WASHINGTON\u2014Today,\u00a0as the people of Iran bravely take to the streets to demand basic freedoms and economic security, the U.S. Department of the Treasury\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking action against the architects of the Iranian regime\u2019s brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators. \u00a0OFAC today is also taking action against the shadow banking networks that allow Iran\u2019s elite to steal and launder revenue generated by the country\u2019s natural resources.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe United States stands firmly behind the Iranian people in their call for freedom and justice,\u201d said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent.\u00a0 \u201cAt the direction of President Trump, the Treasury Department is sanctioning key Iranian leaders involved in the brutal crackdown against the Iranian people. Treasury will use every tool to target those behind the regime\u2019s tyrannical oppression of human rights.\u201d<\/p>\n
Click here to watch a video from Secretary Bessent on today\u2019s action<\/a>.<\/p>\n Among the Iranian security officials sanctioned today is Ali Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS). \u00a0Larijani was one of the first Iranian leaders to call for violence in response to the legitimate demands of the Iranian people.<\/p>\n OFAC is also designating 18 individuals and entities who play critical roles in laundering the proceeds of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical sales to foreign markets as part of the clandestine \u201cshadow banking\u201d networks of sanctioned Iranian financial institutions Bank Melli and Shahr Bank.\u00a0Rather than using these revenues to benefit the Iranian people, who face economic calamity amid crippling inflation and massive deficits caused by the regime\u2019s economic mismanagement, these funds are instead used to finance the regime\u2019s repression of the Iranian people and its support for terrorist groups abroad.<\/p>\n Today\u2019s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13553, which authorizes sanctions on certain person with respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran; E.O. 13876, which is focuses on the Supreme Leader of Iran and his affiliates; and\u00a0E.O. 13902 which targets Iran\u2019s financial, petroleum, and petrochemical sectors.\u00a0 This action is in furtherance of the President\u2019s\u00a0National Security Presidential Memorandum 2<\/a> (NSPM-2), which has impacted the Iranian regime\u2019s ability to sell its petroleum to support its destabilizing behavior and recoup those funds amidst Treasury\u2019s continued campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran\u2019s shadow banking, money laundering, and sanctions evasion networks.\u00a0 In 2025, OFAC sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels, and aircraft as part of this campaign.<\/p>\n OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLENCE TARGETING PROTESTERS<\/p>\n OFAC is designating several senior Iranian officials who oversee elements of the security forces that are violently repressing the Iranian people, including the Secretary of Iran\u2019s SCNS, Ali Larijani. \u00a0Larijani is responsible for coordinating the response to the protests on behalf of the Supreme Leader of Iran and has publicly called for Iranian security forces to use force to repress peaceful protesters.<\/p>\n Since the protests started in December 2025, Iran\u2019s security forces have fired live ammunition at protesters, depriving the Iranian people of life and liberty.\u00a0 Elements of Iran\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have even attacked wounded protesters in one hospital in Ilam Province, firing tear gas and metal pellets into the hospital grounds and assaulting patients, family members, and medical workers. The \u00a0officials sanctioned today\u2014and their organizations\u2014bear responsibility for the thousands of deaths and injuries of their fellow citizens as protests erupted in each of these provinces.\u00a0<\/p>\n Mohammad Reza Hashemifar\u00a0serves as the commander of the U.S.-designated Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (LEF) in Lorestan Province.\u00a0 Nematollah Bagheri is the IRGC commander of Lorestan Province.\u00a0 Iranian security forces in Lorestan Province have committed multiple atrocities targeting Iranian civilians.\u00a0 For example, security forces in Azna have shot multiple civilians, including one whose deceased body was held by security forces to coerce the family into falsely identifying the individual as a martyr for the government.<\/p>\n Azizollah Maleki and Yadollah Buali\u00a0serve as the LEF and IRGC commanders for Fars Province, respectively, which is home to the major Iranian city of Shiraz, a prominent center of resistance against the Iranian regime.\u00a0 Security forces in Fars Province have killed countless peaceful demonstrators since the beginning of protests in December 2025, and Shiraz hospitals are so inundated with gunshot wound patients that no other types of patients can be admitted.\u00a0 Families of the killed have been forced to give false testimony on national television to support the regime\u2019s narratives, lest their loved ones\u2019 bodies never be returned.\u00a0<\/p>\n Ali Larijani is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13876 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Supreme Leader of Iran.\u00a0 Mohammad Reza Hashemifar and Azizollah Maleki are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. \u00a0Yadollah Buali and Nematollah Bagheri are being designated pursuant to\u00a0E.O. 13553 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.\u00a0<\/p>\n BANK MELLI\u2019s MONEY LAUNDERING NETWORK<\/p>\n Iran\u2019s \u201cshadow banking\u201d network is the primary means through which Iran facilitates tens of billions of dollars\u2019 worth of annual trade through the formal international financial system.\u00a0 At the heart of this system is the \u201crahbar\u201d company, a type of entrusted company established by various Iranian banks for the purpose of managing the international transactions of its clients.