Ahmed al-Mansi and his militia (Yasser Abu Shabab’s Facebook page, September 26, 2025)
Al-Astal and his men. The Arabic reads, “We have no room for Hamas dogs” (Hussam al-Astal’s Facebook page, September 17, 2025)
Three “collaborators” executed in the middle of the street in Gaza (Quds Agency, September 21, 2025)
The rocket found in Ramallah (IDF spokesperson, September 19, 2025).
The rocket found in Tulkarm (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2025)
IDF forces continued to operate further inside Gaza City and continued aerial attacks on terrorist targets above and below ground and the targeting of terrorist operatives, including those involved in the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. At least 750,000 Gaza City residents responded to IDF calls and moved to humanitarian areas in the south of the Strip despite threats and attempts by Hamas to prevent them. Six IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting.
The United States president proposed a 21-point plan to end the war and secure the release of all hostages. Hamas denied it had received a new proposal and repeated its previous demands.
Reports indicated the establishment of new militias operating against Hamas in various areas of the Gaza Strip, some in cooperation with Israel. Hamas security forces executed “collaborators” and promised protection to those who surrendered.
The Global Sumud (Resilience) Flotilla is advancing with more than forty vessels and hundreds of activists in an attempt to “break the siege” of the Gaza Strip.
Two IDF soldiers were shot and killed at the Allenby crossing by a Jordanian terrorist, and an IDF soldier was killed in a vehicular ramming attack in Samaria. Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria and located rockets in the Ramallah and Tulkarm areas.
Speaking before the UN General Assembly, Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas called for Hamas to disarm and promised that the “Palestinian state” would be demilitarized. Hamas condemned the speech and accused him of promoting the “Zionist narrative.”
IDF operations
IDF forces continued air and ground operations, attacking hundreds of terrorist targets across the Gaza Strip, mainly those belonging to Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), focusing on gaining greater traction inside Gaza City. They attacked high-rise buildings used by Hamas for surveillance and terrorist activity against the IDF, operational tunnel shafts and other terrorist facilities above and below ground, some operating in civilian areas.[1] Explosives meant to be used to attack IDF forces were neutralized and terrorist operatives were eliminated, including those involved in murder and abductions during the October 7, 2023 attack and massacre. Six IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting (IDF spokesperson, September 16–29, 2025).
The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, claimed they were not afraid of Israel’s expanding its maneuver in Gaza City, adding that their operatives were prepared for ambushes, planting explosives in IDF vehicles and further kidnapping attempts, threatening that “Gaza will be a graveyard for soldiers.” They also claimed that the Israeli hostages had been dispersed throughout Gaza City and the maneuver meant Israel would not receive any hostage, alive or dead, their fate would be the same as that of Ron Arad[2] (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades Telegram channel, September 18, 2025). Hamas political bureau member Ghazi Hamad denied the claim that Hamas was using the remaining hostages as human shields and insisted that all were being treated “according to Islamic principles” (CNN Arabic website, September 26, 2025).
In addition to fighting inside Gaza City, the IDF continued efforts to evacuate the city’s residents through voice messages, leaflets, text messages and phone calls. According to the IDF, more than 750,000 Gazans left the city and moved to the humanitarian area in al-Mawasi near Khan Yunis, despite Hamas’ efforts to prevent their evacuation southward (IDF Arabic X account, September 27, 2025). Meanwhile, the IDF continued enlarging the humanitarian area in Khan Yunis, establishing field hospitals, water connections and desalination, food supply, tents and medical aid (IDF spokesperson, September 22, 2025). The Hamas government media information office in the Gaza Strip claimed that 335,000 Gazans had been forced to leave the city, but more than 900,000 remained (Hamas government media information office Telegram channel, September 24, 2025).
Palestinians leaving Gaza city
(Instagram account of photographer Abdallah al-Attar, September 26, 2025)
The population movement out of Gaza City reportedly caused a severe humanitarian situation in the central Gaza Strip, especially in Deir al-Balah. According to reports, the displaced had only flimsy tents which offered no protection from the heat, and there were shortages of water, electricity and services. Children reportedly suffered from illness caused by the heat and poor hygiene, and public sector workers were unable to provide basic needs. “Palestinian sources” said that Israel’s claims about “safe zones” were collapsing in the face of the situation on the ground (al-Risalah, September 25, 2025).
