Land for hostages? Trump’s Gaza plan redraws the map and revives far-right settlement

According to the initial IDF withdrawal map from the Gaza Strip, presented Saturday by U.S. President Donald Trump, once Israeli forces pull out of Gaza City, the Netzarim Corridor in the center of the seaside enclave and wide areas of Khan Younis and Rafah in the south, Hamas will be able to return to these areas alongside the local population and begin rebuilding its infrastructure, but this time, it will face significantly greater difficulty.

Though vague and somewhat abstract, the “yellow line” map circulated by the Trump administration as a proposed initial withdrawal zone in exchange for the release of hostages grants the IDF temporary — and, if negotiations collapse, potentially permanent — control over territory that exceeds the current buffer zone. Still, control over most of Gaza’s urban and built-up areas would be handed back to Hamas. The plan is meant as a stepping stone toward negotiations for a full end to the war, now entering its third year.

The initial IDF withdrawal map from the Gaza Strip presented by US President Donald Trump

It is likely that the map intentionally includes several problematic clauses to serve as bargaining chips in the coming days as Israel and Hamas attempt to reach agreement on the deal’s first phase.

For example, under the “yellow line” proposal, Israel’s security buffer along the Gaza border has been doubled or even tripled in certain areas compared to its current configuration. Over the past year, most frontline IDF posts — known as forward operating bases — have been positioned 700 to 800 meters from the border fence. This distance was chosen for its topographical advantage: it allows forces to monitor and control the “Ridge 70,” a 70-meter-high elevation that overlooks much of the Gaza interior.

The yellow line extends IDF control beyond those existing positions to deeper areas: up to 1.5 kilometers in central Gaza, 3 kilometers opposite Gaza City, 3.5 kilometers in northern Gaza and as much as 6.5 kilometers in the south.

While this expanded footprint provides greater operational depth to repel threats from the border, the IDF has already spent the past 18 months constructing a new line of defense closer to the fence, aimed at preventing another large-scale infiltration like that of October 7.

Humanitarian aid distribution center, in Nuseirat, central Gaza

(Photo: Eyad BABA / AFP)

This new line has already proven its worth, having withstood repeated attacks on its posts — including one just last week on a position in the buffer zone between the border near Kibbutz Kisufim and eastern Khan Younis.

Since Israeli officials were involved in shaping the map, it is reasonable to assume that part of their intent was to preserve gains made by the IDF during Operation Gideon’s Chariots I. These included the flattening of thousands of buildings in neighborhoods and villages near the buffer zone and border — within 2 to 3 kilometers of the fence — to prevent Hamas from reconstructing its tunnel warfare infrastructure. With the terrain now flattened, terrorists would be exposed if they attempted to dig new tunnels.

For example, in the Abbasan neighborhoods of eastern Khan Younis, near the border, paratrooper units flattened 2,137 structures between May and July, including some four-story buildings. Hundreds of additional buildings were leveled in the eastern part of Gaza City, particularly in the Shijaiyah neighborhood, close to the border. In these areas — which under the proposed “yellow line” would remain on the “Israeli” side — tunnels and shafts still exist, even near IDF buffer-zone positions.

Political sources said Saturday night that under the “yellow line” map, “Beit Hanoun, Rafah and part of Khan Younis” would remain under Israeli control. That is technically correct, but these are largely urban zones that the IDF had already flattened over the past year.

IDF forces in Gaza

(Photo: AP Photo/Ariel Schalit)

Long-range Kornet anti-tank missile system

(Photo: Yariv Katz)

In the south, the “yellow line” pushes much deeper into Gaza, creating a wider safety buffer for border communities such as Kerem Shalom and the Eshkol region. In the north, the proposed line extends the buffer far beyond the train line in Sderot, distancing it from Beit Hanoun and the outskirts of Jabaliya — areas from which terrorists once fired long-range Kornet anti-tank missiles at Israeli rail cars.

On the other hand, and contrary to earlier assessments, two years of fighting in Gaza have produced no evidence that Palestinian factions possess the Kornet missile. Hamas has not used it at all, and extensive intelligence gathered through raids and ground maneuvers found no trace of such weapons in Gaza. The anti-tank missiles used heavily by terrorists remain mostly of the RPG family, with ranges of several hundred meters to about a kilometer or slightly more. The government, years late, fortified the Sderot railway during the war.

