{"id":432465,"date":"2026-05-08T23:05:25","date_gmt":"2026-05-08T23:05:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/432465\/"},"modified":"2026-05-08T23:05:25","modified_gmt":"2026-05-08T23:05:25","slug":"comprehensive-analysis-of-nuclear-facilities-targeted-during-the-second-phase-of-the-iran-war-isis-reports","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/432465\/","title":{"rendered":"Comprehensive Analysis of Nuclear Facilities Targeted During the Second Phase of the Iran War | ISIS Reports"},"content":{"rendered":"<p> By David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, and the Good ISIS Team<\/p>\n<p>                   May 7, 2026<\/p>\n<p>     <a href=\"https:\/\/isis-online.org\/uploads\/isis-reports\/documents\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026-May-7-2026_2026-05-07-192124_gzfh.pdf\" class=\"btn btn-outline-dark btn-sm\" download=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Download PDF <\/a> \u00a0 <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/isis-online.org\/uploads\/isis-reports\/documents\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026-May-7-2026_2026-05-07-192124_gzfh.pdf\" class=\"btn btn-outline-dark btn-sm\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">View PDF <\/a>     <\/p>\n<p>Introduction<\/p>\n<p>The war against Iran has gone through two phases, the first in June 2025 and the second running from February 28 to a ceasefire on April 7\/8, 2026.\u00a0 This report evaluates the damage and destruction caused to nuclear sites during the second phase.\u00a0 The Institute could identify at least six nuclear sites that were attacked.\u00a0 Three other sites that were attacked could be nuclear-related, but there is not enough information to be certain.\u00a0 In total, six to nine sites were attacked that were nuclear related.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The Institute damage assessment of the first phase is contained in reports on the Institute\u2019s website and shows that Iran\u2019s centrifuge program was destroyed, including the ending of uranium enrichment, severe damage to sites associated with producing the nuclear weapon itself, and a loss of key nuclear weapons development and production know-how.<a href=\"#_ftn1\">[1]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>During the second phase of the Iran war, Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities continued to be targeted and destroyed by Israeli and American airstrikes.\u00a0 There was no significant additional damage to the facilities directly associated with uranium enrichment, they have remained destroyed and no reconstruction efforts have been detected.\u00a0 There has been no indication that Iran resumed any enrichment.\u00a0 The Israeli priority in the second phase appears to have been more on further degrading Iran\u2019s ability to make the nuclear weapon itself, a process called nuclear weaponization.\u00a0 Some of these weaponization sites targeted were revealed publicly for the first time, shedding new light onto the extent of Iran&#8217;s nuclear weapons related work.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>With regards to weaponization, the IDF identified at least four more nuclear weaponization-related sites that were attacked in the second phase.\u00a0 In addition, we identified three more sites that are likely nuclear weaponization sites, for a total of four to seven sites.\u00a0 A total of five nuclear weaponization-related sites were attacked in June 2025, for a grand total of nine to twelve sites involved in developing and building nuclear weapons.\u00a0 Many of these sites contained elements added only in recent months or years.\u00a0 At least one site held a post-June reconstituted capability that Israel somehow discovered.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Two fuel cycle facilities were also attacked.\u00a0The Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant (YPP) was targeted by Israel, destroying the key infrastructure needed to produce yellowcake from uranium ore.\u00a0 The Arak heavy water production plant was hit again, this time more thoroughly than in the first phase.\u00a0 The latter has economic consequences since the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran sold heavy water commercially.\u00a0 The attack has strategic consequences since heavy water would be needed in an Arak-type heavy water moderated reactor.\u00a0 The destruction of the Ardakan facility eliminates an important source of natural uranium oxide, needed in a variety of nuclear programs from enrichment to heavy water reactors.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Israel and the United States targeted many industrial and military sites, mostly involved in missile, drone, and conventional arms research, development, and production, deployments, and use of military hardware.\u00a0 It is possible that some of these sites were actually nuclear-related but not announced as such and not identified by the Institute.\u00a0 In addition, a few ex-Amad sites that were repurposed and attacked are also included at the end of the report.<\/p>\n<p>Additional nuclear scientists were killed, although the exact number is not publicly known.\u00a0 Israel did announce that it killed members of the Defense Council, which included the head of SPND and its previous head.\u00a0 Unlike the June war, Israel has not released a list of names and expertise of the scientists it killed, other than announcing that it had killed more.\u00a0 The effort appears to be aimed at eliminating the know-how of those in the nuclear weapons program.\u00a0 Know-how should not be confused with knowledge, which cannot be destroyed.\u00a0 Know-how is much more difficult and time-consuming to replace, particularly in a highly secretive nuclear weapons program.<\/p>\n<p>Other important sites, like the Esfahan underground complex, composed of a tunnel complex with three entrances, and the Natanz Pickaxe Mountain area, composed of two separate tunnel complexes, were not targeted.\u00a0 These sites are believed to hold most of Iran\u2019s ten tonnes of enriched uranium, including 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.\u00a0 But the tunnel complexes believed to hold enriched uranium were sealed by Iran before the war and have yet to be opened.