{"id":272768,"date":"2026-02-04T01:33:07","date_gmt":"2026-02-04T01:33:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/272768\/"},"modified":"2026-02-04T01:33:07","modified_gmt":"2026-02-04T01:33:07","slug":"israels-smearing-campaign-against-qatar-latent-motives-and-objectives","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/272768\/","title":{"rendered":"Israel\u2019s Smearing Campaign against Qatar: Latent Motives and Objectives"},"content":{"rendered":"

Since the outbreak of the Israeli war on Gaza, following the October 7, 2023, \u201cAl-Aqsa Flood\u201d military operation, analysts, governments, and media outlets have debated Qatar\u2019s involvement with Hamas and its wider role in Middle East diplomacy. Pro-Israel critiques assert that Qatar\u2019s hosting of Hamas leaders and financial transfers to the people of Gaza amount to state sponsorship of terrorism<\/a>.1<\/a> Some commentators went as far as implicating<\/a> Qatar in the planning and execution of the October 7 attacks on Israel, and conspiracy theories are invoked in order to distort Qatari diplomatic mediation activities in different parts of the world.<\/p>\n

These allegations are politically driven, rely on selective attribution, and intentionally misrepresent and misinterpret Qatar\u2019s role in Gaza. More importantly, the key objective of the claims that underlie the argument about Qatar\u2019s role in Gaza is to divert the attention away from the core problem; i.e., the continuation of Israel\u2019s occupation and apartheid system and the genocide its forces are executing in the Gaza Strip.<\/p>\n

The campaign against Qatar sought not only to tarnish its image internationally but also to pressure it to abandon its adherence to a just solution to the Palestinian question and extort it to join the so-called Abraham Accords, which means normalizing relations with Israel without solving the Palestinian issue. Other objectives of the anti-Qatar campaign include undermining its role as a mediator, derailing its efforts to stop the genocide in Gaza, and silencing the Qatari-based media outlets such as al-Araby and Al-Jazeera, which exposed Israeli crimes and challenged its narrative of the war on the Palestinians while Israel prevented international media from covering the war from the Strip.<\/p>\n

This essay examines the unfounded pro-Israel allegations against Qatar. By situating Qatar\u2019s engagement with Hamas and its role in the mediation efforts to stop the war on Gaza within the broader framework of the Palestinian Question and the Israeli blockade on Gaza, it also seeks to identify the latent forces behind the campaign to distort Qatar\u2019s image internationally. It proceeds in three sections. The first one outlines the historical contexts of Qatar\u2019s involvement in Gaza and its relations with Hamas. The Second deals with Qatar\u2019s role in the post-October 7, 2023, mediation efforts, and the reasons behind the campaign against it. The third section focuses on the attempts to draw Qatar into the simmering Israeli politics.<\/p>\n

I. Qatar\u2019s Role in Easing the Israeli Blockade on Gaza<\/p>\n

Qatar\u2019s engagement with Gaza expanded significantly following the blockade imposed by Israel after Hamas\u2019 victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. As many countries reduced or suspended aid to the more than two million Palestinians\u2014most of whom are refugees\u2014living in the besieged territory, Qatar, alongside the United Nations and a number of international organizations, led the efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis resulting from the blockade and Israel\u2019s failure, as an occupying power, to fulfil its obligations toward the civilian population. Qatar\u2019s role<\/a> in providing humanitarian aid to Gaza became increasingly prominent following successive Israeli military assaults in 2008\u20132009, 2012, 2014, 2019, and 2021, including post-war reconstruction efforts.<\/p>\n

In the aftermath of the 2012 war, Qatar established \u201cThe Qatari Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza,\u201d a dedicated body for the purpose of post-war reconstruction<\/a>. Concurrently, it committed to paying the salaries<\/a> of public-sector employees and supplied the Gaza Strip with the fuel required for electricity<\/a> generation.<\/p>\n