As for the corridor routes cut by the IDF through southern Gaza during Operation Gideon’s Chariots I — intended as leverage for a hostage-for-withdrawal deal — the “yellow line” map indeed includes a partial pullback from the Magen Oz and Morag corridors. Part of the north–south Magen Oz corridor is to remain under Israeli control throughout negotiations toward a comprehensive agreement, effectively keeping eastern Khan Younis separated from its western half.

(Photo: Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)

There will, however, be a broader withdrawal from the Morag Corridor, which runs east–west between Khan Younis and Rafah — the only Gazan city where the IDF conducted industrial-scale demolitions, virtually erasing an entire urban area.

In the ruins of Rafah, several dozen Hamas operatives are still believed to be hiding, mainly in the al-Jenina neighborhood, and some have killed IDF soldiers in the past month. The implication is that in both Rafah and Khan Younis — east and west — tunnel networks, large and small, remain active, meaning the area’s full military pacification has yet to be achieved.

In western Khan Younis, Hamas is in a much stronger position. In the densely packed displacement zones of the nearby al-Mawasi “humanitarian area” along the coast, thousands of registered Hamas fighters and commanders are concealed among civilians. Many of them attempt, almost daily, to stage attacks from there — using tunnels — against IDF defensive positions along the Magen Oz and Morag corridors. Those defensive positions, meanwhile, are now being reinforced into permanent military outposts.

The Trump map calls for a full withdrawal from the northern route, the older Netzarim Corridor. The road cuts across Gaza for about eight kilometers, from the border to the sea, separating Gaza City in the north from the central and southern regions. The IDF already withdrew from most of this area during the last hostage deal in January. That pullout was quickly exploited: at the start of this year, roughly one million Palestinians — including an estimated 10,000 Hamas terrorists — returned to Gaza City.

On the surface, the “yellow line” map looks like a dream scenario for Israel: one of the war’s main goals — the return of the hostages — would finally be achieved, while the IDF would still retain control over a buffer zone deeper than the one that currently exists. This would push threats farther from sensitive areas and, in the south, give Israel control over Rafah’s “underbelly,” allowing it to preserve its recent military gains there and prevent Hamas from rebuilding in that sector.

Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich

(Photo: Gadi Kabalo)

If negotiations collapse after the hostages are freed and Israel again finds itself in a stalemate with Hamas, the “settlement dream” of ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir in certain parts of the Gaza Strip would remain alive. Under such a scenario, the IDF would still control areas that were under Israeli authority before the 2005 disengagement.

In the north, the Nisanit ridge would remain under Israeli control, and in the south, parts of what was once Gush Katif would stay in Israeli hands — thanks to continued control of the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egyptian border.

On the other hand, if Trump’s optimistic Middle East vision collapses into paralysis or renewed fighting, Hamas would benefit from regaining control over most of Gaza’s populated areas — even if some remain in ruins. The organization would control the majority of towns in northern Gaza and Gaza City itself, as well as Deir al-Balah and the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza, where the IDF did not maneuver during the war and where Hamas’ two local battalions remain largely intact.

Hamas would also continue to hold most of western Khan Younis and parts of northern Rafah. It is no coincidence that Smotrich and Ben-Gvir have offered passive support for a deal with Hamas by simply remaining in the government. Few would be surprised if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented Ben-Gvir with a scenario in which, in the “worst case” — which the national security minister would see as a best case — Israel retrieves all the hostages, withdraws from Gaza but not entirely and resumes fighting later, all while the IDF continues to hold several square kilometers of Gazan territory.

Israeli flag flown over Hamas

(Photo: Yoav Zitun)

The question is whether Hamas will agree — and, above all, what guarantees Israel and the United States have provided to Hamas and Qatar that after the withdrawal to the “yellow line” and the release of 48 hostages, Israel will conduct genuine, good-faith negotiations toward a comprehensive deal to end the war.

If not, and the talks collapse, the war would effectively end — at least temporarily — to the satisfaction of almost everyone involved: Hamas would be too militarily weakened to attempt another October 7 but would still control its population and retain the leverage to rebuild its organization, along with several months of a tenuous ceasefire and relative calm.

Israel, for its part, would achieve one of its most urgent war objectives — the full and emotional release of the hostages — while enjoying a period of internal and international quiet. Trump would present this as the de facto end of the war (which has long since wound down militarily), and the IDF would finally be able to rest, retrain, and rebuild after two exhausting years of combat.

Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, too, would come out ahead: although fighting in Gaza would pause, the “yellow line” would leave sufficient sections of Gazan territory under Israeli control — enough to keep their political ambitions alive.