The current Chinese ambassador to Israel, Xiao Juncheng (who assumed his post in November 2024), is leading an intensive public diplomacy strategy aimed at repairing relations that were significantly strained following the events of October 2023. China’s recent strategy toward Israel has been characterized by what could be termed parallel diplomacy, attempting to build bridges with liberal, civil, and human rights forces to offset the sharp tension with the ruling far-right in Israel and its racist policies, including its escalation of tensions with Iran, the Knesset’s law to execute Palestinian prisoners, and, prior to that, the Gaza war. China’s relationship with Israeli civil and human rights elites is marked by extreme pragmatism, with Beijing focusing on economic, technological, and research cooperation, setting aside ideological and political differences. While China is building partnerships with Israeli financial and academic elites, its official positions remain pro-Palestinian and supportive of the two-state solution, creating a delicate balance amidst mounting American pressure.
Through its embassy in Tel Aviv, China seeks to cultivate and strengthen ties with Israeli civil society and human rights elites. Despite Israel’s official political stance toward China and the conflicting interests between them, China fosters soft relations with Israeli academics, businesspeople, and research institutions, portraying these relationships as a continuation of a historical friendship to bolster the moral foundation of material interests. The Chinese ambassador to Tel Aviv, Xiao Juncheng, focuses his efforts in this regard on several fronts to strengthen ties with Israeli civil society and non-political sectors, such as leading public diplomacy and engaging with Israeli civil society. China is particularly focused on the China-Israel Friendship Association, with the ambassador holding several meetings with the association’s new leadership in January 2026 to deepen the historical Sino-Jewish friendship, praising its role in strengthening ties between the two peoples. The Chinese ambassador to Israel is keen on conducting field visits to kibbutzim. For example, in January 2026, the Chinese ambassador to Tel Aviv visited Kibbutz Ma’abarot and presented on China’s philosophy of poverty reduction and rural development, linking it to the collective cooperation system in Israeli kibbutzim. Furthermore, the Chinese embassy in Israel is committed to engaging with Chinese and Israeli students. The Chinese ambassador in Tel Aviv makes a point of participating in academic events, such as the Chinese Spring Festival celebrations for Chinese students at the Technion Institute and the Weizmann Institute of Science.
Here, Beijing seeks to invest in soft power and emotional appeals to Israeli liberal, human rights, and civil society elites. China is aware that its pro-Palestinian and pro-Iranian political rhetoric is creating a rift with the Israeli government. Therefore, China resorts to humanitarian diplomacy by deepening cultural and academic ties through scholarships and cultural exchanges with Israeli liberal, human rights, and civil society elites who believe in international openness, far removed from the religious ideology of the extreme right. This is coupled with a Chinese focus on reviving the historical memory of the Jewish people, emphasizing narratives such as China’s saving and hosting of Jews in Shanghai and other Chinese cities during World War II to create an emotional connection that transcends current political crises.
China also seeks to pursue a strategy of aligning itself with Israeli civil society against extremism. Here, China finds in Israeli human rights and liberal elites an indirect partner in criticizing extreme right-wing policies, such as the Israeli Knesset’s law to execute Palestinian prisoners, passed at the end of March 2016. This rapprochement serves China by improving its image, projecting itself as a rational power that supports the values ​​of peace and stability to a civil society concerned about Israel’s international isolation. By creating a balance of pressure, China uses these ties as a soft power tool within Israeli society itself to mitigate trends that could harm Chinese economic interests, such as restrictions on Chinese investments due to right-wing American pressure.
Here, China is working to counter the repercussions of the Gaza war, the Iranian issue, and the issue of Palestinian prisoners after the Israeli Knesset passed a law to execute them. Following the events in Gaza on October 7, 2023, and the tension with Iran, Chinese brands in Israel were severely damaged. Therefore, China is attempting to circumvent this by separating trade from politics, addressing Israeli economic, liberal, civil, and human rights elites, and emphasizing that technological and commercial interests should not fall victim to political disputes surrounding the axis of resistance. China is also strengthening its digital diplomacy by targeting the liberal Israeli youth generation through social media platforms with content that focuses on innovation and human cooperation, aiming to transcend the rigid political narrative.
