By: Sarit Zehavi, Tal Beeri, and Yaakov Lappin.
After the shed was built, we suspected it served as a cover for an exit shaft of an approach tunnel.
The IDF’s activity and publication regarding the bombing of this area in December 2023 confirmed our September 2023 suspicion. The massive terror attack by Hamas on the communities surrounding Gaza on October 7, 2023, struck Israel with astonishment, not only because of its unprecedented cruelty but also due to the intelligence and operational surprise. Now, two years after the attack, a central question comes into focus: What was the extent of coordination between Hamas, Hezbollah, and their sponsor, Iran, in the period before the attack, and what explains the fact that Hezbollah, despite its deep involvement in the axis, did not fully join the attack in those critical hours on the morning of the Simchat Torah holiday?
An analysis of accumulating information, including intelligence reports, documents seized in the field, leaders’ statements, and operational pattern analysis, points to a complex picture. While the Hezbollah leadership likely did not know the exact date and time of the start of the Hamas attack (Saturday morning, October 7, 06:29), there is almost no doubt that close, strategic, prior coordination took place, guided and funded by Iran, under the doctrine of the “Unity of Arenas.”
This coordination included high-level meetings, approval of operational plans, allocation of resources, and preparations on the ground in the main arenas of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon (as well as in the other arenas: Syria, Iraq, and Yemen), over many months and even years preceding the attack. Why did the full plan, apparently, not come to full fruition that morning? We may never know for certain, but it is clear that something in the tactical implementation went wrong or was changed at the last minute.
The ‘Unity of Arenas’ Doctrine – The Iranian Concept
The main idea that guided the Shiite axis led by Iran is the ‘Unity of Arenas.’ This doctrine posits that Israel must be attacked by air, sea, and land, from several fronts simultaneously, using Iran’s various proxies (Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Syria and Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and of course Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria), with the aim of exhausting it, splitting its forces, and ultimately bringing about its collapse.
This doctrine received a distinct public expression in April 2023. As reported by the Alma Center, the Iranian ‘Jerusalem Day’ events that year (14/04/2023) were marked by the theme of ‘Unity of Arenas’ and ‘the defense of Jerusalem.’ For example, a video was published by the office of the Iranian Leader depicting the joint command center, where the “ground offensive for the liberation of Jerusalem” is planned by a variety of militias.
The official logo of the Iranian Jerusalem Day events in 2023 also emphasized this. In his speech on the same day, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah repeated these messages and warned that “the Israeli attempt to isolate the different arenas is a dangerous game and Israel’s actions in these arenas (Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Lebanon) could lead to war” (Alma Center, report from April 16, 2023).
Even earlier, on April 5, 2023, a Hezbollah propaganda video was distributed that emphasized the “Unity of Arenas.” The Iraqi terror organization Al-Nujaba, an Iranian proxy, also published a propaganda video in April 2023 that linked the various arenas (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen) to the struggle against Israel, alongside a call from Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, for united action from the direction of Iraq and Jordan.
Even after the war broke out, the deputy commander of the IRGC addressed the issue in a way that proved that despite everything that had happened, Iran had not abandoned the idea of a ground invasion of Israel. He added that this was more important to him than another missile attack from Iran on Israel.
Watch video of the IRGC deputy commander.
Preliminary Signs and Preparations on the Ground (2022-2023)
The practical preparations for a coordinated attack began long before October 2023. Starting in the summer of 2022, steps were taken to coordinate the fronts from Lebanon and Gaza. As early as June 2022, Khalil al-Hayya, a senior member of the Hamas leadership, declared in an interview with the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar (Hezbollah’s main mouthpiece) that Hamas was no longer a defensive force but “an offensive force, whose goal is to liberate the land [to conquer the territory of the State of Israel].” He added that “we have a plan for the liberation of [Palestine]” and that “the important thing is to move the next [military] campaign to the very heart of the entity [Israel].”
