The potential ripple effects of the United States\u2019 military operation in Venezuela on January 3, 2026 extend well beyond either country. Brookings scholars assess the global implications of the events that took place in Caracas.<\/p>\n
Scott R. Anderson<\/p>\n
Who controls Venezuela\u2019s overseas oil assets?<\/p>\n
The Trump administration\u2019s plan to \u201crun\u201d Venezuela<\/a> through interim President Delcy Rodriguez is in deep tension with a signature policy of the first Trump administration. As a result, it has the potential to cause confusion regarding who controls the oil industry the Trump administration wishes to reform.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n In 2019, the first Trump administration\u2014along with various allies\u2014stopped recognizing the Maduro regime as Venezuela\u2019s government. Instead, it recognized the government of Juan Guaid\u00f3<\/a>, who claimed to be interim president<\/a> under Venezuela\u2019s constitution by virtue of his role in the 2015 National Assembly and the fraudulent nature of the 2018 presidential election that Maduro claimed to have won. When Guaid\u00f3 lost this role in 2023, the Biden administration (alongside many other countries) shifted U.S. recognition to the 2015 National Assembly itself as \u201cthe only legitimate branch<\/a>\u201d of Venezuela\u2019s government. While the Maduro regime remained in effective control of Venezuela, such recognition allowed the 2015 National Assembly to control various extraterritorial Venezuelan assets and interests, including control of oil-related assets<\/a>, interests, and institutions.\u00a0<\/p>\n But the Trump administration\u2019s new strategy of working through Maduro\u2019s former deputy, Rodr\u00edguez\u2014including to reform Venezuela\u2019s oil sector<\/a>\u2014casts this practice into doubt. Will the United States continue to recognize the 2015 National Assembly? Or will its new arrangement with the Rodriguez regime restore Caracas\u2019s control of Venezuela\u2019s overseas oil assets and interests? And if the latter, will other countries follow?\u00a0<\/p>\n The answers to these questions will shape how Venezuela\u2019s overseas oil resources are managed\u2014and their absence underscores how little the Trump administration seems to have prepared for the aftermath of its actions.\u00a0<\/p>\n Sarah A. Binder<\/p>\n Don\u2019t count on Congress. But don\u2019t count it out either<\/p>\n The Trump administration\u2019s go-it-alone strike on Venezuela and capture of Venezuelan leader Nicol\u00e1s Maduro raises the inevitable question: Where\u2019s Congress?\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Legal scholar Edward Corwin wrote<\/a> decades ago that the U.S. Constitution is \u201can invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.\u201d True, presidents from both parties have aggressively accrued<\/a> the lion\u2019s share of such authority\u2014typically with lawmakers\u2019 acquiescence or outright consent. But even a weakened Congress can crystallize public dissent to counterbalance<\/a> presidential power.\u00a0<\/p>\n First, public opinion has not rallied to the president. The first survey out of the gate<\/a> shows uneven public support for Trump\u2019s moves in Venezuela. Only a third of Americans support the military\u2019s move to oust Maduro; another third opposes Trump\u2019s move, and the rest does not seem to care or know enough to give an opinion. While two-thirds of Republicans have rallied to Trump\u2019s side, most of the rest of GOP respondents did not proffer an opinion. Still, majorities of both parties and independents expressed concern that the United States will get too involved in Venezuela.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Such public ambivalence is unusual historically. Voters often \u201crally around the flag\u201d: After dramatic, focused, international events, public opinion often favors the president. This time, Democratic leaders have sharply criticized Trump\u2019s lack of a \u201cday after\u201d plan, and even some Senate Republicans have offered tepid support. Such reactions undermine a public rally to the president\u2014weakening Trump\u2019s standing in Congress and strengthening Democrats\u2019 resolve to stay on the attack. The Trump administration\u2019s saber-rattling against Greenland could generate similar pushback: Some Republicans have already questioned<\/a> White House threats against this NATO ally.\u00a0<\/p>\n Second, senators will likely vote this week on Senator Tim Kaine\u2019s (D-Va.) resolution<\/a> to block further use of force within or against Venezuela absent congressional authorization. Skeptics of the 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR) rightly question<\/a> whether the WPR affords any leverage to lawmakers seeking to legally challenge the executive\u2019s deployment of military force. But such fights are more political than legal.