{"id":362232,"date":"2026-03-28T05:25:14","date_gmt":"2026-03-28T05:25:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/362232\/"},"modified":"2026-03-28T05:25:14","modified_gmt":"2026-03-28T05:25:14","slug":"ten-lessons-from-the-first-month-of-the-iran-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/362232\/","title":{"rendered":"Ten lessons from the first month of the Iran war"},"content":{"rendered":"

One month ago, US and Israeli forces launched a military campaign against\u00a0the\u00a0Iranian regime\u00a0that has had\u00a0profound<\/a>, globe-spanning consequences<\/a> ever since\u2014from energy markets to the global economy<\/a>, and from the<\/a> Gulf<\/a> and broader Middle East<\/a> to Romania<\/a>, Sri Lanka<\/a>, Russia, and China<\/a>.<\/p>\n

With scenarios for the conflict\u2019s next phrase ranging from diplomatic off-ramps to military escalation, we asked Atlantic Council experts to identify their biggest takeaways from the war so far.<\/p>\n

What\u00a0we\u2019ve\u00a0learned about . . .\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Iranian regime<\/a><\/p>\n

US military capabilities\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n

The Trump doctrine<\/a><\/p>\n

The Iranian opposition<\/a><\/p>\n

The Gulf states<\/a><\/p>\n

Israel<\/a><\/p>\n

The global economy<\/a><\/p>\n

Global energy markets<\/a><\/p>\n

Russia\u00a0and Iran<\/a><\/p>\n

China and Iran<\/a><\/p>\n

The\u00a0Iranian regime<\/p>\n

One month into the Iran war, the Iranian regime is bruised, battered, and (perhaps irrationally) bullish about its future. The regime\u2019s apparatus has withstood the decapitation of its leadership and more than 15,000 strikes<\/a> on its capabilities and infrastructure. At the same time, the regime has executed a premeditated and effective response that has imposed significant costs on US Gulf allies and energy infrastructure. The de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been its most potent weapon, inflicting significant pain on the global economy that has netted the regime unilateral concessions<\/a> from the United States to relieve stress on financial markets.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Internally, the regime appears stable. The Islamic Republic has proven to be much larger than any one individual. There has not been any significant domestic uprising to date. Most notably, there have not been any defections among political and security elites. The most hardline voices within the system have been empowered. All these factors have led many within the regime to believe it is winning the war despite the conditions of the battlefield.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Yet there are significant challenges ahead for the regime that extend beyond the war. It\u2019s increasingly clear that after rejecting talks with the United States, Iran has no clear plan for what comes next. A reported US offer<\/a> was nowhere near viable, but the rejection of that offer increases the likelihood of US ground troops invading Iranian territory. A messy situation looks primed to get much worse.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Assuming the Iranian regime does survive the war, it still faces a long-term existential crisis. The regime cannot provide the economic or political opportunities its population craves. To stay in power, Iran will either need to consistently and systematically repress dissent or make significant changes to the Islamic Republic\u2019s core ideologies. Those changes seem unlikely to happen in the short term. Therefore, surviving this war will only delay the next crisis.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Nate Swanson<\/a> is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Beginning in 2015, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, including most recently as director for Iran at the US National Security Council.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\"\"A man holds a poster with the image of Iran\u2019s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, during an anti-US and Israeli rally in Tehran, Iran, on March 22, 2026. (Majid Asgaripour\/WANA via Reuters)<\/p>\n