Qatari aid flowed through monitored mechanisms and was coordinated<\/a> with international actors, and Israel, the occupying power itself. Israeli governments tolerated\u2014and at times encouraged\u2014Qatari assistance. Successive Israeli governments\u2014including those of Benjamin Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett, and Yair Lapid\u2014accepted that Qatar assume the primary responsibility for supporting Gaza\u2019s population. This arrangement was driven by political considerations, namely the desire to prevent<\/a> a severe humanitarian collapse and maintain a degree of stability in the Strip, while simultaneously deflecting responsibility for the daily welfare of the besieged population to other international actors.<\/p>\n

Between 2012 and 2021, Qatar allocated<\/a> approximately $1.49 billion in aid to the Gaza Strip, funding essential needs such as food, medicine, electricity, and basic public services. This assistance included monthly financial support to 100,000 families, salaries for teachers and doctors, and contributions to maintaining the Strip\u2019s critical infrastructure. All of these efforts were carried out in coordination with Israel, as the occupying power, as well as with the United States and the United Nations.<\/p>\n

In addition to its humanitarian role, Qatar has also played a political role by hosting the political leadership of Hamas after its departure from Syria in 2012, following its open support for the Syrian uprising against the regime of then-president Bashar al-Assad.2<\/a> Hosting<\/a> Hamas\u2019s political bureau occurred within a broader framework of internationally tolerated\u2014and at times encouraged\u2014engagement. Doha\u2019s purpose of hosting<\/a> Hamas leaders was meant to facilitate communication, de-escalation, and negotiation. US officials have acknowledged that Qatar\u2019s access to Hamas filled a gap in Western diplomatic efforts, particularly during hostage negotiations and ceasefire talks.<\/p>\n

In July 2017, during the height of the Qatar diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain, former CIA director, David Petraeus, gave an interview to the French newspaper Journal du Dimanche. He said<\/a>: \u201cOur partners should remember that Qatar \u2013 at our request \u2013 welcomed delegations from the Taliban and Hamas, and that Qatar is now home to our military headquarters for our operations throughout the Middle East.\u201d At that time the administration of then-US President Barack Obama sought to maintain an open channel<\/a> of communication with Hamas. The US request was consistent with broader Western efforts to encourage Hamas to adopt what was described as a more moderate approach to political engagement with Israel. Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, known for his pro-Israel positions, played a role in these efforts in his capacity as the representative of the Quartet on the Middle East\u2014an initiative involving the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations aimed at advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Blair visited Gaza, where he met with Hamas leaders and called for the adoption of a Palestinian political program based on the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders as a final settlement to the conflict with Israel. He also publicly acknowledged at the time that Hamas was a Palestinian national movement pursuing Palestinian objectives, rather than part of a broader international Islamist network. Following his visit to Gaza, Blair travelled to Doha, where he met<\/a> with the head of then Hamas political bureau, Khaled Mashal, and held further talks on these issues.<\/p>\n

On May 1, 2017, Hamas used Doha as a platform to announce its new political program<\/a>, in which it reaffirmed its identity as a Palestinian national movement and, for the first time, indicated its willingness to accept the two-state solution. Over time, Qatar assumed an influential role in matters related to the Gaza blockade and Palestinian reconciliation, including support for the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. In 2012, the Doha Agreement<\/a> was signed, providing for the formation of a national unity government; however, the agreement was never implemented. In 2016, Qatar invited<\/a> representatives from Fatah and Hamas in a renewed attempt to advance Palestinian reconciliation. This initiative also failed to produce a viable agreement. In 2020, Qatar hosted informal rounds<\/a> of negotiations aimed at finding common ground on holding Palestinian elections. Here too, progress stalled due to interference by regional and international powers.<\/p>\n

In addition, Qatar played a significant role in mediating an end to hostilities in each of Israel\u2019s military offensives against Gaza, including securing a ceasefire that ended the 19-day war in 2014. In August 2020, Qatar led mediation efforts between Hamas and Israel to de-escalate tensions following the protests near the demarcation fence with Israel. In May 2021, Qatar worked in coordination with Egypt, Jordan, and the United Nations to help broker another ceasefire<\/a> between Hamas and Israel.<\/p>\n