\u00a0 In addition, the vehicle and personnel entrances to the Natanz underground enrichment site were attacked.\u00a0 Overall, much of the enriched uranium looks bottled up in sites where any movement can be easily detected, making the enriched uranium more difficult to access and use.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Attacks in phase two have further set back Iran\u2019s ability to make nuclear weapons. \u00a0Recent media reports of the U.S. intelligence community finding that the second phase of the war did not set back timelines for Iran to build nuclear weapons do not accord with the visible damage of nuclear weaponization facilities and require both more explanation and scrutiny.<\/p>\n<p>To further lengthen the time needed to break out to weapon-grade uranium, negotiations should ensure the stocks of enriched uranium are removed or down blended to natural uranium.\u00a0 This will build confidence that enrichment to weapon-grade uranium in a secret program will be more time consuming than building the nuclear weapon itself and increase confidence against cheating under a negotiated, permanent end, or long-term halt to Iran\u2019s centrifuge program.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The attacks in both phases of the war deserve credit for significantly increasing both the time needed to finish a nuclear weapon and the chance of failure if tried.\u00a0 While the new Iranian regime is widely perceived as more motivated to decide to make nuclear weapons, its means to do so are severely degraded as is its confidence in trying.\u00a0 While before the June 2025 war Iran could have broken out and built a non-missile deliverable nuclear weapon with almost 100 percent certainty in less than six months, it will face a much more difficult struggle towards success if it tries in the coming months, and the probability of succeeding, whether it be in nine months, one year, or two years, is now much less technically certain, and significantly less than 100 percent.\u00a0 That real risk of failing to successfully build a nuclear weapon may be a deterrent against deciding to try.<\/p>\n<p>Nuclear Weaponization Related Targets\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Min-Zadayi Site<\/p>\n<p>Min-Zadayi is a previously unknown site suspected to play a key role in Iran\u2019s attempt to reconstitute nuclear weapons capabilities post-June 2025.\u00a0 On March 3, 2026, the Israeli Defense Forces announced that the Min-Zadayi (also sometimes spelled Minzadehei) complex located east of Tehran was targeted in airstrikes, describing the site as a secret nuclear compound, or \u201cnuclear headquarters,&#8221; partially located underground, where a \u201cgroup of nuclear scientists operated covertly to develop a key component in the nuclear weapons system.\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn2\">[2]<\/a>\u00a0 A caption on an IDF video about the attack states, \u201cThe complex is designed to enable the restoration of the required technology and the advancement of capabilities for the development of nuclear weapons.\u201d\u00a0 The meaning of \u201ccomponent\u201d is ambiguous as to whether it refers to a specific component of a nuclear weapon or a group or division of the nuclear weaponization effort.<\/p>\n<p>Subsequent reporting by Le Monde indicated that the complex was involved in the \u201cmetallization\u201d of making a nuclear weapon.\u00a0This likely refers to the metallurgy required to make the weapon-grade uranium core of a nuclear weapon, and can involve converting uranium tetrafluoride to uranium metal, melting the metal in a specialized furnace, casting it, and finishing the core.\u00a0According to the IDF, the site was a restoration of a capability, presumably one lost or damaged during the June strikes. If so, this new activity at this site may be linked to the Meysami (aka Meithami) site, which was attacked twice in the June 2025 war, with many buildings destroyed, including a newly constructed one. In a report to the UN Security Council, Israel stated, \u201cThe site contained a large amount of metallurgical equipment that served the Advanced Materials Centre, under the Shahid Meithami group, the chemistry group of SPND. This equipment can be used, with modifications, for the metallurgy process for fissile core fabrication.\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn3\">[3]<\/a>\u00a0 Post-June, sorting and clearing of rubble was seen at the site.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The Min-Zadayi complex was a pre-existing military, likely SPND site, situated near a civilian recreational park giving it the appearance of a resort, which helped mask its purpose when viewed with satellite imagery, although typical signs of physical protection of a sensitive military installation can be seen upon closer observation.\u00a0 This includes a high-wall security perimeter, checkpoints, and guard towers (see Figure 1).\u00a0 The complex contains two clusters of above-ground buildings as well as long, winding roads with a series of buildings revetted into the hillside.\u00a0One hillside building highlighted by the IDF in an infographic is connected to the above ground complex by a walled walkway as well as by trenching.\u00a0 It is unclear how far this facility extends under the hillside, but the highlighted building was not attacked as of April 1, 2026.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Airbus high resolution satellite imagery from March 4, 2026, showed that the airstrikes destroyed three large above-ground buildings.\u00a0 A large crater can be seen on a nearby hillside above bunkered entrances, as well as five to six smaller craters that penetrated a concrete surface at the top of the hillside (see Figure 2-5).\u00a0 The targeted concrete surface has the appearance of a courtyard\/parking area at first glance, but it may in fact be a roof for a partially raised, partially below-grade facility, connected to both above ground buildings and the targeted facility underneath the hillside (see Figure 6 and 7).\u00a0 \u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-1.