Download PDF Version<\/a><\/p>\nINTRODUCTION<\/p>\n
On 7 April 2026, it was announced that the US and Iran had agreed to a two-week ceasefire. The pause in hostilities provides a suitable opportunity to assess how the Third Gulf War[1] has impacted Southeast Asia thus far and to signpost what the conflict\u2019s long-term consequences might be. The war began on 28 February when the US and Israel launched coordinated air and missile strikes \u2013 codenamed Operation Epic Fury \u2013 targeting Iran\u2019s military infrastructure, political leadership, and facilities associated with the country\u2019s nuclear weapons programme. Iran responded with retaliatory missile and drone attacks against Israel, and US military bases and energy facilities in neighbouring Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.<\/p>\n
Iranian threats to attack vessels in the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed one of the world\u2019s most strategically important maritime chokepoints, bottling up nearly 15 per cent of global oil supplies. This Perspective examines the war\u2019s impact on Southeast Asia\u2019s energy and food security, and the measures regional governments have implemented to ease the situation. It also recaps Southeast Asian responses to the conflict and discusses the geopolitical implications for the region.<\/p>\n
ENERGY SECURITY<\/p>\n
The outbreak of hostilities triggered a global energy crisis not seen since the early 1970s. Approximately one-third of global oil and gas supplies transit through the Straits of Hormuz, more than 80 per cent of which is destined for Asian countries. The de facto closure of the straits, and Iran\u2019s attacks on oil and gas fields in neighbouring countries, raised the price of crude oil from US$70 to over US$100 a barrel and increased natural gas futures by 20 per cent. Although oil prices stabilised following the ceasefire announcement, they remained at just under US$100 a barrel.<\/p>\n
The impact of the energy crisis on Southeast Asia has been severe. While some Southeast Asian countries produce their own oil and gas, and have diversified supply sources, the region is still heavily dependent on fossil fuels from the Middle East and therefore extremely vulnerable to supply chain disruptions (see Table 1). Most regional states only have between 30- and 100-days in oil reserves.<\/p>\n
Table 1: Southeast Asian Dependencies on Oil and Gas from the Middle East[2]<\/p>\n
\u00a0Oil DependencyGas DependencyPhilippines95%\u00a0Vietnam88%49%Malaysia69%\u00a0Thailand59%28%Singapore52%20%Indonesia20-25%37%<\/p>\n
As shown in Table 1, the Philippines is almost wholly dependent on crude oil from the Middle East. Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore are major importers of LNG from the Gulf, particularly from Qatar which produces one-fifth of global LNG output. Over 95 per cent of Singapore\u2019s electricity is generated from LNG, nearly 60 per cent of which is imported from Qatar.[3] In March, Iranian attacks on Qatar\u2019s Ras Laffa LNG complex, the world\u2019s largest LNG export facility, forced Qatar to reduce production by 17 per cent. Repairs could take several years to complete.[4] As a result, electricity tariffs in Singapore have risen.[5]<\/p>\n
The outbreak of the war saw fuel prices surge across Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar, diesel and petrol prices increased 50 per cent.[6] The price of jet fuel, a product of crude oil, also doubled.[7] Although some Southeast Asian airlines took advantage of flight disruptions in the Middle East, higher ticket prices have negatively impacted the region\u2019s lucrative tourism industry.[8] In March, tourist arrivals in Thailand were down 50 per cent on the previous month.[9] By one estimate, if the conflict lasts longer than six months, up to three million fewer tourists will visit Thailand, resulting in an estimated US$4.5 billion in lost tourism revenue.[10]<\/p>\n
Across Southeast Asia, governments acted quickly to mitigate the effects of the energy crisis. In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. declared a state of national energy emergency. The decree allows the government to take measures to alleviate rising energy prices.[11] In Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar, civil servants were told to work from home one day per week. Laos reduced the school week from five days to three.[12] Airlines in Vietnam reduced flights on some domestic routes to conserve jet fuel, while Myanmar suspended them altogether.[13] Myanmar has introduced fuel rationing for private vehicles.[14] To prevent domestic unrest, Indonesia pledged to continue fuel subsidies for the rest of the year but also introduced fuel rations for private motorists.[15] Rising government expenditure forced Indonesia to scale back President Prabowo Subianto\u2019s signature free school meals programme by one day a week.[16] Malaysia, whose fuel subsidy bill increased fourfold in March, temporarily reduced the monthly subsidised fuel quota from 300 liters to 200 liters.[17]<\/p>\n
