The targets set under the plan will determine whether China is able to get back on track for its 2030 climate commitments<\/a>, which were made personally by President Xi Jinping in 2021.<\/p>\n This would require energy sector carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to fall by 2-6% by 2030, much more than implied by the 2035 target<\/a> of a 7-10% cut from \u201cpeak levels\u201d.<\/p>\n \u4e0a\u5fae\u4fe1\u5173\u6ce8\u300a\u78b3\u7b80\u62a5\u300b<\/p>\n \t\t The next five-year plan will set the timing and the level of this emissions peak, as well as whether emissions will be allowed to rebound in the short term.<\/p>\n The plan will also affect the pace of clean-energy growth, which has repeatedly beaten previous targets and has become a key driver<\/a> of the nation\u2019s economy.<\/p>\n Some 250-350 gigawatts (GW) of new wind and solar would be needed each year to meet China\u2019s 2030 commitments, far above the 200GW being targeted.<\/p>\n Finally, the plans will shape China\u2019s transition away from fossil fuels, with key sectors now openly discussing peak years for coal and oil demand, but with 330GW of new coal capacity in the works and more than 500 new chemical industry projects due in the next five years.<\/p>\n These issues come together in five key questions for climate and energy that Chinese policymakers will need to answer in the final five-year plan documents next year.<\/p>\n Five-year plans and their role in China<\/a><\/p>\n 1. Will the plan put China back on track for its 2030 Paris pledge?<\/a><\/p>\n 2. Will the plan upgrade clean-energy targets or pave the way to exceed them?<\/a><\/p>\n 3. Will the plan set an absolute cap on coal consumption?<\/a><\/p>\n 4. Will \u2018dual control\u2019 of carbon prevent an emission rebound?<\/a><\/p>\n 5. Will it limit coal-power and chemical-industry growth?<\/a><\/p>\n Conclusions<\/a><\/p>\n Five-year plans and their role in China<\/p>\n Five-year plans are an essential part of China\u2019s policymaking, guiding decision-making at government bodies, enterprises and banks. The upcoming 15th five-year plan will cover the years 2026-30, set targets for 2030 and use 2025 as its base year.<\/p>\n The top-level five-year plan\u00a0will be published in March 2026 and is known as the five-year plan on economic and social development. This overarching document will be followed by dozens of sectoral plans, as well as province- and company-level plans.<\/p>\n The sectoral plans are usually published in the second year of the five-year period, meaning they would be expected in 2027.<\/p>\n There will be five-year plans for the energy sector, the electricity sector, for renewable energy, nuclear, coal and many other sub-sectors, as well as plans for major industrial sectors such as steel, construction materials and chemicals.<\/p>\n It is likely that there will also be a plan for carbon emissions or carbon peaking and a five-year plan for the environment.<\/p>\n During the previous five-year period, the plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises for very large-scale solar and wind projects were particularly important<\/a>, far exceeding the central government\u2019s targets.<\/p>\n The five-year plans create incentives for provincial governments and ministries by setting quantified targets that they are responsible for meeting. These targets influence the performance evaluations of governors, CEOs and party secretaries.<\/p>\n The plans also designate favoured sectors and projects, directing bank lending, easing permitting and providing an implicit government guarantee for the project developers.<\/p>\n Each plan lists numerous things that should be \u201cpromoted\u201d, banned or controlled, leaving the precise implementation to different state organs and state-owned enterprises.<\/p>\n Five-year plans can introduce and coordinate national mega-projects, such as the gigantic clean-energy \u201cbases<\/a>\u201d and associated electricity transmission infrastructure, which were outlined in the previous five-year plan in 2021.<\/p>\n The plans also function as a policy roadmap, assigning the tasks to develop new policies and providing stakeholders with visibility to expected policy developments.<\/p>\n 1. Will the plan put China back on track for its 2030 Paris pledge?<\/p>\n Reducing carbon intensity \u2013 the energy-sector carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per unit of GDP\u00a0\u2013 has been the cornerstone of China\u2019s climate commitments since the 2020 target announced at<\/a> the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference.<\/p>\n Consequently, the last three five-year plans have included a carbon-intensity target. The next 15th one is highly likely to set a carbon-intensity target too, given that this is the centerpiece of China\u2019s 2030 climate targets.<\/p>\n Moreover, it was president Xi himself who pledged<\/a> in 2021 that China would reduce its carbon intensity to 65% below 2005 levels by 2030. This was later formalised<\/a> in China\u2019s 2030 \u201cnationally determined contribution<\/a>\u201d (NDC) under the Paris Agreement<\/a>.<\/p>\n Xi also pledged that China would gradually reduce coal consumption during the five-year period up to 2030. However, China is significantly off track<\/a> to these targets.<\/p>\n China\u2019s CO2 emissions grew more quickly in the early 2020s than they had been before the Coronavirus pandemic, as shown in the figure below. This stems from a surge in energy consumption during and after the \u201czero-Covid\u201d period, together with a rapid expansion of coal-fired power and the fossil-fuel based chemical industry. as shown in the figure below.<\/p>\n As a result, meeting the 2030 intensity target would require a reduction in CO2 emissions from current levels, with the level of the drop depending on the rate of economic growth.<\/p>\n Xi\u2019s personal imprimatur would make missing these 2030 targets awkward for China, particularly given the country\u2019s carefully cultivated<\/a> reputation for delivery. On the other hand, meeting them would require much stronger action than initially anticipated.<\/p>\n Recent policy documents and statements, in particular the recommendations<\/a> of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the next five-year plan, and the government\u2019s work report<\/a> for 2025, have put the emphasis on China\u2019s target to peak emissions before 2030 and the new 2035 emission target, which would still allow emissions to increase over the next five-year period. The earlier 2030 commitments risk being buried as inconvenient.<\/p>\n Still, the State Council\u2019s plan<\/a> for controlling carbon emissions, published in 2024, says that carbon intensity will be a \u201cbinding indicator\u201d for the next five-year period, meaning that a target will be included in the top-level plan published in March 2026.<\/p>\n China is only set to achieve a reduction of about 12% in carbon intensity from 2020 to 2025\u00a0\u2013 a marked slowdown relative to previous periods, as shown in the figure below.<\/p>\n (This is based on reductions reported annually by the National Bureau of Statistics until 2024 and a projected small increase<\/a> in energy-sector CO2 emissions in 2025. Total CO2 emissions could still fall this year, when the fall in process emissions from cement production is factored in.)<\/p>\n A 12% fall would be far less than the 18% reduction targeted under the 14th five-year plan, as well as falling short of what would be needed to stay on track to the 2030 target.<\/p>\n To make up the shortfall and meet the 2030 intensity target, China would need to set a goal of around 23% in the next five-year plan. As such, this target will be a key test of China\u2019s determination to honour its climate commitments.<\/p>\n A carbon-intensity target of 23% is likely to receive pushback from some policymakers, as it is much higher than achieved in previous periods. No government or thinktank documents have yet been published with estimates of what the 2030 intensity target would need to be.<\/p>\n In practice, meeting the 2030 carbon intensity target would require reducing CO2 emissions by 2-6% in absolute terms from 2025, assuming a GDP growth rate of 4.2-5.0%.<\/p>\n China needs<\/a> 4.2% GDP growth over the next decade to achieve Xi\u2019s target of doubling the country\u2019s GDP per capita from 2020 to 2035, a key part of his vision of achieving \u201csocialist modernisation<\/a>\u201d by 2035, with the target for the next five years likely<\/a> to be set higher.<\/p>\n Recent high-level policy documents have avoided even mentioning the 2030 intensity target. It is omitted in recommendations<\/a> of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the next five-year plan, the foundation on which the plan will be formulated.<\/p>\n Instead, the recommendations emphasised \u201cachieving the carbon peak as scheduled\u201d and \u201cpromoting the peaking of coal and oil consumption\u201d, which are less demanding.<\/p>\n The environment ministry, in contrast, continues to pledge<\/a> efforts to meet the carbon intensity target. However, they are not the ones writing the top-level five-year plan.<\/p>\n The failure to meet the 2025 intensity target has been scarcely mentioned in top-level policy discussions. There was no discernible effort to close the gap to the target, even after the midway review<\/a> of the five-year plan recognised the shortfall.