Subsequently, according to a document seized by the IDF and quoted in an extensive report by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (“Hamas’s Strategy for the Destruction of Israel: From Vision to Reality”), Ismail Haniyeh updated Yahya Sinwar about a secret meeting organized by Saeed Izadi with Nasrallah (Izadi – head of the Palestine branch of the Iranian Quds Force, known as Haj Ramadan, later assassinated in June 2025 by Israel). In this meeting, Hamas representatives presented scenarios for a campaign against Israel. According to Haniyeh, Nasrallah expressed support for the first scenario – “the great strategic campaign” – calling it “realistic,” and it was agreed that the matter would be presented to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
In that same month, July 2022, a report by the Alma Center was published stating that Nasrallah was considering (and may have even made a strategic decision) to go to war in the coming months, following threatening speeches and messages. In a speech delivered on July 13, 2022, Nasrallah began by quoting verses from the Quran from Surah Al-Hajj (verses 39-40), which mean that God will help Muslims who fight those who wrong them. In fact, it seems that Nasrallah was “preparing the hearts” and giving ideological-religious justification for a conflict with Israel.
This signal from Nasrallah, and the direct involvement of a senior Quds Force official, indicated the beginning of the consolidation of a concrete plan for a multi-front attack as early as the summer of 2022.
In our view, the maritime border agreement with Israel actually reflected the change that had occurred in Hezbollah’s strategy – Nasrallah threatened that if there was no agreement, he would go to war and even launched at the beginning of July 2022, three UAVs (which were intercepted) towards the Israeli Karish gas field, which Lebanon claimed was partly in the disputed area.
There was a willingness here to risk war, and if Israel did not take the risk and compromised on the border line (as indeed happened), then Hezbollah gained the demarcation of the border according to the Lebanese position. It was not for nothing that the main headline in the Al-Akhbar newspaper on July 14, 2022, the day after Nasrallah’s speech, was: “Getting our rights or war.” The “Al-Akhbar” newspaper is the main mouthpiece of Hezbollah.
Starting in 2022, we began to identify an increasing open and defiant presence of Hezbollah along the border (operatives of the organization’s geographic units, Nasser and Aziz, who were joined by operatives of the Radwan elite unit returning from Syria), and with this increased presence, provocations began along the border, among other things against the backdrop of the construction of the barrier by the IDF.
At the beginning of September 2022, we published that Hezbollah had entered a high state of alert in preparation for a possible conflict with Israel. Among other things, we based this on the text of an internal Hezbollah leaflet, which reached us at the time, seemingly addressing operatives and encouraging them religiously, spiritually, and mentally ahead of a possible fight. The leaflet stated that victory is near, the commanders and operatives are ready, and “Sahib al-Zaman” (the title of the Mahdi) stands with the operatives. It was also said that the enemy (Israel) is afraid, terrified, and trembling in its home.
The leaflet mentions three symbolic events of ground combat, which Hezbollah considers a “heroic victory”: the battle of Maydoun in 1988 where Hezbollah fought against the IDF, the battle of Dabsheh where Hezbollah operatives succeeded in raising a flag on the outskirts of the IDF’s “Dla’at” outpost in the security zone in 1994, and Jroud—referring to the battles against ISIS and Syrian rebels in Qalamoun and Arsal (Lebanon-Syria border) during the Syrian Civil War.
It should be noted that we could not verify the authenticity of the leaflet, but we assessed that Hezbollah was keeping all options open (regarding the nature and method of action), i.e.: limited/full action, with readiness to act via air and/or sea and/or land.
Spring 2023 marked a further escalation. Starting from March 2023, events began that indicated deterioration, growing coordination, and readiness for a campaign:
March 2023 – Infiltration of a Palestinian terrorist operative from Lebanon through the border fence in the western sector, movement within Israeli territory, and planting of a roadside bomb at the Megiddo junction, which exploded and hit a civilian vehicle passing the junction (March 13).All this was under the direction of Hezbollah (Radwan Force and the Lebanon-Palestine Operations Unit).
March 2023 – On March 21, during the construction work on the border barrier, in the Aita al-Shaab / Shtula area, an anti-personnel mine exploded, injuring two IDF soldiers. It was an accident – an Israeli mine that had been laid many years ago. However, in a document we published immediately after the event. We warned that although the current case was an accident, given that we are observing a drastic change in Hezbollah’s directive in terms of risk management vis-à-vis Israel up to a deterioration into war, it is possible that the next time will be a proactive action by Hezbollah against IDF forces on the border.
April 2023 – Coordinated rocket fire: On April 6 (during the Passover holiday), 34 rockets were launched from Lebanon into Israeli territory in the western sector, a launch carried out by Hamas from Lebanese territory, under the auspices of Hezbollah (see Alma Center report on the subject). This was apparently part of a broader operation, as many more rockets were seized the next day in various areas in Lebanon by the Lebanese army without being launched. It seems that Hezbollah was surprised that Israel did not respond harshly. Two days later (April 8-9), 6 rockets were launched from southern Syria towards the Golan Heights, apparently by Palestinian elements (likely directed by Hamas) operating from there. These events demonstrated in practice the idea of “Unity of Arenas.”
