{"id":102205,"date":"2025-10-28T11:32:11","date_gmt":"2025-10-28T11:32:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/102205\/"},"modified":"2025-10-28T11:32:11","modified_gmt":"2025-10-28T11:32:11","slug":"trumps-20-point-plan-doesnt-mention-palestinian-islamic-jihad-why-it-should-matter","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/102205\/","title":{"rendered":"Trump\u2019s 20-Point Plan Doesn\u2019t Mention Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Why It Should Matter"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"mdl-section-article-content__subheader\">Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, told The Media Line that his survey, to be published on October 28, 2025, shows Islamic Jihad support at roughly 1%\u20132% in both Gaza and the West Bank&#13;\n<\/p>\n<p>This Saturday, Israel said it carried out a\u202ftargeted strike in central Gaza against a\u202fPalestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operative it accused of planning an imminent attack on Israeli troops, while the group denied the allegation. Despite heavy criticism, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the strike did not violate the US-backed cease-fire. In parallel, Israel\u2019s foreign minister said Turkey will not be accepted in any proposed international force for Gaza\u2014highlighting Israel\u2019s insistence on vetting who enters the Strip\u2014while US officials reiterated that no American troops will go into Gaza, with roughly 200 US personnel supporting from outside. <\/p>\n<p class=\"tml-content-in-context\">Founded in the early 1980s by Fathi Ibrahim Abdulaziz Shaqaqi, PIJ rejected Oslo-era politics and advanced armed struggle through its al-Quds Brigades\u2014a lineage and posture well-documented in open sources. In interviews with The Media Line, two specialists\u2014Daniele Garofalo, analyst of Islamist rebels and armed groups, and Erik Skare, senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs\u2014explained how PIJ\u2019s ideology, structure, and battlefield behavior diverge from Hamas, and why that matters in both Gaza and the West Bank.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThere are small but important ideological differences between Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,\u201d Garofalo told The Media Line. \u201cHamas has an Islamist ideology linked to the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood (whose ultimate goal is similar to that of PIJ), namely armed resistance, an end to occupation, independence, etc. The PIJ has a more strictly militant and revolutionary ideology; it rejects political compromise and favors \u2018people\u2019s war\u2019 and armed action as the only means,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s fair to say that PIJ is a military movement engaging in the political field, while Hamas is a political movement engaging in the military field<\/p>\n<p>Skare distilled the identity split into one line: \u201cSo although PIJ has a political wing and a political bureau, it\u2019s fair to say that PIJ is a military movement engaging in the political field, while Hamas is a political movement engaging in the military field,\u201d he told The Media Line. That frame also captures their contrasting social footprint: \u201cPIJ has not bothered much about social services, proselytizing or moral policing to the extent Hamas has \u2014 what matters is armed struggle against Israel; everything else comes later. So, in a sense, PIJ aims for liberation for Islamization, while Hamas traditionally has aimed for Islamization for liberation,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n<p>For residents in camp districts from Jabalia to Jenin, the distinction between a political-military party and a military-political movement isn\u2019t theoretical. It shows up in who fixes the power line after a strike, who negotiates the opening of a checkpoint, and who arrives first when shots are fired. Hamas\u2019 governing apparatus is present in those mundane moments; PIJ\u2019s presence is sharper, narrower \u2014 felt in the rhythm of raids and funerals, in the quiet knock on doors that turn cousins into cellmates. That asymmetry is exactly why the two groups behave differently under a fragile truce.<\/p>\n<p>As Garofalo noted, Hamas separates its political bureaucracy \u2014 foreign offices, social organization, propaganda \u2014 from the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades and governs. \u201cHamas governs, exercises territorial control, internal security and administration,\u201d he said. Governance forces trade-offs \u2014 sequencing fire with partners, absorbing international pressure, and keeping the civil apparatus from buckling.<\/p>\n<p>By contrast, PIJ is \u201csmaller, more centralized in its military command, and sometimes acts as a more clandestine structure less interested in civil politics,\u201d he explained. That leanness removes many brakes in crises: \u201c[PIJ] tends to focus on raids, rockets and military operations without the constraints of civil management; this can lead to more reckless escalations, even if Hamas then pays the political and military cost,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n<p>Skare warned against false precision: \u201cWe do not have specific numbers on PIJ\u2019s militants, but some estimates range between 5,000\u20138,000 compared to the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades\u2019 30,000, which gives a sense of differences in size.\u201d What is clearer is the toolset: \u201cPIJ has engaged in the same types of military tactics as its sister movement \u2014 mortars, rockets, ambushes, armed clashes, IEDs and sniper operations \u2014 although Hamas has carried out more complex ambush operations,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n<p>[PIJ] is not Shiite or followers of any Khomeinist line. It\u2019s a marriage of convenience.<\/p>\n<p>On Tehran, Skare stressed ideological independence versus material dependence: \u201c[PIJ] is not Shiite or followers of any Khomeinist line. It\u2019s a marriage of convenience \u2026 the movement has grown de facto dependent on Iran, which limits its maneuverability should their interests conflict, as one saw in 2015\u20132016,\u201d he noted. Garofalo saw the same post-2023 trade-off: \u201cPIJ became more powerful and more militarized \u2026 ties with the IRGC (Quds Force), via Hezbollah, have increased the PIJ\u2019s capabilities \u2026 at the same time, this dependence has reduced part of its strategic autonomy,\u201d he said. Recent US measures against IRGC-QF financial and procurement networks, including crypto and front-company pipelines, illustrate the levers mediators point to when trying to curb PIJ\u2019s tempo.