{"id":821117,"date":"2026-07-23T15:55:11","date_gmt":"2026-07-23T15:55:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/821117\/"},"modified":"2026-07-23T15:55:11","modified_gmt":"2026-07-23T15:55:11","slug":"explainer-chery-chinese-evs-and-the-future-of-auto-investment-in-canada","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/821117\/","title":{"rendered":"Explainer: Chery, Chinese EVs, and the Future of Auto Investment in Canada"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Vina Nadjibulla and<\/a> Elizabeth Donkervoort<\/a><\/p>\n

This piece is part of our Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada Series on Chinese EV Investment<\/a>.<\/p>\n

July 22, 2026<\/p>\n

Chery Automobile has become one of China\u2019s most important global automakers. Less well known in North America than\u00a0BYD<\/a> or Geely, Chery has nevertheless spent more than two decades building an export-oriented business across emerging and developed markets.<\/p>\n

The company\u2019s growing interest in Canada therefore presents both an opportunity and a policy challenge. For Canadian consumers, Chery could offer more affordable vehicles across the internal-combustion, hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and electric-vehicle (EV) spectrum. For Canada\u2019s automotive sector, a Chery investment could make use of existing industrial capacity, create jobs, support after-sales service skills and potentially contribute to supplier development.<\/p>\n

But Chery\u2019s business model raises questions that go well beyond market entry. Canadian policymakers must ask not only whether Chery should be permitted to invest, but what Canada wants from such an investment: lower-cost vehicles, revived plant capacity, supplier development, after-sales skills, technology access, or a stronger position in the next automotive economy. The harder question is whether Chery is willing and able, under Chinese law and its own commercial model, to provide these benefits for Canada.<\/p>\n

What is Chery?<\/p>\n

Chery Automobile Co., Ltd. is a Chinese car manufacturer headquartered in Wuhu, Anhui province,\u00a0with\u00a0150<\/a> subsidiaries worldwide.\u00a0Founded in 1997, it was one of China\u2019s earliest domestically owned automakers and has had global ambitions from the beginning.<\/p>\n

Unlike BYD, which is best understood as an integrated battery, clean-technology, and mobility company, Chery is an export-led automaker moving through the transition from internal-combustion engine (ICE) vehicles to hybrids and EVs. Its exports remain heavily weighted toward internal-combustion vehicles, but through its\u00a0Yaoguang 2025 strategy<\/a>, Chery is investing heavily in electrification, software, artificial intelligence, robotics, and advanced manufacturing.<\/p>\n

Chery\u00a0says<\/a> it has been China\u2019s largest automobile exporter for more than two decades. In 2025, it reported more than 1.3 million vehicle exports and strong growth in new-energy vehicle (NEV) sales. This export orientation distinguishes Chery from some Chinese competitors that built scale primarily in the domestic market before expanding abroad.<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s relevance to Canada is therefore different from BYD\u2019s. BYD represents the cutting edge of China\u2019s battery-electric vehicle and battery-manufacturing ecosystem. Chery represents something more hybrid: a large-scale global exporter with experience entering difficult overseas markets, reviving or using legacy industrial capacity, and building a broader technology ecosystem that spans vehicles, software, AI, and robotics.<\/p>\n

Who owns Chery?<\/p>\n

Chery characterizes itself as a non-state-owned enterprise.\u00a0However, its largest shareholder is\u00a0Wuhu Investment Holding<\/a>,\u00a0which is\u00a0owned\u00a0almost entirely\u00a0by Wuhu Prefecture\u2019s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. (1)\u00a0This\u00a0pattern\u00a0of state-backed connections\u00a0repeats across\u00a0other\u00a0shareholders,\u00a0which\u00a0include\u00a0a large number\u00a0of companies wholly owned by other municipal\u00a0assets\u00a0or financial bureaus.<\/p>\n

For Canadian policymakers, the key issue is not simply whether Chery is \u201cprivate\u201d or \u201cstate-owned.\u201d It is how much independence the company would have in a Canadian partnership, how decisions would be made, where intellectual property would reside, and how Chinese laws and regulatory approvals would affect technology transfer, data governance, and commercial operations.<\/p>\n

How did Chery become an auto-manufacturing leader?<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s rise reflects three interrelated factors: technology acquisition and development, an early global focus, and strategic adaptability.<\/p>\n

