Regardless of our intentions, the March of 2026 became thematic in terms of the BESA PSCRP publications: all of them focus on various aspects of the ongoing military campaigns against the Islamic Republic of Iran.<\/p>\n
Gershon Kogan provides a structured overview<\/a>\u00a0of the geopolitical risks that instability in Iran might bear for the post-Soviet region. He recommends understanding fragmentation as not an event but a process of gradual transformation and erosion, consisting of territorial, institutional, functional, and cognitive aspects. Kogan considers political-institutional, military, and peripheral drivers of instability. The Iranian situation demonstrates the limits of a securitization strategy in foreign and internal politics, and military conflict risks turning the country not into a \u201cbesieged fortress\u201d but into a field of narrative fragmentation. The peripheral power vacuum, caused by the redistribution of governance resources toward key security nodes, might be easily filled by alternative actors. Fragmentation processes in the IRI are likely to affect the South Caucasus (border instability and migration pressure) and Central Asia (transforming transit routes and logistics, radicalization and information campaigns, and the weakening of border control). Kogan recommends four monitoring priorities regarding the Iranian destabilization, namely, border corridors, information operations, regional diplomatic signals, and proxy-structure activity.<\/p>\n Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman focuses on the Central Asian subregion and scrutinizes<\/a> official and unofficial reactions to the war with Iran in these states. The domineering official reactions are those of expressing concerns but maintaining a rather neutral stance, which allows for greater flexibility in managing potential risks. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have sent formal condolences over the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, but generally remained neutral in assessing the situation. The author claims the public attitudes toward the actions of the US and Israel depend on various factors, inter alia, the strength of fundamentalist Islamic influence in particular regions, susceptibility to external informational influence, the degree of state control over public expression, and the internal political positioning of the actors.<\/p>\n The PSCRP team further zooms in to concentrate<\/a> on the strategic vulnerabilities Tajikistan is facing now, as both its key geopolitical partners, Russia and Iran, are confronted with major crises of a military nature. The strategic dependence of Dushanbe on Russia is evident, manifesting in remittances from the diaspora, military infrastructure, and economic ties. However, in recent years, these levers have proved less reliable than they once were. Consequently, a dangerous situation might emerge if the Tajik-Afghan border remains without the Russian protection and if the Tajik diaspora in Russia is targeted to leverage influence on Dushanbe. In the case of Iran, the ties are more ideological and cultural but still have a significant economic component. The regimes, however, are strikingly different, and civilizational affinity may be easily overwhelmed by other interests. China is trying to fill the void, but Beijing\u2019s influence may be equally disruptive for Tajik economic development and societal stability. The authors claim that, should Dushanbe wish to use the strategic opportunity to reorient its foreign policy partially, it should prioritize its geographic position as a stronghold against the flow of illicit substances from Afghanistan, its natural resources (minerals and hydropower potential), \u201ccivilizational\u201d traits, and an emerging security architecture in the region.<\/p>\n Moving to the South Caucasian area, the PSCRP team assesses<\/a> the Iranian strikes against targets in Azerbaijan, namely, an airport in Nakhchivan and a school in Shekerabad. Baku has harshly reacted to these drone assaults, but in a diplomatic way. The Iranian government denied its involvement in the incident, unlike the IRGC, which has acted nearly autonomously since mid-2025 and has now claimed responsibility for attacks against Baku. The goals may include further restricting the airspace corridor or driving up oil prices. However, it is also possible that IRCG tries to provoke Azerbaijan and Turkey into intervening and thus making the people rally around the flag\u2014echoing the situation of the Iraqi invasion in 1980. Although in reality, such a situation could be catastrophic for Iran, Baku is unlikely to yield to these provocations.<\/p>\n Vladimir Ze\u2019ev Khanin shifts attention to the Eastern European part of the post-Soviet space and provides an analysis<\/a>\u00a0of reactions from Russia and Ukraine to the ongoing Israeli and U.S. operations against the IRI. While the official Kyiv has explicitly supported the intervention, the Moscow authorities have condemned it as an act of unprovoked aggression. As part of bilateral cooperation, Moscow and Tehran have supplied each other with certain military technologies; however, this does not entail direct military action for the sake of the partner\u2019s protection, and at the moment, the Kremlin has limited itself to official condemnations and offers of assistance in achieving a peaceful solution. On the contrary, Kyiv offered its assistance in dealing with the Iranian drones. Moscow\u2019s cautious stance, despite the significance of the infrastructure Iran has provided to it in recent years and the investments it has made into the IRI economy, may also be influenced by the involvement of the Gulf states and the fact that Russia may also expect to gain some economic and military profits from the current war. Khanin draws readers\u2019 attention to the fact that both the U.S. and Israeli leaders face important elections in the fall this year, with the coming months being politically decisive. Thus, they both need a short, decisive campaign that presents a \u201cpicture of victory,\u201d while Donald Trump must also persuade the electorate that the operation itself was justified.<\/p>\n Finally, Kyril Kascian describes<\/a> Belarus\u2019s foreign political attitude towards the ongoing U.S. and Israeli operations against Iran as rhetoric supportive of the Tehran regime, but not entailing any practical actions or risks to Minsk. In the author\u2019s words, the authorities in Belarus and Iran have long cooperated due to the shared challenges posed by Western sanctions and the close nature of their ruling regimes. So, the official rhetoric of Lukashenka, as the most prominent foreign political actor of Belarus, remains anti-Western and, in part, anti-Israeli. This happens despite the historical role of the Belarusian Jewish community in both Belarus and Israel and the multifold personal ties between many Belarusians and Israelis.<\/p>\n Last but not least, Alexander Shpunt shares his monthly overview<\/a> of several important academic publications focused on the post-Soviet space.<\/p>\n