Lebanese Army Commander Haikal on a tour of southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of the disarmament plan (X account of the Lebanese Army, October 3, 2025)
Aoun with General Clearfield (Lebanese Presidency X account, October 23, 2025)
Prime Minister Salam with Ortagus (Lebanese News Agency, October 28, 2025)
Hezbollah Secretary-General Qassem (Al-Manar, October 26, 2025)Highlights
In early October 2025, the commander of the Lebanese Army presented the government in Beirut with the first report on the implementation of Hezbollah’s disarmament plan, in accordance with the government’s August 2025 decisions on the state’s arms monopoly. The report was reportedly formulated in a careful and balanced manner to avoid internal disagreement within the government, but it claimed that the Army would be able to complete the demilitarization of the area south of the Litani River by the end of 2025, on condition that IDF forces leave southern Lebanon.
According to the US military, the Lebanese Army has cleared nearly 10,000 rockets and 400 missiles since the ceasefire in late November 2024. However, “sources” claimed that the Army only acts against sites that have been reported to UNIFIL and to the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee for fear of clashing with Hezbollah, which could lead to civil war.
The Lebanese leadership expressed its commitment to the implementation of the state’s monopoly on weapons and blamed Israel for the delays in implementing the plan due to the continued attacks and the presence of IDF forces in five points in southern Lebanon. Lebanese President Aoun claimed that 80-85 percent of the area south of the Litani River is free of Hezbollah weapons, and Prime Minister Salam stressed that Hezbollah would join to become a political party without a military wing.
Hezbollah leaders made it clear that they oppose disarming the organization, stating it is essential for confronting Israel. Despite the public opposition, Hezbollah reportedly requested guarantees in exchange for giving up the weapons, including protection against Israeli targeted killings and the integration of the organization’s operatives into state security apparatuses. It was also reported that an attempt was made unsuccessfully to open direct negotiations with the United States, similar to Hamas.
Against the backdrop of the delay in implementing the plan, it was reported that US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack would arrive in Lebanon and warn the heads of state that they have one last chance to enter direct negotiations with Israel on a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament, or Lebanon will be left without external support. The US Special Envoy’s Deputy for the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, met with senior Lebanese leaders and asked them to work to prevent the restoration of Hezbollah’s military capabilities.
In the ITIC’s assessment, the Lebanese Army will continue its operations to collect weapons from the terrorist organizations, focusing on Hezbollah, and to deploy its forces, mainly in areas south of the Litani, aiming to finish this by the end of 2025. On the other hand, in Hezbollah’s strongholds north of the Litani, in the Beqaa and Beirut, the Lebanese Army will find it difficult to disarm the organization for fear of a confrontation that could escalate into civil war.
In the ITIC’s assessment, Hezbollah will also continue to publicly oppose its disarmament, but may agree to partial disarmament, mainly in the region south of the Litani, in exchange for appropriate guarantees. At the same time, the Lebanese government will continue its efforts to persuade the international community, especially the American administration, to increase pressure on Israel to reduce its attacks and withdraw its forces from positions in southern Lebanon, fully or partially, to help convince Hezbollah to show greater flexibility on disarmament. However, if the US administration intensifies its use of leverage, such as withholding funds for reconstruction aid or granting a free hand to Israeli action in Lebanon, the Lebanese government may change its cautious position regarding dealing with Hezbollah.
The Lebanese Army’s Activity to Implement the Disarmament Plan
In early August 2025, the Lebanese government instructed the Army to prepare a plan to dismantle all armed militias, including Hezbollah, by the end of 2025. It also approved the principles of the “ideas paper” presented by US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, which included a timetable for disarmament.[1]
In early September 2025, the Lebanese government adopted the plan presented by Army Commander Rodolphe Haykal to implement the state’s monopoly on weapons (Al-Nashra, September 5, 2025). “Government sources” said that the plan consisted of five stages with no fixed timetables for completion: completion of the Army’s work in the area south of the Litani River; activity in the area between the Litani River and the Awali River; The third stage will focus on Beirut and its surrounding areas; The fourth will take place in the Beqaa Valley; and in the fifth stage, the state will ensure a monopoly on arms in all of Lebanon. The sources noted that the Army would decide how to operate in the various areas and submit a detailed monthly report on its activities to the government. It was also reported that, according to the plan, the cessation of Israeli attacks and an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory are essential conditions for the implementation of the plan (Al-Akhbar, September 6, 2025).