Technology acquisition and development<\/p>\n

Since\u00a0its\u00a0founding, Chery has aggressively pursued technology transfer and\u00a0know-how\u00a0to strengthen its products. It was the first Chinese manufacturer to develop\u00a0a fully domestic engine<\/a>\u00a0in 1999\u00a0and among the first to integrate in-car voice activation\u00a0in 2001,\u00a0notable at the time<\/a>\u00a0for a low-cost vehicle like the Chery QQ.<\/p>\n

However, its technology ambitions were not without controversy. General Motors\u00a0sued<\/a> Chery in 2004 over claims that the Chery QQ copied the design of the Chevrolet Spark. One year later,\u00a0the companies settled the lawsuit without disclosing the terms of their agreement.<\/p>\n

More recently, Chery has deepened partnerships with Chinese technology companies including Huawei, ZTE, Horizon Robotics, and iFLYTEK.\u00a0Chery\u00a0also\u00a0invests heavily in its own R&D\u00a0with\u00a0centres\u00a0located<\/a>\u00a0in\u00a0Brazil, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, and Spain, as well as\u00a0establishing\u00a0separate research institutions, such as\u00a0Nextai<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0MOJIA Robotics<\/a>.<\/p>\n

These investments are intended to strengthen Chery\u2019s full production stack: design, software, automation, manufacturing, and user experience. They also move Chery beyond being a conventional automaker toward a broader mobility and technology company.<\/p>\n

While\u00a0domestic competitors prioritized volume at home, a central tenet of Chery\u2019s original strategy was producing domestic products for global export. Chery pursued Russia, the Middle East, South America, Southeast Asia, and Africa \u2014 with\u00a0first exports to Syria in 2002<\/a>.<\/p>\n

That early global footprint\u00a0likely provided\u00a0a meaningful cushion\u00a0as the domestic market heated up\u00a0in\u00a0the 2010s and Chery shed assets to stay competitive, while its export revenue helped offset some of the pressure.\u00a0This\u00a0same\u00a0global\u00a0footprint\u00a0likely\u00a0also\u00a0helps\u00a0Chery accelerate its expansion\u00a0efforts in the area of NEVs, which began\u00a0in the early 2020s.<\/p>\n

Chery has also shown an ability to regroup when strategies stop working. In the 2010s, facing domestic competition and brand-quality concerns, it consolidated its brand strategy, focused more on product quality, and\u00a0brought in external investment and joint ventures to\u00a0strengthen corporate governance<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The same adaptability is visible in its overseas strategy. Chery\u2019s model has evolved from simply \u201cgoing out\u201d through exports to\u00a0\u201cgoing in<\/a>\u201d\u00a0through local partners, dealer networks, assembly operations, after-sales service, and, in some cases, local manufacturing.\u00a0While still in early days, this willingness to change and adapt\u00a0appears to lead to\u00a0positive traction in new markets.<\/p>\n

For Canada, this strategic adaptability is both an asset and a risk. Chery may be more willing than some competitors to adapt to local requirements. But Canada would need to define those requirements clearly. Otherwise, Chery\u2019s adaptation may serve its own market-entry strategy more than Canada\u2019s industrial objectives.<\/p>\n

How does Chery approach international partnerships?<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s international playbook has been refined over two decades. The sequence varies by market, but several patterns are clear.<\/p>\n

Chery often uses exports to build brand recognition and test demand. In emerging markets, it has tended to enter directly or through local distributors. In more mature markets, it often relies on established dealers, importers, or local partners before making larger commitments.<\/p>\n

Chery also targets underutilized legacy capacity rather than relying on greenfield investment.\u00a0Its Spanish joint venture with\u00a0Ebro,<\/a> based at a\u00a0former Nissan plant, began operations in 2024. At the opening of the plant in April 2026, Chery announced it operates in\u00a018 European markets<\/a>.\u00a0Chery also\u00a0acquired\u00a0another\u00a0former Nissan plant in\u00a0South Africa<\/a>\u00a0with production targeted for end of 2027, manufacturing ICE vehicles and potentially NEVs for African and European export.\u00a0In the U.K., it\u00a0plans to\u00a0open an R&D\u00a0centre\u00a0in\u00a0Liverpool<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0has\u00a0signed a\u00a0non-binding agreement with\u00a0Nissan<\/a>\u00a0to use its Sunderland plant in northeast England.<\/p>\n