US military capabilities<\/p>\n

The United States can execute fast, precise, and integrated multi-domain operations at scale, but it can\u2019t sustain this kind of high operational tempo over time.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Headlines have highlighted new technologies, such as the US military\u2019s use of LUCAS<\/a> (Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Aircraft Systems), PrSM<\/a> (Precision Strike Missiles), and an artificial intelligence\u2013driven battle management system<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The real story, however, is the joint integration of these and other capabilities across at least six combatant commands and thousands of soldiers. The United States is delivering coordinated strikes faster than ever while simultaneously working with allies and partners to effectively defend against Iranian attacks. No other military in the world has demonstrated this level of proficiency. Adversaries can acquire new technologies, but they can\u2019t buy talent and the type of command-and-control culture that empowers US soldiers to act together seamlessly.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Sustaining these capabilities, however, is a perennial challenge. Demand for munitions exceeds available supply, and as Diana Maurer of the US Government Accountability Office noted<\/a> in her testimony this month: \u201cDOD has been unable to sustain its weapon systems to meet its goals across all domains and faces challenges providing logistical support to US forces, especially in contested environments.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n

This is why it\u2019s a national security imperative to invest in domestic capacity. The United States must be able to sustain its military in a longer high-end fight\u2014a topic of Forward Defense\u2019s ReForge Commission<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Joe Costa<\/a> is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans and posture in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Trump doctrine<\/p>\n

One month into the war with Iran, Trump\u2019s actions have us rethinking his \u201cpeace through strength\u201d doctrine. Until this point, it was pretty clear that Trump was okay with short, sharp, decisive actions like we saw with the strike to eliminate Iranian IRGC general Qasem Soleimani in the first Trump administration; Operation Midnight Hammer, which targeted Iranian nuclear sites; and Operation Absolute Resolve, which removed strongman Nicol\u00e1s Maduro from power in Venezuela. We also know that Trump is uncomfortable with long, drawn-out military campaigns with no end in sight, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

So while I am not surprised by the airstrikes against Iran, I am surprised by the scale of the campaign and by the fact that it now appears Trump is on the verge of sending in ground forces. Some commentators had previously remarked that we were never going to see Trump send the 82nd Airborne Division to the Middle East. But that\u2019s exactly what he did<\/a> this week.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

It is still my prediction that, consistent with Trump\u2019s \u201cpeace through strength\u201d doctrine, the US president will ultimately declare victory and end the conflict soon rather than allow himself to get into an extended military quagmire.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Matthew\u202fKroenig<\/a>\u202f is\u202fvice president for geostrategy and fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council\u2019s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Iranian opposition<\/p>\n

Amid conflicting messages from the Trump administration about the goal of continued US and Israeli military strikes on Iran (is it for regime change or to only weaken the Islamic Republic\u2019s nuclear and ballistic-missile capacity?) the Iranian opposition has found itself needing to urgently define the path forward.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

This weekend, a group of hundreds of ideologically diverse opposition activists are meeting in London as part of the Iran Freedom Congress<\/a> to discuss Iran\u2019s future and a pluralistic vision for guiding a transition. Critically, they are not positioning this as a challenge to any other opposition figure, including Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah. Rather, it is intended to \u201cbroaden the tent\u201d to ensure that diverse voices are represented in any democratic process moving forward. Pahlavi has also made efforts in recent weeks to expand his reach by holding meetings with a wider set of activists<\/a> and bringing Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Iranian jurist Shirin Ebadi on to chair a transitional justice committee<\/a>. Ebadi\u2019s involvement is significant not only for her deep global reach and connections to figures leading transitional justice processes in other countries, but also for the fact that she once supported the 1979 revolution that unseated Pahlavi\u2019s father.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

While this show of unity was celebrated by some, it has also been critiqued by others who have even called for Ebadi to be stripped of her Nobel<\/a> (which is a technical impossibility<\/a>). Meanwhile, still others contend that no movement for human rights and democracy can move forward without an immediate cease-fire<\/a>, that the bombs only weaken the civil society that is seeking an end to this regime, and that a meaner, harsher regime may be left standing once the strikes end.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

In short, much is yet to be determined but will become clear over the next few weeks\u2014including in light of reports from some on Pahlavi\u2019s team that Iranians have organized a ground game<\/a> that will be activated soon.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Gissou Nia<\/a> is the director of the Atlantic Council\u2019s Strategic Litigation Project and a board member of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Gulf states<\/p>\n

