It appears increasingly likely that in the coming days, the United States will once again launch airstrikes against Iran.<\/p>\n
On Wednesday, President Donald Trump posted on his Truth Social platform<\/a> that a \u201cmassive Armada is heading to Iran,\u201d referring to the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and several other naval ships that have recently taken positions<\/a> in the region, along with rapid build-ups in aircraft and air defense systems. Should he order an attack, Trump warned the damage would be \u201cfar worse\u201d than \u201cOperation Midnight Hammer,\u201d the bombing operation targeting Iran\u2019s nuclear sites carried out by the US last June.<\/p>\n It\u2019s a shockingly quick pivot from just weeks earlier, when Trump appeared to back down from his <\/a>\u201clocked and loaded<\/a>\u201d threat to intervene over the state\u2019s brutal crackdown on protesters. Despite reports of horrific casualties, the president indicated that he was satisfied that the killing of protesters had stopped and that Iran had halted hundreds of planned executions. It\u2019s too late for an intervention to rescue the protesters \u2014 the movement has been effectively crushed for now, with estimates of the number killed ranging from 3,000 to 6,000<\/a>, or potentially much higher<\/a>.<\/p>\n But the stated motives for the new military standoff are different this time. Trump is publicly calling for Iran to negotiate a deal for \u201cno nuclear weapons,\u201d escalating a longstanding demand at a time when the regime looks especially weak. The New York Times has reported<\/a> that US officials have given the Iranians three demands: a permanent end to all uranium enrichment and the destruction of its current stockpiles, limits on its ballistic missile program, and an end to support for proxy groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.<\/p>\n This is not unlike the build-up in Venezuela before the raid that captured Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, during which the administration seemed to alternate between primary motivations \u2014 \u201cnarcoterrorism,\u201d recovering US oil assets \u2014 before taking action.<\/p>\n \u201cThis seems to be a military intervention in search of an objective,\u201d said Ali Vaez, Iran director at the International Crisis Group.<\/p>\n To the extent the protesters fit into the equation now, it may be an additional source of tactical advantage. According to Reuters<\/a>, Trump is also weighing targets for strikes that could help foment regime change by giving Iran\u2019s protesters \u201cthe confidence that they could overrun government and security buildings,\u201d betting that a show of force might renew the now-suppressed opposition.<\/p>\n Trump was reportedly urged earlier this month to refrain from attacks<\/a> by US allies in the Gulf and Israel, but the Venezuela experience may have convinced the president that there are few limits to his ability to use military force overseas.<\/p>\n With his latest Iran escalation, however, he may be pushing his luck. The administration appears to be faced with an Iranian regime unlikely to agree to its demands, but with few military options that don\u2019t involve risk of significant regional blowback or a destabilizing collapse.<\/p>\n What is actually going on with Iran\u2019s nukes? <\/p>\n The conflict over Iran\u2019s nuclear program isn\u2019t resolved, but there\u2019s no sign they\u2019ve moved significantly closer to acquiring nuclear weapons since the last US bombing campaign.<\/p>\n Trump confidently asserted that the 12-day war in June had left Iran\u2019s nuclear program \u201cobliterated.\u201d That claim was almost certainly exaggerated: Even the administration\u2019s recently released National Security Strategy described it more cautiously as \u201csignificantly degraded. And while assessments differ as to the extent of the damage and the time it would take to rebuild, the general consensus on Iran\u2019s nuclear program is that the US\/Israel operation last June, which targeted key nuclear facilities along with important scientists and officials, seriously set back<\/a> Iran\u2019s nuclear program but did not eliminate it entirely.<\/p>\n Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN nuclear watchdog, say they\u2019ve been denied access to the three nuclear facilities that were bombed in June: Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Most critically, the IAEA says it cannot account for the location and condition of Iran\u2019s stockpile of enriched uranium. Estimates suggest Iran may have 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity, just a short technical step from the 90 percent purity needed to build a weapon. In theory, this could be enough for around 10 nuclear bombs, though Iran is not believed to currently be building those bombs, and given the extent of the Israeli intelligence penetration of Iran\u2019s power structure revealed in the lead-up to the war, it would likely be very cautious about doing so.<\/p>\n If an Iranian nuke is still a theoretical threat, its ballistic missile problem is a current and growing one to the US allies in the region who would bear the brunt of Iran\u2019s retaliation.<\/p>\n If Iran appears to have made little progress on reconstituting its nuclear program, the same cannot be said for its missiles. Nicole Grajewski, an expert on Iranian missile warfare at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote recently<\/a> that the regime has embarked on \u201cwhat can only be described as a concerted campaign to reconstitute and dramatically expand its ballistic missile capabilities\u201d since the US and Israeli strikes in June.