Attack on Hamas underground facilities established at civilian sites in the central Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesperson, June 29, 2026)
The renovated emergency medicine department (Dr. Muhammad Abu Salmiya Facebook page, June 23, 2026)
The renovated emergency medicine department (Dr. Muhammad Abu Salmiya Facebook page, June 23, 2026)
Security forces during the operation to remove the weapons from the water cistern. weapons (Israel Police Arabic Telegram channel, June 26, 2026)
The weapons (Israel Police Arabic Telegram channel, June 26, 2026)
In the spirit of the World Cup, a call to isolate Israel (Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas’ inhouse cartoonist, June 24, 2026)Trending
Disagreements over Hamas’ disarmament and the entry of the Palestinian committee to administer the Gaza Strip complicate the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.
The failure of the “June 26 Revolution” indicates Hamas has not relinquished its hold over the governance of the Gaza Strip.
The Palestinian Authority tries to enlist the Christian world in the struggle over Jerusalem.
IDF forces continued operations within the Yellow Line and in other areas of the Gaza Strip, eliminating Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, including operatives involved in the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion and massacre. Hamas military infrastructure rebuilt after the ceasefire was also destroyed.
A Hamas spokesman accused Israel of deliberately targeting children.
The International Committee for the Protection of Journalists is reviewing its database of journalists killed during the war in the Gaza Strip after it became known that some of them were affiliated with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Hamas continued to accuse Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov of promoting Israeli positions and undermining the negotiations for implementing the ceasefire. It reiterated its claim of being prepared to transfer control of the Gaza Strip to the national administration committee.
The organizers of the so-called “June 26 Revolution” against Hamas rule said the attempt to hold mass demonstrations had failed because of Hamas intimidation, but promised to continue their campaign.
A senior Hamas figure held talks with the Iranian foreign minister.
Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria.
The Palestinian Authority wants to enlist the Vatican, the UN and Arab and Western countries against what it claims is “the deliberate targeting of Christian institutions in Jerusalem.”
The IDF
IDF forces continued destroying terrorist infrastructure and eliminating terrorists within the Yellow Line and in other areas of the Gaza Strip. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists who were planning terrorist attacks and posed an immediate threat to the forces were eliminated, including operatives involved in the atrocities of the October 7, 2023 terrorist invasion and massacre and who had held hostages, as well as senior operatives in Hamas’ naval police. Four rocket-launching positions erected after the ceasefire went into effect were destroyed, along with an underground facility in Deir al-Balah which Hamas had been restoring. The IDF sealed a 16-kilometer tunnel in Rafah in which the body of Lt. Hadar Goldin, who was abducted during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, had been held until it was returned in November 2025. An Israeli civilian employed by a Ministry of Defense contractor was killed in an operational accident in the Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesperson, June 23-30, 2026).
Attack on Hamas underground facilities established at civilian sites in the central Gaza Strip
(IDF Spokesperson, June 29, 2026)
According to Palestinian reports, IDF activity focused on Beit Lahia, Jabalia, Khan Yunis, al-Maghazi, Deir al-Balah and Gaza City (Mutabaa Min al-Midan Telegram channel, June 25-26, 2026; activist Hamza al-Masri’s Telegram channel, June 27, 2026).
According to Hamas sources, throughout the war Israel has sought to target Hamas’ economic assets, focusing on operatives, infrastructure, shops and companies remotely managed by the movement. According to a report, an attempt to eliminate a Hamas-affiliated money changer on June 22, 2026, was unsuccessful (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 26, 2026).
Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem accused Israel of “deliberately targeting children” in the Gaza Strip after reports of the death of a Palestinian child in an Israeli strike in Khan Yunis. He said the child had been killed one day after the publication of a UN report condemning Israel for killing children in the Gaza Strip. He claimed that more than 20,000 children had been killed in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the war and called for urgent international action to stop the war and bring the Israeli leadership to trial (Hamas Telegram channel, June 24, 2026).
