![\"Na'im](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/word-image-1771216691223.png\")
Na’im Qassem struggles to reassemble the Hezbollah’s puzzle (Elaph, February 12, 2026)![\"Ali](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/word-image-1771216692899.jpeg\")
Ali Reda with Safa (X account of journalist Ali Reda, February 7, 2026)![\"Wafiq](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/word-image-1771216693932.jpeg\")
Wafiq Safa interviewed about his acquaintance with Nasrallah (al-Mayadeen, February 18, 2026)![\"Safa](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/word-image-1771216695007.jpeg\")
Safa meets with UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (al-Akhbar, May 30, 2025)Yuval Rosenberg
\nOverview[1]<\/p>\n
The Israel-Lebanon-Hezbollah War ended in November 2024, and since then Hezbollah has been reorganizing to repair the damage it suffered, including to the top leadership, and to adapt to Na\u2019im Qassem as the new secretary general.
\nAlongside reports of disputes and power struggles between the \u201cpragmatic\u201d figures led by Qassem, and the proponents of an extremist approach, senior organization figures claimed that Hezbollah had recovered and rebuilt the leadership structure, adapting it to the continued Israeli targeted killings as part of enforcement actions, and preparations for a new war.
\nAccording to reports, at the beginning of February 2026, Hezbollah\u2019s leadership accepted the resignation of Wafiq Safa, who had headed the Coordination and Liaison Unit since 1987 and was considered close to Hassan Nasrallah and one of the most prominent and influential figures in the organization\u2019s top leadership. Media commentaries opined that he resigned because of his disputes with Qassem, but also noted that the move was part of the secretary general\u2019s efforts to reorganize Hezbollah\u2019s hierarchy by tightening his control over the organization\u2019s media, and political and \u201csecurity\u201d forces, while relying on figures loyal to himself and with lower media prominence, in order to reduce the risk of being targeted by Israel.
\nIn ITIC assessment, the termination of Wafiq Safa\u2019s role was intended to stabilize Hezbollah\u2019s leadership, reduce the vulnerability of senior figures and consolidate the secretary general\u2019s control after the profound shock undergone by the organization. However, concentrating authority in the secretary general\u2019s office and weakening veteran power centers may awake latent frictions and undermine internal balances. The success of the move will be partially measured by the organization\u2019s ability to preserve cohesion, prevent further intelligence leaks and redefine Hezbollah\u2019s relations with the Lebanese state without relinquishing its core principles.<\/p>\n
Reorganization Since the End of the War with Israel<\/p>\n
During the war against Israel, which lasted from October 8, 2023 to November 27, 2024, and especially between September 23, 2024 and the ceasefire, Hezbollah lost thousands of terrorist operatives, including dozens of senior leadership and command figures, foremost among them secretary general Hassan Nasrallah, his designated successor, chairman of the Executive Council Hashem Safi al-Din, and the organization\u2019s military commander, Fuad Shukr. Since the ceasefire, within the framework of enforcement activity, the IDF eliminated hundreds of Hezbollah terrorist operatives and commanders, the most prominent of whom was the organization\u2019s acting chief of staff, Ali Haytham Tabataba\u2019i, who was eliminated in November 2025.[2]
\nAt the end of October 2024, after the elimination of Nasrallah, Hezbollah announced that the Shura Council had chosen Sheikh Na\u2019im Qassem, who had served as deputy secretary general since 1991, as the new secretary general.[3] After the ceasefire other senior positions were filled, including Ali Damoush, who was appointed head of Hezbollah\u2019s Executive Council. and Youssef al-Zein, who was put in charge of communications, although in most cases no official announcements were issued.
\nOutwardly, senior Hezbollah figures, mainly members of Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, continued to represent the organization as having recovered from the severe blows it had sustained and claimed that it had rebuilt all levels of its leadership and military structures. For example, Ali Fayyad, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed that the organization had a new secret military structure, with younger and more dynamic leadership, renewed separation between the military wing and the political wing and shortening of command chains. However, \u201csources in the organization\u201d admitted that panic and chaos were still evident near the leadership and that impacted the command fabric (Le Figaro, October 18, 2025).