On October 6, 2025, Army Commander General Rodolphe Haikal presented the first monthly report on the implementation of the plan to government ministers. Information Minister Paul Morcos said the government had examined the report but had decided to keep the discussions on the matter confidential and that the Army would continue to submit its monthly report on the matter to the government (Lebanese News Agency, October 6, 2025).
Lebanese Army Commander Haikal on a tour of southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of the disarmament plan (X account of the Lebanese Army, October 3, 2025)
According to all the information, the Lebanese Army acted mainly to demilitarize the area south of the Litani River and is even advancing to demilitarize the area within a few weeks. At the same time, the Army refrained from operating in Hezbollah strongholds north of the Litani, the Beqaa Valley, and Beirut for fear of clashes with the organization that could deteriorate into a civil war that would threaten stability in the country. The main information about the Lebanese Army’s activity is as follows:
“Informed Lebanese sources” reported that the Army focused on the progress made in removing weapons south of the Litani River as part of the first phase of the plan, during which several Hezbollah positions were dismantled, and various types of weapons were confiscated. The report noted, however, that no binding commitment was made to fully implement the plan, as most of the original deadlines had already passed, and current indications suggested that no major change was expected (Aram News, October 7, 2025).
“Government sources” said that the Army’s report was not merely a description of the security situation but a preface to an integrated plan that had been quietly implemented for several weeks. According to them, the report addressed three main issues: the issue of weapons south of the Litani River, which is mainly related to Hezbollah’s weapons; the eastern border with Syria, which is related to the production and smuggling of drugs; and the Palestinian refugee camps and the weapons found there. According to the report, Haikal noted that the Army is deployed in all areas where it is allowed to operate, except for the areas still “occupied” by Israel, and that in recent months the Army has carried out more than 3,500 field missions south of the Litani, including observation patrols, the establishment of checkpoints and new posts, and the seizure of weapons. Army Command estimated that the mission would continue until the end of the year, but only if Israeli forces withdrew. “Sources” noted that although Haikal did not elaborate on the issue of activity north of the Litani River, in practice, quiet implementation began with the establishment of permanent checkpoints at certain sensitive points, along with a series of security measures aimed at preventing any transfer of weapons outside the framework of the state. It was also noted that Haikal denied claims raised by some of the ministers regarding Hezbollah’s unwillingness to cooperate with the Army (Lebanon Debate, October 9, 2025).
Another report stated that the Army commander’s document was formulated carefully and in a balanced manner to present progress while avoiding internal controversy. It was noted that Haikal presented a number of guiding principles for the implementation of the plan: an approach based on security realism and the avoidance of internal conflicts; The use of force to remove arms is liable to lead to a civilian clash, and therefore, the action will be carried out gradually and in coordination with all the security forces; The emphasis at this stage is on the collection of privately-held and criminal weapons, and not on a direct confrontation with Hezbollah; and maintaining equilibrium between preserving national dignity and independence on the one hand and relying on broad external assistance – mainly from the US, France, Qatar, and the EU – on the other. It was emphasized that true independence is tested by the ability to make decisions in accordance with the Lebanese interest alone; The Army, as virtually the only functioning state institution amid the crisis, continues to maintain political neutrality and regards itself as the “protector of stability,” not a political actor (Al-Modon, October 9, 2025).