Terrorist Operatives Disguised as “Journalists”
The New York City-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) announced it was reviewing its database of journalists killed during the war in the Gaza Strip after Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published posters of slain military operatives whom the committee had classified as “journalists.” The committee said it had removed eight names from the database after it had been determined that they belonged to Hamas or the PIJ, while 12 more names were removed for other reasons. The committee’s executive director, Jodie Ginsberg, condemned false representation of “combatants” as media personnel and the improper use of media identification in the field (Committee to Protect Journalists website, June 25, 2026).
An example of “journalists” who were also terrorist operatives was revealed on June 28, 2026, when the PIJ’s military wing issued a list of its operatives killed during the war. One of them was Tareq al-Sayed Abu Sakhil from the training department of the central operations unit of the Gaza Brigade (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, June 28, 2026). After he was killed at the end of March 2024, he was represented as a media worker employed by the PIJ’s Sawt al-Quds Radio.[2]
Abu Sakhil (Jerusalem Brigades Telegram channel, June 28, 2026)
Sources in Hamas and the other Palestinian organizations said they had decided that the amendments presented by Board of Peace representative Nikolay Mladenov regarding the issue of disarmament were unacceptable and effectively returned the negotiations to square one. They said they would progress to the second phase only after Israel met its commitments under the first phase, especially withdrawing from the Gaza Strip, dismantling of groups collaborating with Israel and establishing the responsibilities of the national committee for the administration of the Gaza Strip. They added that the demand to concentrate, store or freeze the use of weapons before such steps had been taken undermined Palestinian “national principles,” adding that Mladenov’s road map reflected Israeli dictates, including demands concerning tunnels and personal weapons, without a corresponding Israeli commitment (aljazeera.net, June 25, 2026; al-Araby al-Jadeed and al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 28, 2026). Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said the talks with the mediators were continuing and a delegation of representatives from Hamas and the other “organizations” was expected to arrive in Cairo to deliver its response to the new proposals (Anadolu Agency, June 26, 2026).
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and Mladenov met to discuss advancing the implementation of the first phase of the peace plan, the deployment of the international stabilization force and the expansion of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip. Abdelatty said the issue of aid should be separated from the negotiations so its entry would not depend on political progress, while Mladenov praised Egypt’s role in mediation, stabilizing the situation and easing the humanitarian situation (Egyptian foreign ministry Facebook page, June 24, 2026; aljazeera.net, June 24, 2026). Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem praised Egypt’s position, calling it responsible and reflecting an understanding of the Palestinians’ needs and of the proper way to fully implement the ceasefire agreement (Hazem Qassem Telegram channel, June 24, 2026).
Relating to reports in Israel about discussions within the political and military leadership regarding the promotion of voluntary migration from the Gaza Strip, Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said the holding of “Zionist security meetings” to discuss the future of the residents of the Gaza Strip and the revival of plans related to their displacement was a dangerous development and reflected intentions which contradicted talk of peace and stability (Hamas Telegram channel, June 25, 2026). He welcomed the statement by the Gulf States and the United States regarding their opposition to an attempt to force the residents of the Gaza Strip to leave (Hazem Qassem Telegram channel, June 26, 2026).
The Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip
Nikolay Mladenov reportedly instructed the committee for the administration of the Gaza Strip not to give media interviews. The committee told the Palestinian factions that its authority was limited solely to administrative matters and did not deal with the Palestinian organizations (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 27, 2026).
Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said that accelerating the entry of the committee and the start of its work had been at the center of the recent discussions in Cairo. He claimed that Hamas had reiterated its willingness to hand over all areas of governance to the committee, including the security portfolio, and accused the Board of Peace of having become dependent on Israeli positions because it had failed to allow the committee into the Strip for months after its establishment (Hazem Qassem’s Telegram channel, June 24, 2026). PIJ spokesman Muhammad al-Hajj Musa shifted responsibility for the delay in the committee’s entry to Israel, claiming it was closing the crossings and vetoing the entry of the committee members. He said the Palestinian organizations had held direct contacts in Cairo with the committee’s chairman and members, expressed their willingness to receive it and assist its work, while the committee members said they were prepared to fulfill their duties but were prevented from doing so because of the Israeli veto (al-Araby al-Jadeed, June 27, 2026).
