Glenn Cohen is the former Mossad chief psychologist, who was responsible for debriefing 168 Israeli hostages who were being held in captivity by Hamas once they were released. Born and raised in New York City, he moved to Israel after high school and served as an air force pilot, Mossad officer, special forces psychologist, and IDF hostage negotiator. Cohen is one of the very few Mossad officers who was granted permission to share their story, and I was fortunate to be able to interview him about the experience.
Below is the transcript of the interview:
In those first hours after release, when trauma is raw and disorientation is intense, how do you decide what not to ask—even when time-sensitive intelligence may be at stake? What internal red lines guide that judgment?
While writing the protocol for debriefing the returned hostages, what guided me most was the historical mistake made at the end of the Yom Kippur War, while receiving our POWs who returned from captivity in Syria and Egypt. They described the most traumatic part of their whole experience as POWs as not actually being held in captivity, but the way they were treated upon return, since they were locked in a compound in Zichron Yaakov for two weeks and interrogated and treated as potential traitors who may have shared too much with the enemy.
With that image guiding me, the protocol dictated two goals. First and foremost, to treat the hostages as gently as possible, with care for their well-being. The second goal was to bring urgent, life-saving intelligence, mainly about the hostages still left behind.
These two goals might come into conflict, but we decided that in all cases, the first goal — the hostages’ well-being — would be prioritized, and we would not ask anything that would compromise that.
In the first initial meeting, within an hour or two of their return, we asked only the most critical, time-sensitive intelligence regarding the hostages: who they saw, when they saw them, where they saw them, and what their condition was physically and mentally. All other questions were left as the second priority. At any point in the conversation, if something felt overwhelming, we let the hostages dictate the pace. The red line we were not willing to cross was compromising the hostages’ well-being.
Another principle of the protocol was to stick to intelligence and not to probe deeply into their emotional experience in captivity, unless it was important to them to share.
The beauty of these debriefings was that many of the hostages described them as part of their healing process, even though the objective was not therapy or healing.
You’ve described the need to balance psychological care with intelligence gathering. Can you walk us through a moment when those two imperatives came into direct conflict—and how you resolved it?
The most sensitive issue that we were concerned about was the possibility of sexual abuse, especially regarding women. Part of the protocol also dictated that female hostages would be debriefed only by women — both the psychologist and intelligence officer.
I instructed the teams to refrain from explicitly asking about this topic, but if someone initiated this matter, it would be handled delicately, without pulling them further into the conversation. They were told they did not have to share, and that the appropriate hospital staff could address this.
In one case, a teenage girl mentioned sexual abuse. The psychologist from my team stopped the intelligence gathering and stepped out to consult with me. We grabbed the hospital social worker in the corridor to ensure that she was in the know and could ensure proper follow-up. We asked the hostage what she preferred. She chose to continue the debriefing and follow up later.
This was one of the most sensitive moments, requiring constant balance between intelligence needs and the well-being of the returned hostage. It was also one of the most emotional moments for me, since it was the first testimony of sexual abuse to be heard, and I allowed myself a quick “power cry” in a medical supplies closet, out of sight from the returnees and their families.
Across debriefings of more than 150 hostages, did you notice recurring psychological patterns tied to length of captivity, isolation versus group detention, or exposure to propaganda? Which variables most affected recovery?
The most important variable to affect recovery was the returnee’s prior history, personality, and the resilience resulting from that. People with prior trauma and less resilience had a harder time coping and recovering.
Another dominant variable was isolation versus group detention. Being held with others was clearly better, even under suffocating tunnel conditions. Being with others is our oxygen.
Also significant was the cruelty of the captors. There was wide variation, largely a matter of luck. Being held alone and treated cruelly had a significant impact on recovery.
As for the length of captivity, this variable was surprisingly counterintuitive. We prepared for the worst-case scenario, assuming longer captivity would mean worse outcomes. In practice, the length of captivity had less impact than expected. I understand this through Viktor Frankl’s descriptions of camp survivors and the three stages: shock, adjustment, and release. Many hostages described reaching a stage of adjustment which allowed them to survive even hundreds of days. Paradoxically, this may explain why some hostages are having a smoother coping period upon release than some Nova survivors, who experienced the initial shock and returned immediately to normal life without time to process.
Hostages often carry critical information about others still in captivity. How do you help someone share that information without making them feel responsible for outcomes beyond their control?
The debriefing process empowered hostages by allowing them to help others, but it also placed a heavy responsibility on them. Many feared that sharing information could lead to dangerous rescue operations, especially tunnel rescues. Others were concerned their information could lead to killings of captors. Some did not want that responsibility. We therefore emphasized that this information would be used to help other hostages — to locate them, understand their condition, and even strengthen the negotiations on their behalf — rather than emphasizing the impact their information would have for rescue operations or lethal outcomes.