Against this backdrop of avoiding direct confrontation with Hezbollah, “senior military sources” confirmed that the explosion that killed six soldiers on August 9, 2025, during the dismantling of a Hezbollah ammunition depot in southern Lebanon had been a trap set by the organization. “Security sources” reported that Hezbollah had deliberately detonated the depot after the soldiers entered, assuming they were carrying out a routine ordnance-clearing operation. According to the report, the blast, planned in advance, was meant to send a deterrent message to the Army and government that “any hand reaching for the weapons of the resistance will be cut off.” After the incident, the Army conducted an internal investigation, but its findings were not published, raising suspicions of suppression or political pressure. According to the same sources, the explosion achieved its immediate objective by halting the government’s initiatives to restrict Hezbollah’s arms (Sawt Beirut International, October 24, 2025).
Subsequently, “sources” reported that the Lebanese Army does not raid Hezbollah sites, except for sites marked by UNIFIL that were reported to the five-member committee overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. They added that the Army has information about Hezbollah sites that have not been reported to the international forces, but it does not raid them because there is an understanding between the offices of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament that disarmament must be backed by an international resolution, and that any direct confrontation with Hezbollah could plunge the country into civil war. “A politician from an anti-Hezbollah party” added that what had been happening since the government announced the plan to implement the state monopoly on weapons in August was intended to cause the United States to exert pressure on Iran to instruct Hezbollah to voluntarily give up its weapons because Lebanon had no ability or willingness to enter a new civil war (Aram News, October 27, 2025).
According to data presented at a meeting of senior officers from the United States, France, and UNIFIL held at the headquarters of the UN force in Naqoura, the Lebanese Army cleared nearly 10,000 rockets, about 400 missiles, and more than 205,000 unexploded ordnance and remnants of munitions that had not exploded over the past year. US CENTCOM Commander Gen. Brad Cooper praised the Lebanese Army for its activity to ensure the disarmament of Hezbollah’s weapons (CENTCOM website, October 16, 2025). In addition, “Lebanese and American sources” reported that Washington had transferred $230 million to the Lebanese security forces as part of the operations to disarm Hezbollah. A Lebanese source involved in the decision said that the funding included $190 million for the Lebanese Army and $40 million for the Lebanese internal security forces (Reuters, October 2, 2025).
“Ten figures, including senior Lebanese officials, security officials, diplomats, and a senior Hezbollah official,” assessed that the Army was likely to complete clearing the area south of the Litani of weapons by the end of the year, but uncertainty remained regarding continuation in other parts of the country, since the Army avoids friction with Hezbollah pending a formal political decision. According to the report, during September 2025, Army forces located nine new weapons depots and blocked dozens of tunnels used by Hezbollah. “Two sources” revealed that the Army had run out of explosives after destroying numerous Hezbollah stockpiles, forcing it to seal newly found depots while awaiting a new shipment of explosives and related equipment from the US (Reuters, October 28, 2025).
The Positions of the Power Centers
Lebanon’s Leadership
Despite the slow progress of disarming Hezbollah, the Lebanese leadership continued to emphasize its commitment to enforcing the state’s monopoly on arms. Officials blamed Israel for the delays, arguing that ongoing airstrikes and the presence of IDF forces at five positions in southern Lebanon prevent the Army from completing its deployment. The following are prominent statements:
“Sources in the Lebanese government” reported satisfaction in Beirut regarding the weapons restriction process. They clarified that despite minimal cooperation from Hezbollah and the firm position of organization officials, state authorities are convinced that the mission is possible, although not easy. According to “the sources,” there is also satisfaction with the report submitted by the Lebanese Army (Asharq Al-Awsat, October 7, 2025).
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun noted that disarmament is a lengthy process and that it is not possible to set a timetable for completing the process in southern Lebanon, since it is an extensive area that includes valleys, forests, hills, and other obstacles, and that weather must also be considered due to the approaching winter. However, he claimed that 80-85 percent of all the area south of the Litani River has already been cleared of weapons and that Army forces continue to operate all the time since the ceasefire agreement at the end of November 2024 (Lebanese News Agency, October 13, 2025).
