Another round of conflict with Iran could erupt at any time. At the same time, Israel needs a long-term strategy aimed at putting as much pressure as possible on the Iranian regime and exhausting its military and economic capabilities. Such a strategy could include an accelerated arms race designed to force Iran to deplete its resources. This would require coordination and cooperation with other countries, both Western and Arab, as well as deception and other measures.

Despite the poor state of its economy, the Iranian regime continues to invest in military buildup and poses a clear threat to Israel and other countries. But this also presents an opportunity to weaken the regime.

The United States is already stepping up its economic efforts to weaken Iran. This effort should be strengthened.

In the 1980s, as part of the Cold War, the Reagan administration pushed the Soviet Union into an accelerated arms race. This contributed to the decline of the Soviet empire and was one of the factors behind its eventual collapse. Israel could consider a similar strategy: pushing Iran into an accelerated conventional arms race. Such a strategy would clearly carry risks, but it could also exhaust Iran, particularly given the damage and economic strain it has suffered as a result of the war.

If Iran, like the Soviet Union before it, were to devote most of its money and resources to military buildup rather than its economy and society, this could weaken and eventually destabilize the regime. Despite the repression in Iran, there is a limit to how much the population can endure. At some point, the regime may attempt to introduce reforms, but by then it could be too late, as was the case with the Soviet Union.

Israel could also use deception to encourage Iran to invest substantial resources in developing countermeasures against military capabilities that Israel does not actually intend to deploy. In other words, Israel could ostensibly “reveal” various projects to Iran, through one means or another, that it is not actually pursuing, prompting Iran to invest in ways of countering them.

If such measures were indeed feasible, they could include intercepting Iranian ballistic missiles during their most vulnerable stage—the boost phase; attacking routes leading from missile-launching cities by deploying large numbers of sophisticated, difficult-to-detect mines from the air; or launching enormous UAVs carrying numerous small drones capable of penetrating Iranian tunnels and detonating in locations where they could cause significant damage or even collapse tunnels. If Israel invested sufficient effort in creating such deception, Iran could respond by pouring significant resources and money into countering threats that do not actually exist.

Arab countries, following the massive Iranian attacks against them, are likely to continue investing in military capabilities. This, in turn, could pressure Iran to do the same, further depleting its resources. Israel would certainly be concerned about such reciprocal military buildup, but less so than it would be about military buildup by the Gulf Arab states, which have never posed a serious threat to Israel. Israel also maintains relatively close ties with some of these countries, including in the security sphere.

It would therefore be desirable to encourage the Gulf Arab states and Iran to build up capabilities in areas that pose less of a challenge to Israel, such as maritime capabilities. Given the continuing crisis around the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, which could worsen, the Gulf Arab states need stronger naval forces to escort their ships, clear naval mines, and perform other missions.

From Israel’s perspective, naval buildup in the Persian Gulf is the lesser of two evils, as it is relatively less threatening to Israel. This differs from Israel’s concerns over the buildup of naval forces elsewhere in the Middle East, such as those of Egypt and Turkey.

Iran may receive assistance from Russia and China, but China may question the value of investing heavily in Iran, particularly if the Iranian regime appears unstable and another round of conflict seems only a matter of time, with all the damage that would entail. Russia, meanwhile, will face difficulties in assisting Iran given its need to focus on Ukraine and the significant problems facing the Russian economy. Nevertheless, Israel should work, including with the help of other countries, to minimize Chinese, Russian, and other assistance to Iran as much as possible.

The Iranian economy, already in poor shape before the war, is now in significantly worse condition, partly because of the extensive damage it has suffered. The economic pressure being applied by the United States will further strain the Iranian economy. Israel should encourage the United States and other countries to intensify such measures against Iran.

Iran also suffers from economic problems that are directly linked to the regime itself. These include chronic problems such as mismanagement, corruption, waste of resources, and competition over those resources among different factions. These problems are likely to continue and could even worsen as economic hardship increases, making it more difficult for Iran to recover. Combined with the arms race that Israel would seek to impose on Iran, these difficulties could further weaken the country and its regime.

Israel must, of course, be careful not to exhaust itself in the process, given its own significant economic difficulties. Israel’s national debt is now approximately half a trillion dollars, partly as a result of the war.

Israel must therefore avoid falling into a trap similar to the one it seeks to set for Iran. Given the resources required for a long-term strategy to wear down Iran, Israel will need to improve economic efficiency, prioritize what is genuinely necessary, increase exports, and strengthen political, economic, and military assistance and cooperation with other countries, foremost among them the United States.

Israel should also develop a security concept and military doctrine that allow it to sustain a prolonged confrontation without becoming economically exhausted. While Israel clearly needs to increase domestic production, including of ammunition, it will not be possible to achieve complete self-sufficiency. Other solutions should be found through initiative, openness, and diplomatic and military creativity.

Ultimately, Israel should develop a long-term economic and military strategy aimed at weakening the Iranian regime and, ultimately, bringing about its collapse—without weakening itself in the process.