Governments have also encouraged energy efficiency in homes and offices, and have called for commuters to use public transport instead of private vehicles. They are also looking to secure oil and gas supplies from outside the Middle East, including from US, Russia, Nigeria and Brazil. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines negotiated directly with Iran to allow their vessels to transit through the Strait of Hormuz.[18] However, Singapore announced that it would not follow suit as the right of transit passage through international straits is guaranteed in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[19]<\/p>\n
As a short-term measure to deal with soaring energy prices, some Southeast Asian governments have increased electricity generation using coal-fired power stations.[20] Although this will impede decarbonisation commitments, the war has at the same time given impetus to regional governments to increase power output through renewable energy resources including nuclear energy.<\/p>\n
FOOD SECURITY<\/p>\n
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the resulting energy crisis, also threatens Southeast Asia\u2019s food security. The Middle East is a major manufacturing hub for fertilisers.[21] An estimated one-third of global fertiliser exports pass through the strait.[22]<\/p>\n
LNG is used extensively in the manufacture of fertilisers, including urea, a low-cost nitrogen fertiliser widely used to grow wheat and rice, two of Southeast Asia\u2019s most important food staples. Shortages of fertilisers could reduce regional crop yields, especially in energy-poor agricultural countries like Myanmar and Cambodia.[23] To alleviate the problem, Southeast Asian governments are trying to source fertilisers from outside the Middle East. Indonesia, Malaysia and Burnie have agreed to strengthen joint production of fertilisers to enhance regional food security.[24]<\/p>\n
The energy crunch undermines food security in other ways too. Farmers require petrol and diesel for planting and harvesting crops, processing food, and transporting foodstuffs to markets. Diesel also powers fishing boats.[25] Due to rising diesel prices, nearly half of Thailand\u2019s fishing fleet is now confined to port. Last year, Thai exports of seafood were valued at US$7 billion.[26]<\/p>\n
Across the region, food prices have already begun to climb.[27] If the crisis continues, some food growing countries may opt to reduce exports to satisfy domestic demand.<\/p>\n
SOUTHEAST ASIAN RESPONSES<\/p>\n
Unlike the First and Second Gulf Wars, no Southeast Asian country has offered its political support to the US for Operation Epic Fury. Instead, they adopted a neutral though not uncritical stance. Country responses to the crisis generally fall into two categories: condemnation of the warring parties, and expressions of concern.<\/p>\n
Malaysia, Brunei and Timor-Leste condemned both the US-Israeli attacks and Iran\u2019s retaliatory strikes.[28] Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a trenchant critic of American and Israeli policies in the Middle East, \u201cunreservedly\u201d condemned the killing of Iran\u2019s supreme leader, Ali Khameini, and accused Washington and Tel Aviv of pushing the Middle East to \u201cthe edge of grave and sustained instability\u201d.[29] Singapore, which has close relations with the US, Israel and the Gulf states, said it \u201cregretted the failure of negotiations\u201d.[30] In subsequent remarks at a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers, however, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan did condemn Iran\u2019s attacks on the Gulf states.[31]<\/p>\n
In contrast to its fellow Muslim-majority neighbours, Indonesia stopped short of condemning the attacks, and merely said it \u201cdeeply regretted\u201d the failure of talks between the US and Iran.[32]\u00a0 In line with President Prabowo\u2019s aspirations for Indonesia to play a more proactive role in world affairs, he offered to mediate the dispute. However, none of the warring parties took his offer seriously and in subsequent statements Prabowo acknowledged that other countries might be better placed to facilitate talks.[33] In response to domestic criticism of US actions, Prabowo suspended Indonesia\u2019s participation in US President Donald Trump\u2019s Board of Peace for Gaza.[34]<\/p>\n
The responses from the rest of the region have been relatively mild. Philippine President Marcos called for a ceasefire but refused to condemn any of the belligerents, offering instead his support for \u201ccountries under attack\u201d.[35] In mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia expressed concern and called on the parties to resolve the conflict through diplomatic means and in accordance with international law. [36]<\/p>\n
ASEAN\u2019s response to the war reflects the organisation\u2019s consensus decision-making. In a statement issued on 4 March, the ASEAN foreign ministers expressed \u201cserious concern\u201d at the situation in the Middle East.[37] Eleven days later, ASEAN\u2019s foreign ministers convened an on-line meeting to discuss the escalating conflict, while the organisation\u2019s economic ministers met in-person in the Philippines. The foreign ministers issued the customary calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities, dialogue among the parties and a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and also discussed the need for coordination among the member states to assist ASEAN nationals caught up in the conflict.[38] Both meetings highlighted the negative economic repercussions for Southeast Asia.[39] Subsequently, President Marcos, this year\u2019s ASEAN chair, announced that the ASEAN Summit scheduled for May would be a \u201cbare-bones\u201d event devoted to the war\u2019s impact on energy, food and migrant workers.[40] His comments suggest that other pressing issues facing the region, such as Myanmar\u2019s civil war, the Thai-Cambodia border conflict and the South China Sea dispute, would be given a lower priority.<\/p>\n