This approach gives Chery political appeal. Governments facing plant closures, industrial underuse, or pressure to preserve automotive jobs may see Chery as a route to restarting production. But it also means the benefits depend heavily on the terms of the deal: employment guarantees, production volumes, supplier integration, local-content requirements, R&D commitments, and export-market access.<\/p>\n

Canada appears to be following the early-stage version of this pattern. After Prime Minister Mark Carney\u2019s\u00a0agreement<\/a> with China allowing a limited number of Chinese-built EVs into Canada at a reduced tariff rate, Chery moved quickly to explore dealership relationships.\u00a0It has also filed Canadian trademark applications for several brands, including\u00a0Omoda<\/a>,\u00a0Jaecoo,<\/a> and\u00a0Jetour<\/a>. Chery executives have indicated that sales could begin in\u00a0late<\/a> 2026, subject to regulatory approvals. About 20 Canadian dealers<\/a> attended the unveiling of the Freelander 8, an electrified SUV developed by Chery and its joint-venture partner Jaguar Land Rover.<\/p>\n

What can Canada learn from Chery\u2019s experience abroad?<\/p>\n

Spain: restarting legacy capacity<\/p>\n

Spain is the clearest example of Chery using an existing industrial asset to support its European expansion. In April 2024, Chery and Spain\u2019s Ebro-EV Motors\u00a0signed<\/a> an agreement to produce vehicles at the former Nissan plant in Barcelona\u2019s Zona Franca, a site that had become a symbol of industrial loss after Nissan ended production there. The deal was\u00a0presented<\/a> by Spanish authorities as a reindustrialization project: a way to bring production back, recover jobs, and position Spain as an important base for Chinese EV manufacturing in Europe.<\/p>\n

However, early production has centred on Ebro-branded SUVs using a Chery-shared platform and technology, with initial assembly relying on semi-assembled vehicles\u00a0shipped<\/a> from China. Chery\u2019s own production at the Barcelona plant has also faced\u00a0delays<\/a>, with commercial considerations and the EU tariff environment for Chinese-made EVs cited as factors. The project carries ambitious\u00a0targets<\/a> \u2014 including 50,000 vehicles by 2027, 150,000 by 2029, and roughly 1,250 jobs \u2014 but those production, employment, and localization commitments will take years to verify.<\/p>\n

For Canada, the lesson is clear: restarting a plant could be valuable, but it is not enough. Ottawa would need to know whether a Chery-backed facility would assemble imported kits or manufacture major components; whether it would integrate Canadian suppliers or depend on Chinese inputs; whether Canadian workers would gain durable skills or only limited assembly work; and whether Canadian partners would gain any control over engineering, software, batteries, intellectual property, or export rights. Reindustrialization should mean more than putting a closed plant back into use. It should build capabilities Canada can retain.<\/p>\n

Brazil: partnership does not guarantee durability<\/p>\n

Brazil offers a cautionary example. In 2017, Chery entered into a\u00a0partnership<\/a> with CAOA, a major Brazilian automotive distribution and manufacturing group, creating CAOA Chery and presenting the venture as a Brazilian automaker with Chinese partnership. The arrangement helped strengthen Chery\u2019s local brand presence and sales network, and the partnership produced a range of vehicles for the Brazilian market.<\/p>\n

However, the limits of local partnership became clear at Chery\u2019s manufacturing base in Jacare\u00ed, in S\u00e3o Paulo state. Originally opened by Chery in 2014 and later operated under CAOA Chery, the plant\u00a0suspended<\/a> production in 2022.\u00a0The company said the pause was intended to modernize the facility and prepare it for hybrid and EV production by 2025.\u00a0But the suspension generated significant labour uncertainty, with hundreds of workers affected and the union describing the move as effectively a closure. As of now, the promised restart has not materialized. Brazilian\u00a0reporting<\/a> described the plant as idle and politically contested, with local authorities pressing for a concrete plan to resume production or repurpose the site.<\/p>\n

What Canada can take from Brazil\u2019s experience is that local partnership language does not guarantee durable production, stable employment, or successful technology transition. If Canada were to consider a Chery-backed investment, Ottawa would need enforceable commitments on production timelines, employment retention, supplier integration, technology access, and plant-continuity obligations.<\/p>\n