Three days after the rocket fire, on April 9, 2023, Hassan Nasrallah held a meeting with the head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, in Beirut.
This was the second meeting of the senior Palestinian officials that week. Earlier, on April 6, 2023, they also met with the Secretary-General of Islamic Jihad, Ziyad al-Nakhalah.
Leaders’ Statements: In Nasrallah’s speech on April 14, 2023, on the occasion of the last Friday of Ramadan/Iranian Jerusalem Day, he emphasized the weakness of the US and Israel and the strength of the “axis of resistance,” and threatened that Israel’s actions in any arena could ignite an all-out war.
In a document by the Alma Center referring to the rocket fire and these meetings, it was written:
In our assessment, Hezbollah had changed its perception since last summer and is now ready for war with Israel. Nasrallah has already conveyed his ideological and religious legitimacy for a war against Israel during the negotiations over the “Karish” gas field. In light of this, it is possible that Hezbollah approved Hamas’s execution of the rocket attack on April 6. Hezbollah is becoming more and more daring in its actions: incidents and presence on the border fence, as well as very high responsibility and involvement, apparently, in the attack at Megiddo. It seems that Hezbollah wants to “rearrange the cards” with Israel and is ready for war. Otherwise, no one would have carried out such a massive attack from Lebanon towards Israel during the Passover holiday.
In May 2023, Hezbollah held a show of force exercise, inviting many media outlets. During the drill, Hezbollah’s Radwan forces were documented simulating an invasion of the Galilee communities. As we noted above, in tours we conducted along the border during that period, including video documentation of a tour by Hezbollah sector commanders near the fence, we noticed a displayed self-confidence and an open and provocative military presence of the organization.
In a UNIFIL report that reviewed violations of Resolution 1701 between February and June 2023, it was noted, among other things, that there were 600 crossings of the Blue Line from Lebanon into Israel. This huge number in such a short time may reflect preparations for war: preliminary intelligence gathering, testing the IDF’s reaction time, and validating infiltration routes.
Starting from June 2023, it seems that Hezbollah began to physically implement the spirit of Nasrallah’s words regarding the readiness to go to war over the issue of disputed border areas. Hezbollah carried out provocative and even offensive actions in several such disputed areas, displaying a clear and non-accidental pattern of action, also in its timing:
In early June 2023, Hezbollah set up tents in the Har Dov sector, in the Kfar Shuoba area. One tent crossed the Blue Line into Israeli territory and housed about 8 armed Hezbollah operatives. Har Dov is a key disputed area.
On July 05, 2023, Hezbollah operatives crossed the Blue Line in another disputed area – the Meiss al-Jabal area, near the community of Manara.
On July 06, 2023, an anti-tank missile was fired at the fence in the area of the village of Ghajar, while an Israeli patrol was passing there. The missile missed its target. The village of Ghajar is a key disputed area.
On July 12, 2023, four Hezbollah operatives approached the fence in the Al-Bustan area (western sector) and tried to sabotage it. Their area of operation is also considered a disputed area regarding the border demarcation.
In his regular annual speech on July 12, 2023, for the anniversary of the ‘July War’ (the Second Lebanon War, 2006), Nasrallah referred to the above events and noted, among other things, that “one must not remain silent about the occupation of the village of Ghajar… the land of Ghajar will not remain in Israel, nor will the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shouba hills…”
Following the chain of events above, we assessed then that the next stage, in which there would be another escalation and an attempt to cause significant harm to IDF soldiers near the border, was approaching.
Iranian Funding and Direct Involvement
Beyond strategic and ideological coordination, Iran provided the necessary funding and logistical support for the plan. Defense Minister Israel Katz, based on documents seized in Hamas tunnels in Gaza and dated before the attack, said on April 6, 2025, that Israel has in its possession correspondence between the Hamas leadership (Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar) and Saeed Izadi, head of the Palestine Branch of the Quds Force. According to the documents, Deif and Sinwar asked Izadi for $500 million “for the purpose of destroying the State of Israel and the struggle against the US.” Izadi responded affirmatively.