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n WPR rules can propel resolutions to the House or Senate floor\u2014even over party leaders\u2019 objections. Such votes force a president\u2019s partisans to take a stand. A similar Senate vote this past November attracted two Republicans, albeit failing 49-51<\/a>. An analogous House vote last month secured three GOP votes before losing, 211-213<\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Of course, if both chambers passed such a resolution, they would surely fail to override an inevitable Trump veto. But forcing opponents to take a position<\/a> can often be more electorally valuable to lawmakers than passing a bill. Given today\u2019s slim GOP majorities, limited public support for the administration\u2019s actions in Venezuela, and skepticism from a few GOP senators\u2014the Trump administration will need to make a concerted effort<\/a> to keep its partisans in line.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Third, keep eyes on how Democrats exploit the Venezuela issue for the 2026 midterms. Debating the legality and constitutionality of the president\u2019s military incursions abroad will not turn out the swing voters necessary for Democrats to regain control of the House.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Expect Democrats to reframe the politics to turn Americans\u2019 attention back home. The affordability crisis in the United States will matter far more in November than the lives of Venezuelans or inhabitants of Greenland.\u00a0<\/p>\n Richard C. Bush<\/p>\n China doesn\u2019t need Venezuela to justify an attack on Taiwan<\/p>\n China does not need Trump\u2019s takeover of Venezuela to justify a military campaign against Taiwan. If its leaders judge that irreversible actions by Taiwan and\/or the United States require such an attack, they will easily create a pretext. President Xi Jinping does not, moreover, wish to end any chance of forging an understanding with the United States on economic and security issues by attacking Taiwan.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Moreover, whereas Trump did not wait too long into his second term to begin the planning for military action against Venezuela, Xi is playing a longer game with Taiwan, understanding that the dispute has a significant political dimension. True, Xi has used military exercises to punish Taiwan, but he also employs a range of non-military measures to undermine the confidence of Taiwan leaders and the public. This \u201ccoercion without violence\u201d is showing signs of success. Public confidence in Taiwan is down. Inter-party conflict and partisanship have risen over the last year. Looking forward, Xi may see reason to believe that Taiwan\u2019s 2028 elections will bring a more China-friendly government to power, one with which he is willing to negotiate. So, he can play for time. As the ancient Chinese military thinker Sun Tsu wrote, \u201cTo win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n Vanda Felbab-Brown<\/p>\n Unconstrained by norms or institutions: the \u201cDonroe Doctrine\u201d in practice<\/p>\n Immediately after capturing Venezuelan President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, Trump announced<\/a> that the operation was only the beginning. The Trump administration assumes it can control the remaining pillars of the Maduro<\/a> regime through an offshore military presence and oil embargo alone. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio also believe that cutting off Venezuela\u2019s oil lifeline to Cuba<\/a> will topple the Castro-ite government in Havana. At the same time, Trump renewed his threats against Colombian President Gustavo Petro\u2014an adversary for some months\u2014whom he sanctioned on drug trafficking charges<\/a>. Trump likewise reiterated his desire for U.S. military strikes against drug targets in Mexico<\/a>, despite the severe diplomatic consequences<\/a> for that critical bilateral relationship and the fact that counternarcotics cooperation with the United States has improved under the Sheinbaum administration.\u00a0<\/p>\n Most shockingly, Trump also restated his desire to take over Greenland for its rich mineral resources, through either a purchase<\/a> or military force<\/a>. The Trump administration has been justifying this naked aggression against a NATO partner with false claims of Chinese and Russian ships<\/a> surrounding the island. The purchase option is also egregious: people of any country should not be for sale in the 21st century. Moreover, 85% of Greenlanders oppose<\/a> becoming part of the United States, and only 6% support the idea.