As with other recent international crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2023 Israel-Hamas conflict and Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the most immediate priority for Southeast Asian governments was the safety of their citizens. Significant numbers of Southeast Asians reside in the Middle East. The Philippines has by far the largest number of citizens in the region: 2.4 million. These are mainly in the UAE (975,000), Saudi Arabia (813,000) and Qatar (250,000).[41] Indonesia has more than 500,000 nationals in the region and Vietnam 10,000. Most of Southeast Asia\u2019s migrant workers have decided to stay in place, either because they feared losing their jobs or because they could not afford higher air fares caused by airspace closures.[42] However, for those wishing to leave, Southeast Asian foreign ministries worked with their embassies in the region, as well as with diplomats from fellow ASEAN member states, to arrange repatriation flights and evacuations via land borders.[43]<\/p>\n
GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS<\/p>\n
While it is too early to assess whether the Third Gulf War is a global geopolitical gamechanger, the conflict has reinforced several existing trends that will shape the future contours of the world order and the long-term security of the region.<\/p>\n
The Rules-based International Order<\/p>\n
Across Southeast Asia, Operation Epic Fury was generally perceived as another worrisome sign that international norms and the post-war rules-based order are being systematically eroded, and that major powers increasingly rely on military coercion, unilateralism and transactionalism to advance their national interests, sidelining multilateral institutions. America\u2019s attacks on Iran follow hard on the heels of the US military operation to seize Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January, Russia\u2019s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, and China\u2019s use of grey zone tactics in the South China Sea over the past decade.<\/p>\n
Regional leaders were quick to express their concerns over the war\u2019s ramifications for global governance. Prime Minister Anwar argued that the deliberate targeting of Iran\u2019s leadership had \u201cweakened the international order\u201d.[44] Timor-Leste President Jose Ramos-Horta called the US-Israeli attacks a \u201cclear violation\u201d of international law.[45] Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong said the conflict was another illustration of the \u201cworrying breakdown of the institutions and norms that have long anchored the global system\u201d, while Foreign Minister Balakrishnan labelled the US a \u201crevisionist power\u201d.[46] Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn lamented that the \u201cweakening of the global order\u201d would have a negative impact on Southeast Asia, especially small states like Cambodia which rely on international law to protect their interests.[47] The conflict will further encourage small states to work with each other and middle powers to buttress the existing global order.<\/p>\n
Southeast Asia and the Major Powers<\/p>\n
The war is likely to have a discernible impact on perceptions of the major powers, especially the US and China but possibly even Russia, and may lead some states to recalibrate their ties with those countries.<\/p>\n
According to the ISEAS \u2013 Yusof Ishak\u2019s 2026 State of Southeast Asia Survey, elite perceptions of the US and China continue to evolve.[48] Although this year\u2019s survey was conducted prior to the Gulf conflict, it took account of the Trump administration\u2019s levying of tariffs against Southeast Asian countries in April 2025, its missile attacks against Iran a few months later and its Venezuela operation in January 2026. Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, respondents identified US leadership under Trump as the region\u2019s top geopolitical concern (51.9 per cent), up from third in 2025 (46.9 per cent). Confidence in America\u2019s ability to uphold the rule of law dropped from 26.5 per cent in 2025 to 22.3 per cent in 2026, while 43.4 per cent of respondents said Trump\u2019s use of punitive trade measures worsened positive impressions of the US, up from 21.3 per cent last year.\u00a0 Had the respondents been polled after 28 February, America\u2019s actions would likely have reinforced these negative perceptions of the US.<\/p>\n
