I have spent much of my career reading legislation — regulatory law, statutory interpretation and legislative drafting. Lawyers are trained to do something very specific: find the gaps in a legal framework and identify when a statute will create more problems than it solves.
I approached two recently proposed bills — the Ceasefire Compliance Act of 2026 (H.R. 7645) and the Block the Bombs Act of 2026 (H.R. 3565), cosponsored by Rep. Summer Lee — with that same analytical lens. These bills would place new and dramatic restrictions on U.S. security assistance to Israel — requiring Congress to approve individual munitions transfers and allowing arms sales and use to be cut if the administration does not certify certain requirements tied to Gaza and the West Bank.
While I understand the humanitarian impulse behind them, I have serious concerns about how these bills are written — concerns that feel especially urgent given that one of the sponsors is Congressman Chris Deluzio, who has traditionally supported a strong U.S.–Israel relationship and who represents Pennsylvania’s 17th district.
Singling out Israel: A double standard that endangers the region
Before examining those flaws, it is important to clarify the nature of the U.S.–Israel relationship.
Israel is one of America’s most capable and battle-tested partners in one of the world’s most volatile regions. The relationship is deeply reciprocal. Israeli companies support more than 250,000 American jobs; Israel is the third-largest source of foreign companies on the NASDAQ; and in 2024, the U.S. exported approximately $15 billion in goods to Israel. Much of the security assistance provided to Israel is spent here, supporting American manufacturing and our defense industrial base. Israel spends nearly 8% of its GDP on defense — more than double the NATO benchmark. Its missile defense architecture, co-developed with the U.S., is informing our domestic Golden Dome initiative. Israeli counter-drone technology is in use by the U.S. military. The Israeli Emergency Bandage is standard issue for American soldier. U.S. Cyber Command conducts annual joint exercises with the IDF’s Cyber Defense Directorate.
Israeli intelligence has disrupted terrorist plots that threatened both American civilians and American troops abroad. Meanwhile, Iran — the primary adversary confronting Israel — is a direct threat to the United States. Iranian proxies have killed more than 1,000 Americans in the Middle East, and Iran continues to pursue aggressive partnerships with Russia, China and North Korea. Israel is not simply a regional ally. It is one of our most capable partners in countering a shared adversary.
Which makes it all the more troubling that these bills single Israel out in a way applied to no other U.S. security partner. The United States arms dozens of nations — including countries with far more contested human rights records and far weaker commitments to international law — yet none face per-transfer congressional authorization, vague presidential certifications, or conflict-specific compliance conditions. Only Israel — a democracy under sustained rocket fire and terrorist attack — is subjected to this framework. That asymmetry normalizes a posture of hostility toward Israel that would be unthinkable if applied to any comparable ally. And it is strategically reckless: When Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah observe the United States legislating doubts about its commitment to Israel, it signals that terrorism and missile attacks may succeed in eroding American support — rewarding aggression and making the region more dangerous, not less.
The context these bills enter
The timing of this legislation makes this worse. Just two months ago, the Iranian regime was massacring its citizens in the streets. According to Time magazine, as many as 30,000 people may have been murdered on Jan. 8 and 9 alone — a death toll so staggering it overwhelmed the regime’s capacity to dispose of the dead.
Since Feb. 28, the United States and Israel have been conducting joint military operations against Iran, which has launched sustained waves of missiles and drones at Israeli population centers and U.S. allies across the region. Legislation that injects legal ambiguity into arms-transfer decisions right now is not an accountability measure. It is a national security risk.
Structural problems in H.R. 3565
H.R. 3565, would prohibit the transfer of certain munitions to Israel unless Congress first passed a separate authorizing law for each transfer. During a military conflict, that means Israel could not receive resupply of key weapons unless Congress completed the entire legislative process: committee review, floor debate, amendments, reconciliation and presidential signature. There is no expedited procedure and no emergency exception. That is not oversight. It is a legislative veto over routine security assistance.
The bill also requires written assurances “satisfactory to the President,” but it never defines what “satisfactory” means. Another provision requires weapons to be used in accordance with “international humanitarian law” and “international human rights law.” These are important legal frameworks, but they are not self-executing in U.S. domestic law. The bill provides no agency responsible for making compliance determinations, no adjudicative process and no standard of proof.
One provision is particularly self-defeating. The bill restricts JDAM guidance kits — technology that converts unguided bombs into precision weapons. Restricting precision guidance does not reduce strikes. It makes them less accurate, increasing civilian casualties. If the goal is humanitarian protection, restricting precision technology directly undermines it.
Drafting failures in H.R. 7645
H.R. 7645 operates differently but compounds the problem. It would condition U.S. arms transfers on certification by the executive branch that Israel is complying with requirements tied to the October 2025 ceasefire. If the certification cannot be made, the bill would prohibit the sale, export, or use of U.S.-origin defense articles in those territories.
The bill never defines “United States-origin defense articles,” implicitly sweeping in the entire U.S. Munitions List — including spare parts, software updates and training. Routine logistical support for systems already in the field could fall within the prohibition.
The bill also bars the use of U.S. defense articles “in Gaza or the West Bank” without clearly distinguishing between offensive operations and defensive or counterterrorism activities. Although the legislation includes language preserving assistance for defensive systems such as missile defense, that language creates discretionary authority rather than a clear statutory exemption.
Several certification requirements are similarly vague. The secretary of state must certify that Israel has not violated the ceasefire, yet the bill never defines what constitutes a violation or who determines it. It requires certification that negotiations are being conducted “constructively,” but again leaves that term undefined. It requires that civilians be free to leave and return to Gaza, even though the Rafah crossing is controlled by Egypt, not Israel. Israel could fail a certification standard based entirely on conditions outside its control.
The bill also bars support for “permanent occupation” without defining the term or addressing its interaction with the Oslo Accords framework, which established interim arrangements pending a final negotiated settlement.
Without clear definitions, the certification requirement becomes legally unworkable.
The national security stakes
Members of Congress understandably want to respond to humanitarian concerns about Gaza and the war in Iran. Those concerns are real and deserve thoughtful engagement. But thoughtful engagement requires legislation that is carefully drafted, clearly defined and consistently applied.
These bills fail on both counts. They are legally flawed, operationally unworkable, and strategically harmful. In the midst of an active conflict involving the U.S., Israel, and Iran — with Israel under sustained attack and serving as a linchpin of regional deterrence — introducing uncertainty into this partnership does not advance peace. It undermines it. PJC
Karen Gal-Or is an attorney with 15 years of experience in regulatory law and statutory interpretation. She lives and practices in Pittsburgh.