Fatah spokesperson in the Gaza Strip, Monther al-Hayek, said the Palestinian population was concentrated in 25% of “besieged” Gaza City. He claimed that Prime Minister Netanyahu was exploiting the issue of the Israeli hostages as a pretext to destroy Gaza and said he feared the city’s fate would be like that of Rafah and Beit Hanoun (Nasr Palestine Telegram channel, September 26, 2025).
Rocket Fire
On September 21, 2025, two rockets were fired at Ashdod from Gaza City. One landed in an open area and the other was intercepted (IDF spokesperson and Israeli media, September 21, 2025). The PIJ’s military wing claimed responsibility for the rocket fire (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, September 26, 2025).
On September 22, 2025, a rocket fired at Kibbutz Nahal Oz from Gaza City was intercepted (IDF spokesperson, September 22, 2025).
A “senior American administration official” and “another source directly involved in the negotiations” claimed that Hamas had drafted a personal letter to the United States president, asking him to guarantee a 60-day ceasefire in exchange for the immediate release of half of the hostages (Fox News, September 22, 2025). Hamas political bureau member Muhammad Nazzal denied the report (Ultra Palestine website, September 24, 2025). Senior Hamas figure in Lebanon Osama Hamdan also denied that the movement had sent messages to the United States president or anyone else since the attempted assassination of the Hamas leadership in Qatar on September 9, 2025. He said that after the attack in Qatar there was nothing left to discuss, so previous proposals were being recycled to create the appearance of negotiations to cover up “Israel’s crimes” or to make it seem that the United States was still mediating, even though it was partner to the “crime” (al-Mayadeen.net, September 24, 2025). A “source involved in the negotiations” said that all reports of proposals, negotiations or message exchanges regarding a ceasefire proposal were “completely baseless” and that no progress had been made (Ultra Palestine website, September 24, 2025).
According to reports on September 24, 2025, during a meeting held by the American president with eight Arab and Islamic state leaders on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York the previous day, he presented a 21-point plan for ending the war and for the “day after.” The plan included a ceasefire and the release of all the remaining Israeli hostages, a permanent ceasefire, a gradual IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the establishment of an alternative governing mechanism in Gaza without Hamas involvement, the creation of a security force composed of Palestinians and troops from Arab and Islamic countries, funding by Arab and Islamic states for the new administration and for rebuilding the Strip, and limited involvement of the Palestinian Authority (Axios website, September 24, 2025). According to other reports, the plan also included the release of between 100 and 200 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences, an amnesty for Hamas operatives in exchange for surrendering their weapons and leaving the Gaza Strip, the closure of the Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF), immediate and unlimited humanitarian aid delivery under the responsibility of the UN and other international organizations, reconstruction of the Strip within five years through an international coalition, the establishment of a Palestinian security force under Arab and international supervision, and an American commitment that Israel would not annex Judea and Samaria (American, Arab, and Israeli media, September 24–29, 2025).
A “senior Hamas figure” said that mediators in Egypt and Qatar were holding talks regarding the resumption of negotiations based on the latest American proposal, which Hamas had already agreed to at the end of May 2025, and that minor changes might be made for it to become a comprehensive agreement. He claimed Hamas had not received any new official proposal, despite reports of the American plan (al-Sharq TV, September 27, 2025).
Senior Hamas figure Hussam Badran claimed that the movement had been approached with an official proposal through the mediators. He reiterated the Hamas talking points: negotiations only if there were a complete ceasefire, full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the right of Palestinians to manage their own affairs. He noted that the management of Gaza and the Palestinian territories should be Palestinian and coordinated internally, adding that Hamas rejected external involvement or international supervision. Hamas reiterated its position that “resistance[3] and self-defense” were a legitimate right, and therefore the weapons were a national Palestinian matter and not Hamas’ private property (Hamas Telegram channel, September 28, 2025).
The Situation in the Gaza Strip
Hamas continued to accuse Israel of “deliberately targeting” the health system in the Gaza Strip. Hamas health ministry director Munir al-Barsh claimed that about 1,700 medical personnel had been killed since the beginning of the war and that more than 360 had been detained, which he called a “crime” requiring urgent action by the international community (Safa Agency, September 21, 2025). Muhammad Abu Salmiya, director of al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, said the situation in the hospital was “tragic and dangerous” and warned that if the facility stopped offering its services the number of casualties could reach tens of thousands, and there was concern for the safety of medical teams (al-Risalah, September 25, 2025). He added that a large number of sick and wounded had left the hospital, fearing the IDF would invade it (al-Jazeera YouTube channel, September 26, 2025). The health ministry published a list of 20 hospitals in the northern Strip and Gaza City which were not functioning; eight were still operating, including al-Shifa Hospital (Hamas health ministry Telegram channel, September 27, 2025).