\u00a0<\/p>\n The threats against Greenland and other countries in the Western hemisphere are the Trump administration\u2019s \u201cDonroe Doctrine<\/a>\u201d in practice: In the Western hemisphere, the Trump administration says it can do what it wants, unconstrained by norms or institutions, and elsewhere constrained only by the military power of others.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Danish prime minister has said that U.S. moves against<\/a> Greenland would mean the end of NATO. The Trump administration\u2019s threats alone have already accelerated the unraveling of U.S. credibility, authority, alliances, and the post-World War II order.\u00a0<\/p>\n Daniel S. Hamilton<\/p>\n Venezuela likely to embolden Russia<\/p>\n The Trump administration\u2019s Venezuela intervention is likely to embolden Russia, and further challenge Ukraine and Europe, in several ways. Trump called Maduro\u2019s extraction an \u201cextraordinary military operation<\/a>,\u201d echoing Vladimir Putin\u2019s description of his invasion of Ukraine as a \u201cspecial military operation,\u201d and thus suggesting that on occasion, big powers may be warranted in intervening militarily against smaller countries. Trump has openly flouted international law, much as Putin has, giving Moscow further openings to disregard any international legal constraints on its actions. Trump has announced he intends to \u201crun\u201d Venezuela, much as Putin wants to run Ukraine\u2014another boost for Russia. And while Trump\u2019s actions have upended Russia\u2019s support for the Maduro regime, Ukraine is a much bigger prize for the Kremlin: during Trump\u2019s first term, in fact, Russia had informally offered<\/a> to end its support for Venezuela in exchange for U.S. acceptance of Russian dominance of Ukraine. Publicly, Moscow has protested U.S. actions; privately, the Kremlin sees opportunity.\u00a0<\/p>\n While some<\/a> European leaders have criticized the U.S. action as a violation of international law, most have been cautious about crossing Trump at a time when they want to secure U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine, and as they have become acutely aware of their own dependence on the United States. Trump\u2019s subsequent statement that \u201cWe do need Greenland, absolutely<\/a>,\u201d prompted Europe\u2019s largest allies and the Nordic countries<\/a> to close ranks<\/a> behind Denmark, which governs the autonomous region, and to suggest that Greenland\u2019s security is best handled through NATO. Nonetheless, Europe\u2019s options are limited.\u00a0<\/p>\n Jonathan Katz<\/p>\n Will democracy be renewed in Venezuela?<\/p>\n When Trump justified<\/a> Operation Absolute Resolve\u2014the U.S. seizure of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores\u2014defending human rights and restoring democracy in Venezuela were conspicuously absent from the administration\u2019s reasoning. In a revealing moment, Trump said<\/a> the United States would \u201crun\u201d Venezuela during the transition and \u201cget the oil flowing.\u201d Trump claimed<\/a> in a Truth Social post that the United States will now get millions of barrels of oil from Venezuela\u2019s interim government. \u00a0<\/p>\n As I and colleagues explore in the Brookings Democracy Playbook<\/a> reports, it is extremely challenging but possible for democracy renewal to occur<\/a> in countries that have been subjected to authoritarian rule. My colleague Vanda Felbab-Brown wrote<\/a> about the profound security, economic, and political challenges facing Venezuelans.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Trump administration\u2019s rhetoric regarding its actions in Venezuela and pattern of withdrawal from democracy support globally (including cutting<\/a> humanitarian, democracy, and other assistance to Venezuelans in 2025) raise important concerns for Venezuela\u2019s future.