Members of the national committee for the administration of the Gaza Strip meet in Cairo with the EU’s representative to the Middle East peace process, Christophe Bigot (X account of the national committee for the administration of the Gaza Strip, June 25, 2026).
The Failure of the “June 26 Revolution ”
The attempt to promote widespread protests in the Gaza Strip against Hamas rule because of the difficult conditions in the Strip under the banner of the June 26 Revolution failed, as the call for demonstrations received little response (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 27, 2026). The organizers accused Hamas operatives of being stationed in displacement camps and in areas where Gazans had gathered, which affected attendance. They said the movement would continue its activities and continue to operate until Hamas met its demands and allowed residents to take to the streets and express their views freely (June 26 Revolution Facebook page, June 26, 2026).
One of the protest organizers, Abd al-Hamid Abd al-Atti, said that although the movement had failed to achieve all its goals, it had revealed several facts. He noted the exposure of an “unprecedented campaign of treason, defamation and incitement” against every voice opposing the movement, of the extent of the fake news attributed to the protest movement, of the positions of institutions and figures which remained silent, of the extent of the disappointment with part of the Palestinian media’s coverage of the Gazans’ suffering and the proof that the suffering could no longer be concealed. He said the movement might have been suppressed, but the reasons that drove the Gazans to it remained, and they did not intend to remain silent (Abd al-Atti Facebook page, June 26, 2026).
Palestinian sources reported that the event failed because Hamas had deployed armed operatives in the protest areas, preventing civilians from reaching them. According to a report, in Beit Lahia one of the Hamas operatives stationed there to intimidate protest participants was targeted from the air (Jusoor News Facebook page, June 26, 2026). The Hamas-affiliated Khalik Wa’i (“Be Aware”) channel denied reports that the failure of the initiative resulted from a Hamas “security deployment” in Gaza. According to the channel, no “security deployment” had been documented and the security situation and the constant presence of Israeli aircraft prevented any gathering or security deployment (Khalik Wa’i Telegram channel, June 27, 2026).
According to a Hamas source, it had prevented the protests “lest Israel exploit them to target ‘security operatives’ during their deployment and armed groups and gangs would exploit the situation to infiltrate population centers and create internal chaos.” However, the source admitted that the security situation and the strengthening of the armed groups genuinely concerned Hamas, which feared the protests might undermine its control and impose a new situation on the ground. Therefore, instructions were issued to deal with “attempts to create chaos,” along with a media campaign coordinated with the clans to prevent the initiative (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 27, 2026).
Civilian Governance
The Hamas government emergency committee said that until the national committee for the administration of the Gaza Strip began its work, the emergency committee would manage the relevant institutions and maintain public order. The committee noted its commitment to safeguarding the “security of the Gazans” while preserving the unity of the people in the face of “IDF aggression.” The committee accused Israel of responsibility for the poor living conditions in the Strip (Palestine Online Telegram channel, June 24, 2026).
The chairman of the Sharia judicial council in the Gaza Strip, Sheikh Hassan al-Juju, said the Sharia courts had returned to almost full operation despite the shortage of judges and staff, after three of the 30 judges and about 20 employees had been killed during the war. He said the Sharia courts had certified the deaths of 10,000 Palestinians who had been buried under the rubble or whose deaths had been witnessed during the war but whose bodies could not be buried because of the circumstances. Approximately 10,000 more were missing persons who had disappeared during the war (Aljazeera.net, June 22, 2026).
Sources in the Gaza Strip reported that Hamas was facing a severe financial crisis. According to the report, the movement pays 60% of their salaries to its operatives in both the political and militarywings every month or every 40 days, with a minimum payment of $400. The Hamas government, on the other hand, barely pays its employees 1,000 shekels (about $335) every 70 to 80 days (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 26, 2026).
