{"id":133675,"date":"2025-11-14T22:10:09","date_gmt":"2025-11-14T22:10:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/133675\/"},"modified":"2025-11-14T22:10:09","modified_gmt":"2025-11-14T22:10:09","slug":"why-a-gulf-israel-rapid-response-force-still-makes-sense","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/133675\/","title":{"rendered":"Why a Gulf\u2013Israel rapid response force still makes sense"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">When one of us first argued in <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2022\/09\/05\/israel-gcc-uae-gulf-arab-states-iran-rapid-response-force-military-defense-nato-security\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2022\/09\/05\/israel-gcc-uae-gulf-arab-states-iran-rapid-response-force-military-defense-nato-security\/\">Foreign Policy<\/a> in 2022 that Israel and the Gulf states should form a U.S.-backed multinational rapid-response force, the idea seemed ahead of its time. The Abraham Accords were still fresh, and the notion of Arab and Israeli troops training and operating side by side seemed politically remote. <\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Now, three years later, the logic has not only endured \u2014 it has been tested repeatedly in crisis after crisis.<\/p>\n<p>The region has outgrown ad-hoc security<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">The merit for this concept, which we began developing in 2019 while leading Marines in the Middle East, has only strengthened. The Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Gaza war radiated far beyond the borders of that conflict. Iranian-aligned militias <a href=\"https:\/\/www.longwarjournal.org\/archives\/2025\/06\/iran-backed-shiite-militias-attack-us-forces-based-in-iraq.php\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">struck U.S. and coalition bases<\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.militarytimes.com\/news\/your-military\/2024\/01\/04\/houthis-have-attacked-ships-in-the-red-sea-25-times-since-november\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.militarytimes.com\/news\/your-military\/2024\/01\/04\/houthis-have-attacked-ships-in-the-red-sea-25-times-since-november\/\">Houthi forces<\/a> began launching drones and missiles at Red Sea shipping. The United States response, Operation Prosperity Guardian, was a <a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2025\/04\/how-the-biden-administration-won-tactically-but-failed-strategically-in-the-red-sea\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2025\/04\/how-the-biden-administration-won-tactically-but-failed-strategically-in-the-red-sea\/\">qualified success<\/a>, but it reaffirmed the value of regional maritime responses.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">In April 2024, Iran\u2019s unprecedented barrage of more than 300 missiles and drones toward Israel again exposed the region\u2019s dependence on U.S. coordination. Gulf partners quietly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/world\/iran-attack-israel-hamas-war-saudi-arabia-jordan-uae-coalition-rcna147965\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/world\/iran-attack-israel-hamas-war-saudi-arabia-jordan-uae-coalition-rcna147965\">supplied radar tracking and early warning data<\/a>, demonstrating that cooperation is not just possible but probable when common interests are served. It also confirmed U.S. Central Command\u2019s yearslong focus on integrating air and missile defense as part of a broader <a href=\"https:\/\/www.centcom.mil\/ABOUT-US\/THEATER-STRATEGY\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.centcom.mil\/ABOUT-US\/THEATER-STRATEGY\/\">regional security construct<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Meanwhile, trade and technology ties among Israel and Arab countries have deepened, exemplified by the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.newarab.com\/analysis\/will-uae-israel-land-corridor-replace-red-sea-routes\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.newarab.com\/analysis\/will-uae-israel-land-corridor-replace-red-sea-routes\">UAE-Israel land-corridor project<\/a>, which also transits through Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and now includes <a href=\"https:\/\/timesofindia.indiatimes.com\/world\/middle-east\/uae-israel-land-corridor-expanding-to-egypt\/articleshow\/106268652.cms\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/timesofindia.indiatimes.com\/world\/middle-east\/uae-israel-land-corridor-expanding-to-egypt\/articleshow\/106268652.cms\">Egypt<\/a>. Economic integration has moved faster than security integration, leaving new linkages vulnerable to disruption. We believe this underscores the need for regional security pillars beyond maritime and missile defense, such as cyber, special operations and crisis response.<\/p>\n<p>The case for a standing force<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">A standing response force offers something the Middle East still lacks: a highly trained force integrated across like-minded countries and maintained at peak readiness to respond to the region\u2019s rhythmic crises. <\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">A highly trained force would provide deterrence across a broad range of security challenges, including humanitarian and disaster relief operations, while raising the cost of aggression by a resurgent Iran and its proxies. An integrated force would also generate a basic level of interoperability before the crisis occurs. And a force ready to deploy on a moment\u2019s notice would offer early leverage and decision space for political leaders.