\u00a0<\/p>\n Rather than jumpstarting Venezuelan democratic renewal by endorsing either of the leading opposition figures from Venezuela\u2019s 2024 election (Edmundo Gonz\u00e1lez Urrutia, whom many<\/a> governments recognized<\/a> as the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election, or courageous<\/a> 2025 Nobel Prize winner Mar\u00eda Corina Machado) as the country\u2019s next leader, Trump backed Maduro\u2019s vice president, Delcy Rodr\u00edguez, as interim president. For over a decade, Rodr\u00edguez was integral<\/a> in solidifying Maduro\u2019s authoritarian regime that committed significant human rights violations, collaborated with drug cartels, and engaged in corruption<\/a> and self-enrichment. Notably, she was sanctioned<\/a> by the Trump administration in 2018. \u00a0<\/p>\n The administration\u2019s actions should serve as a warning to pro-democracy actors in Venezuela and around the world, especially U.S. partners<\/a> in Ukraine and Taiwan facing autocratic threats and defending democracy. Some may consider<\/a> the United States\u2019 actions in Venezuela over the past several days to have effectively inhibited a possible democratic renewal, rather than advancing one. The stakes are high. Reports from Venezuela already indicate<\/a> that pro-Maduro militias are targeting journalists and civilians celebrating Maduro\u2019s capture.\u00a0<\/p>\n As the situation unfolds, Congress can play a critical role in determining the rationale, legality, and tradeoffs of the administration\u2019s actions in Venezuela. Congress, the media, and the public must consider who ultimately benefits from the administration\u2019s actions. Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle who have supported Venezuelan democracy could request that the Trump administration articulate a plan in support of democracy renewal in Venezuela\u2014and why its actions in Venezuela (and the associated costs of intervention) are in the interest of the United States.\u00a0<\/p>\n Patricia M. Kim<\/p>\n China\u2019s Venezuela rhetoric\u2014and what it reveals about Beijing\u2019s priorities<\/p>\n The Trump administration\u2019s actions in Venezuela have provided Beijing with another low-cost opportunity to criticize U.S. behavior on the global stage. Chinese officials have sharply condemned<\/a> what they describe as U.S. hegemonism, framing Washington\u2019s actions as a violation of international law and Venezuela\u2019s sovereignty and calling for Maduro\u2019s release. Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned<\/a> pointedly that no country should act as a \u201cworld policeman\u201d or \u201cclaim itself to be an international judge.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n The intensity of Beijing\u2019s rhetoric, however, should not be mistaken for its strategic commitment to Venezuela itself. Despite years of close political ties, significant oil investments, and billions of dollars in outstanding loans, Venezuela does not constitute a core strategic interest for China. Beijing has shown little appetite for taking concrete action or for positioning itself ahead of Latin American states in responding to the crisis. When asked whether the crisis would alter China\u2019s broader approach to the region, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson offered<\/a> boilerplate language about long-standing cooperation and friendship with Latin American countries, without signaling any intent to actively counter U.S. influence on the ground. Beijing\u2019s recent reactions are less about defending Caracas than about allowing the United States to absorb the reputational fallout.\u00a0<\/p>\n Some have questioned whether U.S. actions in Venezuela could embolden China to act more aggressively in its own neighborhood, particularly toward Taiwan. The Venezuela case is unlikely to alter Beijing\u2019s timelines or military calculations regarding the island. But it does explain why China has invested so heavily in persuading the international community that Taiwan is an \u201cinternal affair,\u201d rather than a dispute between two sovereign states. Chinese condemnations of U.S. actions in Venezuela rest explicitly on the principle that it is illegal for one country to use force against another. Defining cross-Strait tensions as a domestic matter is therefore not just semantic; it is about laying the legal and normative groundwork to blunt the kinds of criticisms China already faces\u2014and will continue to face\u2014as it uses coercion against Taiwan.\u00a0<\/p>\n Suzanne Maloney<\/p>\n Coinciding unrest in Iran<\/p>\n The Trump administration\u2019s spectacular removal of Venezuelan leader Nicol\u00e1s Maduro coincided with three developments: widening popular unrest in Iran, mounting speculation about renewed Israeli and\/or U.S. military strikes<\/a> on Tehran, and an unprecedented White House pledge<\/a> to intervene on behalf of Iranians protesting their theocratic regime.\u00a0<\/p>\n Maduro\u2019s ouster briefly upstaged the turmoil and uncertainty in Iran, dimming international media interest in the protests. The demonstrations erupted as a result of the plunge in the value of Iran\u2019s currency<\/a> but quickly\u2014and predictably\u2014harnessed deep-seated popular discontent with the revolutionary regime that has ruled Iran since 1979. For many Iranians and their advocates, the Venezuelan developments are a tragic distraction at a pivotal moment of popular mobilization and regime weakness in the aftermath of the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran and the collapse of the theocracy\u2019s regional influence.