After support for Hamas and its political bureau head, Khalil al-Hayya, appeared in the comments to a post by the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), examination revealed that many of the comments originated from accounts located outside the Gaza Strip, including in Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and Kazakhstan, as well as from accounts linked to Iranian elements. According to the COGAT, they were the result of Hamas’ difficulty in generating genuine support from within the Gaza Strip and therefore its attempt to create the appearance of public support through suspicious accounts operating from abroad (COGAT Facebook page, June 29, 2026).
Security Governance
Four “collaborators” were reportedly executed in the early morning hours of June 24, 2026 (Amsik Amil Telegram channel, June 24, 2026), and according to reports, a day later, a group of “collaborators” with the IDF was arrested while in possession of weapons and explosive devices. They allegedly confessed to planning acts of sabotage in several areas (al-Akhres Telegram channel, June 25, 2026). Subsequently, Hamas’ “resistance security” announced it had “neutralized six collaborators” within two days and confiscated weapons, equipment, vehicles and communication devices, and the pursuit of “collaborators” was continuing in various areas throughout the Gaza Strip (al-Akhres Telegram channel, June 27, 2026).
Hundreds of civilians and armed Hamas terrorist operatives participated in the cortège of nukhba operative Walid Haniyeh, who was killed in an Israeli strike in Gaza City. The participants chanted, “We are the al-Qassam fighters, and, Khaybar, Khaybar, O Jews, October 7 will soon return.” Haniyeh was the nephew of former political bureau chief Isma’il Haniyeh, who was killed in July 2024 (Mustafa al-Rantisi Facebook page, June 26, 2026).
The director general of the water authority in the Gaza Strip, Dr. Munther Salem, said there was a severe water and sanitation situation because the “near-total” collapse of the infrastructure. He claimed 85%-90% of the water and sanitation systems had been destroyed, more than 80% of the wells were out of service, about 85% of the private desalination facilities were inoperative and more than 120 km of main pipelines had been damaged. He added that daily water production had declined from about 300,000 cubic meters before the war to less than 120,000 cubic meters in February 2026, while about 70% of the water was lost through the network because of breaks and illegal connections. As a result, about 85% of the population of the Gaza Strip had no access to clean water and was forced to rely on irregular water truck deliveries, a situation which was becoming severe with the onset of summer (aljazeera.net, June 23, 2026).
The director of al-Shifa medical complex, Dr. Muhammad Abu Salmiya, said the supply of sodium bicarbonate, which is used in dialysis to neutralize metabolic acidosis and costs less than $1, has been completely exhausted because its entry was prevented, threatening the lives of about 650 patients suffering from kidney failure, including 250 patients at al-Shifa medical center. He claimed the medical teams had been forced to shorten dialysis treatments from four hours to two and a half hours, and to reduce the number of weekly treatment sessions from three to two, because of the shortage of the dialysis solution required (Shehab, June 27, 2026). The head of the dialysis department at al-Shifa medical complex, Dr. Ghazi al-Yaziji, said that they had reduced the time and frequency of treatments after 25 dialysis machines could not be used because of the shortage of sodium bicarbonate, leaving only 26 machines operating partially (Hamas ministry of health in Gaza Facebook page, June 28, 2026).
Abu Salmiya also announced the renovation and reopening of the emergency medicine department at al-Shifa medical complex after it had been destroyed during the war (Dr. Muhammad Abu Salmiya’s Facebook page, June 23, 2026). He said the medical teams had restored a large part of the department using available means, but they still had a shortage of beds, air-conditioning systems, radiology rooms, imaging equipment, medical supplies, consumable materials and no CT scanner. He added that during the past two years the outpatient department had served as a temporary alternative and a great deal of medical equipment which had been returned to service, including operating rooms, radiology equipment and dialysis facilities, had been recovered from the rubble, repaired and refurbished (Arabi 21 website, June 28, 2026).