<\/p>\n The State Council published an action plan<\/a> to get back on track, including a target for reducing carbon intensity in 2024 \u2013 albeit one not sufficient to close the shortfall. Yet this plan, in turn, was not followed up with an annual target for 2025.<\/p>\n The government could also devise ways to narrow the gap to the target on paper, through statistical revisions or tweaks to the definition of carbon intensity, as the term has not been defined in China\u2019s NDCs.<\/p>\n Notably, unlike China\u2019s previous NDC, its latest pledge did not include a progress update for carbon intensity. The latest official update sent to the UN only covers the years to 2020.<\/p>\n This leaves some more leeway for revisions, even though China\u2019s domestic \u201cstatistical communiques\u201d, published every year, have included official numbers up to 2024.<\/p>\n Coal consumption growth around 2022 was likely over-reported<\/a>, so statistical revisions could reduce reported emissions and narrow the gap to the target. Including process emissions from cement, which have been falling rapidly in recent years, and changing how emissions from fossil fuels used as raw materials in the chemicals industry are accounted for, so-called non-energy use, which has been growing rapidly, could make the target easier to meet.<\/p>\n 2. Will the plan upgrade clean-energy targets or pave the way to exceed them?<\/p>\n The need to accelerate carbon-intensity reductions also has implications for clean-energy targets.<\/p>\n The current goal is for non-fossil fuels to make up 25% of energy supplies in 2030, up from the 21% expected<\/a> to be reached this year.<\/p>\n This expansion would be sufficient to achieve the reduction in carbon intensity needed in the next five years, but only if energy consumption growth slows down very sharply. Growth would need to slow to around 1% per year, from 4.1% in the past five years 2019-2024 and from 3.7%<\/a> in the first three quarters of 2025.<\/p>\n The emphasis on manufacturing<\/a> in the Central Committee\u2019s recommendations for the next five-year plan is hard to reconcile with such a sharp slowdown, even if electrification will help reduce primary energy demand<\/a>. During the current five-year period, China abolished the system of controlling total energy consumption and energy intensity, removing the incentive for local governments to curtail energy-intensive projects and industries.<\/p>\n Even if the ratio of total energy demand growth to GDP growth returned to pre-Covid levels, implying total energy demand growth of 2.5% per year, then the share of non-fossil energy would need to reach 31% by 2030 to deliver the required reduction in carbon intensity.<\/p>\n However, China recently set<\/a> the target for non-fossil energy in 2035 at just 30%. This risks cementing a level of ambition that is likely too low to enable the 2030 carbon-intensity target to be met, whereas meeting it would require non-fossil energy to reach 30% by 2030.<\/p>\n There is ample scope for China to beat its targets for non-fossil energy.<\/p>\n However, given that the construction of new nuclear<\/a> and hydropower<\/a> plants generally takes five years or more in China, only those that are already underway have the chance to be completed by 2030. This leaves wind and solar as the quick-to-deploy power generation options that can deliver more non-fossil energy during this five-year period.<\/p>\n Reaching a much higher share of non-fossil energy in 2030, in turn, would therefore require much faster growth in solar and wind than currently targeted. Both the NDRC power-sector plan for 2025-27 and China\u2019s new NDC aim for the addition of about 200 gigawatts (GW) per year of solar and wind capacity, much lower than the 360GW achieved in 2024.<\/p>\n If China continued to add capacity at similar rates, going beyond the government\u2019s targets and instead installing 250-350GW of new solar and wind in each of the next five years, then this would be sufficient<\/a> to meet the 2030 intensity target, assuming energy demand rising by 2.5-3.0% per year.<\/p>\n All previous wind and solar targets have been exceeded by a wide margin, as shown in the figure below, so there is a good chance that the current one will be, too.\u00a0<\/p>\n While the new pricing policy<\/a> for wind and solar has created a much more uncertain and less supportive policy environment for the development of clean energy, provinces have substantial power to create a more supportive environment.