The Palestinian Center for Missing Persons[4] warned of a rise in the number of missing people in Gaza due to the fighting, noting that many families had reported losing contact with relatives because of communication breakdowns and the difficulty in escaping combat zones. According to the center, “forced evacuation” from combat areas had led to the hasty flight of thousands of families, leaving behind missing people. In addition, civil defense teams were struggling to operate due to a shortage of fuel and equipment and difficulty accessing targeted areas. The organization called for immediate international intervention and an end to “forced evacuation” (Filastin al-‘An Telegram channel, September 21, 2025).
Hamas Governance
The Rada Force, operating as part of Hamas’ “resistance security,” claimed that Ashraf Muhammad Mahmoud al-Mansi, a known criminal from the Tel al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City, was leading a “traitor network” working for Israeli intelligence, using people with criminal records for sabotage and espionage. The force announced the opening of a window for voluntary surrender for those who chose to abandon the path of treason and reach an agreement before the case was closed (Rada Force Telegram channel, September 15, 2025). Reportedly, the network consisted of 20 people with previous convictions for drugs, theft, espionage and corruption offenses who received money, drugs and protection from the “occupation.” Al-Mansi’s family was also required to immediately and publicly disown him (Palestine Online, September 16, 2025). The al-Siyad Telegram channel, affiliated with Hamas’ Sahm (Arrow) Unit in the interior ministry, claimed that al-Mansi and his men were responsible for an attack on a medical team at the Sheikh Radwan clinic and the killing of three civilians in northern Gaza City (al-Siyad Telegram channel, September 26, 2025). On the other hand, Yasser Abu Shabab, commander of the Israel-supported Popular Forces militia, expressed his gratitude and appreciation on behalf of his militia to al-Mansi for his efforts against Hamas terrorism, his standing alongside the Gazans and his enforcement of security (Yasser Abu Shabab’s Facebook page, September 26, 2025).
Ahmed al-Mansi and his militia (Yasser Abu Shabab’s Facebook page, September 26, 2025)
Hussam al-Astal, a 50-year-old resident of Khan Yunis and former Palestinian Authority officer, announced the establishment of a “counterterrorism force” militia. He called on anyone living under Hamas oppression to join him, and claimed that dozens of families were already living in his camp in Kizan al-Najjar, a village emptied of its population near Khan Yunis. He claimed that his militia received food, water, shelter supplies, and equipment from Israel, along with military equipment. His message, he said, was that there were people in the Gaza Strip who wanted to live in peace. A “senior commander in Yasser Abu Shabab’s militia” confirmed that the two groups were in contact and described al-Astal’s force as part of the Popular Forces. He added that the groups sought to create a “control belt” under their protection through Khan Yunis and Rafah in coordination with Israel (Times of Israel, September 22, 2025). According to reports, al-Astal had been cooperating with Israel since the 1990s and in January 2022 he was arrested and admitted to participating in the assassination of Hamas operative scientist Fadi al-Batsh in Malaysia in 2018. The al-Astal clan issued an official statement completely disowning Hussam al-Astal, aka Abu Sfan, claiming that his actions did not represent the family or its national and moral values and that he was “outside the Palestinian national consensus” (Palestine Online, September 21, 2025).
Right: Hussam al-Astal (Hussam al-Astal’s Facebook page, August 28, 2025). Left: Al-Astal and his men. The Arabic reads, “We have no room for Hamas dogs” (Hussam al-Astal’s Facebook page, September 17, 2025)
Following reports about the militias of Ashraf al-Mansi and Hussam al-Astal, it was claimed that seven armed groups operating against Hamas in the Gaza Strip had so far been exposed: Yasser Abu Shabab’s militia in eastern Rafah, a group led by Hussam al-Astal in eastern Khan Yunis, a group led by Rami Khalas in eastern al-Shuja’iyya, a group led by Ahmed Jundiya in eastern al-Shuja’iyya, a group led by Ashraf al-Mansi in Beit Lahia, an armed group in the Bedouin village area in the northern Gaza Strip, and an armed group in the Jordanian hospital area (Dr. Eman’s X account, September 26, 2025).