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 1. An overview of the Min-Zadayi complex, highlighting the security perimeter and its proximity to civilian recreational facilities.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/May-2026-Comprehensive-Report_Figure-2.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 2. A before and after image of the compound, highlighting the attacked areas in the two clusters of above ground buildings as well as\u00a0craters on and near the hillside.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-3.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 3.\u00a0 A close up of the targeted cluster of buildings closest to the entrance to the site.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/May-2026-Comprehensive-Report_Figure-4.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 4.\u00a0 A close up of the hillside crater and smaller craters on a nearby concrete surface, apparently a roof for a partially buried area.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-5.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 5.\u00a0\u00a0A close up of the bunkered entrance and the impact crater close by.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-6.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 6.\u00a0 The targeted concrete surface was constructed from 2014 to 2015, with excavation at the top of the hillside visible in early 2015 (not shown) indicating a connection to the bunkered entrance facility targeted by the hillside strike.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-7A.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/><br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-7B.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 7.\u00a0\u00a0A November 2021 and a November 2025 image show the targeted concrete surface is raised.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Taleghan 2<\/p>\n<p>The IDF destroyed a newly built, highly fortified facility at a site known as Taleghan 2, located within the Parchin military complex, and tied the strike directly to Iran\u2019s nuclear weapons capabilities.\u00a0 It described the attack on the site as \u201can additional layer in the ongoing effort to deny the regime the core components required to achieve nuclear weapons.\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn4\">[4]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>The Taleghan 2 location is well known among those studying Iran\u2019s nuclear weapons program.\u00a0 It was a building used for nuclear weapons development purposes under Iran\u2019s Amad Plan in the early 2000s.\u00a0 During the Amad Plan, Taleghan 2 originally contained a specially built, cylindrical high explosive test chamber operated with a flash x-ray able to peer deeply into high explosive experiments, providing a capability to study in detail the initiation of the spherical compression of a dense mass.\u00a0 Iran conducted an important nuclear weapons test in Taleghan 2 in 2003 involving a scaled-down version of the multipoint initiation system that Iran called the shock wave generator.\u00a0 It was designed to fit in the outer volume of the nuclear weapon and uniformly set off the main high explosive charge.<\/p>\n<p>The IAEA never visited the building.\u00a0Available evidence supports that the high explosive chamber and associated flash x-ray were removed from the building during a multi-year Iranian sanitization of the site, which also included the co-located Taleghan 1 building.<\/p>\n<p>The original building at Taleghan 2 was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in October 2024.\u00a0 Based on Axios reporting and the Institute\u2019s understanding, it appears likely that just prior to the October 2024 bombing, Taleghan 2 contained equipment used to make high purity PETN plastic explosives.\u00a0 These explosives, which are moldable, are an essential component of the shock wave generator.\u00a0 Translated portions of the IDF March 2026 post in Hebrew described the site as one \u201cused by the Iranian regime to advance nuclear weapons capabilities,\u201d and \u201cused in recent years to develop advanced explosives.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The site was rebuilt beginning in May 2025, before the June war.\u00a0 Satellite imagery of the early stages of construction showed what was possibly one or multiple high explosive containment vessels installed inside the new structure.\u00a0 The facility under construction was not attacked in June 2025.\u00a0 Iran subsequently went to great lengths to harden and protect the new facility, constructing it with a reinforced steel frame, covered in hardened concrete, and buried under dirt.\u00a0 Additional passive defensive measures were installed, such as an anti-drone fence above the facility and hardened concrete walls in front of its entrance.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Vantor satellite imagery from March 11, 2026, revealed the destruction of Taleghan 2 (see Figure 8).<a href=\"#_ftn5\">[5]<\/a>\u00a0 Three large craters caused by earth penetrating weapons can be seen evenly spaced across the top of the facility.\u00a0 The weapons penetrated directly into the main internal building holding the probable high explosive containment vessels beneath and destroying the facility (see Figure 9).\u00a0 The blast concussion created by the earth penetrating weapons caused a nearby support building and the outer defensive concrete wall to collapse.\u00a0 Nearby, a fire control and instruments building used at the Taleghan 1 facility was destroyed.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-8.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 8.\u00a0A Vantor satellite image provided to the Institute showed the attack on the Taleghan 2 facility and surrounding buildings.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-9.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 9.\u00a0An overlay of the Vantor satellite image showing the precision of the strikes and how they entered directly into the main internal building.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Malek Ashtar University and the Building Adjacent to the Mojdeh Site (Lavisan 2)<\/p>\n<p>Two buildings near the previously destroyed Mojdeh site were targeted in March 2026.