If nuclear weapons were ever introduced into actual conflict between Israel and specific enemies, either by Israel itself or an Arab\/Islamic foe, nuclear warfighting dynamics could emerge at one level or another. This would be true so long as: (a) enemy first-strikes against Israel would not destroy Jerusalem\u2019s second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for an Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy Jerusalem\u2019s nuclear counter-retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy adversarial second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first-strikes would not destroy enemy nuclear counter-retaliatory capability.<\/p>\n
Ipso facto, in order to satisfy essential survival requirements, Israel\u2019s strategic planning would likely prioritize reducing the vulnerability of (a) and (b) while complicating adversary targeting success.<\/p>\n
In absolutely all cases, Israel\u2019s nuclear strategy and forces should remain oriented to deterrence, not war fighting. With this counsel in mind, Jerusalem has likely already taken steps to reject (1) tactical or relatively low-yield \u201cbattlefield\u201d nuclear weapons, and (2) corresponding plans for counter-force targeting. For Israel, without exception, nuclear weapons are primarily relevant to deterrence, rather than post-strike retribution. Moreover, recalling Israel\u2019s \u201cbomb in the basement,\u201d this calculation should become incrementally \u201cless ambiguous.\u201d<\/p>\n
There is still more. These four scenarios should remind Israeli planners and decision-makers of the always-overriding need for coherent nuclear strategy and doctrine. Among other things, this need stipulates a counter-value targeted nuclear retaliatory force, one that is recognizably secure from enemy first-strikes and also capable of penetrating an enemy state\u2019s active defenses.<\/p>\n
Such recommended strategic calculation points in one principal direction: Israel needs to consider a theory-based end to its traditional posture of \u201cdeliberate nuclear ambiguity.\u201d Adjustments to nuclear ambiguity \u2013 whether toward greater clarity or continued opacity \u2013 would affect deterrence perceptions. Though possibly counter-intuitive, possession of nuclear forces alone may not be sufficient to ensure credible deterrence for Israel.<\/p>\n
In all such complex strategic planning, analytical rigour and structured reasoning remain central. Prospective aggressors, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, must be encouraged to believe that Israel has the willingness to launch a measured nuclear retaliation and that Jerusalem\u2019s discernible nuclear forces are sufficiently invulnerable to first-strike attacks. These enemies should also be encouraged to expect that Israel\u2019s designated nuclear forces could reliably penetrate their overlapping missile, drone, and air defenses.<\/p>\n
The core task is to support the utility and security of Israel\u2019s nuclear retaliatory forces. Accordingly, to maximize Israeli nuclear deterrence, this task should emphasize the survivability, resilience, and penetration capability of pertinent military forces. Under certain conditions, the credibility of Israeli nuclear deterrence could vary inversely with the destructiveness of its weapons. In the end, nuclear deterrence is not about having the \u201cbiggest button\u201d (the self-deceiving metaphor used earlier by U.S. President Donald J. Trump vis-\u00e0-vis North Korea), but the perceived willingness to retaliate with \u201cassured destruction.\u201d Also vital will be the assumed rationality or irrationality of adversarial (state and sub-state) leaderships.<\/p>\n
Finally, Israel will need to prepare differently for an expectedly rational nuclear adversary than for an irrational one. In such nuanced and bewildering circumstances, national decision-makers in Jerusalem and also Washington will have to distinguish between genuine enemy irrationality and pretended enemy irrationality. In actual practice, distinguishing between these categories would pose significant analytical and political challenges.<\/p>\n
As Friedrich D\u00fcrrenmatt observed, \u201cThe worst does sometimes happen.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"If nuclear weapons were ever introduced into actual conflict between Israel and specific enemies, either by Israel itself…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":397637,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[85,46,43],"class_list":{"0":"post-397636","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-israel","8":"tag-il","9":"tag-israel","10":"tag-news"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/397636","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=397636"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/397636\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/397637"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=397636"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=397636"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=397636"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}