Last month, US special envoy Steve Witkoff<\/a> announced the launch of phase two of the plan, describing it as the transition \u201cfrom ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance and reconstruction.\u201d<\/p>\n At the World Economic Forum in Davos days later, US President Donald Trump\u2019s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who works closely with Witkoff, presented plans for a \u201cNew Gaza\u201d in which the Strip\u2019s demilitarization paved the way for an almost-complete Israeli withdrawal and the redevelopment the entire enclave into neat blocks of residential zones, industrial areas, parks, and even a seaport and airport.<\/p>\n Planners had considered plotting out a \u201cfree zone\u2026 and a Hamas zone,\u201d but had instead decided to build a vision for \u201ccatastrophic success,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n \n\t\t\tGet The Times of Israel’s Daily Edition \t\t\t\tBy signing up, you agree to the terms<\/a><\/p>\n But for now, those ambitions \u2014 and even much more modest ones \u2014 remain largely theoretical.<\/p>\n \t Under the framework, Israel is prohibited from occupying Gaza, and the IDF is required to \u201cwithdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon\u201d between the Israeli military, a prospective International Stabilization Force, the bodies overseeing Gaza\u2019s transition via the Trump-controlled Board of Peace, and the United States.<\/p>\n \u201cPractically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat,\u201d the plan outlines.<\/p>\n A roughly sketched map released alongside the plan marked the Yellow Line that Israeli troops retreated to once the ceasefire took hold in October, which left 47% of the enclave in the hands of Hamas. A Red Line included in the map marks the area where troops would be expected to pull back to once the ISF deploys, expanding the area outside IDF control to roughly two-thirds of the Strip.<\/p>\n Even in a full withdrawal scenario, Israel would still retain an approximately one-kilometer- (0.6 mile-) wide buffer zone along Gaza\u2019s perimeter, including the Philadelphi Route on the Egyptian border, which Israel says has long served as a major smuggling corridor.<\/p>\n \t Yet, so far, only one of the plan\u2019s benchmarks has been fulfilled: the return of all hostages held in Gaza, completed last week with the recovery of the remains of Ran Gvili<\/a>.<\/p>\n Hamas, however, remains armed and firmly in control of most areas west of the Yellow Line.<\/p>\n \u201cAs long as our enemies inside Gaza are still\u2026 planning to regain their power\u2026 we are doomed to carry on staying with ground forces surrounding Gaza,\u201d Orit Miller-Katav, a researcher at Ariel University\u2019s Institute for Middle Eastern and Asian Studies, told The Times of Israel.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, the ISF has struggled to materialize. In December, The Wall Street Journal reported that the US State Department had formally approached more than 70 countries to contribute troops, funding or logistical support. While 19 reportedly expressed some willingness to assist, any actual deployment appears far off, with many governments reluctant to commit forces absent a clear mandate and security framework.<\/p>\n Israel has also repeatedly voiced strong opposition to allowing countries such as Turkey and Qatar \u2014 both of which have expressed interest in participating and sending ground troops into Gaza \u2014 to take part in the force, further complicating efforts to assemble an international contingent.<\/p>\n \t And even if the ISF forms, analysts have questioned whether it would be willing or able to forcibly dismantle Hamas\u2019s military infrastructure \u2014 a task Israel increasingly suggests could take years. A senior Israeli official said last week that while the IDF could deprive Hamas of its weapons, the process would be lengthy.<\/p>\n \u201cWe really don\u2019t know what\u2019s going on in [the Hamas-controlled section] of Gaza,\u201d Hillel Frisch, professor emeritus at Bar-Ilan University and former senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, said.<\/p>\n \u201cWe have to assume that what is happening there is very similar to what happened in Gaza for the last [two decades] or even before that,\u201d he said, referring to Hamas\u2019s rule in the Strip since it seized power in 2007 \u2014 years in which the group developed extensive terror infrastructure, including its vast tunnel network, and steadily built up its weapons arsenal ahead of the shock October 7, 2023, attack.<\/p>\n \t That possibility underscores why Israel remains unwilling to retreat further without clear evidence of Hamas\u2019s disarmament.