<\/p>\n For example, they can include clean-energy projects and downstream projects using clean electricity and green hydrogen in their five-year plans, as well as developing their local electricity markets in a direction that enables new solar and wind projects.<\/p>\n 3. Will the plan set an absolute cap on coal consumption?<\/p>\n In 2020, Xi pledged<\/a> that China would \u201cgradually reduce coal consumption\u201d during the 2026-30 period. The commitment is somewhat ambiguous.<\/p>\n It could be interpreted as requiring a reduction starting in 2026, or a reduction below 2025 levels by 2030, which in practice would mean coal consumption peaking around the midway point of the five-year period, in other words 2027-28.<\/p>\n In either case, if Xi\u2019s pledge were to be cemented in the 15th five-year plan then it would need to include an absolute reduction in coal consumption during 2026-30. An illustration of what this might look like is shown in the figure below.<\/p>\n However, the commitment to reduce coal consumption was missing from China\u2019s new NDC<\/a> for 2035 and from the Central Committee\u2019s recommendations<\/a> for the next five-year plan.<\/p>\n The Central Committee called for \u201cpromoting a peak in coal and oil consumption\u201d, which is a looser goal as it could still allow an increase in consumption during the period, if the growth in the first years towards 2030 exceeds the reduction after the peak.<\/p>\n The difference between \u201cpeaking\u201d and \u201creducing\u201d is even larger because China has not defined what \u201cpeaking\u201d means, even though peaking carbon emissions is the central goal of China\u2019s climate policy for this decade.<\/p>\n Peaking could be defined as achieving a certain reduction from peak before the deadline, or having policies in place that constrain emissions or coal use. It could be seen as reaching a plateau or as an absolute reduction.<\/p>\n While the commitment to \u201cgradually reduce\u201d coal consumption has seemed to fade from discussion, there have been several publications discussing the peak years for different fossil fuels, which could pave the way for more specific peaking targets.<\/p>\n State news agency Xinhua<\/a> published an article\u00a0\u2013 only in English \u2013 saying that coal consumption would peak around 2027 and oil consumption around 2026, while also mentioning the pledge to reduce coal consumption.<\/p>\n The energy research arm of the National Development and Reform Council had said<\/a> earlier that coal and oil consumption would peak halfway through the next five-year period, in other words 2027-28, while the China Coal Association advocated<\/a> a slightly later target of 2028.<\/p>\n Setting a targeted peak year for coal consumption before the half-way point of the five-year period could be a way to implement the coal reduction commitment.<\/p>\n With the fall in oil use in transportation driven by EVs, railways and other low-carbon transportation, oil consumption is expected to peak soon or to have peaked already.<\/p>\n State-owned oil firm CNPC projects<\/a> that China\u2019s oil consumption will peak in 2025 at 770m tonnes, while Sinopec thinks<\/a> that continued demand for petrochemical feedstocks will keep oil consumption growing until 2027 and it will then peak at 790-800m tonnes.\u00a0<\/p>\n 4. Will \u2018dual control\u2019 of carbon prevent an emission rebound?<\/p>\n With the focus on realising a peak in emissions before 2030, there could be a strong incentive for provincial governments and industries to increase emissions in the early years of the five-year period to lock in a higher level of baseline emissions.<\/p>\n This approach is known as \u201cstorming the peak\u201d (\u78b3\u51b2\u950b) in Chinese and there have been warnings<\/a> about it ever since Xi announced the current CO2 peaking target in 2020.<\/p>\n Yet, the emphasis on peaking has only increased, with the recent announcement on promoting peaks in coal consumption and oil consumption, as well as the 2035 emission-reduction target being based on \u201cpeak levels\u201d.<\/p>\n The policy answer to this is creating a system<\/a> to control carbon intensity and total CO2 emissions\u00a0\u2013 known as \u201cdual control of carbon<\/a>\u201d\u00a0\u2013 building on the earlier system for the \u201cdual control of energy<\/a>\u201d consumption.<\/p>\n Both the State Council and the Central Committee have set the aim of operationalising the \u201cdual control of carbon\u201d system in the 15th five-year plan period.\u00a0<\/p>\n However, policy documents speak of building the carbon dual-control system during the five-year period rather than it becoming operational at the start of the period.