\u00a0 Rahbar companies work closely with the Iranian banks\u2019 Iran-based clients to facilitate international trade payments, relying on a web of front companies and exchange house in multiple jurisdictions.<\/p>\n As described above, Bank Melli has created an extensive network of cover companies to send and receive funds outside of Iran.\u00a0 Iran-based Nikan Pezhvak Aria Kish Company (Nikan Pezhvak) is the head of Bank Melli\u2019s rahbar network in Iran.\u00a0 UAE-based Empire International Trading FZE (Empire International) is Bank Melli\u2019s UAE-based rahbar company used for managing foreign currency.\u00a0 Empire International has provided customers with details of cover companies, enabling millions of dollars in foreign currency revenue.<\/p>\n Since 2024, Bank Melli\u2019s network, run by Nikan Pezhvak, processed transactions worth billions of dollars for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the IRGC and the Central Bank of Iran, among others.\u00a0 As one example of how Nikan Pezhvak supports the rahbar network, in 2022, Nikan Pezhvak and Arya Sasol Polymer Company employees falsified an invoice and transferred funds through multiple jurisdictions before depositing the funds to the ultimate beneficiary outside of Iran.\u00a0<\/p>\n Between 2024 and 2025, Empire International used Singapore-based Golden Mist PTE. Ltd. (Golden Mist) as a cover company to receive millions of dollars\u2019 worth of revenue.\u00a0 In 2024, Golden Mist paid tens of millions to NIOC on behalf of a NIOC customer Petronix Energy Trading Ltd.<\/p>\n Mehdi Rashno, Bashir Abbaspour Qomi, and Hamid Reza Khamer serve on the board of Nikan Pezhvak.<\/p>\n Nikan Pezhvak Aria Kish Company, Mehdi Rashno, Bashir Abbaspour Qomi, Hamid Reza Khamer, Empire International Trading FZE, and Golden Mist PTE. Ltd. are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.<\/p>\n BANK SHAHR MONEY LAUNDERING NETWORK<\/p>\n UAE-based HMS Trading FZE (HMS Trading), a commercial front company registered in the UAE, acts on behalf of Shahr Bank as a key element in Iran\u2019s oil export and rahbar shadow banking mechanism.\u00a0 HMS Trading and Iran-based Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm are primarily responsible for overseeing the commercial trade activities of Shar Bank\u2019s rahbar network via numerous front companies.\u00a0 HMS Trading\u2019s contracts, deals, and shadow banking network companies include front companies that have been used by NIOC, Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO), Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd., and Armed Forces General Staff cover company Sepher Energy Jahan to sell Iranian oil abroad.\u00a0<\/p>\n Treasury is also designating three senior officials of Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm.\u00a0 Masoud Mahdavi Ardakani is the current chairman of Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm, Masoud Shamani serves as the director of the company, and Akbar Givari is the vice chairman of\u00a0Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm.<\/p>\n HMS Trading FZE is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahr Bank.\u00a0 Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy.\u00a0Masoud Mahdavi Ardakani, Masoud Shamani, and Akbar Givari are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm.\u00a0<\/p>\n HMS Trading relies on a number of financial front companies, to include:<\/p>\n UAE-based Shine Road Trading FZE;UAE-based Crystal Gas FZE;UAE-based Turkiz Fuel Trading LLC;UAE-based Desert Pulse Trading FZE;UAE-based Limonium Petrochemicals Trading LLC SOC;UAE-based Naviera Shipping and Trading FZ LLC; andUnited Kingdom-based Nanshan Ltd.<\/p>\n As part of the Shahr Bank exchange network, Shine Road Trading FZE (Shine Road) was used by NIOC to help with transactions involving the production, transportation, and export of Iranian crude oil and oil distillates. \u00a0In late 2024, Shine Road Trading FZE was used to pay NIOC over $30 million for Iranian oil distillates to be delivered to Malaysia.\u00a0 Similarly, in 2024, Crystal Gas FZE was used to pay NIOC over $40 million for Iranian oil distillates.\u00a0<\/p>\n In 2025, front companies Shine Road, Naviera Shipping and Trading FZ LLC, and Crystal Gas FZE were used for financial transactions for exports and imports of Iranian oil.\u00a0Turkiz Fuel Trading LLC has previously signed multiple contracts with NIOC to deliver Iranian petrochemical products to East Asia.\u00a0 Desert Pulse Trading FZE, previously known as Siwan Trading International FZE, and Limonium Petrochemicals Trading LLC SOC, formerly known as Desert Oasis Petrochemical Trading Company, have been used to facilitate payments related to petroleum and petrochemical product shipments on behalf of Triliance.<\/p>\n Shine Road Trading FZE, Crystal Gas FZE, Turkiz Fuel Trading LLC, Desert Pulse Trading FZE, Limonium Petrochemicals Trading LLC SOC, Naviera Shipping and Trading FZ LLC, and Nanshan Ltd are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.<\/p>\n SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS<\/p>\n As a result of today\u2019s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.\u00a0 In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.\u00a0 Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC\u2019s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.\u00a0<\/p>\n Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. \u00a0OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. \u00a0OFAC\u2019s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines<\/a> provide more information regarding OFAC\u2019s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.\u00a0In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. \u00a0The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/p>\n The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC\u2019s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.\u00a0 The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.\u00a0 For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC\u2019s guidance on\u00a0Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List<\/a>.<\/p>\n