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">This vision aligns squarely with President Donald Trump\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/united-states\/case-trumps-second-term-foreign-policy\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/united-states\/case-trumps-second-term-foreign-policy\">emerging foreign policy<\/a> approach: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/how-trump-sees-allies-and-partners\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/how-trump-sees-allies-and-partners\">pushing partners and allies<\/a> to take primary responsibility for their own defense, with the U.S. serving as a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/04\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-reforms-foreign-defense-sales-to-improve-speed-and-accountability\/#:~:text=In%2520tandem%252C%2520this%2520mutually%2520reinforcing,speed%2520to%2520minimize%2520process%2520delays.\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/fact-sheets\/2025\/04\/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-reforms-foreign-defense-sales-to-improve-speed-and-accountability\/#:~:text=In%2520tandem%252C%2520this%2520mutually%2520reinforcing,speed%2520to%2520minimize%2520process%2520delays.\">strategic enabler<\/a> rather than a first responder. The administration\u2019s new defense framework calls for increased <a href=\"https:\/\/www.war.gov\/News\/Releases\/Release\/Article\/4172735\/statement-on-the-development-of-the-2025-national-defense-strategy\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.war.gov\/News\/Releases\/Release\/Article\/4172735\/statement-on-the-development-of-the-2025-national-defense-strategy\/\">\u201cburden-sharing,\u201d<\/a> empowering regional actors to lead while the U.S. provides intelligence, training and high-end support.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Such an approach would not replace the Gulf Cooperation Council\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/intpolicydigest.org\/peninsula-shield-force-gulf-cooperation-council-s-vestigial-organ\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/intpolicydigest.org\/peninsula-shield-force-gulf-cooperation-council-s-vestigial-organ\/\">Peninsula Shield Force<\/a> \u2014 which has rarely deployed in four decades \u2014 but could augment it as either the \u201ctip of the spear\u201d or as an adjacent force legitimized by international agreement. Ultimately, it would show that collective defense need not rely on Western forces alone.<\/p>\n<p>The strategic moment: Riyadh\u2013Washington 2025<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman\u2019s scheduled <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/trump-saudi-arabia-crown-prince-0482a4bdcf5a40f5e7a9effe53f2a1d9\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/trump-saudi-arabia-crown-prince-0482a4bdcf5a40f5e7a9effe53f2a1d9\">visit<\/a> to Washington this month could be the inflection point. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. are reportedly finalizing a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hoover.org\/research\/why-us-saudi-military-agreement-makes-strategic-sense\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.hoover.org\/research\/why-us-saudi-military-agreement-makes-strategic-sense\">mutual-defense pact<\/a> to accompany possible normalization with Israel. If concluded, this arrangement would be the largest realignment since the Abraham Accords. <\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Moreover, Saudi Arabia is continuing with a decadelong <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/events\/2019\/07\/saudi-defence-reform\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/events\/2019\/07\/saudi-defence-reform\/\">military transformation<\/a> effort as part of the Kingdom\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vision2030.gov.sa\/en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.vision2030.gov.sa\/en\">Vision 2030<\/a>. One of its major defense goals is to become a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.arabnews.jp\/en\/uncategorized\/article_155238\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.arabnews.jp\/en\/uncategorized\/article_155238\/\">regional leader<\/a> in military coalitions. To that end, it recently operationalized a new <a href=\"https:\/\/faoajournal.substack.com\/p\/a-us-saudi-defense-pact-might-interrupt\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/faoajournal.substack.com\/p\/a-us-saudi-defense-pact-might-interrupt\">Joint Forces Command<\/a> (modeled on the United Kingdom\u2019s Joint Operational Command and a U.S. combatant command) and continues with comprehensive reorganizations of each Saudi military service using the \u201cbest practices\u201d of many western militaries.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">This convergence creates the perfect environment for launching a Gulf\u2013Israel rapid-response initiative. A Saudi\u2013U.S. pact would provide the anchor; normalization would supply the political glue. Together they could yield the first truly multilateral Arab-Israeli security instrument \u2014 one born of regional ownership and cooperation, not outside imposition.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Just as importantly, such a force would demonstrate that Washington\u2019s new <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mei.edu\/publications\/us-policy-middle-east-second-quarter-2025-report-card\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.mei.edu\/publications\/us-policy-middle-east-second-quarter-2025-report-card\">burden-sharing<\/a> model can work in practice: regional allies assuming the lead, backed by American advisory and technological support.