The renovated emergency medicine department
(Dr. Muhammad Abu Salmiya Facebook page, June 23, 2026)
The civil defense directorate in the Gaza Strip accused the Egyptian committee and international organizations of failing to fulfill their commitments to provide heavy equipment for recovering bodies from the rubble. According to the directorate, the delays are undermining the ability of the teams to operate and delaying the recovery of missing persons (Quds Press, June 27, 2026).
Hamas deputy head of the office for Arab and Islamic relations, Bassem Na’im, spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi about the negotiations between Iran and the United States and the Palestinian issue. He welcomed the framework agreement and praised Iran’s support for the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip. Araghchi said Iran would continue to support the Palestinians and would raise the issue of Gaza with the mediators in the international arena and in its contacts with the United States (Hamas Telegram channel, June 23, 2026).
Hamas sources said the objective of the conversation was to help ground the ceasefire and explore the possibility that Iran would exert pressure to put the Gaza Strip on the agenda of the negotiations, similar to its influence in the Lebanese arena. However, they acknowledged that the prospects were limited because of the desire of the United States and Israel to separate the fronts and because Hamas understood that for some time Gaza had been handled as a separate arena (al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 24, 2026).
Counterterrorism
Israeli security forces continued extensive counterterrorism operations throughout Judea and Samaria, detaining more than 100 wanted Palestinians, including Hamas-affiliated suspects, suspects wanted for rock-throwing and Molotov cocktail attacks and suspects involved in the possession and trafficking of weapons. Seven drones, weapons and other military equipment, and incitement propaganda were seized. In the village of al-Jib, near Jerusalem, a weapons cache concealed inside a water cistern was exposed, containing rifles and explosive devices. In the village of Yamun, west of Jenin, a weapons dealer was eliminated. He had supplied weapons to a terrorist who wounded two IDF soldiers (IDF and Israel Police Spokespersons, June 23-30, 2026). The ministry of health in Ramallah reported the death of a 15-year-old who was shot by IDF forces in al-Bireh (Wafa, June 29, 2026).
Right: Security forces during the operation to remove the weapons from the water cistern.
Left: The weapons (Israel Police Arabic Telegram channel, June 26, 2026)
PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas sent letters to Pope Leo XIV, the King of Jordan, the presidents of Russia and France, the prime ministers of Greece, Spain, Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom and the secretary general of the United Nations regarding the actions of the Jerusalem Municipality, which he claimed were “directed against churches and church institutions in east Jerusalem,” particularly the attempt to impose municipal property taxes on them. He called it a violation of the existing legal and historical status quo and alleged it was a direct attack on the Christian presence and on the religious institutions in Jerusalem. He said no action by the “occupation authorities” could be interpreted as granting Israel sovereignty or legal or judicial guardianship over east Jerusalem or over its religious institutions and the Islamic and Christian holy endowments. He called on the churches not to agree to the unilateral measures or enter into any arrangements with the “occupation authorities” (Wafa, June 27, 2024).
PA prime minister Muhammad Mustafa met in Ramallah with the EU commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, and other European representatives, to discuss the need to promote regional security, stability and peace by ending the war in the Gaza Strip and achieving an independent Palestinian state in accordance with international law and UN resolutions. He condemned Israel’s policy in the “Palestinian territories,” claiming Israel wanted to dismantle the Palestinian security forces and institutions and undermine the two-state solution, adding that the economic situation threatened the ability of the Palestinian institutions to continue functioning. He called on the EU and international partners to continue supporting the PA, promote the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803 [the American 20-point plan] and strengthen institutional and economic reforms. He added that the Gaza Strip was an integral part of the “State of Palestine” and the PA was the legitimate body to assume responsibility for its reconstruction and administration (Wafa, June 23, 2026).
In the spirit of the World Cup, a call to isolate Israel
(Facebook page of Alaa al-Laqta, Hamas’ inhouse cartoonist, June 24, 2026)
[1] Click https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en to subscribe and receive the ITIC’s daily updates as well as its other publications.
[2] See the December 2025 Amit Institute report, About 60% of the Gazans Classified as “Journalists” and Other Media Personnel Killed in the Gaza Strip War Belonged to Hamas and Other Terrorist Organizations
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