\u00a0 One was a newly built, large engineering laboratory-type building, the other was part of Malek Ashtar University.\u00a0 The latter was directly tied to nuclear weaponization work by the IDF.\u00a0Figure 10 shows the buildings before they were struck.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The large, suspected engineering laboratory-type building was targeted in early March. As Figure 10 shows, the new building was located adjacent to the Mojdeh site (aka Lavisan 2), connected to the site by ground paths, and connected to Malek Ashtar University via a pedestrian walking bridge.\u00a0 The Mojdeh site was destroyed in the June 2025 war and subsequently sanitized.<a href=\"#_ftn6\">[6]<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Satellite imagery from March 3, 2026, confirmed that the suspected engineering laboratory-type building was completely destroyed, spreading debris across a wide area and onto the highway next to it (see Figure 11).<\/p>\n<p>The purpose of the building was not clarified by the IDF.\u00a0 Its proximity to the Mojdeh Site suggests a connection to SPND and nuclear weapons development.\u00a0 It also appears to share a common security perimeter with the Mojdeh site.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>In a report to the UN following Operation Rising Lion, Israel described the Mojdeh site as \u201cused for radiation R&amp;D and high explosives.\u201d\u00a0 It explained, \u201cThe site contained SPND laboratories, including unique components and R&amp;D projects both for the nuclear and conventional projects weapons [sic] in the fields of neutronics, explosives, and diagnostics.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The newly destroyed building was finished only in early 2025.\u00a0 With construction starting in 2016, it likely was built to supplement SPND activities at Mojdeh and\/or at Malek Ashtar University.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Later in March, the IDF announced the attack on a large building on the campus of Malek Ashtar University; as shown in Figure 10, the building is close to the building discussed above and connected by a foot bridge.\u00a0 Malek Ashtar University of Technology has been connected to Iran\u2019s nuclear weapons program for years.\u00a0 Post-Amad planning meeting minutes from 2003 found in the nuclear archive describe plans for continuing nuclear weapons research and development at Malek Ashtar University.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>In their statement, the IDF described the purpose of the attacked building as, &#8220;a strategic research and development site used by the Iranian terror regime to develop components for nuclear weapons production.&#8221;<a href=\"#_ftn7\">[7]<\/a>\u00a0 Airbus satellite imagery from March 18, 2026, confirmed that the building had been heavily damaged by the airstrike, destroying an entire section of the structure (see Figures 12).\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-10.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 10.\u00a0 The newly targeted buildings are close to the previously targeted Mojdeh site and connected by footpaths.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-11.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 11.\u00a0 A before and after view of the destroyed engineering-laboratory building connected to Malek Ashtar University and the Mojdeh Site.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-12.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 12.\u00a0\u00a0Before and after view of the large workshop building at Malek Ashtar University that was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Shahid Chamran<\/p>\n<p>A large site east of Tehran was identified by the Institute as attacked and destroyed by Israel or the United States.\u00a0This site had earlier been identified by NCRI as the location of the alleged headquarters of the SPND subordinate entity, Shahid Chamran Group.<a href=\"#_ftn8\">[8]<\/a>\u00a0 The complex was initially struck between March 6 and March 19.\u00a0 The site was then struck again sometime between April 5 and April 11, 2026.\u00a0 While there is currently no confirmation by the IDF that the site was related to SPND or the Chamran Group, the destruction is significant, and the connection between the Chamran Group and nuclear weapons development is well documented.\u00a0In a sanction listing dated to May 2025, the United States\u2019 State Department stated the Shahid Chamran Group \u201cconducted nuclear-related research.\u201d\u00a0 At the time, the head of the group was sanctioned for supporting \u201cSPND\u2019s nuclear and explosives research and development efforts, including those with potential military applications.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The attacked complex is located near Sorkheh Hesar, off of Damavand Highway, along the main road to Khojir, the Aerospace Industries Organization&#8217;s (AIO&#8217;s) main missile development and production site and near former Amad Plan sites.\u00a0 Construction of the site started in 2012 at about the same time as the new SPND headquarters moved to the Noor site.\u00a0 Major expansion of the site began in mid-2023 and was nearly complete when it was attacked.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The complex was not attacked in June 2025, as far as could be determined from satellite imagery.\u00a0 As of early 2025, several buildings had just been completed or were still under construction.\u00a0 Post-June 2025, imagery shows high levels of activity remaining across the site, as indicated by large volumes of cars in the parking lots and the paving of roads.\u00a0Limited activity is visible with respect to progress on the construction of four buildings in the northern portion of the complex.\u00a0 Figure 13 shows the complex as of April 2025.<\/p>\n<p>Imagery from March 24 and April 14, 2026, shows that the multiple destroyed buildings include both the administrative headquarters and laboratory office building complex, as well as a possible ejector-diffuser test facility, and several other engineering halls and support buildings. One destroyed building piqued our interest due to a central high-bay section, with a large radius loop road, a large drive-in door on the west end and a large, paved area all around the building.