\u00a0<\/p>\n But Venezuela also provided a real-time precedent and potential proof of concept for the Trump administration\u2019s muscular and unconventional approach to foreign policy, reinforcing the possibility that Washington might make good on Trump\u2019s threats. The credibility of the president\u2019s warnings to Tehran is reinforced by his repeated willingness to use force against Iran; to target key leaders, such as the 2020 U.S. assassination of Quds Force commander Qassim Soleimani; and \u00a0the successful track record of his limited strikes on Iran\u2019s nuclear and terrorist infrastructure.\u00a0<\/p>\n The uncertainty may be reinforcing Tehran\u2019s apparent hesitation to launch a full-scale crackdown on the protests and may explain the notes of conciliation that are emerging from some regime figures<\/a>. The Islamic Republic has no quick fixes for alleviating its citizens\u2019 misery. Its proxies are battered and its legitimacy is shattered by decades of misrule and its failure to protect the homeland from its foremost adversaries. And an uncertain leadership succession<\/a> looms large.\u00a0<\/p>\n Ultimately, it\u2019s unlikely that Washington\u2014either through rhetoric or more concrete action\u2014can provide the wild card that reshapes the calculus of the Iranian regime or the street. The protests are historic and inspiring, but still relatively small-scale. At present, there appears to be no evident leader, political movement, or strategy that can overcome regime dominance. Unfortunately, Tehran is adept and well-practiced at neutralizing opposition; during the first 10 days of the current wave of protests, at least 27 Iranians have been killed<\/a> and 1,500 arrested. And Iranians know better than most that deposing an autocrat is only the beginning of the story.\u00a0<\/p>\n Still, for years, many in Washington and beyond have regretted the Obama administration\u2019s reticence<\/a> during epic 2009 protests. Thanks to the Trump administration, we may learn what a more active posture might achieve.\u00a0<\/p>\n Steven Pifer<\/p>\n Concern but silver linings in Moscow<\/p>\n The Russian Foreign Ministry quickly condemned the U.S. attack and seizure of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro and his spouse. It termed the assault an \u201cact of armed aggression<\/a>\u201d and called for the Maduros\u2019 release<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n That should surprise no one. Russia cultivated warm relations with the Hugo Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro regimes. Among other things, Russia served as a major arms supplier<\/a>, providing S-300 air defense missiles and Su-30 fighter aircraft.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Kremlin cannot be happy with the situation. First, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed \u201csolidarity with the Venezuelan people<\/a>,\u201d Moscow likely will offer no more than rhetorical support. That replicates Russian inaction following<\/a> last June\u2019s U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Russians cannot be happy with that image of weakness.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Second, as in Iran, Russian military equipment did nothing to impede<\/a> the U.S. assault.\u00a0 Of some 150 aircraft involved in the operation, only one helicopter sustained minor damage from ground fire. These failures hardly serve as an advertisement for future Russian arms sales.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Third, while the two cases hugely differ, pundits already are contrasting the overnight success of the U.S. action with Russia\u2019s \u201cspecial military operation<\/a>\u201d against Ukraine, now in its fourth year with no end in sight.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Kremlin, however, will see silver linings. The dubious legality of the U.S. attack under international law weakens the basis for condemning Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine. Trump\u2019s invocation of the Monroe or \u201cDonroe\u201d doctrine<\/a> will bolster Russian claims for a regional sphere of influence.\u00a0 Secretary of State Marco Rubio told<\/a> NBC, \u201cThis is the Western Hemisphere. This is where we live. And we\u2019re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors and rivals of the United States.