However the Iran war ends, it will not eliminate all of Iran\u2019s attack capabilities<\/a>. The Iranian regime\u2019s apparent resilience and resolve<\/a> suggest that the war will not change Iran\u2019s intent to terrorize the region and assert leverage over the Strait of Hormuz either. The United States and Israel may feel comfortable with the dent the war has put in Iran\u2019s long-range missile capabilities and nuclear program, especially as Trump seeks an exit that will quell global markets and relieve political pressure at home. But the threat to Iran\u2019s Gulf neighbors will remain.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s attacks on all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide an unprecedented opportunity for its member countries to deepen their diplomatic<\/a>, security<\/a>, and economic<\/a> integration in ways that could profoundly strengthen their resilience. GCC solidarity<\/a> in the immediate aftermath of the attacks demonstrated the potential of such unity, including a historic<\/a> UN Security Council Resolution.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

One month in, however, longstanding fissures are re-emerging, including around how<\/a> and when<\/a> to end the war and what the region should look like after the bombs stop. And it appears<\/a> there is still a rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that will jeopardize Gulf unity going forward.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Gulf countries do not have a simple solution for navigating heightened security and economic threats after the war. While there may be frustration with the United States, Russia and China\u2019s responses<\/a> to the war make it clear that there is no replacing US security support. And while the war\u2019s disruption to oil and gas production reinforces Gulf countries\u2019 efforts to diversify their economies, the disruption to air travel, shipping, and investor confidence underscores that no sector<\/a> is completely safe.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Gulf solution to these threats is likely to be intense diversification: deepening security partnerships with a range<\/a> of different<\/a> partners<\/a>, reducing strategic redundancy through new trade<\/a> and energy corridors, and embracing a range of industries that are less vulnerable to disruptions to the movement of goods and people, such as advanced technology.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Allison Minor<\/a> is the director of the Project for Middle East Integration with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. She previously served as US deputy special envoy for Yemen and as director for Arabian Peninsula affairs at the National Security Council.<\/p>\n

Israel<\/p>\n

While US and Israeli forces engage in an unprecedented, combined military campaign in Iran with considerable operational achievements\u2014a high point in bilateral military cooperation\u2014views on the conflict diverge considerably among the American and Israeli publics.\u00a0<\/p>\n

In contrast with US polls that indicate around 60 percent<\/a> opposition to the war, support for the war effort began and remained high in Israel, with initial\u00a0polls<\/a>\u00a0indicating well over 80 percent support, and over 90 percent among Jewish Israelis.\u00a0More recent polling<\/a> suggests slight slippage, as four weeks of being sent to bomb shelters by missile attacks wears on the population, but an overwhelming majority still support continuing the war. That steady backing is understandable, considering the Iranian regime\u2019s long-held and oft-stated commitment to Israel\u2019s destruction, and its hostility expressed in sponsoring terrorist organizations, attacks on Israel with ballistic missiles, and pursuit of a nuclear program that could enable Iran to possess a nuclear weapon.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The global interests that animate so much of the American debate around the war\u2014the fear of overstretch in regime-change wars, the global economic shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the impact on strategic competition with China and Russia\u2014feature far less prominently in the Israeli discourse.\u00a0<\/p>\n

While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains a divisive figure in Israeli politics, his political opponents have nearly universally expressed backing for the campaign in Iran. They have echoed his hope that the campaign will weaken the regime to the point that the Iranian people will overthrow it. But that consensus has not translated into a meaningful boost for the prime minister in polls ahead of a crucial election later this year. In a sense, the Israeli consensus, surrounding the need to strike a dangerous foe at its weakest point and take advantage of the opportunity presented by Trump\u2019s willingness to join the fight, exists alongside, and distinct from, Israel\u2019s longstanding polarized politics.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Daniel B. Shapiro<\/a> is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017 and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The global economy<\/p>\n