\nMeanwhile, independent and opposition claimed there were serious disputes and power struggles between rival factions at the top of the organization:<\/p>\n
Power struggles were reported between the hawks, who also opposed Qassem\u2019s leadership despite his de facto appointment by Iran, and the doves, who sought to operate according to the current situation on the ground, including the government\u2019s decision to implement a state monopoly on weapons. As a result, three rival camps were formed in the leadership: one, the moderate camp led by Qassem, which expressed commitment to the ceasefire and to the organization\u2019s remaining within the government of Nawaf Salam, but also opposed disarmament; two, the camp led by the head of the Coordination and Liaison Unit, Wafiq Safa, and deputy head of the Political Council Mahmoud Qamati, who promoted were extremist and threatened the Lebanese government, and three, the camp led Fadlallah, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, who linked disarmament to Israeli withdrawal from five positions in south Lebanon, the return of Lebanese detainees held in Israel and the reconstruction of south Lebanon. Reportedly, all mediation attempts between the camps failed and \u201cknowledgeable political sources \u201d said Hezbollah was disintegrating and unable to make decisions (Hona Lebanon, October 21, 2025).
\nAfter the elimination of Tabataba\u2019i, a struggle reportedly began between senior Hezbollah figures identified with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and senior figures in Hezbollah\u2019s second and third level leadership who wanted to increase their representation in the organization\u2019s military leadership. It was also noted that field ranks, especially in south Lebanon and the Beqa\u2019a Valley, were angry at the leadership because they were subjected to daily attacks and their families did not receive compensation, while the leadership was seen as detached and enjoying resources and not making even a symbolic response to Israel. According to the \u201csource,\u201d for that reason even Hezbollah\u2019s support base was mocking the organization and claiming it was finished, and claiming that there was no one in its ranks who could replace those killed in Israeli strikes (Eram News, November 24, 2025).
\n\u201cSources close to Hezbollah\u201d said the top of the organization\u2019s leadership was coping with internal tensions. Reportedly, there were also power struggles within the Shura Council which were influenced by the split between pragmatic and conservative currents in Iran, creating paralysis in major decision-making and casting doubt on the current leadership\u2019s ability to impose consensus. One example was the delay in the appointment of Hezbollah\u2019s parliamentary faction chairman, Muhammad Raad, as deputy secretary general of the organization, a delay perceived as a sign of hesitation by secretary general Qassem and pressures from conservative currents opposing leadership renewal, particularly the appointment of a political figure who was not a cleric. \u201cSources\u201d opined that completion of the appointment, if it occurred, would begin a struggle for the leadership of Hezbollah\u2019s parliamentary faction and increase internal turmoil (Janoubia, December 16, 2025).
\nIt was further reported that Qassem was trying to strengthen his control and promote a more moderate approach, including to the issue of Hezbollah\u2019s weapons, but was facing opposition from the extremist faction, which is committed to preserving and reconstructing the organization\u2019s military capability. It was also reported that he was making extensive appointments to the military and security forces to preserve his standing (al-Jarida, December 17, 2025).
\nIn the assessment of \u201csources close to Hezbollah,\u201d the organization is at a crossroads, juggling the hawks and the \u201cpragmatists\u201d and dealing with internal and external pressures regarding the weapons issue and the status of the state. There is reportedly criticism of Qassem\u2019s leadership because Hezbollah has failed to resolve the displaced people\u2019s crisis, ceased compensation to families of those killed and shown poor economic management. Despite calls to replace Qassem, there is concern that such a move would widen the split, while continuation of his leadership might accelerate the erosion of the organization\u2019s public legitimacy (Eram News, December 17 and 19, 2025).<\/p>\n
Na\u2019im Qassem struggles to reassemble the Hezbollah\u2019s puzzle (Elaph, February 12, 2026)<\/p>\n
The Resignation of Wafiq Safa<\/p>\n
On February 6, 2026, it was reported that Wafiq Safa submitted his resignation as head of Hezbollah\u2019s Liaison and Coordination Unit, an unusual and unprecedented move for the organization\u2019s security forces.[4] According to \u201cvarious sources,\u201d he resigned because of disputes with the organization\u2019s secretary general, Na\u2019im Qassem, and with Shura Council member and parliamentary faction chairman Muhammad Raad, over the reduction of his powers and his deviation from the organization leadership\u2019s decisions, for example by encouraging protests regarding the restrictions of weapons. \u201cSources\u201d noted that Safa submitted his resignation some time ago, but Hezbollah\u2019s leadership accepted it only after he insisted. The powers of the Liaison Unit were transferred to Hussein Abdallah, close to Qassem and former security chief in south Lebanon, while Ahmed Mahna, who was Raad\u2019s assistant, was put in charge of contacts with the state and external actors (Reuters, al-Hadath, al-Jadeed, February 6, 2026; al-Quds al-Arabi February 8, 2026). Hezbollah did not publish a statement regarding Safa\u2019s resignation.