<\/p>\n At a press conference<\/a> following Gvili\u2019s return last week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted Israel was \u201cfocusing on completing the two remaining missions: dismantling Hamas\u2019s weapons and demilitarizing Gaza of arms and tunnels.\u201d<\/p>\n Israel will maintain security control \u201cfrom the Jordan River to the sea,\u201d including in Gaza, he added, making clear that withdrawal, in Israel\u2019s view, cannot proceed in parallel with Hamas\u2019s continued rule.<\/p>\n \u2018New border\u2019<\/p>\n Even with fighting officially halted, the ceasefire boundary has become a frequent source of friction. Alleged violations are reported almost daily, as Israeli forces target armed suspects \u2014 and at times unarmed civilians \u2014 who cross into Israeli-controlled areas.<\/p>\n Israeli strikes over the weekend reportedly killed 32 Gazans<\/a>, with the army saying the attacks were in response to a ceasefire violation in which Hamas gunmen emerged from a tunnel in the southern Gazan city of Rafah, which is outside the Yellow Line.<\/p>\n At the same time, Israel has been accused of quietly shifting the line<\/a> deeper into Hamas-controlled territory by moving the concrete barriers that mark it \u2014 allegations the IDF denies.<\/p>\n The evolving reality along the line has brought renewed attention to what its future may be \u2014 whether it is merely a temporary ceasefire marker or a more lasting military boundary.<\/p>\n During a visit to the Strip<\/a> in December, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir appeared to signal the latter.<\/p>\n \t \u201cWe will not allow Hamas to reestablish itself. We control large parts of the Gaza Strip and stand along [strategic] lines,\u201d Zamir said during a tour of Beit Hanoun and Jabalia.<\/p>\n \u201cThe Yellow Line is a new border line, a forward defensive line for the communities and an offensive line,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n Coloring inside the lines<\/p>\n Miller-Katav said the debate over the Yellow Line reflects a broader historical pattern: interim security lines can take on political weight when the conditions meant to dissolve them fail to materialize.<\/p>\n Israel has seen temporary demarcations endure before. The Green Line, drawn as a 1949 armistice line and never intended as a permanent border, became the default framework for Israel\u2019s engagement with territory beyond it when no final settlement emerged.<\/p>\n But the Yellow Line differs from the Green Line in key ways. The latter represents the rough contour of a future border but as of now in practice is often rendered invisible by Israel\u2019s presence on both sides of it.<\/p>\n \u201cWe were on both sides of the Green Line [in 1967]. This is not true of the Yellow Line today,\u201d said Frisch.<\/p>\n \t Rather than mark a political or administrative division, the Yellow Line is an actual deployment boundary deep inside non-Israeli territory, beyond which lies an armed hostile force, making it somewhat more akin to the demarcation between the West Bank\u2019s Area A and the rest of that territory.<\/p>\n While Israel has military control of most of the West Bank, Palestinian population centers are technically under the PA\u2019s security forces and often home to entrenched terror operations, making IDF incursions more fraught.<\/p>\n In Gaza, the Yellow Line separates a Hamas-free and largely depopulated territory where the IDF has free rein on one side, from a densely populated area still under Hamas\u2019s guns on the other; any future Israeli move beyond the line would carry heavy operational and political consequences, according to Frisch.<\/p>\n \u201cThe cost of penetrating Gaza is totally different from [the West Bank],\u201d he said.<\/p>\n The cost of holding the line<\/p>\n There are also dangers that come with keeping troops inside Gaza, even if only on the eastern side of the Yellow Line, said Miller-Katav.<\/p>\n \u201cI think the government wishes to withdraw from [the Yellow Line]. No one wants to keep the army staying alert within this territory,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n Marked only by a string of large yellow concrete bollards, on the ground the Yellow Line is unfenced and freely traversable aside from the physical presence of troops. Friction along the seam is ever-present.<\/p>\n Soldiers have been attacked on multiple occasions and dozens of Gazans have been shot and killed when approaching the line, which in many places cuts through dense urban landscapes, including alongside rubble-strewn residential buildings.