<\/p>\n<p class=\"tml-content-in-context\">PIJ has a long history of absorbing leadership losses,\u00a0 from the 1995 assassination of founder Fathi Shaqaqi onward, by pushing decision-making downward and privileging repeatable tactics (rockets, IEDs, sniper fire) over complex, leader-dependent operations. Decapitation weakens coherence and tempo, but it rarely erases capability: logistics nodes re-route, training flows from Hezbollah and the IRGC adapt, and local commanders regain initiative. That\u2019s why single strikes can calm a sector for weeks yet, by themselves, do not remove the escalatory risk when the political environment shifts.<\/p>\n<p>In Gaza, Hamas\u2019s governing role compels sequencing \u2014 calibrating fire to avoid institutional collapse or losing its political monopoly. Garofalo said on the matter: \u201cIn Gaza, where Hamas is the main governing actor, Hamas must combine military action with administrative responsibilities,\u201d often coordinating operations \u201cto prevent the collapse of the civil apparatus or to preserve its political-military monopoly,\u201d he added. PIJ, lacking that burden, accepts higher operational risk.<\/p>\n<p>In the West Bank, the ecology is local and networked. Skare noted: \u201cThe West Bank cells are mainly locally driven and organized, and function partly as neighborhood watches in absence of any actor providing Palestinians in Jenin, Tulkarm and Tubas, etc., with security against Israeli raids.\u201d Recruitment, he added, turns on \u201cpre-existing social ties where recruitment is driven by who you know and from where you know them,\u201d a pattern that has held \u201cfor both PIJ and Hamas \u2026 since the Second Intifada,\u201d he further added.<\/p>\n<p>Unlike Gaza, the West Bank is mediated by a triangular dynamic: the Palestinian Authority\u2019s (PA) security presence, regular Israeli raids, and PIJ\/Hamas clandestine cells. PA coordination \u2014 uneven and politically costly \u2014 narrows the oxygen for PIJ\u2019s sustained networks, even as short, locally rooted cells keep reappearing. That\u2019s why Jenin or Tulkarm can flare quickly after a single raid or arrest sweep: the cells are social first, ideological second, and state and nonstate pressures don\u2019t remove the pool of recruits so much as keep the cycle intermittent. The result is a pattern of bursts rather than continuous insurgency, with PIJ accepting higher risk precisely because it carries no governance burden.<\/p>\n<p>Garofalo situated those networks inside three drivers: \u201csocial\/youth frustration, local dynamics (clans, refugee camps, territorial identity), and external\/organizational support that enables action and amplifies its scope,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n<p>The current public framing of the 20-point track overwhelmingly references Hamas, yet compliance hinges on PIJ as well. However, PIJ is not explicitly mentioned in President Trump\u2019s 20-point plan.<\/p>\n<p>Compared with Hamas, PIJ is more rigid in exchanges. It seeks leverage and won\u2019t accept deals that look like capitulation; it wants terms and guarantees it can frame as victory<\/p>\n<p>Diplomatically, Skare described PIJ as \u201ca veto player or a junior partner,\u201d and added, \u201cMuhammad al-Hindi \u2026 has met regularly with Hamas\u2019 diplomatic team to be updated on developments, provide advice and make clear what the red lines may be \u2026 Al-Hindi and Secretary-General Ziyad al-Nakhalah have also engaged with mediators such as Egypt. The fact that any ceasefires have been coordinated with PIJ makes it more difficult for PIJ to break or violate them,\u201d he noted. Garofalo called Cairo an \u201cembedded mediator\u201d with limited margins, hence the emphasis on logistics-and-finance pressure to keep PIJ within guardrails.<\/p>\n<p>In practice, the plan\u2019s durability rests on a three-layer mix: first, material pressure on PIJ\u2019s finance and procurement routes \u2014 the only lever that consistently slows its tempo; second, inclusion without governance, which keeps PIJ inside Cairo channels so that violations carry reputational cost across the Palestinian arena; and third, graduated responses by the international force and Israel \u2014 localized, time-boxed actions designed to avoid collapsing Gaza\u2019s civil apparatus while still raising the price of breach.<\/p>\n<p>Garofalo\u2019s view is that PIJ\u2019s stance in prisoner-for-hostage bargaining is more rigid than Hamas\u2019: \u201cCompared with Hamas, PIJ is more rigid in exchanges. It seeks leverage and won\u2019t accept deals that look like capitulation; it wants terms and guarantees it can frame as victory,\u201d he said. That helps explain late-stage brinkmanship in Cairo rounds \u2014 and why small battlefield incidents can quickly test cease-fire tripwires.<\/p>\n<p>One reason PIJ is so militarily present yet politically faint is that support is tiny. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, told The Media Line that his survey, to be published on October 28, 2025, shows Islamic Jihad support at roughly 1%\u20132% in both Gaza and the West Bank, notably low following the announcement of the ceasefire.<\/p>\n<p>Concerning whether PIJ could pivot to governance in Gaza, Garofalo was blunt: \u201cWith regard to a potential government, the PIJ, by statute and doctrine, considers armed resistance to be the only means of liberation; it does not recognize the legitimacy of political processes under occupation. \u2026 First of all, a doctrinal reformulation: the PIJ should redefine jihad from \u2018total and permanent struggle\u2019 to \u2018a means to achieve concrete political objectives,\u2019\u201d he noted. Until then, Gaza and the West Bank will continue to feel the pull of a movement that rejects governance yet shapes escalation from the shadows. As Skare put it, \u201cPIJ has no ambition or capacity to govern both Gaza and the West Bank since it was founded following the principle of \u2018jihad for liberation and not for governance,\u2019\u201d he concluded<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, told The Media Line that his&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":102206,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[42,43,40,38,41,39],"class_list":["post-102205","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-headlines","tag-headlines","tag-news","tag-top-news","tag-top-stories","tag-topnews","tag-topstories"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/102205","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=102205"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/102205\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/102206"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=102205"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=102205"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=102205"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}