Tehran funneled a great deal of money to Hamas because the goal of destroying Israel is at the top of the Iranian regime’s priorities. Iran’s direct financial involvement in Hamas’s plan of destruction, a plan of which the October 7 attack was a part, is an established fact.
Another report by the Alma Center describes a series of meetings, interviews, and statements in Lebanon between representatives of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas in the context of offensive activity against Israel in the summer of 2023. The series of meetings positions Nasrallah as the central axis through which the Iranians and Palestinian factions coordinate, while in the background is the Iranian concern about normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
In addition to the meetings mentioned in the report above, other meetings were held, at least one of them in Tehran. In June 2023, about 4 months before the Hamas attack, it was reported that Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, flew from Qatar to Iran to meet with the heads of the regime to discuss “new developments in the region.”
The I24 News channel reported that Haniyeh’s arrival in Tehran symbolizes “a very significant improvement in relations” between Hamas and Iran, after an earlier rift due to Hamas’s support for the [rebel] sides fighting in Syria.
On April 26, 2023, then-Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein-Amir Abdollahian, visited Lebanon and met with Nasrallah, along with the leader of Islamic Jihad, Ziyad al-Nakhalah. Abdollahian also toured close to the Israeli border and received a briefing from Hezbollah officials, the content of which is unknown. During a visit to the village of Maroun al-Ras in southern Lebanon, the Iranian minister said he came to declare loudly his support for the “resistance to the occupation,” and said he received a detailed briefing on the situation of the “Palestinian and Lebanese resistance,” and that “their situation is better than ever, while the political and social situation of the Zionist entity is worse than ever.” He also noted that “the Middle East is entering a new era of comprehensive cooperation.”
The Riddle of October 7: Why Did Hezbollah Hesitate?
If the strategic coordination was so tight, and Hamas’s plans for a maximum attack were approved at the highest levels in Tehran and Beirut, why didn’t Hezbollah launch an all-out attack on the northern border at 06:29 on the morning of October 7, simultaneously with the Hamas invasion? This is, perhaps, the central question that remains open. Several hypotheses can be raised:
Tactical surprise by Hamas: It is possible that Hamas moved up the originally agreed-upon date, or changed the details of the plan at the last minute, surprising not only Israel but also its partners in the axis, including Hezbollah, in its timing, but not in the action itself. In an interview with the official Iranian channel “Tasnim,” published in early October 2025, Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani claimed that Hamas did not coordinate the timing of the attack with Iran or Hezbollah.
In an interview with “Tasnim,” Esmail Qaani said that he arrived in Beirut on October 7, 2023, already in the afternoon.
In the image above — which was published on social media and Iranian news sites on October 6, 2025 and is claimed to have been taken in Beirut on the evening of October 7, 2023 — Qaani (third from the left), Izadi (killed; third from the right), Hassan Mahdavi (killed; former commander of the Syria–Lebanon Corps in the Quds Force) are seen together with the leader of Islamic Jihad, Ziyad al-Nakhalah. Qaani stated in the interview that he also met with Nasrallah on the evening of October 7 to discuss Hezbollah’s involvement in the war. The image strongly reflects Iranian involvement and coordination.
Hamas’s Success
–Hezbollah cannot be “second fiddle”: When Hezbollah was surprised by the timing of the Hamas attack, it decided not to join in an immediate invasion format (although it was operatively ready for it), for reasons of honor, i.e.: Hezbollah (the Arab-Shiite) will not be second fiddle to Hamas (the Palestinian-Sunni).Hezbollah wanted to differentiate itself in this context from Hamas and therefore joined “from a distance” the next day (October 08, 2023) and kept the option of an invasion for later.
— At the operational level – Hamas’s staggering success, from its perspective, in the first hours of the attack, and the shock that gripped Israel, caused Nasrallah and the Iranians to recalculate their path. It is possible that they decided to “sacrifice” Hamas, to let it exhaust its initial achievement, and to keep Hezbollah’s Radwan force as a strategic reserve for a later stage, or as a deterrent force that would prevent Israel from responding with excessive force in Gaza or from attacking Iran directly.