<\/p>\n The IDF currently has two divisions deployed to the Strip, amounting to tens of thousands of troops. Should the situation stabilize and soldiers pull back to the buffer zone, the move would reduce the deployment to a single division, as it was pre-October 7, albeit with more personnel.<\/p>\n Aside from keeping troops in relative danger, the extra deployments carry a manpower cost for the already stretched army, which has forced many reservists to put families and careers on hold for extended periods. The toll has gone beyond personal: reservists account for an estimated 20% of Israel\u2019s tech workforce, widely seen as the backbone of the economy, amplifying the broader economic impact of a prolonged deployment.<\/p>\n The financial burden is also significant. According to the Institute for National Security Studies, maintaining a full long-term military occupation of the Gaza Strip would cost an estimated NIS 25 billion ($8.1 billion) annually, though maintaining a deployment along the current lines would presumably cost less.<\/p>\n \t There is also a human toll. Since troops pulled back to the Yellow Line, four soldiers have been killed in attacks.<\/p>\n Even so, experts cautioned that withdrawal remains unrealistic so long as Hamas remains intact.<\/p>\n \u201cWhatever happened within the Gaza Strip is totally under [Hamas\u2019s] responsibility,\u201d Miller-Katav stressed, referring to the widespread destruction and humanitarian crisis after more than two years of war. \u201cTherefore, leaving it to be rebuilt [by] those who created this situation in the first place is a critical mistake.\u201d<\/p>\n Somewhat paradoxically, though, it seems that any hope of leaving the Strip for good hinges on Israel returning to the whole of the enclave and relaunching the war.<\/p>\n Go big to go home<\/p>\n According to Frisch, the central challenge moving forward is \u201chow to get rid of Hamas.\u201d<\/p>\n Contrary to the US push for a multinational force to ensure Hamas\u2019s disarmament, Frisch argued that the IDF is the only actor capable of carrying out that mission.<\/p>\n \u201cIf anyone needs proof of that, you can just [look to] the 12,000-man UN force\u2026 in Lebanon since 2006,\u201d he said, in reference to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was tasked with monitoring the ceasefire after the Second Lebanon War and preventing Hezbollah from reestablishing an armed presence near the border.<\/p>\n Instead, Frisch said, the UN force \u201cdid nothing. Forty-six countries [contributed to UNIFIL], and it didn\u2019t prevent a movement of one single Hezbollah terrorist.\u201d<\/p>\n
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\n\t\tA yellow concrete block demarcating the ceasefire line, east of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip, November 2, 2025 (Fathi Ibrahim\/Flash90)<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/IMG_8076.png\")
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\n\t\tA map of a proposed withdrawal of IDF troops as part of a deal to end the war in Gaza, published on September 29, 2025. (White House)<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/AFP__20251117__2246647015__v1__HighRes__UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilMeetsToConsiderT-e1763417687418-.jpeg\")
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\n\t\tMembers of the UN Security Council raise their hands to vote in favor of a draft resolution to authorize an International Stabilization Force in Gaza, on November 17, 2025 at UN headquarters in New York City. (Adam Gray\/Getty Images\/AFP)<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/MYN_7107-640x400.jpg\")
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\n\t\tPrime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holds a press conference in Jerusalem on January 27, 2026. (Maayan Toaf\/GPO)<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/WhatsApp_Image_2025-12-07_at_17.22.44_1-640x400.jpeg\")
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\n\t\tIDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir (unblurred) speaks to troops in the Gaza Strip, December 7, 2025. (Israel Defense Forces)<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/F080701MT18-e1483206712739-640x400.jpg\")
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\n\t\tAn illustrative photo of an IDF guard post in the West Bank. (Matanya Tausig\/Flash90)<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/2337f4e0-1277-40f6-8e88-9f1573dd316f-640x400.jpg\")
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\n\t\tIDF troops operate at a cemetery in Gaza City during a search for the body of Master Sgt. Ran Gvili, in a handout photo issued on January 27, 2026. (Israel Defense Forces)<\/p>\n
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