WASHINGTON \u2014 Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating 21 individuals and entities and identifying one vessel that have transferred oil products, procured weapons and dual-use equipment, and provided financial services for Iran-backed terrorist organization Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. \u00a0This action targets financial conduits between the Iranian government and the Houthis, building on previous Treasury actions to constrict the Iranian regime\u2019s use of its oil wealth to fund regional terrorist proxies at the expense of the Iranian population\u2019s welfare.\u00a0 It also targets key front companies, facilitators, and operatives located in Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that are part of the Houthis\u2019 vast revenue generation and smuggling networks, which enable the group to sustain its capability to conduct destabilizing regional activities and unprovoked attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea.<\/p>\n
\u201cThe Houthis threaten the United States by committing acts of terror and attacking commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. Treasury is taking action to cut off nearly two dozen individuals and entities involved in transferring oil, procuring weapons, and providing financial services for this Iran-backed terrorist organization,\u201d said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent.\u00a0 \u201cTreasury will use all tools at its disposal to expose the networks and individuals enabling Houthi terrorism.\u201d<\/p>\n
Today\u2019s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.)\u00a013224, as amended, and builds on OFAC\u2019s\u00a0numerous<\/a> actions targeting Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, procurement operatives, and suppliers. \u00a0The U.S. Department of State designated Ansarallah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O.\u00a013224, as amended, effective February 16, 2024, and subsequently also designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) pursuant to section 2019 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on March 5, 2025.\u00a0<\/p>\n houthi oil companies and financial facilitators<\/p>\n Despite the pressure of international sanctions, the Houthis continue to acquire a significant amount of revenue through illicit oil sales, generating over $2 billion annually.\u00a0 As part of the Houthi oil sales operation, the Iranian government both sells and provides a free monthly shipment of oil to the Houthis using Iranian-owned or affiliated companies based in Dubai, UAE.\u00a0<\/p>\n Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services and Adeema Oil FZC,\u00a0owned by Waleed Fathi Salam Baidhani, and Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC<\/a> are among the major Houthi oil and gas facilitators based in the UAE.\u00a0 These companies receive financial support from the Iranian government and maintain ties to Iranian nationals.\u00a0 Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC\u00a0(Alsaa), owned by Iranian national Imran Asghar, is one of the main UAE-based, Iran-affiliated companies involved in facilitating financial transactions between the Iranian government and Houthi-affiliated oil companies.\u00a0 Alsaa has also acted as a front company to make payments and review trades for Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC.\u00a0 The Houthis pay the Iran-affiliated companies by sending money to UAE-based exchanges, including Janat Al\u00a0Anhar General Trading LLC (Janat Al Anhar), via exchange companies in Sana\u2019a, Yemen.\u00a0Janat Al Anhar is the new operating name of Abu Sumbol General Trading L.L.C.<\/a> following its 2024 designation for support to Iran-based Houthi financial facilitator Sa\u2019id al-Jamal<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n Houthi leaders charge ordinary Yemenis exorbitant prices for oil and oil derivatives, pocketing the proceeds of these sales for personal gain and to fund the group\u2019s military operations.\u00a0 Zayd \u2018Ali Ahmed Al-Sharafi (Zayd Al-Sharafi) uses his businesses, Yemen-based Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives<\/a> and Al-Sharafi Oil Companies Services, to import and export oil for the Houthi-led government.\u00a0As part of his business dealings, Zayd Al-Sharafi maintains multiple vessels that transferred oil to the Houthis.\u00a0 Zayd Al-Sharafi is also affiliated with Janat Al Anhar in Dubai, using it to evade sanctions on himself and the Houthis.\u00a0<\/p>\n New Ocean Trading FZE (New Ocean) is a commercial entity that provides logistical support to the Houthis.\u00a0 New Ocean acted as an agent for a Yemeni company that procured military equipment for the Houthis.