\nAccording to commentaries in the media, Safa\u2019s resignation from the position he had held since 1987 was apparently part of a broad organizational move by Hezbollah\u2019s upper echelons, intended to entrench the hierarchy under Na\u2019im Qassem and centralize decision-making in his hands, while appointing figures with lower media prominence, alongside an attempt to reduce friction with state institutions:<\/p>\n
Safa\u2019s resignation was not a dismissal, but rather a move of reorganization and restoration of control within Hezbollah\u2019s upper echelons alongside reducing power centers which had developed over the years around veteran figures, and adapting the organizational structure to a post-war situation of high security sensitivity, internal political erosion and the need to avoid direct friction with state institutions. However, Safa\u2019s remaining within the senior organizational echelon and his receiving new tasks indicate the leadership\u2019s desire to preserve his experience and standing, while changing his arena of activity and reducing his public exposure. The timing of the \u201cofficial announcement\u201d was intended to present the move as a controlled process of the distribution of functions in response to regional and international pressures and not as a sign of internal crisis (Lebanon 24, February 7, 2026). Journalist Ali Reda from Hezbollah\u2019s al-Manar channel published a picture of himself alongside Safa in his new office and wrote: \u201cRelax, he only changed offices, but he is still sitting in your heart\u201d (X account of journalist Ali Reda, February 7, 2026).<\/p>\n
Ali Reda with Safa (X account of journalist Ali Reda, February 7, 2026)<\/p>\n
Safa\u2019s responsibilities were split into three: security responsibility went to Hussein Abdallah, institutional coordination to Dr. Ahmed Mahna and management of political contacts to a dedicated department. Reportedly, that reflected the transition from centralization, relying on a single key figure, to decentralization and caution intended to reduce personal vulnerability and restore hierarchical control to the leadership center (RED TV, February 9, 2026).
\n\u201cKnowledgeable Lebanese sources\u201d said Safa\u2019s resignation was only the visible tip of a broader reshuffling following the war with Israel, with a growing concentration of decision-making in the office of secretary general Qassem. Unlike the Nasrallah period, in which the Executive Council functioned as a kind of \u201cinternal government,\u201d Qassem seeks to connect all party institutions directly to the general secretariat and tighten hierarchical control over the media, and political and military forces. In addition, there are more \u201ccivilian\u201d political figures within the decision-making circle, at the expense of the religious dominance which characterized Nasrallah\u2019s leadership, and of figures who worked alongside Qassem in the Islamic Dawah Party and the Islamic Committees before he joined Hezbollah upon its establishment. Muhammad Raad, head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, is expected to be appointed as Qassem\u2019s deputy after the parliamentary elections in the spring, while Muhammad Fneish, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament, will lead the Executive Council with Ali Damoush responsible for its operational and executive roles. Media will be consolidated under Ibrahim Mousawi, a member of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese Parliament who operates in full, direct coordination with the organization\u2019s leadership. Moreover, \u201csources\u201d noted that after the Liaison and Coordination Unit had also fulfilled political and media roles under Safa, it would now again be limited only to security and technical coordination with the Lebanese security forces, and all political decisions and contacts would be handled solely by the political leadership, especially secretary general Qassem, bloc chairman Raad or Qassem\u2019s political aide, Hussein Khalil (al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 7, 2026).
