Read more: Understanding how these two dynamics interact is key to making sense of the region\u2019s current trajectory. They\u2019re distinct but interconnected. Together, they expand Israel\u2019s room to manoeuvre and redefine its regional position. <\/p>\n What\u2019s emerging is a more assertive approach to regional order in the Middle East, combining the use of force, selective military interventions, security partnerships and the management of surrounding political conditions.<\/p>\n Weak, fragmented states<\/p>\n This approach is most visible in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria<\/a> and now Iran. Military operations increasingly extend beyond immediate tactical goals, contributing to the erosion of governance capacity, infrastructure and territorial cohesion.<\/p>\n The objective is not only deterrence, but the creation of political environments where state authority remains weak, fragmented and unable to consolidate. <\/p>\n This logic is not always tied to imminent threats. It reflects a broader preference for environments in which adversaries \u2014 actual or potential \u2014 remain divided and constrained<\/a>.<\/p>\n These developments are happening in a changing international environment<\/a>, particularly Israel\u2019s current relationship with the United States, which grants greater operational autonomy and lowers the political costs of unilateral action.<\/p>\n U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with Israel\u2019s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the end of a news conference in Palm Beach, Fla., in December 2025. Regional fragmentation<\/p>\n A second part of this strategy works at the regional level by maintaining divisions and tensions. This is especially visible in the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s deepening partnerships with Greece<\/a> and the Republic of Cyprus<\/a> are evolving into an alliance<\/a>: an integrated security framework based on shared technologies, intelligence co-operation, joint exercises and converging strategic interests. <\/p>\n Greece\u2019s acquisition of Israeli defence systems<\/a> \u2014 in areas such as air defence, surveillance and drone warfare \u2014 makes it easier for their forces to work together, and connects Israel more closely to the region\u2019s security system.<\/p>\n Greek Defense Minister Nikos Dendias, left, and his Israeli counterpart Israel Katz review an honour guard before a meeting in Athens in January 2026. This relationship doesn\u2019t just reflect shared interests; it actively shapes the strategic environment. <\/p>\n Israeli officials have increasingly portrayed Turkey as a future challenger<\/a>, suggesting it will become a major concern<\/a> following the Iran war. <\/p>\n That means Israeli co-operation with Greece and Cyprus encourages them to adopt a more assertive stance in disputes with Turkey<\/a> over maritime boundaries, energy exploration and airspace.<\/p>\n From one perspective, this is standard defence co-operation among aligned partners. From Turkey\u2019s perspective, however, it looks like a wider effort by potentially hostile neighbours to surround it<\/a>. <\/p>\n But these partnerships don\u2019t need open conflict to work. Israel\u2019s goal isn\u2019t necessarily to fight Turkey, but to position itself in a region where tensions remain constant.<\/p>\n Examples from further afield<\/p>\n This regional approach supports the internal dynamics described earlier. Weakening states limits adversaries from within, while regional divisions limit them from the outside by preventing stable alliances.<\/p>\n A comparable pattern can be observed in the Horn of Africa. Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state<\/a> introduces a new political entity in a strategically sensitive area near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The waterway separates the Arabian Peninsula from Africa and leads to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. <\/p>\n U.S. Navy personnel on the USS Stout, a guided missile destroyer, man their gunnery stations as the ship passes through the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb in 2016. Read more: This move overlaps with Turkish influence in Somalia, where the Turks have built close ties and taken on a major role in providing military and naval security. But Somaliland is a breakaway region, not an internationally recognized state. Israel\u2019s recognition risks creating new tensions along the Somali coast, complicating the maritime space Turkey is helping to secure.<\/p>\n As in the eastern Mediterranean, the aim isn\u2019t direct confrontation, but insertion into a complex regional landscape that adds new forces to the mix, diversifies alignments and complicates the consolidation of rival influence.<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s new security doctrine?<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s security doctrine has deep historical roots<\/a>, including traditions that emphasize force<\/a>, strategic autonomy and coercive capacity<\/a> over negotiated order.<\/p>\n
\n Iran war: 4 big questions that help clarify the future of the Middle East<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Two](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/file-20260401-69-xdlnlf.jpg\")
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\n (AP Photo\/Alex Brandon)<\/p>\n![\"Two](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/file-20260401-69-9het8u.jpg\")
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\n (AP Photo\/Thanassis Stavrakis)<\/p>\n![\"U.S.](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/file-20260401-69-yaryql.jpg\")
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\n (United States Navy), CC BY-SA<\/a><\/p>\n
\n Why a second global shipping chokepoint could soon live up to its name as the \u2018Gate of Tears\u2019<\/a><\/p>\n