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<\/a> *Table of the percentage of \u201chigh-impact\u201d papers for each mission type and cost category. Credit – A.H.D. Koeppel & C. Dreier*<\/p>\nThe lack of planetary science data is probably due to the fact that no very-low cost planetary science mission has actually worked. It\u2019s admittedly hard to write an effective paper on the science of a mission that didn\u2019t collect any data. But what about the impact of time on these numbers? Don\u2019t older missions have more time to accrue more citations and therefore score better on this metric?<\/p>\n
In short, yes, that is a weakness of most bibliometric research. However, the authors recognized this problem and even pointed out examples in the paper – such as Perseverance, which haven\u2019t necessarily had enough time to get to 100 citations. But to truly account for this time-bias, they investigated what they called \u201ctime-domain sensitivities by looking at production rates\u201d of papers. In other words they put the total number of \u201chigh impact\u201d papers in the numerator and divided it by the total number of years since the start of science operations.<\/p>\n
Dividing a zero by any number is still zero, though, so even this metric didn\u2019t look much better for the very low cost missions. If these low-cost missions keep failing, this metric will not get any better. Another metric they looked at was the \u201ctime-to-science\u201d – how long it took after a mission began to get its first major \u201chit\u201d. According to the paper, \u201cVery-low-cost missions can take years to publish a highly cited result, largely negating their rapid development advantage\u201d. In other words, the \u201cmove fast\u201d model so prevalent in Silicon Valley doesn\u2019t really work when the scientific community is slow to follow up on the research it produces.<\/p>\n
So what is causing these difficulties for very-low-cost missions? There are two main explanations – first is, simply, that more of them fail. Nine of the missions that cost less than $100M didn\u2019t produce any science at all, whereas the only other category with any failures was the $100-450M range, which produced only six failures (and many more successes) than its lower cost cousins. None of the missions costing more than $450M failed at all. But that\u2019s only part of the reason.<\/p>\n The authors\u2019 main point is that low cost missions are quite simply constrained on the actual cutting-edge science they are able to perform. These missions are severely restricted in their size, complexity, and the capability of the scientific instruments on board. In other words, they\u2019re simply not as good as larger missions at collecting quality data, whether they actually get to the phase of data collection or not. As the authors put it, very-low-cost missions would need to see a \u201cdramatic change in the quality, reliability, and capability of low-cost missions and instrumentation\u201d in order for them to make a real-world impact at the same level as larger missions.<\/p>\n That flies directly in the face of Project Athena, the NASA administration\u2019s pivot to lower cost missions. You can\u2019t iterate yourself to a larger, more capable sensor or a physically larger housing for a larger sunshield. These things can\u2019t be modularized and iterated, at least at this point in our technological development. So while running ten smaller missions for the cost of one large \u201cflagship\u201d might seem like a good trade-off, the paper makes the point that it actually might not be because the smaller ones will never have the same capabilities as the larger one, even collectively.<\/p>\n Fraser talks about the rise of giant space telescopes.<\/p>\n There does appear to be a sweet spot, though. Mid-tier missions (i.e., those between $250\u2013750M in budget) seem to provide the minimum \u201ctime-to-science,\u201d beating even smaller missions, with an average of just six years from the project formulation to the publication of a major impact paper.<\/p>\n Whether this advice will be taken in by the NASA administration remains to be seen. The \u201cmove fast and break things\u201d mentality has been deeply ingrained in the culture of many companies in the last few decades. But that doesn\u2019t mean it’s what’s best for space exploration. And we might be doing ourselves a disservice by pivoting to that while ignoring the benefits of the larger missions that provide the most comprehensive breakthroughs in science so far.<\/p>\n Learn More:<\/p>\n A.H.D. Koeppel & C. Dreier – ASSESSING SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY OF NASA\u2019S SPACE MISSIONS BY COST<\/a><\/p>\n UT – How To Aerobrake a Mission To Uranus On the Cheap<\/a><\/p>\n UT – Can Philanthropy Fast-Track a Flagship Telescope?<\/a><\/p>\n<\/a> *Graph showcasing the different missions in the different cost and science categories, including the failures. Credit – A.H.D. Koeppel & C. Dreier*<\/p>\n