\u00a0 New Ocean imported communications devices, technical and control systems, computers, electronics, drilling equipment, industrial and electrical materials, and power systems to Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.\u00a0 New Ocean provided logistical and financial support services to Houthi oil importer Arkan Mars Petroleum Company<\/a> as the shipper on an Arkan Mars Petroleum Company fuel shipment between Sharjah, UAE, and Ras Isa, Yemen.\u00a0 \u00a0<\/p>\n Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services, Zayd \u2018Ali Ahmed\u00a0Al-Sharafi, Adeema Oil FZC, Waleed Fathi Salam Baidhani, and New Ocean Trading FZE are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.\u00a0 Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC and Imran Asghar are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC.\u00a0The SDN List entry for Abu Sumbol General Trading L.L.C. has been updated to reflect the company\u2019s current name, Janat Al-Anhar.\u00a0<\/p>\n HOUTHI WEAPONS SMUGGLING OPERATIONS<\/p>\n Houthi procurement operatives rely on a sprawling network of front companies, logistics firms, and shipping facilitators to transport weapons and other military-grade materials into Yemen.\u00a0 One such company, Wadi Kabir Co. for Logistics Services\u00a0(Wadi Kabir), is a Sana\u2019a-based shipping facilitator with a branch in Oman that has conducted weapons smuggling operations for the Houthis. \u00a0Wadi Kabir owns a network of warehouses and trucks in Yemen that it uses to coordinate weapons and other illicit shipments in support of Houthi procurement efforts. \u00a0In 2022, representatives of Wadi Kabir attempted to smuggle 52 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) hidden inside purpose-built fake electric generators from Oman to the Houthis in Sana\u2019a, which were seized by the internationally-recognized Republic of Yemen Government authorities. \u00a0The Oman-based shipping and logistics firm Rabya for Trading FZC\u00a0(Rabya), at the behest of its Oman-based director and beneficial owner Ameen Hamid Mohammed Dahan\u00a0(Dahan), used its warehouse located in Oman\u2019s Al-Mayzunah Free Market Zone to assist Wadi Kabir to conceal the Kornet ATGMs for transport into Yemen.\u00a0<\/p>\n Houthi leaders use a variety of Yemen-based exchange houses to finance weapons-related purchases. \u00a0Al-Ridhwan Exchange and Transfer Company\u00a0(Al-Ridhwan), based in Sana\u2019a, is a Houthi-affiliated exchange house that plays a key role in facilitating payments for the group\u2019s weapons procurement and other destabilizing activities. \u00a0Al-Ridhwan is jointly overseen by the Houthis\u2019 so-called Director of Procurement\u00a0Muhammad Ahmad Al-Talibi<\/a> (Al-Talibi), a primary aide to U.S.-designated Houthi spokesman\u00a0Mohammad Abdulsalam<\/a> and at least one other Houthi operative, and maintains accounts in Sana\u2019a for the Houthis\u2019 so-called Ministry of Defense and other Houthi-aligned institutions. \u00a0Al-Talibi has repeatedly directed Al-Ridhwan to use its depositors\u2019 funds to finance Houthi militant activities and support Houthi smuggling operations into Yemen from Iran, Djibouti, and elsewhere in the Red Sea region. \u00a0Al-Talibi and other key Houthis leaders have used Al-Ridhwan to support their regional web of procurement operatives and front companies, facilitating numerous payments to Houthi-owned accounts outside Yemen for missile components, advanced weapon systems, and other military-grade materials.\u00a0<\/p>\n Wadi Kabir Co. for Logistics Services, Rabya for Trading FZC, and Al-Ridhwan Exchange and Transfer Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. \u00a0Ameen Hamid Mohammed Dahan is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, Rabya for Trading FZC.\u00a0<\/p>\n HOUTHI AVIATION COMPANIES AND PROCUREMENT<\/p>\n Houthi procurement and financial operatives have also attempted to use the group\u2019s international networks to purchase aircraft for use in smuggling and revenue-generation schemes. \u00a0The Houthis have collaborated with U.S.-designated, Houthi-aligned Yemeni businessman Muhammad Al-Sunaydar<\/a> (Al-Sunaydar) to establish two new airlines based in Sana\u2019a called Barash Aviation and Cargo Company Limited\u00a0(Barash Aviation) and Sama Airline. \u00a0Barash Aviation, an air cargo transportation company, has assisted the Houthis\u2019 efforts to purchase a commercial jet aircraft, which Houthi leaders planned to use to transport illicit cargo through Houthi-controlled Sana\u2019a International Airport (SIA). \u00a0The Houthis and Barash Aviation collaborated to identify and evaluate potential aircraft for purchase. \u00a0Houthi leaders established Sama Airline as a sister company to Barash Aviation, intending for Sama Airline to generate revenue for the Houthis by providing passenger service from SIA. \u00a0In early 2025, Barash Aviation and Sama Airline attempted to partner with U.S.