South Africa: takeover of a struggling plant<\/p>\n

South Africa provides the most recent example of Chery taking over underused legacy capacity. Nissan\u00a0announced<\/a> in January 2026 that it would sell its Rosslyn manufacturing assets to Chery\u2019s South African arm. Earlier this month, Chery formally\u00a0took over<\/a> the plant, committed to retaining its 692 existing employees, and said it would invest in upgrades and new machinery before beginning production in mid-2027. It has also said it wants to develop South Africa as an African hub for manufacturing, exports, R&D, and regional operations, with Rosslyn becoming a broader auto centre that includes R&D, supply-chain operations, and training. Chery has launched a localization program aimed at moving toward 40 per cent local content in the initial stage.<\/p>\n

The deal shows how Chery can turn market entry into a deeper local presence. Four years after re-entering South Africa, Chery had become\u00a0a top-10 player<\/a> in local sales, with an expanding dealer network. The Rosslyn takeover gives it a manufacturing foothold to support that growth and potentially serve broader African and export markets. However, the extent to which local manufacturing will lift the broader South African component industry remains an open question. While Chery committed to\u00a040 per cent<\/a> local value-added by 2028, at the same time key EV and intelligent-system components will still be sourced from Chinese suppliers.<\/p>\n

For Canada, this is the most relevant lesson. A Chery investment could potentially revive or repurpose existing automotive capacity, but the value would depend on whether Canada secures measurable commitments: employment retention, local-content targets, Canadian supplier integration, workforce training, R&D activity, export plans, and accountability if commitments are missed. South Africa shows what should be negotiated up front and what will still need to be verified over time.<\/p>\n

Does Chery transfer technology to overseas partners?<\/p>\n

The evidence to date suggests that Chery\u2019s overseas partnerships are more likely to provide operational know-how than independent technological capability.<\/p>\n

The Tata Motors example in India illustrates the distinction.\u00a0Despite early\u00a0reports suggesting<\/a>\u00a0the agreement would include platform-level technology transfer, both Chery and Tata moved\u00a0quickly to deny<\/a>\u00a0this claim. This was likely a response calibrated\u00a0to satisfy Chinese regulatory requirements, which in recent years have significantly tightened restrictions on outbound technology transfer across automotive and related sectors.<\/p>\n

What Tata\u2019s team described gaining was\u00a0operational rather than proprietary<\/a>: factory and production-line layouts, technology roadmaps, and access to Chery\u2019s supplier network. The distinction is material \u2014 process visibility is not platform IP.<\/p>\n

For Canada, this distinction is central. A Canadian company could be the majority owner of a local venture and still remain technologically dependent on Chery. Chery could continue to control the platform, software, battery architecture, engineering specifications, brand, and high-value components.<\/p>\n

What could Chery investment realistically offer Canada?<\/p>\n

Chery\u00a0operates\u00a0across the full ICE-to-NEV spectrum while simultaneously pursuing deployable frontier technologies. Collaboration with the company therefore\u00a0presents\u00a0opportunities\u00a0that could expand well beyond strengthening Canada\u2019s\u00a0auto-sector.\u00a0However, this\u00a0breadth\u00a0also creates\u00a0acute risks. The technology dimensions in particular move fast and deploy into consequential domains, raising concerns that extend well beyond the EV sector and that Canadian frameworks are not yet in place to address. The four areas below map both sides of that equation.<\/p>\n

R&D, AI, and robotics<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s technology ambitions extend well beyond automobiles.\u00a0Some\u00a0jokingly refer to Chery as\u00a0a robotics company\u00a0making cars on the side<\/a>.\u00a0The company is also taking AI seriously and pursuing\u00a0AI integration into all levels of its operations.\u00a0It is aggressively investing in AI research through its R&D centres and independent research institutes.\u00a0At its January 2026 \u201cAI Night,\u201d Chery framed this as the\u00a0inevitable extension<\/a>\u00a0of a unified technology base, grouping vehicle innovation and humanoid robotics together across its nine priority research domains.<\/p>\n