\u00a0 \u00a0See Figures 14 and 15.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-13.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 13.\u00a0 The alleged Shahid Chamran Group headquarters complex in April 2025.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-14.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 14.\u00a0 A view of the complex after it was initially targeted with airstrikes sometime between March 6 and March 19.\u00a0 Several buildings are heavily damaged or destroyed.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-15.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 15.\u00a0 A view of the Shahid Chamran Group complex after it was targeted in a second airstrike.\u00a0 One additional blue roofed high-bay engineering hall was destroyed in that attack.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>SPND Officials and Nuclear Scientists<\/p>\n<p>On the first day of the war, the IDF announced that several members of the Iranian Defense Council were killed.<a href=\"#_ftn9\">[9]<\/a>\u00a0 This strike eliminated two key personnel involved in SPND, including Houssein Jabal Amelian (Chairman of SPND) and Reza Mozafari Nia (former Chairman of SPND).\u00a0Ali Shamkhani was also killed.\u00a0Shamkhani was on the late 1990s, early 2000s interagency Supreme Council for Advanced Technologies that was responsible for overseeing the decision to launch a crash nuclear weapons program, codenamed the Amad Plan.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>On two separate occasions, Israel claimed that it had just killed nuclear scientists but did not release their names and affiliations, as it had done in the June war.\u00a0 \u00a0From open sources, only one or two individuals can be identified.<a href=\"#_ftn10\">[10]<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The media has named two scientists.\u00a0 The first is Hossein Zaki Dizaji.\u00a0 He was from Imam Hossein University and allegedly a former Amad program member.<a href=\"#_ftn11\">[11]<\/a>\u00a0 He has co-authored with Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, leader and founder of the nuclear weapons program and former head of the AEOI.\u00a0 They co-authored a paper in May 2025 about shielding radiation using the software MCNP.\u00a0 He has done considerable work on fast neutron detection using MCNP and SRIM codes.\u00a0 The other one is Mohammad Reza Kia from Amirkabir University.\u00a0 Little is known about his possible involvement with the nuclear weaponization program.\u00a0 His available published work was also related to radiation therapy and dosimetry, and he used Monte Carlo simulations.<a href=\"#_ftn12\">[12]<\/a><\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-16.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 16. A statement by the IDF identifying the defense personnel killed. SPND and nuclear related officials are among the dead.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Imam Hussein University<\/p>\n<p>Imam Hussein University is a key IRGC university and information about strikes on the site largely focused on the role of serving the IRGC during the war.\u00a0 At least one building was tied to the nuclear program.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>On March 10, 2026, the IDF announced airstrikes on an underground complex at Imam Hussein University.\u00a0 According to the IDF Telegram post, the target was a \u201cweapons research and development complex used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)\u201d with an \u201cunderground route [&#8230;] where IRGC armed forces conducted experiments and tests related to the development and production of ballistic missiles.\u201d\u00a0 The post continued stating, \u201cThe complex was located within the IRGC\u2019s central military university (\u201cImam Hussein\u201d), which served as an emergency asset and a gathering site for operational activity.\u201d\u00a0 On March 11, the IDF announced its attack on \u201ca compound established in the heart of the central military university of the IRGC (&#8216;Imam Hussein&#8217;), used by the regime&#8217;s operatives to oversee the campaign and conduct meetings.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>On March 30, the IDF announced striking Imam Hussein University grounds again, to \u201cinflict significant damage to the regime\u2019s weapons production and development capabilities.\u201d\u00a0 It described the destroyed military infrastructure as including:\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u201c* Wind tunnels constructed beneath the university, used by the regime for testing and development of ballistic missiles<\/p>\n<p>* The chemistry center of Imam Hossein University, used by the regime for research and development of chemical weapons<\/p>\n<p>* The technology and engineering center of the mechanics and development group, a central complex used by the regime for the development of ballistic missiles and additional weapons.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In an attached infographic, the IDF also clearly labels one building as a \u201cPhysics Center\u201d used for \u201cdevelopment and research of the Iranian Nuclear Program.\u201d Figure 17 shows the infographic.\u00a0 Figure 18 shows an overview of Imam Hussein University and highlights the post-strike damage visible at the sites labeled in the IDF infographic.\u00a0 Figure 19 shows a close-up of the \u201cPhysics Center\u201d before and after the strike; the strikes leveled the building, which was a two-story building resembling an office building, but also leveled or destroyed nearby buildings, including a laboratory-type building and a workshop.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-17.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 17.\u00a0\u00a0An IDF visual of Imam Hussein University labels a building as a Physics Center used by the Iranian Nuclear Program.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-18.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 18.\u00a0 Overview of visible damage at the Imam Hussein University, which was attacked multiple times because of its ties to the IRGC.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-19.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 19.