II. Post-October 7 Role and the anti-Qatar Campaign<\/p>\n

By October 2023, it had become evident that aid to the Gaza Strip had neither changed the nature of the Palestine question nor reshaped its core issues; i.e., the Israeli occupation at large, the settlement project in the West Bank, the Judaization of Jerusalem, and indeed the siege of Gaza, and that such aid had never been intended to achieve these outcomes anyway. Israel\u2019s assumptions in this regard proved to be utterly misplaced.<\/p>\n

Following the October 7 attacks and attempts by Israel\u2019s top political leadership to deny any responsibility for its failure, Qatar\u2019s role in assisting Gaza was brought to the fore. Israel\u2019s internal political simmering fueled the debate, with Qatar at its centre. This campaign particularly focused on Qatar\u2019s financial<\/a> support to Gaza\u2019s residents, with allegations that portions of this aid had been diverted to the construction of Hamas\u2019s tunnel network. The anti-Qatar crusade completely overlooked the fact that this assistance, allocated to pay salaries and support families in need, was transferred through Israel, including via approved lists of aid recipients, and was barely sufficient to meet the basic needs of families in Gaza.<\/p>\n

Notwithstanding this campaign, Qatar rushed to restrain Israel\u2019s incomprehensible reaction to the October attacks, which quickly turned into a genocidal war on Gaza by leveraging its relations with Hamas to secure the release of female Israeli civilians and foreign nationals, including Americans. Qatar\u2019s mediation<\/a> efforts were undertaken at the request of the Biden administration.<\/p>\n

Qatar identified three primary objectives<\/a> in its political engagement on Gaza: preventing the escalation of the conflict, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, and securing the release of the detainees. In pursuit of these objectives, which had the full backing of the US administration, Doha hosted regular talks involving top Israeli and American officials, including former Mossad chief, David Barnea, and former CIA Director, William Burns. From November 2023 onward, Barnea<\/a> visited Doha on several occasions to secure the release of detainees held in Gaza. Subsequent meetings<\/a> were later held in Europe and other locations, with the participation of Qatar, Israel, and the United States.<\/p>\n

On November, 22, 2023, mediation efforts\u2014 in which Qatar played a central role\u2014succeeded in securing a 5-day truce<\/a> that involved the release of approximately 100 detainees in exchange for 240 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Over the next two years, Qatar engaged in sustained and intensive diplomatic efforts aimed at mediating an end to the war on Gaza and securing the release of the remaining detainees. On January 15, 2025, the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Israel and Hamas had reached a ceasefire and prisoner exchange agreement, scheduled to enter into force on Sunday, January 19, 2025. The agreement provided for a reciprocal exchange of detainees and was intended to establish a period of sustained calm that could serve as a foundation for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. Its first phase stipulated that the ceasefire<\/a> would remain in effect for the duration of negotiations over the implementation of the second phase, with the guarantors\u2014Qatar, Egypt, and the United States\u2014committing to continued diplomatic engagement to ensure the agreement\u2019s implementation and durability.<\/p>\n

The agreement underscored the significance of Qatar\u2019s role as an indispensable mediator in the efforts to bring an end to the Gaza war. Qatar\u2019s unique diplomatic position has enabled it to maintain channels of communication with all relevant parties, including Hamas, Israel, and the United States. In this context, the United States has come to rely heavily on Qatar\u2019s capacity to engage Hamas\u2019 leadership and persuade the movement to accept the terms of the prisoners\u2019 exchange agreement.<\/p>\n

As Israel\u2019s frustration with the pace of progress in its war on Gaza grew, its displeasure with Qatar\u2019s efforts to stop the genocide against Gazans grew in parallel. Netanyahu\u2019s right-wing government was not interested in the mediation process except as a tool in its war which it sought to continue until it realizes its proclaimed objectives: the total annihilation of Hamas as an armed movement and a governing body and the displacement of the people of Gaza, and was furious at Qatar\u2019s tireless mediation efforts. Netanyahu thought that Qatar was undermining his key war objective: rendering Gaza an uninhabitable place and thus creating the necessary conditions for the expulsion of its population.<\/p>\n