We\u2019ve learned two connected things about the global economy in the month since the Iran war started. The first is that the markets matter for the military. Strikes have consistently ramped up on Friday evenings and over the weekend, while statements about deescalation have often coincided with Sunday evening (when Asian markets open) or Monday morning. This is not a coincidence. There is a direct line of communication between the White House and Wall Street. But Tehran understands this dynamic as well: Many Iranian statements have been crafted precisely to sow confusion in markets at key moments.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

But neither market sentiment nor media rhetoric can overcome the hard reality of oil and gas not being transited through the Strait of Hormuz. Time and again, the reality of the closure has rippled throughout the global economy. In the first week, gas prices dominated concerns. In the second, it was helium, a key component for chip-making throughout the world. In the third week, it was fertilizer and the potential strain on the global food supply. Just like the COVID-19 pandemic, the war has reminded us that for all the discussion about resiliency and artificial intelligence, the global economy is still incredibly reliant on a few strategic chokepoints, and the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most vital.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Josh Lipsky<\/a>\u202fis the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and the senior director of the GeoEconomics Center. He previously served as an advisor at the International Monetary Fund.<\/p>\n

Global energy markets<\/p>\n

Geopolitical risks are and will remain an enduring feature of energy markets, but the next energy crisis could dwarf even the Iran war.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

In recent history, Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent world energy and food prices soaring, further amplifying inflation already triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic\u2019s effects on global supply chains and revenge consumption. In 2026, the US\u2013Iran war could become the world\u2019s largest energy crisis in living history, with the head of the International Energy Agency warning<\/a> that the current supply shock could outstrip the two oil crises of the 1970s combined.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

While energy-related geopolitical risks are inherently unpredictable, they are generally not unforeseeable. The COVID-19 pandemic was sui generis, but Russian President Vladimir Putin credibly threatened a full-scale military action in Ukraine in early 2021<\/a>, and analysts have been warning<\/a> about Iran\u2019s ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz for decades.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Another, greater foreseeable geopolitical risk looms over global energy markets. If the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) attempts to coercively absorb Taiwan, probably via quarantine or blockade<\/a>, Beijing will likely trigger the greatest geopolitical and energy crisis in history. Both the United States and the PRC are nuclear-armed, of course, but both also hold critical leverage over global energy supply chains.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

If the PRC initiates hostilities, Beijing would use its monopoly across critical minerals, including graphite<\/a> for batteries and possibly petrochemicals<\/a>, while potentially exploiting cyber vulnerabilities<\/a> embedded in its energy exports. The United States would seek to constrain the PRC\u2019s imports of crude oil, iron ore, and other commodities, although Beijing is assiduously mitigating its Malacca Dilemma<\/a> and reducing oil-import exposure<\/a> via electric vehicles and other measures.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Just as Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Iran\u2019s closure of the Strait of Hormuz were foreseeable risks, a cross-Strait crisis, while not inevitable, must be prepared for\u2014starting now.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Joseph Webster<\/a> is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council\u2019s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Russia\u00a0and Iran<\/p>\n

Russia has largely been a beneficiary of the war for several reasons. First, US and global attention has shifted from Moscow\u2019s aggression in Ukraine to the war in the Gulf. Second, the United States\u2019 need for weapons in the Middle East may reduce stocks available for Ukraine. Third, the predictable jump in oil prices prompted by the war led Washington to suspend its sanctions on Russian oil, providing a substantial, immediate income boost to Russia\u2019s stumbling economy.\u00a0 <\/p>\n

But not every consequence of the war works in Moscow\u2019s favor. The Gulf countries\u2019 air defense, which is heavy on expensive US weapons, has not been fully up to the task of protecting against Iranian drones and missiles, and has prompted some of these countries to make deals with Ukraine<\/a> for both drones and help in establishing a layered air defense system. This provides money for Ukraine\u2019s growing drone and defense industries, which means more production not just for the Gulf Arab states but also for Ukraine to use against Russia. This has also improved Ukraine\u2019s standing in the Middle East, where many states had leaned in Moscow\u2019s direction.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