That convergence is already\u00a0happening through ventures such as\u00a0AiMOGA Robotics\u00a0\u2014 described as Chery\u2019s \u201csecret weapon<\/a>\u201d for the future.\u00a0AiMOGA deployed the\u00a0first purpose-built<\/a> humanoid in its policing line in Wuhu, where it acts as a traffic officer. The company frames this as the next stage in its\u00a0robotics family<\/a>, alongside its humanoid robot\u00a0deployed\u00a0in more than\u00a030 countries. <\/a>In 2025, AiMOGA began\u00a0selling humanoid robots<\/a>\u00a0and robot dogs to consumers, built on technology shared with\u00a0Chery\u2019s\u00a0vehicle platforms.<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s AI and robotics ambitions show why Chinese automotive investment can no longer be treated as a narrow auto-sector question. The same data, software, sensors, and AI systems that power connected vehicles can also support robotics, public-service applications, industrial automation, and surveillance-relevant technologies.<\/p>\n

While joint R&D could benefit Canadian researchers and help address the adoption gap\u00a0identified\u00a0in Canada\u2019s\u00a0AI strategy<\/a>, it raises critical concerns: ownership of intellectual property and research outcomes, data protection, and \u2014 most acutely \u2014 how that research is deployed. As Chery\u2019s traffic-police deployment illustrates, applications can scale quickly into domains where Canadian and Chinese regulatory values diverge sharply, compounding the already significant challenge of governing AI and emerging technologies.<\/p>\n

Industrial development<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s willingness to use underutilized plants could be attractive to Canada. It may offer a way to preserve automotive employment, use existing facilities, and attract new production at a time when Canada\u2019s automotive sector faces intense competitive pressures. However, the quality of that industrial development would depend on the scope of the operation.<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s overseas operations have delivered some production line improvements, which could\u00a0benefit\u00a0Canada\u2019s\u00a0auto industry. But job creation has been much more mixed. In proposals to Australia, Chery has\u00a0indicated\u00a0that any manufacturing\u00a0plant it might\u00a0establish\u00a0would be largely\u00a0robotics-driven<\/a>, which significantly limits employment upside.<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s\u00a0express\u00a0commitment to localize supply chains\u00a0could\u00a0benefit\u00a0Canadian suppliers \u2014 but two decades of overseas operations offer limited evidence it happens in practice.<\/p>\n

The bar set by others in the same market makes the gap more striking. Chery entered Egypt in 2005 \u2014 a gateway to African markets \u2014 and opened two manufacturing plants in the mid-2010s, yet its own website still describes vehicles like the\u00a0Tiggo\u00a04 Pro as being \u201cassembled\u201d in Egypt, pointing to continued reliance on imported parts. Other manufacturers\u00a0operating\u00a0in Egypt have\u00a0reported\u00a0achieved localization rates of up to\u00a050 per cent<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Production presence does not automatically mean supply chain integration, and supply chain integration does not automatically mean jobs at scale.<\/p>\n

After-sales service<\/p>\n

While Chery\u2019s playbook does not include\u00a0any substantive\u00a0technology transfer, after-sales service is one\u00a0potential\u00a0area\u00a0for\u00a0knowledge-sharing\u00a0that is\u00a0in Chery\u2019s interest. It is a priority on two levels:\u00a0commercially<\/a>, as part of Chery\u2019s effort to build\u00a0its\u00a0brand\u00a0image\u00a0by improving servicing of its vehicles; and\u00a0politically<\/a>\u00a0as Beijing has recognized after-sales\u00a0servicing\u00a0as a key risk for Chinese EV companies.<\/p>\n

The scarcity of\u00a0EV servicing skills\u00a0is a challenge shared across\u00a0China and overseas markets.\u00a0Despite leading the world in EV sales, China faces a talent shortfall of over\u00a0one million EV service workers<\/a>, with 80 per cent of the gap in after-sales services.\u00a0Chery is already training overseas technicians and in 2026 launched its\u00a05th Global After-Sales Skills Competition<\/a>, running technicians through national, regional, and global rounds culminating at the Chery Super Factory in Wuhu.<\/p>\n

Canada has a leapfrog opportunity \u2014 building EV servicing capacity alongside Chinese workers at a moment when both countries are figuring this out together.<\/p>\n