\u201d\u00a0 Substitute \u201cEurasia\u201d for \u201cthe Western Hemisphere\u201d and \u201cRussia\u201d for \u201cthe United States,\u201d and see how it sounds.\u00a0<\/p>\n Finally, the Kremlin almost certainly hopes that Trump will stumble into a larger conflict, perhaps even with U.S. boots on the ground, that would further undermine U.S. international legitimacy and distract Washington from Russia\u2019s continuing war against Ukraine.\u00a0<\/p>\n Dafna A. Rand and Kari Heerman<\/p>\n Venezuela sanctions: a lever of choice without much leverage.<\/p>\n The stunning military ouster of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro underscores a hard truth about modern economic statecraft. For over 20 years, the Venezuelan regime has been subject to an increasingly expansive U.S. sanctions regime<\/a> as the main alternative to the use of force, targeting individuals, oil revenues, financial channels, and other public and private sector entities. Those sanctions imposed real economic damage and narrowed the regime\u2019s economic options.\u00a0But they never generated decisive leverage sufficient to force a change in the regime\u2019s core objectives or to improve U.S. security interests; efforts to escalate or ease sanctions over time instead underscored how difficult they are to calibrate in practice.\u00a0<\/p>\n In part, this is because Maduro\u2019s regime adapted, using technology and third-country networks to shift activity into alternative channels and push the burden of sanctions onto civilians, intermediaries, and foreign firms, while insulating the leadership itself. This kind of sanctions avoidance<\/a> does not erase pressure but shifts it\u2014allowing regimes to reroute activity through costlier and less transparent channels rather than change course.\u00a0<\/p>\n The geopolitical lesson is sobering. Sanctions remain a valuable tool for imposing some costs and signaling U.S. (and international) opprobrium. And we are only beginning to learn about the impacts over time of relatively new individualized sanctions, which targeted nearly 1,000 Venezuelans since the 2010s. In Venezuela, Russia, Iran, and elsewhere, however, sanctions are blunted when regimes can externalize pressure and wait out economic pain; they work best when embedded in diplomatic strategies that can translate cost imposition into political outcomes. Venezuela reminds us that economic leverage depends not just on scale, but on strategy\u2014and on realism about what sanctions can and cannot achieve.\u00a0<\/p>\n Douglas A. Rediker<\/p>\n Potential friction with China<\/p>\n After the American raid on Venezuela, there was immediate excitement around the economic opportunities Venezuela now offers, and not just in the oil sector. \u00a0Venezuela and PDVSA defaulted bonds surged, with investors effectively pricing in a sanctions unwind and a path to restructuring. \u00a0But the \u201cday after\u201d problem in Venezuela is not only political. It is also contractual, litigious, and creditor driven. \u00a0Analysts estimate<\/a> roughly $60 billion in defaulted bonds and total external obligations around $150 billion-$170 billion once PDVSA liabilities, bilateral claims, and legal judgments are included. The International Monetary Fund\u2019s (IMF) October 2025 World Economic Outlook<\/a> puts Venezuela\u2019s 2025 nominal GDP at about $82.77 billion, implying a debt-to-GDP ratio in the 180%\u2013200% range, even before one argues about data quality.\u00a0<\/p>\n And then there is China, which may be the most underpriced friction point in this entire story. China will not be a passive stakeholder. Beijing has long-standing oil-for-loans arrangements with Venezuela, remains a major customer for Venezuelan crude, and still receives barrels linked to debt repayment. While opaque, analysts estimate Venezuela\u2019s remaining debt to China exceeds $10 billion with, estimates of cumulative historical Chinese financing in the range of $60 billion since 2005, though broader official-sector credit tallies are higher. \u00a0Regardless of the actual amounts, China has meaningful residual claims, an ability to litigate and obstruct, and a strategic incentive to prevent the United States from establishing a new political, economic, and\/or energy regime and creditor hierarchy in Caracas.\u00a0<\/p>\n Unlike in other recent sovereign debt restructurings, China is likely to argue that any prospective impairment of its Venezuelan claims and interests was not primarily caused by Venezuelan policy choices. They were caused by a U.S. military intervention that aims to reorganize control of the oil sector and, implicitly, future export revenues. This provides Beijing with reasons to be confrontational, not cooperative. In Zambia, China\u2019s role<\/a> as the key official creditor slowed the process and created long delays in resolving restructuring issues and finalizing IMF support. Venezuela should be assumed to be much harder: larger political stakes, murkier claims, more assets exposed to court action, and a creditor (China) that may see reputational and strategic costs in \u201caccepting\u201d losses caused by U.S. action.