However, Marwan Bakr, mukhtar of the Bakr clan, claimed that Israel had contacted him and offered to allow him to remain in Gaza City in exchange for his cooperation, but he refused, saying, “For 100 years we have not worked with you, and we will not work with you” (alresala.net, September 27, 2025). Dr. Nizar Abd Daghmash, head of the Daghmash clan council, also said he refused to cooperate with Israel. He said, “No matter what the disagreements are, it is inconceivable that we would betray our land or our people and become agents of the occupier. If we are given the choice between betrayal and death, then martyrdom is more sublime and noble than having shame attached to our clan’s history” (al-Risalah Telegram channel, September 27, 2025).
With the reports of the formation of militias opposing Hamas, Hamas security forces intensified their efforts to act against “collaborators.” Hamas announced that the so-called Gate of Repentance operation, designed to allow “collaborators” to surrender themselves to “resistance security,” was ongoing and promised that they would receive protection (Aalam Gaza Telegram channel, September 20, 2025). According to reports, three “collaborators” from Abu Shabab’s militia were executed in front of hundreds of cheering Gazans after being captured in a joint security operation by the “resistance factions.”[5] The Rada Force said they would take action against other collaborators in Khan Yunis and in the central Gaza Strip (Rada Force Telegram channel, September 21, 2025). Three Gazans were executed in al-Shuja’iyya on charges of collaborating with IDF forces (al-Nuseirat refugee camp Telegram channel, September 26, 2025). “Knowledgeable security sources” reported that in al-Shuja’iyya the “resistance” security forces had dismantled a network of agents recruited by the “occupation” to destabilize internal security and spread chaos inside the Gaza Strip.” Reportedly, Ahmed Jundiya, who headed the network and several of its members surrendered, and a number of civilians held as hostages were released. In addition, four members of the group were shot after refusing to surrender (al-Siyad Telegram channel and the Sahm 103 Unit Telegram channel, September 28, 2025).
Three “collaborators” executed in the middle of the street in Gaza
(Quds Agency, September 21, 2025)
On September 23, 2025, the Abu Maghsib clan announced the death of clan head Mahmoud Abdullah Abu Maghsib, kidnapped, according to claims, two days earlier by operatives in three “government” cars and transferred to a clan in Khan Yunis working with Hamas’ Sahm Unit, where he was tortured to death. They demanded the immediate extradition of the perpetrators and the disclosure of the circumstances of his murder (Abu Maghsib Youth Association Facebook page, September 23, 2025). Hamas’ interior ministry said it was opening an investigation, claiming that Abu Shabab’s militia operatives were responsible for Abu Maghsib’s killing (al-Siyad Telegram channel, September 24, 2025). Abu Shabab’s Popular Forces militia responded by accusing three members of the al-Astal family of being responsible for Abu Maghsib’s abduction and execution as part of their activities in Hamas’ Sahm Unit (Popular Forces militia Facebook page, September 24, 2025).
The International Flotilla against the Siege of the Gaza Strip
The Global Sumud (Resilience) Flotilla, which set sail at the end of August 2025, continued its progress in the Mediterranean Sea to “break the siege on the Gaza Strip.”[6] On September 28, 2025, the organizers announced that 44 vessels with hundreds of activists had set sail from Crete to the Strip, with two additional vessels expected to join. Within two days they expected to enter a “risk zone” and would reach the Strip a day or two later, noting that they were determined to continue their voyage (Flotilla Telegram channel, September 28, 2025).
A meeting was held at the headquarters of the Egyptian delegation to the UN, attended by representatives from more than 30 countries, led by Egypt, Germany, the UN, and the Palestinian Authority, to discuss preparations for implementing the Arab plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip immediately after the cessation of hostilities. Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Muhammad Mustafa, participating by video call from his office in Ramallah, said the Palestinian government continued to update its aid and reconstruction plans and that 56 operational programs had been prepared to restore life and basic services to the Strip, in addition to 350 detailed projects covering various sectors (Wafa, September 23, 2025).
Egypt continued to object to the “displacement” of Gazans. “Egyptian sources” said Cairo had rejected a Western proposal that included a “mega-package” of grants and investments in exchange for accepting Palestinian refugees from the Strip. Egypt said it would cooperate only with solutions that kept the Gazans in the Strip and ensured urgent reconstruction and security arrangements, and Cairo would act to implement a two-state solution while rejecting the proposal to establish an “alternative homeland” for the Palestinians (al-Araby al-Jadeed, September 24, 2025). The Egyptian foreign minister said Egypt rejected any attempt to “forcibly displace” the Palestinians, adding that Egypt would convene a conference in Cairo for the reconstruction of the Strip and would immediately implement the Arab-Islamic plan for its reconstruction, while strengthening the Palestinian Authority so that it could assume full responsibility for the Strip (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, September 25, 2025).