<\/p>\n For example, an authoritative analysis of the Central Committee\u2019s recommendations by China Daily<\/a> says that \u201csolid progress\u201d is needed in five areas to actually establish the system, including assessment of carbon targets for local governments as well as carbon management for industries and enterprises.<\/p>\n The government set an annual target for reducing carbon intensity for the first time in 2024, but did not set one for 2025, also signaling that there was no preparedness to begin controlling carbon intensity, let alone total carbon emissions, yet.<\/p>\n If the system is not in place at the start of the five-year period, with firm targets, there could be an opportunity for local governments to push for early increases in emissions\u00a0\u2013 and potentially even an incentive for such emission increases, if they expect strict control later.<\/p>\n Another question is how the \u201cdual\u201d element of controlling both carbon intensity and absolute CO2 emissions is realised. While carbon intensity is meant to be the main focus during the next five years, with the priority shifting to reducing absolute emissions after the peak, having the \u201cdual control\u201d in place requires some kind of absolute cap on CO2 emissions.<\/p>\n The State Council has said<\/a> that China will begin introducing \u201cabsolute emissions caps in some industries for the first time\u201d from 2027<\/a> under its national carbon market<\/a>. It is possible that the control of absolute carbon emissions will only apply to these sectors.<\/p>\n The State Council also said<\/a> that the market would cover all \u201cmajor emitting sectors\u201d by 2027, but absolute caps would only apply to sectors where emissions have \u201cstabilised\u201d.<\/p>\n 5. Will it limit coal-power and chemical-industry growth?<\/p>\n During the current five-year period, China\u2019s leadership went from pledging to \u201cstrictly control<\/a>\u201d new coal-fired power projects to actively promoting them<\/a>.<\/p>\n If clean-energy growth continues at the rates achieved in recent years, there will be no more space for coal- and gas-fired power generation to expand, even if new capacity is built. Stable or falling demand for power generation from fossil fuels would mean a sharp decline in the number of hours each plant is able to run, eroding its economic viability.<\/p>\n Showing the scale of the planned expansion, researchers from China Energy Investment Corporation, the second-largest<\/a> coal-power plant operator in China, project<\/a> that China\u2019s coal-fired power capacity could expand by 300GW from the end of 2024 to 2030 and then plateau at that level for a decade. The projection relies on continued growth of power generation from coal until 2030 and a very slow decline thereafter.<\/p>\n The completion of the 325GW<\/a> projects already under construction and permitted at the end of 2024, as well as an additional 42GW permitted<\/a> in the first three quarters of 2025, could in fact lead to a significantly larger increase, if the retirement of existing capacity remains slow.<\/p>\n In effect, China\u2019s policymakers face a choice between slowing down the clean-energy boom, which has been a major driver<\/a> of economic growth in recent years, upsetting coal project developers, who expect to operate their coal-fired power plants at a high utilisation, or retiring older coal-power plants en masse.<\/p>\n Their response to these choices may not become clear for some time. The top-level five-year plan that will be published in March 2026 will likely provide general guidelines, but the details of capacity development will be relegated to the sectoral plans for energy.<\/p>\n The other sector where fossil fuel-based capacity is rapidly increasing is the chemical industry, both oil and coal-based. In this sector, capacity growth has led directly to increases in output, making the sector the only major driver<\/a> of emissions increases after early 2024.<\/p>\n The expansion is bound to continue. There are more than 500 petrochemical projects planned by 2030 in China, of which three quarters are already under construction, according to<\/a> data provider GlobalData<\/a>.<\/p>\n As such, the emissions growth in the chemical sector is poised to continue in the next few years, whereas meeting China\u2019s 2030 targets and commitments would require either reining it in and bringing emissions back down before 2030, or achieving emission reductions in other sectors that offset the increases.<\/p>\n The expansion of the coal-to-chemicals<\/a> industry is largely driven by projects producing gas and liquid fuels from coal, which make up 70% of the capacity under construction and in planning, according to a mapping<\/a> by Anychem Coalchem.