Affordability and product-market fit\u00a0<\/p>\n

Chery could offer Canadian consumers more affordable vehicles across a range of propulsion systems, including hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and EVs.\u00a0Chery\u2019s position in the ICE-to-NEV transition\u00a0may\u00a0be better aligned with Canadian infrastructure realities than NEV-first competitors like BYD. ICE vehicles still account for 58.1 per cent of Chery\u2019s revenue,\u00a0and its\u00a0expanding\u00a0hybrid lineup<\/a>\u00a0offers a credible\u00a0on-ramp\u00a0for consumers in markets where charging infrastructure\u00a0remains\u00a0underdeveloped.<\/p>\n

What safeguards must be in place before considering Chery investment?<\/p>\n

The four safeguards identified in our previous analysis<\/a> of BYD remain the baseline for any Chinese automotive investment in Canada: business structure and market viability, labour standards, privacy and data protection, and civil-rights protections. Chery\u2019s model adds further considerations around legacy plant use, after-sales service and frontier technologies.<\/p>\n

R&D\u00a0and data governance\u00a0<\/p>\n

Chery\u2019s\u00a0business model,\u00a0operating\u00a0across the full technology stack \u2014 from vehicle platforms to deployable frontier AI \u2014\u00a0illustrates\u00a0how\u00a0EV\u00a0collaborations\u00a0could\u00a0have\u00a0consequences well beyond the automotive sector, necessitating\u00a0additional\u00a0safeguards that should be considered for any collaboration.\u00a0In particular,\u00a0Chery\u2019s\u00a0strategy of\u00a0sharing\u00a0technology<\/a>\u00a0across vehicles\u00a0and\u00a0frontier\u00a0AI applications, in particular\u00a0robotics,\u00a0presents potential challenges\u00a0extending beyond the EV sector.<\/p>\n

Two issues demand particular attention:<\/p>\n

Digital sovereignty:\u00a0Ensuring Canadian data is stored in Canada and governed\u00a0in accordance with\u00a0Canadian values and laws.
\nDeployment\u00a0risk:\u00a0Canada\u2019s\u00a0AI Strategy<\/a>\u00a0currently focuses on tracking\u00a0emerging\u00a0risks and evaluating models; it must move faster and further to grapple with technologies already in the field.\u00a0\u00a0Chery\u2019s\u00a0Xiaoqi assistant<\/a>, for instance, is designed with interactive, human-like memory frameworks capable of reading human emotions. The volume of data it will collect, and the inferences it\u00a0could\u00a0draw, raise questions about use that go well beyond what existing frameworks were built to answer.<\/p>\n

After-sales services<\/p>\n

Servicing vehicles requires access to how they are built and the data they generate \u2014 an opening for Canadian job creation and skills development that maps directly onto the shared challenge\u00a0identified\u00a0above. But that access may not come voluntarily. Australia had to compel Chinese EV companies \u2014 including BYD,\u00a0Zeekr, XPeng, Smart, and\u00a0Leapmotor\u00a0\u2014 to\u00a0comply with\u00a0its\u00a0Motor Vehicle Service and Repair Information Sharing Scheme Act 2021<\/a>\u00a0before independent repair shops could access the technical information they needed.<\/p>\n

Canada\u2019s 2024 Copyright Act\u00a0amendments<\/a>\u00a0are a start but fall well short of\u00a0Australia\u2019s\u00a0comprehensive\u00a0framework\u00a0on after-sales servicing. Closing that gap \u2014 through\u00a0specifications\u00a0on\u00a0information access\u00a0standards,\u00a0pricing parity,\u00a0and\u00a0bundling prohibitions\u00a0\u2014 is the regulatory condition\u00a0Canada\u00a0would need to turn the leapfrog opportunity into reality.<\/p>\n

(1) According to\u00a0Chery\u2019s 2025 IPO filings<\/a>, Wuhu Investment Holding is 95.59 per cent owned by Wuhu SASAC and 4.41 per cent owned by the Anhui Provincial Department of Finance. SASACs were established in the early 2000s to\u00a0oversee and manage<\/a> state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China and represent the government on their boards.<\/p>\n

Policy Contributing Writer Vina Nadjibulla<\/a> is Vice President of Research & Strategy at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.<\/p>\n

Elizabeth Donkervoort is the Senior Advisor, China Programs for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"By Vina Nadjibulla and Elizabeth Donkervoort This piece is part of our Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada Series…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":821118,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[49,48,44],"class_list":["post-821117","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-canada","tag-ca","tag-canada","tag-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/821117","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=821117"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/821117\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/821118"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=821117"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=821117"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=821117"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}