What techniques proved most effective in helping hostages reconstruct timelines and locations when memory is fragmented by fear, deprivation, or manipulation?
They were instructed to share in a cognitive way. This aligns with trauma treatment, because when someone is traumatized, the emotional area of the brain — the amygdala — is activated. The goal after trauma is to shift control from the amygdala to the neocortex, the cognitive part of the brain. This helps create order, grounding, and understanding rather than emotional overload.
We therefore directed them to share facts, details, dates, and descriptions, not emotional narratives. This was a win-win: we received critical intelligence, and it helped them organize their experience cognitively.
We worked chronologically, from October 7 until their release, whether it was 55 days, 500 days, or 738 days. It was remarkable how much effort they invested in tracking dates and events. Even two years later, they could recall extraordinary details. When asked when they were moved between tunnels, they could answer instantly, down to the exact date and day number. This cognitive and chronological approach was best for them and for us.
Hamas reportedly used psychological tactics—false hope, shifting rules, selective cruelty. How did those tactics shape the way you structured debriefings and emotional support afterward?
The most important thing we needed to do was build trust. This began with the families, even before the hostage returned, explaining the importance of the debriefing.
When one of the hostages returned, we explained the purpose with transparency and sensitivity, and we often began with an apology for how long it took to bring them home.
After such trauma, trust and transparency were essential.
How did you and your team prepare families for the reality that a returning loved one might carry information about others who were not released? What ethical responsibilities do you feel towards both families?
The hostage situation presented many ethical dilemmas regarding returned hostages and hostage families. Our primary responsibility was to the returning hostage. If families of other hostages requested information or contact, the decision rested with the returned hostage.
Many chose to share. Others preferred discretion. We respected both.
We also had a responsibility to families to convey intelligence without exposing sensitive sources. Most families understood these limitations.
After working so closely with survivors of prolonged captivity, has your understanding of human resilience changed—and if so, in what unexpected ways?
My main message to the world has always been that human beings are all capable of much more than we imagine. But what I learned from these brave hostages has taken it to a different level, and that’s what I’m writing my book about.
When I discuss captivity with people – whether it’s with commandos that I am training for POW work or ordinary individuals around the world, they will often tell me they feel they would be better off dead than being in captivity. But what I learned from these 168 hostages is that they went to hell and came back to tell the tale, and not a single one of them said that they would have preferred to be dead than to have been in captivity.
And not only that, but these 168 hostages coped and did things that we actually train our commandos to do in the case of captivity. And I’m talking about eighty-year-old ladies and ten-year-old boys in some cases. Without any prior training, they did almost exactly what our commandos are taught to do. So this is proof to me that they have this inherent resilience, and if they have it, then it means that we, as Jews around the world, also have it. I now understand, because of this experience, that Israelis and Jews have even more resilience than other humans, simply because we unfortunately have more experience with existential trauma and threats to our very existence for thousands of years. So I’m convinced it’s part of our collective consciousness and even in our DNA.
Looking ahead, what lessons from these debriefings should inform how Israel—and the international community—prepare psychologically and ethically for future hostage situations?
Hopefully, we won’t have to deal with future hostage situations, but if so, then first and foremost, we need to remember our national, Jewish, and individual resilience, and that we can cope, even with the worst-case scenario of captivity. And this is not just psychological preparation, but it also has operational implications.
Once we have a skewed perception of our ability to cope with captivity, it may lead us to make faulty tactical decisions. I heard from a tank commander who described how he, on the seventh of October, saw a pickup truck taking hostages towards Gaza, and he gave the order to fire to kill the hostages, because he said, “I know that they’re better off dead than being in captivity.” I eventually met these same hostages when they came out of captivity alive. They survived it, because thank God, this tank commander missed. This is also due to a misinterpretation of the IDF’s Hannibal procedure, which stipulates that you are allowed to take greater risks while opening fire if a soldier is being abducted, but in no way is this a directive to actually kill our soldiers, and definitely not civilians, in order to spare them the trauma of captivity.
Another lesson that we need to learn from these hostages is to remember the importance of our togetherness and unity. This is one of the most important things that helped our hostages cope while in captivity. Not just being held with other hostages gave them a sense of togetherness, but many of the hostages reported upon their return that they saw on TV or heard on the radio how much support and how many Israelis and Jews around the world were rallying for them … and this actually gave them the extra strength to cope. And this is what we need to do to cope with future challenges, including hostage situations: to go through this together and be united as a people, Jews in Israel and around the world.
Finally, how can one get in touch with you about a speaking appearance?
Those interested in booking a speaking appearance or executive coaching can contact me at glenn@gobeyond.team. I am also writing a book about my experience in debriefing hostages, which will be available soon. More information is available on my website, glenn-cohen.com