<\/p>\n These projects are a way of reducing reliance on imported oil and gas. In these areas, electrification and clean energy offer another solution that can replace imports.<\/p>\n Conclusions<\/p>\n The five-year plans being prepared now will largely determine the peak year and level of China\u2019s emissions, with a major impact on China\u2019s subsequent emission trajectory and on the global climate effort.<\/p>\n The targets in the plan will also be a key test of the determination of China\u2019s leadership to respect previous commitments, despite setbacks.<\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ie\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/qrcode_for_gh_9c056d53c2b7_258-1.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"Chart](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ie\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/China_would_need_to_cut_emissions_by_2030_to_meet_its_carbon-intensity_target_1.png\")
Energy sector CO2 emissions, billion tonnes. Black: historical. Blue dashes: pre-Covid trend. Red: path to meeting carbon-intensity targets with 5% GDP growth. Pink: path with 4.2% growth. Sources: Year-to-year change in CO2 emissions calculated from reported<\/a> GDP growth and CO2 intensity reductions since 2017; earlier figures calculated from reported total energy consumption and energy mix, using CO2 emission factors from China\u2019s latest national GHG emission inventory<\/a>, for 2021. Absolute emission level for 2021 from the emission inventory, with emissions for other years calculated from year-to-year changes. The path to targets is calculated based on carbon-intensity reduction targets for 2015<\/a>, 2020<\/a> and 2025<\/a>, together with reported GDP growth<\/a>. There was no carbon-intensity target for 2006-10, but a 21% reduction was achieved, so the path to targets is set equal to actual emissions. For 2025, CREA projection<\/a> of 0.5% increase in energy sector CO2 emissions and 5% GDP growth is used. For 2030, two different assumptions about average GDP growth rate in 2026-30 are used, with corresponding maximum CO2 emission level to meet the 2030 carbon-intensity reduction commitment<\/a> calculated. Pre-Covid trend is the linear best-fit to 2012-19 data.<\/p>\n![\"Chart](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ie\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/China_s_2030_carbon-intensity_target_would_require_a_step_change_in_progress.png\")
Energy sector CO2 emissions and CO2 intensity reductions by five-year period. Source: Year-to-year change in CO2 emissions calculated from reported<\/a> GDP growth and CO2 intensity reductions since 2017; earlier figures calculated from reported<\/a> total energy consumption and energy mix, using CO2 emission factors from China\u2019s latest national GHG emission inventory<\/a>, for 2021. For 2025, CREA projection<\/a> of 0.5% increase in energy sector CO2 emissions and 5% GDP growth is used. For 2026-2030, maximum CO2 emission level to meet the 2030 carbon intensity reduction commitment<\/a> is calculated based on reductions achieved until 2025.<\/p>\n![\"Chart](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ie\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/China_has_repeatedly_beaten_its_own_targets_for_wind_and_solar_growth.png\")
Solid line: China\u2019s combined capacity of solar and wind power. Dashed lines: Various official targets. Source: Capacity<\/a> by year from National Energy Administration (NEA). Targets compiled<\/a> from various policies, including five-year plans, NEA annual energy work guidance and China\u2019s nationally determined contributions. Targets include specific targets for wind and solar separately, for the two technologies combined and for \u201cnew energy<\/a>\u201d capacity, including other non-fossil energy sources. Targets stated as gross capacity additions over a given period were converted to targeted cumulative total capacity by adding the target to the capacity level at the end of the base year, assuming that retirements are negligible.<\/p>\n![\"Chart](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/ie\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/China_has_pledged_to__gradually_reduce__coal_use_during_2026-30.png\")
China\u2019s annual coal consumption growth rate by five-year period, 2006-2025. For 2026-2030, the commitment to \u201cgradually reduce coal consumption\u201d is illustrated as a small absolute reduction over the period. Source: Until 2024, calculated from reported<\/a> total energy consumption and energy mix. For 2025, the CREA projection<\/a> of a 0.3% increase is used. <\/p>\n