<\/p>\n This has included active reconstruction and reinforcement efforts at missile sites damaged during the war \u2014confirmed by satellite imagery \u2014 and new production sites coming online. In December, a US special operations team intercepted a ship<\/a> carrying Chinese missile components to Iran, and there was speculation that month that Israel was considering a new strike on Iran\u2019s missile capabilities<\/a>.<\/p>\n As for the \u201caxis of resistance,\u201d Iran\u2019s network of armed proxy groups throughout the Middle East that Trump is also demanding be cut loose, it was badly degraded by Israeli attacks following the October 7 attacks, particularly Hezbollah, the Lebanese militia\/political movement that was once the most prominent member of the network.<\/p>\n But it\u2019s not eliminated entirely either. The Houthis, the Yemeni group that emerged as the most surprisingly dangerous Iran-aligned group during the post-October 7 war, has warned<\/a> that it will resume its attacks on shipping through the Red Sea in the event of new strikes in Iran, and the Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite militant Kataib Hezbollah has vowed to launch \u201ctotal war<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n How dangerous could an Iranian counterattack be?<\/p>\n In June, Iranian retaliation against the United States was limited and seemingly performative: it launched missiles against Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, but only after giving the Qataris advanced notice, allowing them to intercept all of the missiles<\/a>.<\/p>\n During that conflict, Iran\u2019s leaders appeared to be looking for a way to maintain credibility without escalating the war further. This time around, the dynamics are likely to be different. Amid its recent military setbacks, economic turmoil, and mass protests, the regime appears more vulnerable<\/a> than it has been in decades.<\/p>\n \u201cThey may be reading this as an existential fight,\u201d Grajewski told Vox. \u201cThey may be more escalatory and not as rational as they were during the 12-day war.\u201d<\/p>\n Iranian officials have reportedly reached out<\/a> to counterparts in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey, warning that US bases in those countries could be targets and these governments have very publicly stated<\/a> they will not take part in any strikes.<\/p>\n After the operations in Iran in June and in Venezuela this month, Trump is clearly gaining confidence in his use of military force. Both operations delivered quick results with minimal US casualties and without leading to the quagmires that critics warned of.<\/p>\n But Trump is also confronting the reality that even a military as powerful as America\u2019s has limits on its ability to conduct complex military operations on multiple consequences in quick succession.<\/p>\n Only about a third of the 11 US aircraft carriers are at sea at any given time. When the USS Gerald Ford was moved from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean in the Venezuela build-up, it left the Middle East without a nearby carrier strike group<\/a>, which may have partly limited US options to strike Iran during the protests in early January.<\/p>\n Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that the purpose of these strike groups is as much defensive as it is offensive. The US doesn\u2019t need an \u201carmada\u201d of surface ships to attack Iran: Operation Midnight Hammer was carried out by submarines launching ballistic missiles and B-2 bombers that took off from Missouri<\/a>. But the two carrier strike groups at the time played a key role in intercepting the hundreds of missiles and drones Iran launched at Israel in retaliation.<\/p>\n The operation took a toll. The US used around a quarter<\/a> of its total stock of Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) interceptors \u2014 at least 100 missiles, only 11 or 12 of which are produced each year. And while Israel had remarkable success at intercepting Iranian missiles during the war, it was running dangerously low on its defensive Arrow interceptors<\/a> by the end of the conflict.<\/p>\n Officials say the US has been working to replenish the supply of interceptors in the region<\/a>, though supplies are not unlimited, particularly given the ongoing demand for systems to protect Ukrainian cities from Russian bombardment. A recent CSIS analysis<\/a> described air defenses and interceptors as the \u201ctable stakes for modern conflict\u201d. A new conflict with Iran may test just how much the US is able to bring to the table.<\/p>\n Crisis Group\u2019s Vaez said the Iranian government is unlikely to agree to anything close to the maximalist demands from the US side described in media reports.<\/p>\n \u201cThis is now a regime that is hanging on by a thread, and that thread is its core constituents,\u201d he said, referring to hardline nationalist supporters of the regime. \u201cThe only thing that the Iranians find more dangerous than suffering from US sanctions or another US strike on their territory is surrendering to US terms,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n At the same time, this is an administration that prefers quick, decisive, and overwhelming victories<\/a> and has shown no appetite for true regime change. Even Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a dyed-in-the-wool Iran hawk, told senators yesterday that his hope was that if Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei were to fall, he would be succeeded by \u201csomebody within their system<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n This also appears to be borrowing from the Venezuela playbook, where the country\u2019s regime was left in place without its problematic president, though most analysts don\u2019t believe the US has the capability to carry out the same kind of snatch-and-grab operation in Iran that it executed in Venezuela.<\/p>\n