\nThe Liaison and Coordination Unit was re-subordinated to the Political Bureau and will operate as a \u201ccoordination unit\u201d in the narrow sense only. Reportedly, the move was politically supervised by secretary general Qassem and militarily by figures close to the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and its objective was to return the unit to technical missions and strip it of any independent political, legal or security authority. That ended its status as a parallel power center, and control over sensitive files was transferred to Hezbollah\u2019s senior political and security echelon (Asas Media, February 11, 2026).
\nAnother commentary linked Safa\u2019s resignation to a process of renewed preparation and organizational \u201cslate-cleaning,\u201d whose objective was compartmentalization, secrecy and reducing the public visibility of senior security figures as lessons learned from the exposure of cover and protection networks. Given the growing international and internal demands to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and to leave weapons exclusively in the hands of the state, it was noted that Hezbollah\u2019s leadership might decide that figures identified with the previous era were no longer suitable for managing the next stage, which required \u201cless provocative faces\u201d and a fundamentally different pattern of action (Middle East Online, February 6, 2026).
\nEditor of the Janoubia website, Ali al-Amin, said Hezbollah\u2019s upper echelons were being reorganized because Na\u2019im Qassem wanted a team which would operate according to his vision, thereby changing the leadership which had surrounded Nasrallah. Therefore, Qassem is taking steps to avoid previous mistakes by tightening control over political, media and security functioning (Al-Hurra, February 10, 2026).
\nAccording to another report, Hezbollah\u2019s reorganization also relies on internal investigations conducted following the war and the eliminations of the leadership, to close security and organizational breaches. \u201cSources\u201d noted that in addition to rebuilding decision-making mechanisms, the organization\u2019s leadership sought to come to terms with Lebanese state institutions and prepare the ground for dialogue in response to the regional and American pressure directed at Iran. Wafiq Safa\u2019s demotion was presented not only as an internal move, but also as an attempt to reduce image-based and political friction with state mechanisms (Anatolia Agency, February 8, 2026).<\/p>\n
Appendix: Profile of Wafiq Safa<\/p>\n
For years, Wafiq Safa was considered a central, influential figure in Hezbollah\u2019s security forces, with direct access to the top leadership. His unique status, as someone with ties to Lebanese security forces and high public exposure, made him both an organizational asset and a vulnerable figure in an era of growing intelligence and operational pressure.<\/p>\n
Wafiq Safa interviewed about his acquaintance with Nasrallah (al-Mayadeen, February 18, 2026)<\/p>\n
Safa joined Hezbollah in 1984 and in 1987 was appointed to head the Security Committee, which later became the Liaison and Coordination Unit. Although ostensibly he dealt with internal security disputes or with other actors, Safa gradually became the leading figure in Hezbollah\u2019s contacts with Lebanese state institutions, security forces, the judicial system and international actors (al-Arabiya, October 10, 2024, al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 7, 2026). His sense of power was illustrated in September 2021, when he reportedly threatened Tareq Bitar, the judge investigating the 2020 Beirut port explosion, telling him that Hezbollah \u201cwould remove him from office\u201d if he continued to \u201cpoliticize\u201d the investigation (CNN, September 23, 2021).[5]<\/p>\n
Safa meets with UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert
(al-Akhbar, May 30, 2025)<\/p>\n
Safa controlled a network of aides in the customs authority and in oversight mechanisms at Beirut airport and the city\u2019s seaport, which enabled the Hezbollah to smuggle funds and equipment (al-Hadath, April 8, 2025). However, at the beginning of 2025, the Nawaf Salam government tightened its control over the international airport and the port of Beirut and identified employees linked to Hezbollah, which weakened Safa\u2019s ability to continue operating without disruption.
\nIn July 2019, the United States Treasury Department placed Safa on its sanctions list of terrorist operatives. According to the Department\u2019s statement, as head of Hezbollah\u2019s security forces Safa exploited Lebanon\u2019s ports and border crossings to smuggle goods, drugs and weapons and to facilitate travel for Hezbollah operatives. It was further stated that he had ties to Hezbollah partners and to the organization\u2019s financiers (United States Treasury Department website, July 9, 2019).