In a meeting with the new chairman of the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, American General Joseph Clearfield, Aoun called for pressure on Israel to withdraw from territories it “occupies” so that the Lebanese Army can complete its deployment along the border. He noted that Army achievements in the south include the removal of weapons from areas under its control, the prevention of public presence of armed men, the exposure of tunnels, and the seizure of weapons and ammunition. He emphasized that no one in southern Lebanon or Lebanon in general wants to return to a state of war (LBCI, October 23, 2025).
Aoun with General Clearfield (Lebanese Presidency X account, October 23, 2025)
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam noted that during the first three months of implementing the state’s monopoly on weapons plan, the emphasis would be on preventing the transfer or use of weapons south of the Litani River, while in the second stage, efforts would focus on the area between the Litani River and Sidon. He added that the ultimate goal is for the state to fully reclaim its monopoly on weapons, in accordance with the Taif Agreement signed in 1989.[2] He emphasized that ultimately, Hezbollah, like any other element, will need to return to being a regular political party without a military arm (Al-Nashra, October 22, 2025). In an interview with the Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Mayadeen network, Salam said that Lebanon was decades late in implementing the Taif Agreement, which stipulates that weapons must be held exclusively by the state. He emphasized that their goal is to rebuild the state and that it cannot exist with two armies. At the same time, he acknowledged that without the sacrifices of Hezbollah and the “national resistance” in general, the liberation of southern Lebanon would not have been achieved (Al-Mayadeen, October 23, 2025).
In his meeting with American General Clearfield, Salam reiterated Lebanon’s commitment to completing the weapons collection process south of the Litani River by the end of the year, as described in the Lebanese Army plan. He also emphasized that Israel must fulfill its commitments by withdrawing from occupied Lebanese territory and stopping its ongoing violations (LBCI, October 23, 2025).
Lebanese Minister of the Displaced Kamal Shehadeh emphasized that Hezbollah, Amal, and other armed militias in Lebanon had pledged to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all active militias in the country. He stated that this means Hezbollah will hand over all weapons in its possession across Lebanese territory to the state. Shehadeh emphasized that Lebanon must implement the agreement because it serves the country’s interest and is mandated by the Lebanese constitution (Free Lebanon Radio, October 23, 2025).
In parallel, American pressure on the Lebanese administration continued, urging it to accelerate the pace of Hezbollah’s disarmament to prevent an escalation with Israel. US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack warned that if Lebanon hesitates to implement the state’s weapons monopoly, Israel may act unilaterally, with severe consequences. He added that disarming Hezbollah is not only vital to Israel’s security but also presents Lebanon with an opportunity for renewal and economic recovery. Lebanon, he said, must choose between seizing this opportunity for national renewal or sinking into paralysis and decline (Thomas Barrack’s X account, October 20, 2025).
“Informed sources” reported that Barrack is expected to visit Lebanon to meet state leaders and make it clear to them that they have one last chance to enter direct American-sponsored negotiations with Israel to set a timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament. Otherwise, Lebanon would be left isolated, without US or regional assistance, and without anyone willing to pressure Israel to refrain from acting militarily to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. According to the sources, President Aoun responded to the warnings by saying that the Lebanese Army could not currently implement Hezbollah’s disarmament, and that any attempt to do so would lead to civil war (Al-Akhbar, October 28, 2025).
On October 28, 2025, Deputy US Special Envoy for the Middle East Morgan Ortagus visited Beirut and met with state leaders. It was reported that Ortagus expressed to President Aoun the US administration’s satisfaction with the implementation of the Army plan for weapons restriction. Aoun emphasized that the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee must do its work to stop “Israeli violations” and enable the Army to complete its deployment in the south of the country. Prime Minister Salam told Ortagus that implementing the decision on weapons restriction requires accelerating support for the Army and security forces (Lebanese News Agency, October 28, 2025). “Sources” reported that Ortagus asked Lebanon to act to prevent the restoration of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and resolve the issue through negotiations. According to the report, Lebanese officials emphasized to Ortagus the state’s commitment to disarming Hezbollah south of the Litani (Al-Hadath, October 28, 2025). It was also reported by “knowledgeable sources” that Ortagus stressed to President Aoun the need for the Lebanese Army to redouble its efforts to complete implementation of the plan (Al-Akhbar, October 29, 2025).