<\/p>\n<p>A rough blueprint for action<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">First, embed the concept in the Saudi\u2013U.S. defense framework. The agreement should include provisions for joint contingency planning and a pathway for participation by other Abraham Accords partners and regional allies \u2014 reflecting the Trump administration\u2019s principle that sustainable security depends on capable partners, not permanent U.S. deployments. From our earlier work, we know the concept suffered from the perception of a lack of \u201cU.S. skin in the game.\u201d The framework should therefore also address this issue head on and note that the U.S. will provide capabilities consistent with U.S. foreign policy.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Second, begin transitioning the concept to reality in 2026. Under U.S. Central Command\u2019s umbrella, conduct deliberate planning next year to develop the response force\u2019s mission, lines of operation and a general organizational structure. Planning should focus initially on mutually agreeable activities like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and, over time, expand into \u201cgray zone\u201d and higher intensity military tasks. U.S. advisers and trainers should facilitate these missions, consistent with the administration\u2019s focus on enabling rather than substituting for regional capacity. <\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Third, institutionalize interoperability. Establish a long-range training plan and, over time, standardize communications and develop shared logistics networks to cohere the organization. With U.S. planning support, technical input and regional oversight, this would model the U.S. administration\u2019s \u201cpartners-first\u201d approach to defense cooperation. In our view, the key to avoiding abstractive delays is to begin with smaller units focused on a narrow set of agreeable missions and build interoperability over time with larger units oriented on a wider spectrum of activities.<\/p>\n<p>Seizing the opportunity<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">The lull since the so-called <a href=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/content-series\/fastthinking\/the-big-lessons-from-12-days-of-war-with-iran\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/content-series\/fastthinking\/the-big-lessons-from-12-days-of-war-with-iran\/\">Twelve-Day War<\/a> last June gives us an opportunity to think more broadly about the Middle East\u2019s security challenges \u2014 border security, drug trafficking, climate change, cyberattacks, Iranian proxies and terrorism. All of these transcend borders, and so too should the region\u2019s responses. The meeting between Trump and the crown prince offers a rare moment when political, strategic and diplomatic incentives align.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">If Riyadh, Washington, and Jerusalem act decisively, they can move the region from episodic coordination to a sustainable security architecture \u2014 one consistent with Trump\u2019s emphasis on America\u2019s allies doing more for themselves, while the U.S. remains the indispensable enabler.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">A Middle East rapid-response force would not only deter aggression \u2014 it would symbolize a new era of partnership and self-reliance.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Sam Mundy is a retired Marine Corps lieutenant general who served as commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command from 2018 to 2021. He serves as an adviser to several companies and works as a consultant in the defense and security sector.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Devin Young is a retired Marine Corps colonel who served as the staff judge advocate and director of strategy and plans of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command from 2018 to 2021. He lives and works in the Middle East as a consultant.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"When one of us first argued in Foreign Policy in 2022 that Israel and the Gulf states should&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":133676,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[47994,32454,33673,8872,33674,32455,33675,8873,8866,83420,85,46,47,66318,43,545,627],"class_list":{"0":"post-133675","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-israel","8":"tag-centcom","9":"tag-circulated-air-force-times","10":"tag-circulated-army-times","11":"tag-circulated-defense-news","12":"tag-circulated-marine-corps-times","13":"tag-circulated-military-times","14":"tag-circulated-navy-times","15":"tag-defense-news","16":"tag-dn-dnr","17":"tag-gulf-states","18":"tag-il","19":"tag-israel","20":"tag-middle-east","21":"tag-mohammed-bin-salman","22":"tag-news","23":"tag-opinion","24":"tag-trump"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/133675","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=133675"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/133675\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/133676"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=133675"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=133675"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=133675"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}