\u00a0<\/p>\n Post-sanctions Venezuela could eventually generate large returns. But the nearer-term reality is a high-friction debt and claims environment, with China positioned to insist on repayment and to contest any U.S.-led attempt to reorder the country\u2019s balance sheet on Washington\u2019s terms.\u00a0<\/p>\n Melanie W. Sisson<\/p>\n Venezuela makes NSS window dressing<\/p>\n The capture of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro by the U.S. military on January 3 exposes the Trump administration\u2019s National Security Strategy<\/a> (NSS)\u2014released just 30 days prior\u2014as window dressing. That document promises an America that will \u201cenlist\u201d hemispheric friends to support U.S. interests and \u201cexpand\u201d the number willing to do so \u201cby cultivating and strengthening new partners.\u201dThe Western Hemisphere has instead received an America that forcibly extracted the leader of a sovereign state. It is an America whose secretary of state gloat posts about owning half the globe, and whose president repeatedly and glibly threatens other of its hemispheric neighbors.\u00a0<\/p>\n Maduro is an unsavory person and a terrible president, but his persistence in office was not a threat to the United States. His removal serves no vital national interest. It strains credulity to contend that this passes the \u201chigh bar\u201d of an administration whose NSS proclaims a \u201cpredisposition for non-intervention.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n The implications of the U.S. intrusion into Venezuelan politics, and of the government\u2019s incoherent rationalizations for it, are global. The action undermines the administration\u2019s ability to pursue the other major foreign policy objectives identified in its own NSS. Demonstrating what a successful special military operation looks like might feed egos. But it starves the U.S. of standing<\/a> to insist upon peace and stability in Eastern Europe and the Taiwan Strait\u2014much less in contested waters throughout the Indo-Pacific. Trump has taken America\u2019s good cards and played a bad hand.\u00a0<\/p>\n Constanze Stelzenm\u00fcller<\/p>\n Flashpoints in Europe<\/p>\n Worried about keeping the United States onside during ongoing Ukraine negotiations and earlier presidential threats<\/a> about \u201cgetting\u201d Greenland, most European governments (except France<\/a>, Norway<\/a>, and Spain<\/a>) carefully avoided criticizing the Trump administration\u2019s attack on Venezuela and kidnapping of its president, Nicol\u00e1s Maduro. The apex of embarrassed contortion: German Chancellor Friedrich Merz\u2019s statement<\/a> that \u201cthe legal evaluation of the U.S.\u2019s intervention is complex, and we are going to take time to do so.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n It\u2019s really not<\/a>, but there was no time anyway. The administration immediately moved on to Greenland, with Trump<\/a>; senior aide Stephen Miller<\/a>; Miller\u2019s wife<\/a>, Katie; White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt<\/a>; and Secretary of State Marco Rubio<\/a> all stating designs to acquire Denmark\u2019s autonomous Arctic territory. (In the words of a State Department post<\/a>: \u201cThis is OUR hemisphere.\u201d)\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n But now, seven European heads of government (Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the U.K.) have signed a joint statement<\/a> forcefully denouncing these claims; others have since joined in (Canada<\/a>, Netherlands<\/a>, the European Commission<\/a>) or made a similar statement (the Nordic<\/a> countries). Greenland\u2019s premier, Jens Frederik Nielsen, thanked<\/a> them wearing an anorak (Inuit: annoraaq) in European Union blue. Somewhat more ominously, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said<\/a>, \u201cif the United States chooses to attack another NATO member militarily, then everything stops.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n It would, of course, be easy for the United States to coerce or browbeat Greenland into breaking away from Denmark. But that would indeed be the end of NATO. Meanwhile, it is worth noting who finds these developments encouraging: in Germany, Alternative for Germany legislator Maximilian Krah crowed<\/a> that the Trump administration was finally putting into motion the hemispheric spatial theories<\/a> of (Nazi crown jurist and antisemite) Carl Schmitt.