The Blogs: How Israel’s Greatest Victory Became Its Greatest Problem | Eli Hassell

May 1967 was a frightening month for Israel. The Soviet Union had informed Egypt that Israeli forces were massing on the Syrian border (in preparation for an attack). This intelligence was a complete fabrication but, regardless, the Arab states treated it as real – and as an opportunity to destroy Israel once and for all.

In response, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai Peninsula, where it had been stationed since the 1956 Suez Crisis, and instead deployed around 100,000 Egyptian troops into Sinai. Egypt then closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping – a move that Israel had explicitly stated would constitute casus belli – and Nasser publicly announced, on national radio, Egypt’s readiness for war. Shortly after, Egypt signed mutual defence agreements with Jordan, Iraq and Syria, which all moved forces to Israel’s borders.

Israel faced an existential threat. There was a big military danger, but alongside to that, there was also a severe economic risk. According to renowned historian Benny Morris, due to this threat, Israel had mobilised roughly 10% of its workforce into their army, which was unsustainable for a long period of time – especially for such a small and fragile economy. A prolonged mobilisation could have caused economic collapse, threatening the state’s survival even without a battlefield defeat. Israel was essentially facing two existential threats: militarily and economically.

Faced with this reality, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike on the 5th of June 1967, destroying around 90% of Egypt’s aircraft and giving Israel complete air superiority for the following days. Over the next six days, Israel did extraordinarily well. They defeated multiple Arab armies and captured a lot of territory: the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. And on the 10th of June, the United Nations brokered a ceasefire.

The war was an extraordinary success. Israel, fighting several states simultaneously, had not only survived but expanded its territory by around four times. Yet the victories didn’t stop there.

Israel annexed East Jerusalem and later the Golan Heights, and viewed the other territories as bargaining chips for peace. Levi Eshkol, Israel’s Prime Minister, attempted to do so almost immediately after the war. However, the Arab League responded with the Khartoum Resolution- famously declaring “no peace, no recognition, no negotiations with Israel” – and closed that door. Over time, Israel did manage to trade land for peace: in 1979 it returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in exchange for a peace treaty, and in 1994 Jordan also signed a peace treaty (although this time without giving up any territory).

On paper, this war was a huge success for Israel. But despite these achievements, the war had devasting effects on Israel: their oppresion over the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza enabled and encouraged the growth of the Palestinian independence movement.

After 1967, Israel controlled the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Sinai was eventually returned to Egypt. In the Golan Heights, much of the local Druze population received Israeli citizenship and gradually integrated into Israeli society. In East Jerusalem, the local Palestinians were offered permanent residency and the option to apply for Israeli citizenship, though only a minority did so, leaving hundreds of thousands without citizenship today.

The core problem, however, lay in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians there were not offered citizenship at all.

Israel faced a dilemma. Fully annexing these territories would require granting citizenship to the local Palestinians, which would have threatened Israel’s Jewish demographic majority – and which is incompatible with the state’s founding purpose. It seemed like Israel would hold onto the territories pending peace agreements with their neighbouring Arab states.

But over time, especially since the 1960’s, Palestinian national identity became the dominant framework for resolving the conflict. Egypt and Jordan no longer sought to reclaim Gaza or the West Bank, and Israel was unwilling to hand the territories to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, whose founding charter rejected the existence of a Jewish state outright.

The result was an unresolved status quo. Israel retained control over borders, airspace, and security in the West Bank and Gaza, while refraining from formal annexation. At the same time, it supported the establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements – particularly in the West Bank – while maintaining military rule over the Palestinian population.

Today, over 500,000 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank. They are governed by Israeli law and enjoy full political rights. Palestinians living alongside them are subject to military law, lack voting rights in Israel, and are treated as non-citizens in a territory Israel effectively controls. Israeli historian Benny Morris describes this system as “an apartheid regime based on nationality”.

Around five million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza live under this reality. They experience Israeli authority without political representation, and the legal inequality between settlers and Palestinians is evident and stark. This dynamic dominates the online narrative surrounding Israel where footage of the unequal treatment is commonly found. Domestically and regionally, it has fuelled Palestinian nationalism and made the conflict increasingly intractable.

Historian Benny Morris has argued that Israel should have found a way early on to relinquish the West Bank to Jordan. By failing to do so, Israel locked itself into a situation with no clean exit.

Israel resoundingly won the Six-Day War, which helped reshape the Middle East. But the continued control of the West Bank and Gaza, the expansion of settlements, and the permanent denial of rights to millions of Palestinians has created a reality that is unsustainable.

In that sense, the 1967 war was a decisive short-term victory – but one that may yet prove to be Israel’s greatest long-term defeat.

Eli Hassell is a UK-based political analyst and YouTube host. His interviews and panel discussions with key media and government figures across the UK, USA, and Israel have attracted tens of thousands of viewers. Eli has also been featured on major global media outlets, including BBC News and ITV News.