Israel went as far in its endeavor to derail Qatar\u2019s mediation efforts as to targeting Doha in September 2025, the first ever attack against a mediator in mediation history. The attack intended to kill the head of the Hamas delegation to the ceasefire talks and hence destroy every chance to stop the war on Gaza.3<\/a> Netanyahu decision to strike Doha produced the opposite result, however. Embarrassed by the failed Israeli attack, President Donald Trump felt that the war on Gaza has served its purpose and that it must stop before it implicates the United States in a wider regional conflict. He went as far as to allow several direct meetings between his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and his advisor and son-in-law, Jared Kushner, to meet Hamas leaders to broker an end to the war on Gaza.<\/p>\n

Israel was not only upset by Qatar\u2019s efforts to stop the war before it can achieve its objectives, but also by the coverage of the Qatar-based media outlets. Al-Araby and Al Jazeera news network have played a significant role in shaping Arab and international public opinion and narratives around the Gaza war by providing continuous, graphic, and critical coverage of Israeli genocide against the Palestinians. Their reporting has emphasized civilian casualties, humanitarian conditions, displacement, and violations of international humanitarian law. This coverage has contributed to heightened global scrutiny of Israel\u2019s actions and has influenced public opinion in the Global South as well as among Western audiences. In addition, the coverage of the Qatar-based media played key role in referring Israeli crimes to the International Criminal Court (ICC). For Israel, this represented a strategic challenge to its narrative dominance. By focusing on civilian suffering, questioning official Israeli claims, and giving airtime to Palestinian voices\u2014especially those excluded from Western media\u2014Al-Araby and Al Jazeera undermined Israel\u2019s efforts to maintain moral and legal legitimacy for its military campaign. Images that reflected the scale of the humanitarian crisis resulting from Israel\u2019s military campaign dismantled Israel\u2019s preferred framing of the war as a purely defensive or counterterrorism operation. This has heightened Israeli sensitivity to these channel\u2019s influence, particularly during a prolonged war with mounting international criticism. Al-Araby and Al Jazeera\u2019s coverage have also been cited within Israeli domestic debates, especially by critics of Netanyahu\u2019s right-wing government, families of the detainees, and civil society groups. Israeli leaders have responded by portraying these channels as part of a broader hostile information environment, using this framing to justify measures such as restricting their operations or accusing Qatar of information warfare.<\/p>\n

The campaign against Qatar increasingly linked media criticism with diplomatic demands. Israeli officials and pro-Israel critics stipulated that Qatar should restrain its media if it seeks to act as a mediator. This argument intended to delegitimize Qatar\u2019s mediation role and question its impartiality in the negotiations process. Israel\u2019s campaign against Qatar therefore reflected not only frustration with mediation outcomes but also discomfort with the informational power exercised by Qatar-based media. In Israeli strategic thinking, diplomacy, media, and legitimacy are increasingly treated as interconnected arenas\u2014making the media a symbolic and practical target within the broader confrontation with Qatar.<\/p>\n

In addition, over the past decades, Qatar has consistently advocated a just solution to the Palestinian cause, based on UN resolutions 242 and 338, making the normalization of relations with Israel conditional upon that. These positions have contributed to Israel adopting an increasingly confrontational stance toward Qatar, a dynamic that has escalated to the level of direct political and media incitement following the October 7, 2023, attacks.<\/p>\n

III. Drawing Qatar into Simmering Israeli Politics<\/p>\n

Throughout the negotiation process over a ceasefire in Gaza, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to pressure Doha to compel Hamas to release the detainees according to his own terms, while also drawing Qatar into Israel\u2019s simmering internal politics. The Israeli opposition, on the other hand, sought to weaken Netanyahu\u2019s position by holding him responsible for the continuation of Hamas\u2019 rule in Gaza in spite of the blockade. They deplored Netanyahu\u2019s decision to allow Qatar to provide aid to Gaza, effectively enabling Hamas\u2019 rule, they argued. Parts of the Israeli opposition accused Netanyahu of even encouraging Qatar to provide aid to the Gaza Strip and, by extension, of financing Hamas. While this claim was meant to undermine Netanyahu\u2019s grip on power by the opposition, Qatar\u2019s financial assistance to Gaza was provided in coordination with all Israeli governments since 2009.4<\/a> The funds were transferred in suitcases through Israeli airports and via land crossings under the supervision of Israeli security forces. While Qatar helped Gaza for humanitarian purposes and in solidarity with the Palestinian people, the governments led by Benjamin Netanyahu, Naftali Bennett, and Yair Lapid facilitated and effectively encouraged the delivery of this aid. This policy was based on the belief that financial aid would help maintain calm in Gaza and shift the focus of Hamas toward governance instead of armed resistance. This strategy, which was widely debated in the Israeli media, came to be known as \u201cbuying quiet\u201d<\/a> approach. A consensus emerged among Israel\u2019s political leadership, military establishment, and intelligence agencies that this was the most viable and least costly policy to entangle Hamas in the day-to-day administration of civilian life in the Gaza Strip.<\/p>\n

