Until Disaster Strikes: The Israeli Civilian Home Front Is Not Prepared for a High-Intensity War

Those who fail to organize and prepare in advance for a high-intensity, multi-front war will…

Those who fail to organize and prepare in advance for a high-intensity, multi-front war will be left without an adequate response. This concern becomes especially salient amid escalating threats of a large-scale war with Iran and its proxies, raising a critical question: how prepared is the Israeli public for a prolonged emergency?

In recent years, the State of Israel has experienced a series of confrontations, among the most difficult in its history. These confrontations did not expose the civilian home front before to the real challenges expected in an intense and prolonged multi-front conflict, but they did create a certain sense of security among the citizens of the state, and apparently also among decision-makers, a mistaken sense that the civilian home front is organized and ready for an intense and prolonged multi-front conflict.

There are those who will say that the likelihood of an intense and prolonged multi-front event, of the kind that would place the civilian home front before significant challenges, is not particularly high. However, even if we tend to agree with this assessment, the severity of the consequences stemming from lack of preparedness should outweigh the doubt regarding the need for preparation. The fact that a severe event has not yet materialized in its full scope is not evidence of sufficient preparedness, but primarily of a combination of circumstances that have not, at this stage, required full readiness. This reality does not absolve the need for systematic preparation for a more complex scenario, in which the duration, the scope of damage, and the burden on national systems and critical infrastructure will be far greater.

The events of October 7 sharpened the challenges facing the civilian home front and led a considerable number of local municipalities to reinforce their preparedness, some of them through models developed at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University. At the base of these models lies the assumption that national bodies may be called upon, in an emergency, to such a wide range of events that it will not be possible for them to provide an immediate, simultaneous, and continuous response to all regions of the country and to the entire population. In other words, the State of Israel must abandon the basic assumption that national authorities will be able to provide a full, immediate, and continuous response to every situation during a large-scale emergency. The practical meaning is the need to rely on residents of the local municipality, volunteers who will be trained to deal with a variety of challenges and to assist in maintaining functional continuity in their area of residence.

Such preparedness requires a reorganization of the local municipalities, mapping the vulnerabilities of individuals in the population who may require assistance of some kind, alongside those who can help in emergencies by providing support to those in need, and identifying people with professions relevant to emergency response; equipping and training volunteers; and embedding clear coordination mechanisms. For citizens, this entails active involvement and an understanding that preparedness is not an emergency state but an understanding that preparedness is not an emergency state but an ongoing process

Accumulated experience and research in the field indicate that in the initial stages of a prolonged emergency, the local community can provide the most effective response. Proper preparedness at the neighborhood or district level, guided and managed by the local municipality, is the correct operational response in the State of Israel. 

Emergency volunteer teams responsible for maintaining functional continuity at the neighborhood level, and the readiness-squad volunteers who will operate at the municipal level to assist with security needs, must undergo appropriate training that includes, among other things, first aid and rescue. Subsequently, periodic drills must be ensured to maintain continued competence and readiness.

The central challenge for the State of Israel in this matter is not budgetary; it is not a lack of suitable manpower for the task; nor is it the absence of knowledge or models adapted to prolonged emergency situations, since these, as noted, are readily available, prepared, and ready for activation, and in some local authorities are even operated independently. The Government of Israel must ensure that all local municipalities, small and large alike, both those act on this matter as required.