Speaking before the UN General Assembly, Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Mahmoud Abbas presented his roadmap for the “day after” the war, which included transferring control of the Gaza Strip to the PA and Arab and international support for the reforms he had implemented. Mahmoud Abbas addressed the Assembly by video from Ramallah because the American administration had banned PA figures from entering the United States, and demanded the disarmament of Hamas and the transfer of its weapons to the PA. He also claimed the “Palestinian state” would be demilitarized and announced political reforms including general elections within a year and constitutional amendments made by a constitutional committee within three months (Wafa, September 25, 2025).
Hamas reacted sharply to Mahmoud Abbas’ speech, accusing him of promoting the “Zionist narrative.” The movement emphasized that Palestinian “resistance” was a national and moral duty, drawing its legitimacy from the support of the Palestinian people and the natural right “to resist the occupation.”[7] Hamas also rejected Mahmoud Abbas’ statement that the movement would have no role in governance, saying it was an infringement of the Palestinian people’s right to choose their leaders and an unacceptable capitulation to external dictates. Hamas further warned that the “weapons of the resistance” could not be touched as long as the “occupation” continued, condemning Mahmoud Abbas’s demand to surrender them. Hamas called for unity and national consensus on a comprehensive “struggle plan” until the realization of the Palestinians’ aspirations for liberation, return[8] and the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem [sic] as its capital (Hamas Telegram channel, September 26, 2025).
Palestinian cartoonist ‘Alaa al-Laqta on Mahmoud Abbas’ demand that Hamas disarm
(Palestine Online Telegram channel, September 26, 2025)
Hamas political bureau member Ghazi Hamad said that if a Palestinian state were established, Hamas’ weapons would be transferred to the Palestinian army. However, he said Hamas could not be excluded because it played a “positive role.” He justified Hamas’ October 7, 2023 terrorist attack and massacre by claiming that “Hamas created a ‘golden moment’ for the Palestinian issue.” Referring to protests against Hamas, he claimed to be “aware” of the residents’ situation but blamed Israel (CNN, September 25, 2025).
Terrorist Attacks
There were two terrorist attacks in which three IDF soldiers were killed:
A terrorist attack at the Allenby Crossing on the Israel-Jordan border: on September 18, 2025, a Jordanian terrorist driving a truck with aid for the Gaza Strip drove to the Israeli side of the border crossing, opened fire at IDF forces and then continued stabbing soldiers until security guards shot and killed him. Two IDF soldiers were killed in the attack. As a result, the crossing was temporarily closed (Israeli media, September 19 and 25, 2025).[9]
Vehicular ramming attack: on September 28, 2025, a Palestinian terrorist driving a truck at the Jit junction in Samaria rammed into soldiers; he was shot and killed. One IDF soldier was killed, who may have been a victim of friendly fire (Israeli media, September 28, 2025).
Counterterrorism Activities
Israeli security forces continued counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, detaining dozens of wanted persons and terrorists and seizing weapons and incitement propaganda. Two PIJ terrorist operatives planning an attack were eliminated in Tamun, three terrorists were detained in Ramallah on suspicion of attempting to fire a rocket from the village of Na’ima, a rocket manufacturing lathe was located and another rocket was found in Tulkarm.
Right: The rocket found in Ramallah (IDF spokesperson, September 19, 2025).
Left: The rocket found in Tulkarm (IDF spokesperson, September 23, 2025)
Amin Hassan Abd al-Qader Azzam, 22 years old from Tayibe, was charged with planning to kidnap a soldier and use him as a bargaining chip to force Israel to end the fighting in the Gaza Strip. According to the indictment, Azzam browsed Hamas-linked websites and Telegram channels, participated in discussions on the Shaheed Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades channel, took part in paintball training as military readiness practice, downloaded Hamas combat training materials, attempted to obtain weapons and recruit partners, sought religious authorization for the act and ordered tactical gear, including a vest and a communication device (spokesperson of the Southern District of the Ministry of Justice, September 25, 2025).