Loss of the element of surprise in the north: While the surprise in the south was total, in the north, the IDF got an opportunity to correct its readiness failure and quickly stream numerous forces to the border. A swift evacuation of communities near the fence in the north also occurred after the attack broke out in the south. All of these neutralized the element of surprise that Hezbollah had built on when preparing its Galilee invasion plan. During October, Iran and Hezbollah declared that if the IDF entered Gaza by ground, Hezbollah would invade from the north. This was a statement that was perhaps intended to buy time and prepare its forces better, but it also canceled the initial surprise effect.
Evolving situation assessment: It is possible that the original decision was for Hezbollah to join immediately after Hamas, and after IDF forces moved south, but in light of the developing events on the ground – both Hamas’s success and Israel’s response (IDF deployment on the northern border within hours and the evacuation of communities) – it was decided in Beirut and Tehran to “sit on the fence,” to see how the situation develops, and to prepare the forces for a longer campaign. This was while, in the background, there was a feeling in Hezbollah and Iran that there was no need to waste important cards like Radwan, given the phenomenal achievement of evacuating northern Israel, at a very small price from their perspective.
Whatever the explanation may be, there is no doubt that a coordinated plan existed. The evidence for strategic coordination, for the meetings, for the approval of the plans, and for the Iranian funding is unequivocal. The fact that the tactical execution did not occur as fully planned, or was changed at the last minute, does not negate the severity of the combined threat and the intentions of the elements of the Iranian axis.
Moreover, throughout the war and in fact until the assassination of the Hezbollah leadership in September 2024, the option of a ground attack by Radwan forces was on the table and was apparently discussed in the meeting between Ibrahim Aqil and the Radwan commanders at the time of their assassination on September 20, 2024, and one can even learn about it from the recording of a conversation between Nasrallah and Aqil that was published during September 2025 (see our article on the subject).
Summary
Israel was not prepared to repel a surprise attack by Hezbollah from the north just as it was not prepared for the Hamas attack from the south. The writing was on the wall – all the signs and warnings published publicly by the Alma Center and based on open-source material, and the understanding of the residents on the ground that Hezbollah had changed and the border line was not quiet, indicated that something was happening. As in the south, so too in the north – Israel relied on the concept of advance intelligence warning, on the idea that it was deterring the enemy, and on the belief that it understood its intentions.
(Note – We are referring to Israel’s immediate ability to block Hezbollah, meaning that in our assessment, Hezbollah would have had a good to very good chance of carrying out an invasion and penetrating Israeli territory on October 7, 2023. We are not referring to Israel’s broader defensive and preventive capabilities after the invasion had already begun.)
In the image above – Subterranean approach and attack infrastructure of the Radwan Unit in the Aita al-Shaab/Ramiya area, aimed at the Zar’it–Shtula area. This infrastructure was suspected by us to exist already in September 2023.
The suspicion arose following the construction of a suspicious shed in the summer of 2023, near a known Hezbollah position (“Green Without Borders”), located between Zar’it and Shtula — at the bend where IDF soldiers were abducted in 2006, close to the village of Ramiya.
The road to October 7 was paved with tight strategic coordination led by Iran, under the doctrine of the “Unity of Arenas.” High-level meetings between senior officials from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, the approval of operational plans, dedicated funding from Tehran for the “destruction of Israel,” and open military and propaganda preparations – all these indicate that the attack was not a local initiative by Hamas, but part of a broader strategic move by the Iranian axis, which began to be built back in the days of Qasem Soleimani as the commander of the Quds Force.
Everything was on the table – detailed visual materials on Hezbollah’s invasion plans for the “conquest of the Galilee” were published as early as the beginning of the previous decade and in retrospect are identical in their operational moves to the plan that Hamas carried out on October 7, including marking communities as the main target, and kidnapping civilians to serve as “human shields.” Nasrallah threatened in his speeches over the years that alongside the fire array, the organization had developed an invasion capability and that on the day of reckoning, this would occur from a variety of fronts while “100,000 fighters will invade Israel.”
Watch video of the attack plan.
Hezbollah’s conduct in the first hours of October 7 does not detract from the severity of the proven strategic coordination. It may indicate internal friction within the axis, a mistaken or changing situation assessment, or a cold decision to sacrifice one pawn (Hamas) to preserve Hezbollah for the next campaign (defending the nuclear facilities? And here too Hezbollah did not join during the 12-day war with Iran in June 2025, probably due to the lack of religious sanction from the Supreme Leader.