\u00a0 Pre- and post-attack satellite imagery taken in early April 2025 and 2026 that shows the leveling of the \u201cPhysics Center\u201d highlighted by the IDF.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Other Universities with Nuclear Weaponization Relevance<\/p>\n<p>There are additional universities that were attacked that may have held nuclear weaponization relevant equipment, activities, or resources.\u00a0 While the IDF has not announced a nuclear related reason for targeting additional universities, the Amad follow-on organization SADAT was affiliated with several universities, in particular Malek Ashtar University of Technology and Imam Hussein University, which are already discussed above, but also Shahid Beheshti University.\u00a0 Further, a secret Iranian document on further developing a neutron initiator for a nuclear weapon included plans to \u201cprotect our capacity\u201d at Shahid Beheshti University.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Satellite imagery of Shahid Beheshti University dated to April 14, 2026, shows only little visible damage around the site, which is dense with multi-story buildings (see Figure 20).\u00a0 One multi-story building in the northern area of the university grounds was destroyed.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-20.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 20.\u00a0\u00a0Before and after strike damage at Shahid Beheshti University, with before and after close-ups of a destroyed multi-story building in the northern area of the university grounds.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The IAEA was reported to have at least tried to inspect multiple universities in Iran,<a href=\"#_ftn13\">[13]<\/a> likely for purposes of trying to verify if Iran\u2019s declaration was complete and later possibly to monitor Section T of the JCPOA, where Section T constituted a ban on certain nuclear weaponization activities.\u00a0In September 2017, the then-IAEA Director General Amano described difficulties in verifying Iran\u2019s Section T compliance, citing a lack of requirements to submit declarations or ensure access.<a href=\"#_ftn14\">[14]<\/a>\u00a0 Reporting in 2018 indicated that the IAEA was only able to visit two universities, Iran University of Science and Technology and Sharif University of Technology.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Natanz Nuclear Complex<\/p>\n<p>The Natanz Nuclear Complex was targeted multiple times during the 2026 war.\u00a0 On March 1,\u00a02026, the personnel and vehicle access points to the underground enrichment halls were targeted and destroyed by airstrikes (see Figure 21).\u00a0 On the first day of the war, satellite imagery identified vehicle activity outside the vehicle access building, suggesting that Iran was entering the underground facility.\u00a0 Destroying the access points effectively denied entrance into the underground complex and increased the visibility of future efforts to restore access.\u00a0 Later, March 27th imagery showed that two onsite aboveground security checkpoints and the main entrance to the complex were destroyed (see Figure 22 and 23).\u00a0 This was done to limit freedom of movement at the site and prevent ground access.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The enrichment facilities at Natanz have not operated since before the June 2025 war, as a result of the destruction caused to the onsite primary and backup utilities (electrical and HVAC systems), the physical destruction caused to the enrichment halls themselves and the above ground PFEP, and the displacement of HVAC chiller around the complex.\u00a0 In the months leading up to the 2026 war, Iran constructed a makeshift paneled roof over the bombed-out Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, likely as an effort to hide their activities while they conducted salvaging and recovery operations of any equipment or materials that may have survived the June 2025 bombing.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Pickaxe Mountain.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Pickaxe Mountain site, composed of two independent tunnel complexes just south of the Natanz enrichment plant, was not attacked in either phase of the war, except for what may have been part of a mobile air defense capability placed on a spoil pile near the western tunnel entrances of the larger tunnel complex.\u00a0 The debris remains there and has not been removed.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Iran did take steps to make access to the tunnel complexes more difficult.\u00a0 Soon before the start of phase 2 of the war, Iran buried and hardened with concrete the older tunnel portals to the smaller tunnel complex that was built around 2007.\u00a0During the war, as early as April 22, the two eastern tunnel portals of the larger, newer complex were partially blocked by grey earthen material, sufficiently to prevent vehicle access to both portals.\u00a0 On April 1, 2026, these portal entrances were clear and unobstructed.\u00a0 Unlike the situation at both the Fordow and Esfahan tunnel entrances, this material does not provide complete tunnel entrance obscuration at either portal.\u00a0 Nonetheless, this material would appear to be sufficient to significantly hinder rapid ingress\/egress by vehicles and would require the use of heavy earth moving equipment to gain such access and clear an unobstructed path inside.\u00a0 At present, we do not yet see evidence of such blockage having been undertaken at the two western tunnel portals of the larger complex.\u00a0 Figures 24 and 25 show this recent activity at the larger Pickaxe complex.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-21.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 21.\u00a0 A Vantor satellite image that showed the destroyed personnel and vehicle entrances to the underground complex at Natanz.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-22.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 22. A view of the airstrikes on the main gate entrance and an internal security checkpoint.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-23.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 23.\u00a0 A view of the northern security checkpoint that was targeted in the attack.