While the Israeli opposition sought to maintain the pressure on Netanyahu by keeping the focus on Qatar\u2019s role in the provision of aid to the people of Gaza, he in turn attempted to divert the attention away from his strategy, which prioritized the destruction of Gaza over securing the release of the Israeli captives, by directing criticism at Qatar. He claimed that Doha was capable of compelling Hamas to accept Israel\u2019s terms, yet it had chosen not to do so. In January 2024, he seized the opportunity during a meeting with the families of Israeli captives to mount an unprecedented attack against Qatar. He described its involvement in the talks to release the captives as \u201cproblematic,\u201d claiming that it possesses the leverage to pressure Hamas into releasing the captives but had failed to exercise it. He, furthermore, expressed frustration at the US administration for not applying greater pressure<\/a> on Qatar, citing its hosting of Hamas\u2019 leadership and its financial support to Gaza.<\/p>\n

Indeed, Israel\u2019s \u201cbuying quiet\u201d policy has since been clearly shown to be fundamentally misguided. Isarel cannot impose a siege on an entire population, deny it the necessary conditions for survival, and simultaneously prevent others from providing aid. Nor can the limited provision of aid, barely sufficient to sustain life, be expected to compel the Palestinians to accept the siege of Gaza, the confiscation of their lands for the purpose of building settlements, or the Judaization of Jerusalem. These assumptions reflect serious miscalculations and misunderstandings of the role of humanitarian aid, for which Israel, as an occupying power, should have delivered. Moreover, when a population is governed by a particular government of political movement, any aid can be portrayed as indirectly sustaining that government\/movement. This logic would apply equally to the work of international humanitarian organizations operating in the Gaza Strip, to the fuel supplied by Israel to Gaza, and to the flow of goods into the territory through Israeli crossings. Here, one must say, Israel has not only imposed a blockade and failed to meet its obligations as an occupying power but has also sought to derive economic benefit by selling goods to the very population it continues to besiege.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

The Israeli campaign against Qatar is driven by a combination of strategic, political, and domestic considerations, rather than a single cause. At its core, the campaign reflects tensions arising from Qatar\u2019s unique diplomatic role, Israel\u2019s internal political dynamics, and competing visions for managing the war on Gaza.<\/p>\n

Indeed, Qatar occupies a rare diplomatic position as one of the few states capable of maintaining open channels of communication with Hamas while simultaneously engaging with Israel and the United States. This role has made Qatar indispensable in ceasefire negotiations and prisoner exchanges, but it has also generated strong Israeli criticism. When mediation does not produce outcomes aligned with Israeli government preferences\u2014particularly rapid or unconditional releases of detainees\u2014Qatar becomes a convenient target for blame, despite lacking coercive authority over Hamas.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, Israel\u2019s long-standing strategy toward Gaza\u2014combining blockade, deterrence, and limited economic relief\u2014has failed to produce the desired outcomes. Criticism of Qatar allows Israeli leaders to deflect responsibility for these policy failures by externalizing blame. By portraying Qatari aid or mediation as enabling Hamas, attention is diverted away from the structural shortcomings of Israel\u2019s own approach to Gaza.<\/p>\n