In any case, although the Iranian axis has suffered massive blows and today its strength is less than its pre-war strength, Iran and Hezbollah have not abandoned the path of resistance. The intentions (based on a deep, radical religious ideology, which in fact renders the concept of “Israeli deterrence” irrelevant in the context of organizations operating on such an ideological basis) and the attempts to rehabilitate and renew the capabilities and the resistance continue in the present and will continue in the future.
Many of the lessons were learned by Israel. But there is one important lesson – this learning must not erode over the years.
The lessons of the Yom Kippur War (October 1973) did not exist 50 years later.
The IDF must ensure that the failure of October 7, 2023 is seared into future generations, so that its lessons do not disappear from its mode of operation in years to come, if and when the threat of catastrophe becomes tangible again.
Appendix: Sequence of Events and Evidence 2022-2023
DateEvent/Meeting/ReportSourceNotesJune 2022Khalil al-Hayya interview: Hamas as an offensive force with a plan for “liberation”Al-AkhbarDeclaration of strategic intentionsJuly 1, 2022Haniyeh-Nasrallah-Izadi meeting in LebanonSeized booty document (quoted by Meir Amit Center)Nasrallah supports the “great strategic campaign” scenario; agreement to present to KhameneiJuly 2, 2022IDF intercepts 3 UAVs that were on their way to the Karish gas field in the Mediterranean SeaIDF Spokesperson, Media and Alma Center PublicationsHint of Hezbollah’s readiness for war with IsraelJuly 13, 2022Nasrallah’s speechAlma Center PublicationsReligious sanction for war against Israel.September 2022Internal Hezbollah bulletin to its operatives.Alma Center PublicationsReligious/moral encouragement for operatives ahead of an expected campaign.March 13, 2023Attack at Megiddo Junction by a Palestinian terrorist sent by Radwan unitMedia outlets and Alma Center PublicationsSignificant escalation by Hezbollah and an operational readiness check for an invasion of the Galilee.April 6, 2023“Unity of Arenas” events: Coordinated rocket fire from Lebanon and Syria, Iranian Jerusalem Day, propaganda videos. Meeting between senior Hamas officials (Haniyeh and al-Arouri) and the leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Ziyad al-Nakhalah.Alma Center publicationDemonstration of multi-arena capability and coordinationApril 9, 2023Nasrallah held a meeting with the head of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, in Beirut.Alma Center publicationCoordination between Hezbollah and HamasApril 5, 2023Nasrallah’s speech/video on “Unity of Arenas”Reported in media / propagandaReinforcement of the ideological messageDuring April 2023The terror organization Al-Nujaba, an Iranian proxy, published a propaganda video linking the various arenas, with a call from Yahya Sinwar for united action from Iraq and JordanMedia reportsComponents of the Iranian axis echo a unified message and clear intentionApril 14, 2023Nasrallah’s speech on Jerusalem DayAlma Center publicationTying all the arenas togetherApril 26, 2023Iranian FM’s visit to Maroun al-Ras and observation into Israeli territoryMedia outlets and Alma Center publicationMay 2023Radwan force show of strength simulating an invasion of the GalileeReported in media outlets and Alma Center publicationOperational preparationMay 2023Tours by Hezbollah commanders on the borderAlma Center publicationOperational readiness for an invasion of the GalileeJune 2023Hezbollah erected tents in the Mount Dov area, crossing the Blue Line.Media outlets and Alma Center publicationsA clear demonstration of Hezbollah’s perception of Israeli “deterrence.”July 5, 2023Hezbollah operatives cross the Blue Line in the Meiss al-Jabal areaMedia outletsOperational readiness check for an invasion of the Galilee.July 6, 2023An anti-tank missile was fired at an Israeli patrol in the area of the village of Ghajar.Media outlets and Alma Center publicationsLikely carried out by a proxy. A significant escalation.July 12, 2023An attempted sabotage of the border fence by four Hezbollah operatives in the Al-Bustan area (western sector).Media outlets and Alma Center publicationsOperational readiness check for an invasion of the Galilee.July 12, 2023Nasrallah’s speech in which he threatens that “the village of Ghajar… will not remain in Israel”Media outlets and Alma Center publicationsPreparing the ground for conflictBefore Oct. 2023Correspondence between Deif/Sinwar and Izadi (Quds Force)Seized document (revealed by Def. Min. Katz)Request for $500 million for the “destruction of Israel,” and Iranian approvalAug-Sep 2023Series of final coordination meetings in Lebanon (Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas)Alma Center publicationApproval of plans