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-24.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 24.\u00a0 A before and after view of the eastern tunnel portals show how they were partially blocked by earthen material.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-25.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 25.\u00a0An alternate angle of the eastern tunnel portals at Pickaxe Mountain. This angle shows how the portals are partially blocked.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Arak Heavy Water Production Plant<\/p>\n<p>On March 27, 2026, the IDF announced on X that the Arak heavy water production plant was again targeted in airstrikes.<a href=\"#_ftn15\">[15]<\/a>\u00a0 Satellite imagery from March 29, 2026, confirmed that the heavy water production plant adjacent to the Arak IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor was destroyed (see Figure 26).\u00a0 In this attack, all three stages of heavy water production were targeted as well as several support facilities, rather than just one stage as had occurred in the June war.\u00a0 The attack has rendered the heavy water production plant completely inoperable.\u00a0The nearby IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor remained destroyed and was not targeted again during this phase of the war.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The IDF further stated in their announcement that the plant was \u201ca significant economic asset for the terrorist regime and served as a revenue source for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Its operations generated tens of millions of dollars in revenue for the regime each year.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-26.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 26. A view of the destroyed Arak heavy water production plant.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant<\/p>\n<p>Satellite imagery from March 28, 2026, showed that the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant (YPP) was targeted by the IDF.\u00a0 The IDF announced the strike on March 27, and reported, &#8220;The strikes were aimed at the central infrastructure used for the unique production processes at the site.&#8221;<a href=\"#_ftn16\">[16]<\/a> The airstrikes destroyed the main and auxiliary processing buildings and caused collateral damage to the surrounding buildings (see Figure 27 and 28).\u00a0 Debris could be seen strewn across the complex.\u00a0 The strikes rendered the production plant inoperable.\u00a0 Ardakan was receiving uranium ore from the Saghand uranium mine but could have also processed ore from other mines Iran was planning and building, such as the Narigan Mine.<a href=\"#_ftn17\">[17]<\/a> Producing yellowcake, or U3O8, is the first step to convert the uranium into a form usable for enrichment or nuclear fuel.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-27.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 27.\u00a0 A before and after view of the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant.\u00a0 The main and auxiliary processing buildings were completely destroyed, rendering the production plant inoperable.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-28.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 28.\u00a0 A close-up view of the destruction caused to the main and auxiliary production buildings at Ardakan.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Esfahan Nuclear Site<\/p>\n<p>Tunnel Complex.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 There were no new attacks on the tunnel complex at Esfahan holding over half of Iran\u2019s stock of 60 percent HEU, but possibly also near 20 percent enriched uranium and the beginning stages of a new enrichment plant.\u00a0 As previously reported by the Institute, the tunnels may have been more damaged in June than is widely believed.\u00a0 One indicator of such damage would be the very limited activity at the tunnel entrances post June 2025.\u00a0 Of the three entrances, only the northern one appears to have been repaired. \u00a0The middle one was dug out but not visibly opened.\u00a0No visible efforts were made to repair or dig out the southern tunnel entrances post June, which experienced severe damage to ventilation equipment outside the entrance.\u00a0 This is the entrance where blue barrels, likely carrying HEU in overpack containers, were seen a few days before the June strikes.<a href=\"#_ftn18\">[18]<\/a>\u00a0 Evidently, no portion of the tunnel was ready for sustaining regular operation: Even before new bombings began, Iran sealed all three tunnel entrances again with dirt.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>On or after March 18, 2026, Iran\u00a0installed additional roadblocks at all three tunnel entrances, the northern, middle, and southern ones, as well as the entrance to a probable utilities alcove adjacent to the middle entrance.\u00a0 Figure 29 shows an overview.\u00a0 The addition of the makeshift roadblocks complicates efforts to access the tunnel entrances but also makes access more detectable.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Adjacent Air Defense Site Destroyed.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Following IAEA information in early March that an attack took place near the Esfahan nuclear complex that damaged two buildings, we identified that a defense complex in the southwest corner of the area was destroyed.<a href=\"#_ftn19\">[19]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Satellite imagery shows that damage at this site near the Esfahan nuclear complex occurred between February 28 and March 6 and additionally between March 6 and March 18.\u00a0 Because of the difficulty of finding the site, here are the coordinates, 32\u00b034&#8217;3.07&#8243;N, 51\u00b048&#8217;59.77&#8243;E. The site is likely involved in the defense of the Esfahan nuclear complex, and the main attacked building could have been the command and control center for physical protection of the above ground nuclear complex roughly 1.2 km away (2.1 km away from the underground complex).\u00a0 Wikimapia identified the site as Army Defense Unit Esfahan.\u00a0 This site includes a small tunnel complex built around 2007 (see Figure 30).