Asharq Al-Awsat, London, August 1

Seven years ago, I wrote about “Israel’s regional rise.” Today, its presence looms even larger, shaping the massive geopolitical shifts that followed the attacks of October 7. In the aftermath, a pressing question emerges: How does Israel view itself now? It seems unlikely that Israel will remain content with its old role as a defensive actor confined to its disputed borders. Instead, it appears poised to pursue political ambitions that mirror its military strength.

For half a century, Tel Aviv’s strategy centered on survival, on defending its existence and its long-held territories while countering threats from powers like Iran and navigating the hostilities of regimes such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Hafez Assad’s Syria.

But that era is over. The neighboring powers that once challenged Israel have been weakened or dismantled. For the first time in its modern history, Israel faces no regional force capable of posing an existential threat. Even Iran, long its most formidable adversary, lacks the offensive capacity to challenge Israel today. While this balance could shift if Tehran rebuilds its power, such a reversal appears distant and uncertain. As circumstances evolve, Israel’s strategy shifts with them. It is no longer merely a border guard; it seeks to become an assertive player in the regional arena. The Middle East today is fragmented, alliances blurred, and many actors are waiting for a resolution to conflicts that have left the so-called Tehran axis greatly diminished.

Two paths lie before Israel. The first is to cast itself as a stabilizing force, one that preserves a fragile new order and engages its neighbors in pursuit of peaceful coexistence. This would mean moving past the decades of war and boycotts, normalizing relations with more Arab states, and consolidating its geopolitical position by neutralizing any remaining hostile groups.

The second path is more disruptive: Israel could wield its superior power to reshape the region to suit its political vision and interests, raising the specter of fresh confrontations. Regional states have long harbored concerns about such ambitions. Past regimes, from Saddam’s Iraq to revolutionary Iran, viewed Israel as a rival standing in the way of their own expansionist dreams, cloaking their hostilities in the language of Palestinian solidarity. Hamas’s October 7 attacks propelled Israel further into the regional equation, positioning it not just as a reactive actor but as a force with wider ambitions.

Does Israel envision itself as a partner in coexistence, or as a regional powerbroker? Is it becoming the Middle East’s self-appointed policeman? Recent actions suggest Israel seeks a central role in the region’s political and military contests—whether as a direct combatant, a power broker, or even a leader of new alliances. It has already moved to block Iraqi involvement in Syria and curb Turkish influence. Meanwhile, the Netanyahu government’s appetite for continued conflict has reignited fears of a “Greater Israel” agenda and dreams of territorial expansion. Yet these notions are largely stoked by Israel’s adversaries—Iran, Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood, and leftist groups—who warn of expansionist plots to rally opposition. In reality, Israel’s small size and its preoccupation with absorbing the territories it seized in 1967 limit such ambitions. For decades, it has poured resources into entrenching its hold on these areas, fending off efforts to establish a Palestinian state or return lands to Jordanian or Egyptian control.

Geography is not Israel’s greatest challenge—demography is. The state is committed to preserving its Jewish identity, yet 20 percent of its citizens are Palestinian. Annexing the occupied territories would push Palestinians to half the population, threatening the state’s defining character. This demographic reality makes expansion unlikely but raises fears that extremists might exploit chaos, as they did in the aftermath of October 7, when Hamas’ attacks were used as a pretext for mass expulsions in the West Bank and Gaza. Such actions, while possible, remain politically fraught.

Talk of a “Greater Israel,” illustrated by speculative maps and ideological manifestos, feels closer to myth than policy—a counterpart to the nostalgic Arab and Islamic longing for lost Andalusia. Israel seeks dominance, but it dreads the inevitable demographic fusion that would follow annexation, a fear unlike that of most Middle Eastern states that absorbed multiple ethnic groups in their formation.

Politically, Israel’s future course remains undefined. Fresh from its recent military successes, it is still shaping its long-term strategy. Whether it chooses to become a peaceful state open to Arab neighbors or a regional enforcer perpetually engaged in battles, one truth persists: The Middle East is too complex, too driven by competing forces and ambitions, for any single power to fully dominate it.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed (translated by Asaf Zilberfarb)