There is one more important issue related to Russian policy in this war: Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s decision to provide Iran<\/a> with drone components and intelligence that Tehran can use to target US forces, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran\u2019s drone supply to Russia after Moscow\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was critical to its campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilians. Russia not only used those drones in its war on Ukraine, but also took the prototype and started improving the drones and producing them in large numbers. Iran has been a beneficiary of these improvements.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Moscow\u2019s aim is clear: To prevent a US victory in Iran, or at least to slow it down and make it more expensive. It also wants the suspension in oil sanctions to continue as long as possible. The perplexing thing here is the Trump administration\u2019s efforts to ignore or explain away this unpleasant fact. While criticizing US allies for not being more supportive in the Middle East\u2014a fair criticism\u2014it lets Russia off the hook for aiding Iran\u2019s attacks on US servicemembers. <\/p>\n

This situation is not likely to hold. Washington\u2019s inaction on this matter may be encouraging Russia to provide additional help. According to Western intelligence, Moscow may now be sending drones<\/a> to Iran. If a Russian drone or an Iranian drone with Russian components strikes and kills US soldiers, that may prompt the Trump administration to take strong measures to force Putin to knock it off. One such step would be to provide Ukraine the weapons it needs to take out Russia\u2019s massive drone factory in Tatarstan.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014John E. Herbst<\/a> is the senior director of the Atlantic Council\u2019s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

China\u00a0and Iran<\/p>\n

One month into the war, Beijing increasingly views this conflict as a strategic opportunity. On the energy front, it is less dependent on imported oil than many of its neighbors and has massive stockpiles that it can use to offset near-term shortages. It is in Iran\u2019s interest to keep the oil payments from China flowing, so Tehran is carefully avoiding firing on China-flagged tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Those ships are among the few<\/a> passing safely through, with Iran\u2019s blessing. <\/p>\n

Thus far, the downsides for China are minimal, and Beijing is focusing on a major upside: This war is forcing the United States to draw down military assets in the Asia-Pacific region. For China, that is a massive strategic win, and well worth any near-term disruptions to global energy markets. China has long complained about the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antiballistic missile system stationed in South Korea. Now, for the first time since its deployment in 2017, the United States is moving some of those interceptors<\/a> to the Middle East to deal with Iran\u2019s retaliatory strikes.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Across the board, the US military is already running low on munitions, forcing it to consider pulling assets away from Ukraine<\/a> as well. That will further embolden Russia, which is yet another win for China given that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said<\/a> Beijing needs to ensure Russia does not lose that conflict. The Chinese foreign minister told<\/a> his European counterparts that Beijing benefits when Russia\u2019s actions toward Ukraine keep the United States tied up in that war and unable to focus on China. The Iran conflict is delivering an even bigger distraction from China than the war in Ukraine.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Chinese analysts do not expect<\/a> the Iranian regime to fall or the United States to achieve its objectives. Instead, they anticipate that the United States will become mired in a protracted war that further drains US resources. One of China\u2019s leading think tankers recently published a piece framing the war as a \u201cstrategic opportunity\u201d for China. China\u2019s censors quickly pulled<\/a> that article down, most likely to avoid angering Iran or undermining Beijing\u2019s message of outrage over the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But make no mistake: That is the inside view. China sees the United States as dropping a rock on its own foot, becoming (yet again) entangled in the Middle East in ways that will make it exponentially harder for the United States and its allies to counter China\u2019s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u2014Melanie Hart<\/a> is the senior director of the Atlantic Council\u2019s Global China Hub. She previously served as senior advisor for China in the Office of the Undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment at the US Department of State.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"One month ago, US and Israeli forces launched a military campaign against\u00a0the\u00a0Iranian regime\u00a0that has had\u00a0profound, globe-spanning consequences ever…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":362233,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[42,43,40,38,41,39],"class_list":{"0":"post-362232","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-headlines","8":"tag-headlines","9":"tag-news","10":"tag-top-news","11":"tag-top-stories","12":"tag-topnews","13":"tag-topstories"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/362232","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=362232"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/362232\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/362233"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=362232"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=362232"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=362232"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}