Prime Minister Salam with Ortagus (Lebanese News Agency, October 28, 2025)
Hezbollah
Amid the growing demand for Hezbollah’s disarmament, reports increased that the organization is in an advanced stage of restoring its military capabilities for a possible further confrontation with Israel, close to a year after the ceasefire came into effect, while adapting to the new reality in light of Israeli enforcement activity. Following this, Israeli attacks increased against Hezbollah infrastructure and against Hezbollah operatives involved in the restoration process, most of which focused on areas north of the Litani River and in the Beqaa.[3]
Hezbollah officials reiterated their refusal to disarm the organization despite the government’s decision and threatened that this could lead to civil war in Lebanon. They also emphasized the importance of the “resistance” and holding weapons in the organization’s hands in light of the Lebanese Army’s inability to deal with ongoing Israeli attacks:
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem stated that holding weapons in the organization’s hands is a “legitimate right intended to defend our homeland and our existence.” In an interview marking one year since his appointment, Qassem said that if the Lebanese Army cannot confront “Israeli aggression” on its own, there is a need for “popular resistance” to operate alongside it. He questioned why Hezbollah should disarm while Israel continues its attacks in Lebanon, asserting that Israel must first cease its aggression before any discussion of weapons can take place. Qassem added that Hezbollah has so far refrained from responding to Israeli attacks so as not to provide Israel with a pretext for a broader assault, but that the organization is prepared for a new campaign if Israel initiates one. He stressed that Hezbollah would continue the “resistance” even if it were left “with only a stick in hand.” He concluded: “Our decision is for defense and resistance until the last breath — let the enemy try to come and disarm the weapons itself” (Al-Manar, October 26, 2025).
Hezbollah Secretary-General Qassem (Al-Manar, October 26, 2025)
Deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council Ali Damoush warned that “whoever confronts us will enter the battle of Karbala.”[4] According to him, there is an American-Israeli effort to make the Army a partner in the war against the “resistance.” He made it clear that they would not accept this and that all Lebanese have a responsibility to thwart these attempts (Al-Ahed, October 1, 2025).
Deputy head of Hezbollah’s Political Council Mahmoud Qomati said that no pressure will deter Hezbollah from continuing the “resistance.” He emphasized that international laws allow any people whose land is occupied to resist and that they override even internal government decisions when they contradict them. Therefore, he clarified, the “resistance” will continue to fight and will prevail with the help of Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and other countries (Lebanese News Agency, October 4, 2025). In additional remarks, Qomati said that they would not hand over their weapons, as they regard them as “a source of strength for the Lebanese nation” (Al-Akhbar, October 25, 2025).
Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah stated that instead of debating the exclusivity of weapons, the government should first determine how to arm the Lebanese Army to confront “Israeli aggression.” He clarified that the discussion on weapons exclusivity is irrelevant to the “resistance,” since it is legitimate under the section of the Taif Agreement that addresses the liberation of occupied land. Therefore, he said, the resistance will remain, and no one will be able to harm it or its weapons. Fadlallah added that certain elements within the government had recently attempted to drag the Army into a confrontation with the public, but when the Army acted with national and legal responsibility, those same elements began inciting against it, as well as against senior security officials and relevant ministers (An-Nashra, October 6, 2025).
