Last month, the Trump administration announced the start of the second phase of its Gaza peace plan, which the UN Security Council endorsed in November. Phase one, which went into effect last October, produced an initial cease-fire and ultimately the return of all hostages alive and dead, the release of about 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, and the resumption of humanitarian aid. Phase two mandates the creation of a technocratic Palestinian governing authority, the deployment of an international stabilization force, the disarmament of Hamas, the reconstruction of Gaza, and the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces. The success of phase two will depend on the disarmament of Hamas. If there is disarmament, there will be reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal. Without it, there will be neither. The success of phase two hinges on the answer to a central question: Can the conditions that produced years of terrorism and war truly be dismantled?<\/p>\n
At present, there are effectively two Gazas that must be unified before a durable peace can take hold. Israel maintains control of what is known as the Green Zone, which is roughly 53 percent of the territory and is largely in the east. Hamas<\/a> controls the so-called Red Zone, the remaining 47 percent, primarily in the western part of the strip. In a statement issued in October, Hamas formally agreed to \u201chand over the administration of the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian body of independent technocrats,\u201d but it is far from clear that the group will lay down its arms and allow Gazans to build a future it does not dominate. Achieving that outcome will require multiple actors, led by the United States, to use their leverage.<\/p>\n U.S. President Donald Trump<\/a> must make clear to three countries in particular\u2014Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey\u2014that they are expected to deliver disarmament or risk damaging their relationships with Washington. The heads of state of all three countries have joined Trump\u2019s Board of Peace and endorsed his Gaza peace plan. Each has influence over Hamas\u2019s finances, legitimacy, political standing, and internal cohesion. Together, they have the power to pressure Hamas to begin decommissioning its weapons. They can publicly condemn the group for blocking the reconstruction of Gaza, and they can threaten to deny its leaders the ability to continue operating in their countries.<\/p>\n If a process of disarmament takes hold, Trump\u2019s peace plan, including a pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, will begin to look less aspirational and more realistic. That may seem implausible today, but successful implementation of phase two would fundamentally alter the psychological and political landscape for both the Israelis and the Palestinians.<\/p>\n Conversely, if Hamas chooses not to disarm and Gaza does not reunify, the future looks bleak. At best, the territory will remain partitioned, with Gazans living under Hamas\u2019s tyranny or Israeli occupation. At worst, Gaza will once again become a war zone.<\/p>\n INTO THE RED ZONE<\/p>\n UN Security Council Resolution 2803 gives the Board of Peace exclusive authority over the governance of Gaza for the next two years, with the possibility of extension. The Board of Peace\u2019s executive committee will work closely with the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, which is made up of 15 Palestinian technocrats. The NCAG will manage day-to-day governance in both the Green and Red Zones. An International Stabilization Force will back a Palestinian police force that recently underwent training in Egypt and Jordan; together they will assume responsibility for law and order. (The number of countries and the exact mandate and rules of engagement for the ISF are not yet finalized.)<\/p>\n The fate of phase two hangs on what happens in the Hamas-controlled Red Zone. This area is crucial because it contains more than 95 percent of Gaza\u2019s population and most of its urban centers, with the notable exception of Rafah near the Egyptian border. The members of the NCAG, all of whom are from Gaza, have indicated that their mission is to bring stability and economic development to all of Gaza. Should they neglect the Red Zone, they will fail to consolidate their authority and credibility.<\/p>\n But for the NCAG to be able to work in the Red Zone, it will need security\u2014and that cannot be guaranteed unless Hamas disarms and the ISF-backed Palestinian police force can operate unimpeded. In October, Hamas endorsed Trump\u2019s peace plan, but the group\u2019s leadership did not explicitly commit to disarmament, stating that certain unnamed issues (presumably disarmament among them) would be deferred until they can be \u201cdiscussed within a comprehensive Palestinian national framework.\u201d Perhaps that was meant to provide Hamas an out, but there should be no doubt about point 13 of Trump\u2019s peace plan: \u201cAll military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt.\u201d It is very clear that disarmament and demilitarization are required, and there will be monitoring to ensure it.<\/p>\n In theory, Hamas leaders should not be able to oppose the redevelopment and reconstruction of Gaza, since they have already indicated that they are prepared to relinquish administrative control to technocrats. Still, the danger is that Hamas will never entirely abandon control, the NCAG will never fully take charge, and the two will maintain an uneasy cohabitation indefinitely. Although Hamas claims it will not interfere with the NCAG\u2019s work, the history of the contemporary Middle East has repeatedly shown that those who control the weapons often control the outcomes.<\/p>\n A QUESTION OF MEANS<\/p>\n For its part, Israel<\/a> will not withdraw to the perimeter of Gaza and permit reconstruction, as it is obliged to do eventually under the terms of Trump\u2019s cease-fire plan, unless Hamas first disarms. Without disarmament, there can be no reconstruction, in part because Israelis fear that Hamas will divert materials such as cement, wiring, and steel to rebuild its tunnel system, where it stored and produced the bulk of its weapons, and in part because the Saudis and Emiratis have made clear that they will not invest in reconstruction if Hamas is not disarmed.<\/p>\n At a televised cabinet meeting in January, Trump expressed optimism, saying that \u201cit looks like they\u2019re going to disarm.\u201d His envoy Steve Witkoff added, \u201cThey will because they have no choice. . . . They\u2019re going to give up their AK-47s.\u201d According to U.S. and other officials, Qatar and Turkey have recently conveyed to Washington that Hamas will, in fact, begin a process of decommissioning their weapons.<\/p>\n Israeli officials do not share the Trump administration\u2019s optimism. They point to Hamas\u2019s ideological commitment to rejecting Israel\u2019s right to exist. And although a senior Israeli official conceded that Hamas might stage a symbolic gesture, perhaps decommissioning a limited number of heavy weapons, he insisted that the group will never relinquish its ability to reassert control by force. Moussa Abu Marzouk, a veteran senior official of Hamas, seemed to validate the Israeli view in an interview in Al Jazeera in late January, declaring that Hamas had not agreed to disarm. He said such a commitment \u201cnever happened,\u201d adding that \u201cnot for a single moment did we talk about the surrender of weapons.\u201d<\/p>\n