\nSafa also led the negotiations that resulted in the return of Israeli soldiers abducted by Hezbollah, a deal in January 2004 to return the bodies of three IDF soldiers abducted from Har Dov in October 2000 and an Israeli civilian who was abducted in October 2000 in exchange for the release of Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists, and the deal in July 2008 in which the bodies of two IDF soldiers abducted in July 2006 were returned in exchange for the release of prisoners and the bodies of Hezbollah terrorists. Safa himself oversaw the transfer of the bodies of the two soldiers to UNIFIL personnel (al-Arabiya, October 10, 2024, Middle East Online, February 6, 2026).
\nOn October 10, 2024, according to reports, Israel attacked Beirut. Wafiq Safa reportedly was the target of the attack and was seriously wounded (Sky News Arabic, al-Hadath and Israeli media, October 11, 2024). However, \u201csources in Hezbollah\u201d said that the attempted elimination failed and that Safa had not been present at the targets which were attacked (al-Mayadeen and al-Manar, October 10, 2024). Immediately after the announcement of the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, Safa was the first senior Hezbollah figure to appear in public, arriving at\u00a0the site of Nasrallah\u2019s elimination in the Dahiyeh al-Janoubia (LBCI, November 27, 2024).<\/p>\n
![\"Wafiq](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/word-image-1771216696370.png\")
Wafiq Safa in his first appearance after the start of the ceasefire (LBCI, November 27, 2024)<\/p>\n
On September 25, 2025, Safa arrived at the Beirut Corniche opposite Raouche Rock when Hezbollah staged a display for the anniversary of Nasrallah\u2019s elimination, during which images of the former secretary general and his designated successor Hashem Safi al-Din were projected onto the rock, contrary to a government ban. Clashes also developed at the site between Lebanese army soldiers and demonstrators who waved Hezbollah flags and pictures of the organization\u2019s leaders while calling for the \u201cresistance\u201d[6] to continue (al-\u2018Ahed, al-Mayadeen and al-Joumhouria, September 25, 2025).
\nSafa was also a dominant figure in Hezbollah\u2019s contacts with the army leadership during the efforts of the Lebanese government to advance the state\u2019s monopoly on weapons and disarm Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations. A few days before the government\u2019s decision on the disarmament plan, he met with the commander of the Lebanese army, Rodolph Haykal (al-Jadeed, July 31, 2025). The two also spoke hours after Haykal announced before the ministers the actual completion of the first stage of the demilitarization plan south of the Litani River at the beginning of January 2026, when Safa arrived at the funeral of the army commander\u2019s mother-in-law (Telegram channel Noon News, January 10, 2026).<\/p>\n
[1] Click https:\/\/www.terrorism-info.org.il\/en<\/a> to subscribe and receive the ITIC’s daily updates as well as its other publications. Related Articles<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Na’im Qassem struggles to reassemble the Hezbollah’s puzzle (Elaph, February 12, 2026)Ali Reda with Safa (X account of…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":294588,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[86,85,4427,46,20429,88,129126,43,20425,146878,49612,149393,149392,62695],"class_list":{"0":"post-294587","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-israel","8":"tag-hezbollah","9":"tag-il","10":"tag-intelligence","11":"tag-israel","12":"tag-itic","13":"tag-lebanon","14":"tag-nasrallah","15":"tag-news","16":"tag-qassem","17":"tag-raad","18":"tag-resignation","19":"tag-shukr","20":"tag-wafiq-safa","21":"tag-yuval-rosenberg"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/294587","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=294587"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/294587\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/294588"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=294587"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=294587"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=294587"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\n[2] See the May 2025 ITIC report, Challenges Faced by Hezbolla after the November 27, 2024 ceasfire<\/a> and the December 2025 report, Hezbollah: One Year After the Ceasefire<\/a>
\n[3] See the November 2024 ITIC report, Sheikh Na\u2019im Qassem, Hezbollah\u2019s Newly \u2013 Appointed Secretary General<\/a>
\n[4] For further information about Wafiq Safa, see the Appendix.
\n[5] See the November 2025 ITIC report, Iran Assists Hezbollah\u2019s Post-Ceasefire Reconstruction<\/a>
\n[6] Anti-Israel terrorist attacks and violence in an effort to destroy the State of Israel.<\/p>\n