back up to the level of production that it was at a couple of decades ago.<\/p>\n It\u2019s true that Venezuelan crude is heavy, like Canadian oil sands crude, which also requires a lot of refining. Ultimately, it could compete with Canada, but we’re talking about five, 10, 15 years down the road.<\/p>\n Some of the messaging we\u2019re hearing from Canada about how this points to the urgency of pipelines is a little bit tendentious. People are jumping on the prospect of Venezuela\u2019s oil coming back online as being a threat to Canadian competitiveness, leaving quite apart the whole question of whether we should be leaving the oil in the ground. I don’t see this as being an immediate threat.<\/p>\n