\u00a0<\/p>\n Andrew Yeo<\/p>\n Reverberations in North Korea<\/p>\n Within hours of the U.S. strike on Venezuela and capture of its leader, Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, North Korea test fired<\/a> multiple ballistic missiles and swiftly condemned<\/a> the U.S. operation as evidence of the \u201crogue and brutal nature\u201d of American power. While it remains unclear whether the hypersonic missile test was a direct response to U.S. actions in Venezuela, it nonetheless signals military readiness against external attacks.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s demonstrated willingness to use force against adversaries reinforces Kim\u2019s long-standing conviction that North Korea must never negotiate away its nuclear weapons. Whereas Venezuela lacks credible retaliatory strike capabilities or a strong anti-air defense system, North Korea possesses formidable artillery, missile, and nuclear capabilities that provide the regime with a measure of protection. A military strike against a nuclear-armed North Korea would dramatically raise the risks and costs of conflict for the United States and its South Korean ally.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n In 2018, the first Trump administration considered conducting a so-called \u201cbloody nose<\/a>\u201d strike against North Korean missile and nuclear facilities. Although Trump had not explicitly threatened North Korea during his second term, Kim may now be more acutely concerned about regime survival after witnessing the speed and precision of U.S. military and intelligence capabilities\u2014particularly Washington\u2019s ability to track and capture Maduro.\u00a0<\/p>\n For the time being, Pyongyang will likely continue to denounce<\/a> U.S. imperialism alongside China and Russia<\/a> while further strengthening its defense capabilities, including its nuclear arsenal. But at the same time, North Korea may have stronger incentives to return to diplomatic engagement with Washington to ensure that Trump does not place Kim, like Maduro, in his crosshairs.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Brookings Institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact.
We are supported by a diverse array of funders<\/a>. In line with our values and policies<\/a>, each Brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The potential ripple effects of the United States\u2019 military operation in Venezuela on January 3, 2026 extend well…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":226367,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[123879,123878,114290,127,44334,123874,123875,51651,51652,6781,6650,1153,7737,51645,5471,51646,20043,12354,50155,1685,2973,51647,24702,48211,7609,6648,42,33870,87,123876,44335,123880,51653,43,16010,1593,123871,1141,123877,15624,40,38,41,39,123872,109444,123873,1594,18413],"class_list":["post-226366","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-headlines","tag-and-security-acds","tag-and-technology","tag-anti-corruption","tag-article","tag-asia-the-pacific","tag-center-for-asia-policy-studies","tag-center-for-effective-public-management-cepm","tag-center-for-middle-east-policy","tag-center-on-the-united-states-and-europe","tag-climate-energy","tag-commentary","tag-conflict","tag-congress","tag-defense-security","tag-democracy","tag-diplomacy-multilateralism","tag-economic-studies","tag-energy-industry","tag-europe-eurasia","tag-european-union","tag-foreign-policy","tag-foreign-politics-elections","tag-geopolitics","tag-global-economy-and-development","tag-governance","tag-governance-studies","tag-headlines","tag-international-affairs","tag-iran","tag-john-l-thornton-china-center","tag-latin-america-the-caribbean","tag-latin-america-initiative","tag-middle-east-north-africa","tag-news","tag-north-korea","tag-russia","tag-security-alliances-partnerships","tag-strategy","tag-strobe-talbott-center-for-security","tag-taiwan","tag-top-news","tag-top-stories","tag-topnews","tag-topstories","tag-u-s-defense-policy","tag-u-s-foreign-policy","tag-u-s-government-politics","tag-ukraine","tag-venezuela"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/226366","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=226366"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/226366\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/226367"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=226366"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=226366"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=226366"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}