Although a solid 42.7 per cent of those surveyed expressed confidence in America\u2019s reliability as a strategic partner, this was down from 44.9 per cent in 2025. US actions in the Middle East could erode this figure further. Although the Trump administration has pledged to prioritise the Indo-Pacific over the Middle East,[49] the war has pulled the US back into the latter region, reinforcing perennial questions about America\u2019s commitment to Asia\u2019s security. Moreover, in prosecuting the war, the US redeployed military assets from Asia to the Gulf, including Patriot and THAAD missile batteries, two Marine expeditionary forces and aircraft carrier battle groups. The war has also depleted America\u2019s stockpile of precision-guided missiles, which will take years to replace. The transfer of US military assets, and the depletion of munitions,\u00a0 reinforce concerns that US forces are overstretched and this may impede America\u2019s ability to respond to crises in Asia, such as in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. However, fears that China will seek to take advantage of America\u2019s focus on the Middle East to attack Taiwan are probably unfounded. [50]<\/p>\n
For China, the war is an opportunity to promote itself to Southeast Asia as a reliable partner, particularly in energy security.[51] China has much to offer the region as a provider of green technologies. It has huge reserves of oil and has already shipped fuel to Vietnam and the Philippines.[52] The conflict may even ease tensions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea. President Marcos has said the energy crisis may provide an impetus for talks between the two countries over energy cooperation in disputed waters.[53] Beijing responded positively, noting that shelving sovereignty disputes in favour of joint development of resources was the \u201cright path\u201d.[54] However, any joint development project in Philippine waters still faces considerable constitutional hurdles as well as domestic opposition.[55] Nevertheless, China\u2019s overall stance on the Gulf conflict could increase trust levels in China, which was already rising. According to the ISEAS annual survey, regional concern about China\u2019s political and strategic influence fell from 68.8 per cent in 2025 to 66.1 per cent in 2026, while trust in China\u2019s confidence to contribute to global peace, security and prosperity rose from 36.6 per cent in 2025 to 39.8 per cent in 2026.[56]<\/p>\n
The war may also provide an opportunity for Russia to improve its standing in the region. Russia is a major producer of oil, fertilisers and wheat, sales of which is being promoted to countries in the Global South.[57] The Philippines, which rejected buying oil from Russia after it invaded Ukraine, has ordered 2.48 million barrels of Russian crude and other Southeast Asian countries are likely to follow suit.[58] As regional countries turn to renewable energy resources, Russia\u2019s civilian nuclear power industry also stands to benefit. Vietnam has already ordered two nuclear reactors from Russia. [59] \u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
Southeast Asia\u2019s Regional Security<\/p>\n
While Southeast Asian countries grapple with rising food and fuel prices, they must also start to give serious consideration to the medium and long-term security implications of the war. Regional governments will have to urgently determine how to improve their food security, energy sovereignty and supply chain resilience, either unilaterally or in partnership with ASEAN partners and middle powers such as Australia, Japan and Canada. Lessons will have to be drawn concerning the conduct of modern asymmetric warfare, especially the use of unmanned systems such as drones. Southeast Asian states must also consider the how they would respond to a similar conflict in East Asia, especially a US-China clash in the Taiwan Strait.\u00a0 Over a million Southeast Asians reside in Taiwan and evacuating even a small number would be a massive logistical challenge.\u00a0 Military facilities in the region used by US forces might become targets as they have done in the Gulf. [60] Shipping in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea could be disrupted with severe consequences for the global economy.[61] In a conflict that subsumes the whole region, neutrality might not be an option.<\/p>\n
SUMMARY<\/p>\n
Talks between the US and Iran ended without agreement on 12 April, prompting President Trump to declare a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. However, at the time of writing the ceasefire was still in place. Even if the truce holds, restoring the flow of oil, gas and fertilisers through the Strait of Hormuz will take months, while repairing the damage inflicted on the Middle East\u2019s critical energy infrastructure could take years. As a result, the effects of the conflict are likely to persist for at least the rest of this year and probably into 2027. As such, Southeast Asia will be suffering higher food and energy prices, elevated inflation and lower economic growth rates for some time to come.<\/p>\n
ENDNOTES<\/p>\n
For appendix and endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document<\/a>.<\/p>\nISEAS Perspective is published electronically by:
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![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/AFP__20260408__AA_08042026_2729633__v1__HighRes__VesselsPassThroughStraitOfHormuzFol-copy.jpeg\")
A vessel passing through the Strait of Hormuz following the two-week ceasefire reached between the United States and Iran on the condition that the strait be reopened, as seen from Oman on 8 April 2026. (Photo by Shadi J. H. Alassar\/ANADOLU\/Anadolu via AFP).<\/p>\n