-designated and convicted arms dealer Viktor Anatolijevitch Bout<\/a> to purchase suitable commercial aircraft for both companies.\u00a0<\/p>\n In addition to Al-Sunaydar, Yemeni businessman Adil Mutahhar Abdallah Al Muayyad\u00a0(Al Muayyad) has also played a key role in Barash Aviation\u2019s and Sama Airline\u2019s business operations and aircraft procurement efforts. \u00a0Beyond his role with Barash Aviation and Sama Airline, Al Muayyad acts as a purchasing official for the so-called Houthi Ministry of Defense, facilitating procurement of military-grade and dual-use commercial equipment on behalf of the Houthis. \u00a0He maintains close personal relationships with high-ranking Houthi figures, including U.S.-designated Mohamed Ali Al-Houthi<\/a>, and is responsible for conducting economic outreach to potential foreign partners on behalf of the Houthis.\u00a0<\/p>\n Barash Aviation and Cargo Company Limited and Sama Airline are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. \u00a0Adil Mutahhar Abdallah Al Muayyad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Houthis.\u00a0<\/p>\n VESSELS AND SHIP CAPTAINS<\/p>\n Following the designation of the Houthis as an FTO in March 2025, OFAC issued a humanitarian general license to allow in-progress deliveries of petroleum products to ports in northern Yemen to be safely offloaded through April 4, 2025.\u00a0 However, even after this allowed period for wind-down activities, certain vessels have continued to deliver petroleum products to Houthi-controlled ports, providing vital economic support to the Houthis and in clear violation of restrictions on doing business with an FTO.\u00a0<\/p>\n Albarraq Shipping Co\u00a0and its sole director, Ebrahim Ahmed Abdullah Al-Matari, facilitated the delivery of oil products to Ras Isa port via the vessel ALBARRAQ Z after the expiration of OFAC\u2019s GL 25A. \u00a0ALBARRAQ Z discharged oil products at Ras Isa port in July 2025. \u00a0Ahmad Ismail served as the captain of ALBARRAQ Z.<\/p>\n OFAC is also designating the captains of four previously designated vessels that delivered petroleum products to Houthi-controlled ports.\u00a0 Ahmad Adriss served as captain of the U.S.-designated vessel SARAH<\/a>, which delivered Liquefied Petroleum Gas to the Houthi-controlled port of Ras Isa in June 2025.\u00a0 Ahmad Bseis\u00a0served as captain of the U.S.-designated oil tanker ATLANTIS MZ<\/a>, which also discharged gasoline at Ras Isa in June 2025.\u00a0 Ranveer Singh\u00a0served as captain of the U.S.-designated vessel AKOYA GAS<\/a>, which discharged its cargo at Ras Isa in April 2025.\u00a0Alexander Yurovich Pshenichnyy served as captain of the U.S.-designated vessel VALENTE<\/a>, which discharged gasoline at Ras Isa in May 2025. \u00a0<\/p>\n Albarraq Shipping Co, Ahmad Ismail, Ahmad Adriss, Ahmad Bseis, Ranveer Singh, and Alexander Yurovich Pshenichnyyare being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.\u00a0 Ebrahim Ahmed Abdullah Al-Matari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly,\u00a0Albarraq Shipping Co.\u00a0<\/p>\n The ALBARRAQ Z is being identified as property in which Albarraq Shipping Co has an interest, pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended.<\/p>\n SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS<\/p>\n As a result of today\u2019s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.\u00a0 In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.\u00a0 Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC\u2019s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.\u00a0<\/p>\n Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. \u00a0OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. \u00a0OFAC\u2019s\u00a0Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines<\/a>\u00a0provide more information regarding OFAC\u2019s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.\u00a0 In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. \u00a0The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.\u00a0<\/p>\n Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. \u00a0OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.<\/p>\n The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC\u2019s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.\u00a0 The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.\u00a0 For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC\u2019s guidance on\u00a0Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List<\/a>.<\/p>\n