\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Figure 31 shows the strikes hit both tunnel entrances, one of which could have served mainly as utilities support in recent years and featured what may have been a cooling unit protected by a concrete defensive barrier.\u00a0 Both features appear to have been destroyed in the strike.\u00a0 A probable command and control bunkered facility was also struck in a second attack between the 6th and 18th of March 2026, and a connected underground portion appears to have collapsed.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The residential area next to it is labeled in Wikimapia as Thamari Town (AEOI Housing) and it appears not to have been attacked.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-29.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 29.\u00a0 Overview of the tunnel complex as of April 8, 2026, with the new roadblocks identified.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-30.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 30.\u00a0 Overview of the attacked defense post near the Esfahan nuclear complex, with a tunnel and bunker under construction in 2007-2008.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-31.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 31.\u00a0 The damage inflicted on the defense post in two separate bombing campaigns.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Additional Ex-Amad Sites Hit<\/p>\n<p>The Institute looked at several additional sites with relevance to the Amad Plan.<\/p>\n<p>One that was attacked was the former Amad Plan mountain tunnel site called Shahid Boroujerdi, situated in the Parchin military complex, and built under the Amad Plan to be a production-scale plant for making weapon-grade uranium metal cores for nuclear weapons.<a href=\"#_ftn20\">[20]<\/a>\u00a0 The IDF did not release accompanying information.\u00a0 The Institute later received confirmation from Israel that the site was not struck because of a current relation to the nuclear program, but instead it was repurposed after Amad to be part of Iran\u2019s defense industrial base.\u00a0 It is not included in our count of nuclear facilities.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Another attacked site is the Lashkar Ab\u2019ad complex, where Iran conducted secret laser uranium enrichment activities under the Amad Plan and succeeded in enriching small amounts of unsafeguarded Chinese-supplied uranium metal feed in 2002\/2003, achieving enrichment levels of 0.8 percent in Russian-supplied equipment.<a href=\"#_ftn21\">[21]<\/a>\u00a0 IAEA experts assessed that the facility could have made highly enriched uranium, albeit in very small quantities, if all\u00a0 the foreign-supplied equipment had been delivered.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Iran decommissioned the enrichment equipment but continued to develop lasers at the site.\u00a0 From 2003 to 2006, the IAEA had sufficient access to the site to verify that Iran did not reconstitute enrichment activities at this site.\u00a0 The site received new attention in 2010, following a statement by then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: \u201cToday, we are capable of enriching uranium with lasers. It is now possible to do this using the same devices which are on display here in this exhibition,&#8221; He continued, \u201cusing the laser technology for enriching uranium would lead to carrying out the enrichment process with a higher quality, accuracy and speed.\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn22\">[22]<\/a>\u00a0 The IAEA visited the site again in February 2014 and did not report seeing\u00a0 any uranium enrichment activities.\u00a0 No uranium enrichment project emerged, as far as can be discerned from open sources.<\/p>\n<p>The recent bombing campaign struck the original building involved in uranium enrichment and others built later.\u00a0Figures 32 and 33 show the Lashkar Ab&#8217;ad site pre and post bombing, in January 2026 and on April 25, 2026.\u00a0 It was not included in our count of nuclear sites.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-32.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 32.\u00a0\u00a0The Lashkar Ab\u2019ad laser site before it was struck.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Comprehensive-Analysis-of-Nuclear-Related-Facilities-Iran-War-2026_FIGURE-33.jpg\" alt=\"\" title=\"\"\/>  <\/p>\n<p>Figure 33.\u00a0 The Lashkar Ab\u2019ad laser site after it was struck.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>          Sources<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a> Note Verbale dated 9 September 2025 from The Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, transmitting Israel&#8217;s working paper on operation &#8220;Rising Lion&#8221; And The Iranian Nuclear Program And Ballistic Missiles Threat*<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref14\">[14]<\/a> Francois Murphy,\u201d IAEA chief calls for clarity on disputed section of Iran nuclear deal,\u201d Reuters, September 26, 2017, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-iran-nuclear-iaea\/iaea-chief-calls-for-clarity-on-disputed-section-of-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKCN1C12AN\/<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref15\">[15]<\/a> https:\/\/x.com\/IDFFarsi\/status\/2037572204439777286?s=20\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"By David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, and the Good ISIS Team May 7, 2026 Download PDF \u00a0&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":432466,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[85,46,43],"class_list":["post-432465","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-israel","tag-il","tag-israel","tag-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/432465","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=432465"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/432465\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/432466"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=432465"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=432465"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=432465"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}