With the increasing pace of technological and climate cooperation, reflecting the shared Chinese-Israeli interest in climate issues, the Chinese ambassador to Israel participated as a guest of honor at the Israel Climate Change Conference 2026 in Beersheba, emphasizing the enormous potential for technological cooperation between the two countries to address shared environmental challenges. Emphasizing cooperation in the innovation and communications sectors, the Chinese ambassador in Tel Aviv held several meetings with the Israeli ministers of energy and communications to discuss collaboration in renewable energy and advanced communications infrastructure.
Beijing’s interest in Tel Aviv is focused on deepening humanitarian and emotional diplomacy, which can be seen in the Chinese interest in the Israeli hostage file. In a remarkable move during the Chinese reception in Israel on the occasion of the Chinese New Year in February 2026, the Chinese ambassador to Israel offered his heartfelt condolences to the family of Ran Gafili (one of the Israeli hostages), expressing his solidarity with the hostage families and the Israeli people, a message described as an attempt to get closer to the Israeli public sentiment. China’s stance toward Israel since the beginning of the Gaza crisis in October 2023 indicates an attempt to adopt an approach that balances traditional political support for the Palestinian cause with what could be termed humanitarian diplomacy to bridge the gap with Tel Aviv. The hostage issue stands out as a key aspect of this approach. The most prominent manifestation of Chinese interest in the Israeli hostage situation is its demand for the immediate release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas and their Palestinian counterparts held in Israeli prisons. China has repeatedly called, through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its envoys to the United Nations, for the immediate and unconditional release of all civilians and hostages held by both sides. Furthermore, the Chinese Embassy in Israel has been keen to receive the families of the hostages. Beijing has hosted delegations of Israeli hostage families and listened to their demands for intervention with Hamas, which represents a Chinese attempt to demonstrate direct humanitarian empathy that transcends rigid political calculations. In addition to its ongoing engagement with Hamas, China has leveraged its relationships with regional powers and Palestinian factions (including hosting reconciliation talks between various Palestinian factions in Beijing) to push for humanitarian solutions, considering the release of hostages an integral part of a comprehensive ceasefire. While cautiously welcoming the exchange agreements, Beijing has officially endorsed all prisoner and hostage exchange deals reached, such as the January and October 2025 agreements, describing the return of the hostages as a step to awaken the human conscience.
Despite Beijing’s interest in the issue of the Israeli hostages, China initially avoided condemning Hamas by name, focusing its rhetoric on protecting civilians on both sides. China has linked the exchange of Israeli and Palestinian hostages to a ceasefire, arguing that the indiscriminate use of force will not secure the hostages’ release but rather endanger them. China maintains that diplomacy and a cessation of hostilities are the only way to ensure their safety. While China is keen to find a formula for strategic balance, its humanitarian concern for the hostage issue aims to present itself as a neutral peace broker and an internationally responsible actor, in contrast to what it perceives as American bias. This strengthens its influence in the Middle East without engaging in direct confrontation with Israel. It’s worth noting that by early 2026, following several prisoner exchange agreements brokered by China, the Gaza Strip was declared free of living Israeli hostages for the first time since the start of the conflict in October 2023.
On the other hand, China has focused on highlighting and publicly disseminating the economic figures and results of cooperation between the two sides. Despite political differences, the Chinese ambassador in Tel Aviv confirmed that trade between the two countries reached a record high of $33 billion in 2025. China remains Israel’s second-largest trading partner globally, with approximately 25,000 Chinese workers continuing to contribute to Israeli development projects. This intensive activity aims to portray China as a responsible power and a friend to all, attempting to separate economic and technological cooperation from the regional political complexities where Beijing adopts positions that often diverge from official Israeli stances.
Finally, despite China’s persistent efforts, through its embassy in Tel Aviv, to cultivate closer ties with Israeli civil society, human rights groups, and liberals, these efforts face significant challenges. These relations are increasingly strained by strong Chinese criticism of Israeli military operations, both in Iran and in the Gaza Strip, which could impact future cooperation with Israeli elites. Despite these efforts, China faces formidable obstacles, such as Israeli liberal, human rights, and civil society skepticism towards China. Even Israeli liberal elites view China’s alliance with Iran with suspicion, especially given the continued American pressure on Israel. Washington is attempting to steer Israeli civil society and academia away from Chinese influence for security reasons. Therefore, we conclude that China is attempting to build a strategic reserve of relations with the Israeli liberal opposition, civil society, and human rights groups, in anticipation of future political changes in Israel, and to ensure it maintains a foothold in the Israeli mindset, despite its current clash with the far-right Israeli government and its racist policies.