Despite the public statements about the refusal to disarm Hezbollah, there were reports that the organization had conveyed secret messages to the Lebanese leadership and foreign countries in an attempt to find an agreed solution regarding the weapons in its possession:
It was reported that Hezbollah conveyed through mediators a message to senior officials about its willingness to comply with the government decision, in exchange for receiving a series of guarantees that will be secured by senior ranks in Lebanese administration, the Arab world, and among “friendly” foreign countries: ensuring protection for Hezbollah leadership and organization operatives from Israeli elimination operations in the stage after disarmament; commitment by the Lebanese state not to pursue senior Hezbollah officials and organization members for political reasons or based on claims about incidents related to “resistance” against Israel; integration of Hezbollah operatives into state security, army, and civil defense institutions; preservation of Hezbollah institutions and the organization’s education, culture, health and development associations. According to the report, no official body announced or confirmed that the Lebanese state accepted this guarantee list, or even discussed receiving voluntary handover of Hezbollah weapons to the state, but “diplomatic sources” did not rule out the possibility that the guarantees issue was discussed more than once, far from media, to examine the state’s position on this proposal and determine its response (Al-Liwaa, October 8, 2025).
“Diplomatic sources” reported that following the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, efforts were underway to prevent an expansion of Israeli attacks in Lebanon and to open negotiations with Hezbollah, through mediators, aimed at reaching an understanding on a mechanism for handing over weapons and transforming the organization into a purely political party. According to the sources, leaked information indicated that contacts had been initiated between Hezbollah and influential Arab and Western countries, focusing primarily on the weapons issue and on the guarantees Hezbollah sought in exchange for relinquishing its arsenal. The report added that messages on the matter had been conveyed to Hezbollah since the beginning of the ceasefire at the end of November 2024, but Hezbollah’s response was clear: discussion of weapons exclusivity within the framework of a national security strategy would not take place until “the enemy” withdrew from “occupied” Lebanese territory, stopped its “violations,” fully implemented Resolution 1701, returned prisoners, and enabled reconstruction (Al-Liwaa, October 11, 2025).
It was reported that Hezbollah conveyed a message to the United States through mediators, including Iran, stating that the organization was ready to relinquish its weapons on the condition of direct negotiations with the US administration – similar to the process previously conducted with Hamas before the Gaza Strip ceasefire. According to the report, Hezbollah understood that Hamas’s elimination from the military and political arenas in the Gaza Strip signaled that it would be next in line and that international pressure would soon focus on it. The report also noted that the fall of the Syrian regime and internal political pressure from the Lebanese government were among the factors that prompted Hezbollah to reach out to the Americans. In addition, Hezbollah reportedly sought through this move to gain some form of compensation for its military setbacks, to build trust with the United States, to secure veto power within Lebanon’s executive authority, and to integrate its members into the Army and other state institutions. However, the report concluded that Hezbollah’s messages failed to achieve their objectives and that the United States was unwilling to conduct direct negotiations with the organization (Nidaa al-Watan, October 14, 2025).
“Lebanese and Iraqi sources” revealed that mediators had proposed transferring strategic weapons held by Hezbollah as a “deposit” to militias in Iraq, but the United States strongly opposed the move. The report also stated that a proposal allowing Hezbollah to retain light weapons for self-defense was immediately rejected, further complicating the situation from Hezbollah’s perspective. The report noted that Hezbollah faces logistical challenges that prevent it from maintaining its weapons properly, warning that prolonged storage without maintenance could render them unusable. In addition, the organization faces a political and ideological challenge stemming from its failure to obtain “final approval” from Iran to proceed with disarmament (Asharq Al-Awsat, October 12, 2025).
[1] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from August 11, 2025, “Lebanese Government Decides to Disarm Hezbollah – Positions of Power Actors”
[2] For further information on the agreement, see the ITIC’s study from March 10, 2005, “The Taif Agreement: Main Components and Significance” (Hebrew).
[3] For further information, see the ITIC’s study from October 23, 2025, “Hezbollah’s Reconstruction Efforts Amid the IDF’s Enforcement of the Ceasefire in Lebanon”
[4] The Battle of Karbala (680 CE) was a confrontation between the followers of Imam Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, and the army of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid. Imam Hussein and his men were killed after refusing to surrender, and the battle became a symbol among the Shiites of the “shahid” (a Muslim who sacrificed his life for a religious commandment), total loyalty to the principles, and the struggle to the end – even in the face of certain defeat.
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