The campaign against Qatar is closely tied to Israel\u2019s internal political struggles, particularly surrounding Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Pressure from opposition parties, families of detainees, and public opinion has intensified scrutiny of government decisions related to Gaza. Targeting Qatar serves a domestic political function by shifting public debate away from leadership accountability and toward an external actor allegedly obstructing Israeli objectives.<\/p>\n

Qatar\u2019s mediation efforts are aimed at ceasefires, de-escalation, and negotiated settlements. For segments of the Israeli political and security establishment that favour maximal military pressure or open-ended conflict until Hamas\u2019 complete capitulation, mediation itself is perceived as an obstacle. Undermining Qatar\u2019s credibility weakens diplomatic pathways that could constrain Israel\u2019s military freedom of action.<\/p>\n

Even Israel\u2019s loss of significant support from western public opinion, including in the United States, has led it to blame Qatar instead of acknowledging its own responsibility. Israel has resorted to conspiracy theories to explain its public relations failures by attributing them to alleged Qatari activity in the west, even though Israel has used lobbying to call for coercion to silence its critics and suppress protests. It has no one to blame for its public relations failure but itself.<\/p>\n

In essence, the Israeli campaign against Qatar is less about Qatar itself than about unresolved strategic dilemmas surrounding Netanyahu\u2019s policies in Gaza, domestic political pressures within Israel, and competing approaches to conflict management. Qatar\u2019s effectiveness as a mediator, rather than any singular action, has placed it at the center of these tensions.<\/p>\n

The views expressed in this publication are the author\u2019s own and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arab Center Washington DC, its staff, or its Board of Directors.<\/p>\n

References:<\/p>\n

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1<\/a> See also Barak Mendelsohn, \u201cUnderstanding Qatar\u2019s Relationship with Hamas: A Critical Exploration of State Sponsored Terrorism,\u201d Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2025), at: https:\/\/acr.ps\/1L9F2zg<\/a>; Matthew Levitt, \u201cStatement for the Record before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Does Engagement with Terrorist Groups Enable Violence?\u201d testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, October 26, 2023, at: https:\/\/acr.ps\/1L9F2lv<\/a>; \u201cAn Analysis of Qatari Connections to Illicit Terror Financing and the Resulting Foreign Policy Implications,\u201d International Affairs Review, at: https:\/\/acr.ps\/1L9F2i3<\/a>; \u201cAllegations against the Government of Qatar: The Role of Select Non-Governmental Organizations in Doha\u2019s Support for Terrorism,\u201d report, at: https:\/\/acr.ps\/1L9F2s6<\/a>
\n2<\/a> Qatar first gave refuge and housing to Hamas leaders when they were ejected from Jordan in 1999. See: \u201cThe Palestinian Cause at the Heart of the Campaign against Qatar,\u201d AlJazeera.net, 5\/6\/2017, (in Arabic), https:\/\/n9.cl\/23233<\/a>.
\n3<\/a> On September 9, 2025, Israel launched an attack on Qatar, targeting homes and residential buildings housing members of the political bureau of Hamas. The attack left several people dead, including the son of the Palestinian movement\u2019s leader in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, the director of his office, several members of his entourage, and a Qatari security officer. It also wounded several civilians who were in the vicinity.
\n4<\/a> Qatar has provided regular, public financial support to the Gaza Strip on a monthly basis. For several years, it has provided $30 million per month to support impoverished Gazans, pay the salaries of civil servants, finance some of the fuel needed to run Gaza\u2019s power plants, and fund the reconstruction of Gaza after several rounds of destruction by Israel, bringing Qatar\u2019s support to the Gaza Strip to several billion dollars. See: \u201cQatar Plans to Resume Gaza Funding with New Mechanism,\u201d Al Jazeera, 6\/9\/2021, at: https:\/\/n9.cl\/dlgqq<\/a>.
\n* Featured image credit:Shutterstock\/Sven Hansche<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Since the outbreak of the Israeli war on Gaza, following the October 7, 2023, \u201cAl-Aqsa Flood\u201d military operation,…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":272769,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[85,46,43],"class_list":{"0":"post-272768","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-israel","8":"tag-il","9":"tag-israel","10":"tag-news"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/272768","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=272768"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/272768\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/272769"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=272768"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=272768"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=272768"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}