International Activity
PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas met in Ankara with Turkish President Erdogan. They discussed Palestinian diplomatic moves in the international arena, efforts to end the fighting in the Gaza Strip, and advancing humanitarian aid. Mahmoud Abbas thanked Turkey for its support and reiterated the Palestinian priorities: an immediate ceasefire, unconditional aid delivery, IDF withdrawal from the Strip, and preparations for reconstruction (Wafa, September 18, 2025).
The “Palestine” delegation presented a report to the International Commission of Inquiry in Geneva on [alleged] “occupation violations against Palestinian women.” The report included documented materials, recordings and evidence of alleged serious violations against women and girls, claiming they constituted war crimes, and crimes against humanity. “Palestinian sources” claimed that the killing, displacement, and destruction of infrastructure targeting women was a “double crime” harming the entire social fabric, and expressed hope the report would serve as a basis for accountability and strengthening global solidarity. The Commission pledged to continue its independent investigation and report to the Human Rights Council and the UN (Wafa , September 19, 2025).
About ten countries, including France, Britain, Canada and Australia, announced their recognition of a Palestinian state as part of the two-state conference held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. The PA welcomed the recognition and called for the implementation of practical steps to enable the establishment of a “Palestinian state.” Hamas claimed the recognition was a result of the October 7, 2023 attack and promised to continue “armed resistance.” However, Palestinian social media users expressed doubt whether diplomatic recognition would end the war in the Gaza Strip or improve the humanitarian situation.[10]
On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, financial support was announced for the PA treasury in light of the severe crisis caused by Israel’s freezing of tax clearance funds, which had reached nearly $3 billion. The World Bank allocated an emergency grant of $90 million, and other countries pledged split grants for periods of up to six months, including Saudi Arabia, which contributed $90 million, Spain €50 million, and Germany €50 million. PA Prime Minister Muhammad Mustafa thanked them and requested fixed monthly assistance of $200 million for six months to allow the government to continue providing essential services to citizens and ease the financial pressures resulting from the tax revenue freeze (Bethlehem al-Hadath Telegram channel, September 25, 2025). The French foreign ministry reported the establishment of the Emergency Coalition for the Financial Sustainability of the Palestinian Authority, led by 12 countries, with the objective of stabilizing the PA’s economic situation and preserving its governance capability (French foreign ministry, September 26, 2025).
Activity of the PA security forces
The French anti-terror prosecutor’s office reported that the PA security forces had arrested Mahmoud Khaderr Abd al-Adra, aka Hisham Harb, 70 years old, a key suspect in the August 9, 1982 terrorist attack on a Jewish restaurant on Rue des Rosiers in Paris, attributed to Abu Nidal’s organization. Six people were killed in the attack (France24 website, September 19, 2025; al-Mashhad, September 20, 2025).
[1] Using civilian facilities such as schools, hospitals, etc. for terrorist purposes is a common modus operandi of the terrorist organizations in the Strip, especially Hamas, and the terrorist organizations exploit IDF attacks on them for propaganda and incitement purposes, exaggerating the number of casualties, making claims about the number of civilians allegedly harmed, and in most cases hiding the identities of the terrorists who were targeted. In all cases, before an attack measures are taken to minimize the possible harm to civilians, including the use of precision munitions, aerial surveillance and additional intelligence information.
[2] Ron Arad is an Israeli Air Force weapon systems officer missing in action since 1986 after his plane was shot down over Lebanon. His fate is unknown, although he has been presumed dead.
[3] Anti-Israel terrorism and violence.
[4] The Palestinian Center for the Missing and Disappeared is a human rights organization operating in the Gaza Strip whose purpose is to document cases of missing persons and disappearances, provide assistance to the families, and push for solutions regarding their fate.
[5] Terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip. “A source in the resistance” said the ambush and the executions were carried out by operatives from Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s Jerusalem Brigades, and the al-Mujahideen Brigades (al-Siyad TV, September 21, 2025).
[6] For further information, see the September 2025 ITIC report, “The Global Sumud Flotilla to the Gaza Strip – Update (September 25, 2025).”
[7] Attack Israel and Israelis.
[8] The return of the “refugees” to their pre-1948 homes, that is, the destruction of the State of Israel.
[9] In September 2024 there was a shooting at the same site. A Jordanian truck driver shot and killed three Israelis working at the crossing.
[10] For further information, see the September 2025 ITIC report, “Reactions to the Wave of Recognition of a Palestinian State.”
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