{"id":476434,"date":"2026-06-04T20:05:09","date_gmt":"2026-06-04T20:05:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/476434\/"},"modified":"2026-06-04T20:05:09","modified_gmt":"2026-06-04T20:05:09","slug":"the-pharma-choke-point-council-on-foreign-relations","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/476434\/","title":{"rendered":"The Pharma Choke Point | Council on Foreign Relations"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A Brief History of the U.S. Response to Pharmaceutical Dependence on China<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">U.S. policymakers have been concerned for nearly two decades about U.S. dependence on China for active pharmaceutical ingredients and key starting materials for many critical medicines. Although the United States has changed its perception of the problem from a regulatory to a national security challenge, it continues to struggle to rectify the problem in any meaningful way. The figure below highlights certain milestones along that journey to date.<\/p>\n<p>Pathways for Weaponization<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Choke points\u00a0in\u00a0critical\u00a0supply chains\u00a0share three characteristics.<a href=\"#d01728f4-a569-4b2b-8958-44dad1cf6f01\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">25<\/a> First, a nation\u00a0or coalition of allies\u00a0has\u00a0a dominant, concentrated market share\u00a0in a critical input or production stage. Second, substitutes\u00a0are not immediately available. Third, that country\u00a0has a practical means of weaponizing\u00a0its position in ways that create asymmetric leverage, inflicting substantial pain on the target while suffering minimal harm\u00a0itself. \u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Pharmaceutical supply chains\u00a0are particularly susceptible to choke points\u00a0because both supply and demand for essential medicine inputs and production processes\u00a0often do not readily respond to changes in price. That may be the case for the demand for an essential medicine if it is a medical necessity to patients and no good therapeutic substitute exists. The supply of\u00a0an\u00a0essential\u00a0drug is similarly constrained, especially in the\u00a0short term, because existing\u00a0suppliers must obtain FDA approval for\u00a0new manufacturing facilities or production lines needed to meet the shortfall.\u00a0New entrants face similar regulatory obstacles and have to offer lower prices than existing producers to gain market\u00a0share, while innovative production technologies often struggle to gain traction\u00a0in a highly regulated sector that is understandably path-dependent and conservative.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Older U.S. generics are particularly\u00a0susceptible to\u00a0shortages\u00a0because margins are\u00a0low.\u00a0A 2025 study found that\u00a0once U.S. drug shortages occur, they tend to persist, lasting three years on average (up from two\u00a0years in 2020).<a href=\"#38c8a408-1b16-47c2-abe0-5bacd76d4787\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">26<\/a>\u00a0Shortages\u00a0affect both purchasers\u2014spurring hoarding and\u00a0higher health-care costs\u2014and patients, delaying surgeries and leading to less effective or less safe alternatives, medication errors, and avoidable deaths.<a href=\"#19b292e5-69b1-4b34-b11f-8cc32259bfb7\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">27<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">In 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping\u00a0announced a \u201cwhole nation\u201d effort to advance the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector, deploying\u00a0the full weight of the authoritarian state across central ministries, provincial\u00a0governments, academia, and industry to pursue\u00a0the nation\u2019s\u00a0strategic priorities in this sector.<a href=\"#53aa0e59-f93e-48fd-bcf0-8620e72ea254\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">28<\/a>\u00a0This broad authority empowers China with a\u00a0wide\u00a0range\u00a0of\u00a0options to exercise\u00a0leverage over U.S. pharmaceutical supply chains.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">China could weaponize supply cuts by imposing direct or indirect export restrictions. China\u00a0has previously exercised its authority to require that exports of medical products\u2014including COVID-19 testing kits, medical face masks and protective suits, ventilators, and infrared thermometers\u2014be accompanied by proof of registration with the National Medical Products Administration.\u00a0Alternatively, China could resort to\u00a0more indirect, subtle\u00a0regulatory\u00a0measures that delay shipments or temporarily halt production at a critical facility, accomplishing the same practical effect of\u00a0choking off\u00a0needed supplies\u00a0to U.S. patients and purchasers.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">China can\u2014and does\u2014cut prices to disable competing supply chains. For generics, producers all along the global supply chain operate on thin margins due to robust price competition, reimbursement limits, or fixed contracts. Chinese producers recently\u00a0flooded\u00a0the market with\u00a0below-cost exports\u00a0of APIs and KSMs\u00a0to\u00a0cripple alternative suppliers\u00a0in India that were supported under India\u2019s Production-Linked Incentive scheme.<a href=\"#2ad60e19-db24-4837-8d57-b6494a36e135\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">29<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">A further risk is China weaponizing information. China need not impose a physical export restriction to create downstream stress; threatening restrictions or amplifying rumors via channels like TikTok can trigger anticipatory hoarding and panic-buying by consumers, hospitals, group purchasing organizations (GPOs), wholesalers, and manufacturers. In a buffered multitier supply chain, this behavior converts perceived scarcity into real scarcity by pulling forward demand, distorting order signals, and exhausting inventories faster than normal consumption would. The 2022 infant formula crisis illustrated how media attention and panic buying can intensify shortages beyond the underlying physical disruption. Similar behavior was observed during the COVID-19 pandemic, when hospitals and buyers over-ordered critical products in anticipation of future scarcity.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">China could also pursue subtler forms of coercion by weaponizing quality, with Beijing\u2019s manufacturers adulterating inputs or allowing manufacturing standards to quietly erode. Weaponization of quality\u2014whether through deliberate adulteration or because of inadequate standards\u2014represents a form of supply chain disruption particularly difficult to attribute and counter. The 2007\u201308 contamination of Chinese-manufactured heparin, which killed eighty-one Americans, illustrated that harm can propagate through supply chains even without formal export restrictions. Whether or not that particular episode was deliberate, the possibility that it could be repeated intentionally is a form of risk that cannot easily be deterred. As pharmaceutical inputs become more complex and AI-driven synthesis makes their origins harder to trace, quality becomes an increasingly viable instrument of quiet pressure. Quality problems create plausible deniability, enabling a pathway for weaponization that is not always straightforward and may remain deliberately obscured.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Thus,\u00a0assessing the risk of China\u00a0weaponizing\u00a0the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain usually boils down\u00a0to situations where China\u00a0has dominant, concentrated market share and where pathways exist through which\u00a0China could\u00a0practically\u00a0leverage that\u00a0dependence\u00a0in a manner that adversely affects\u00a0the United States.\u00a0Four such scenarios exist.<\/p>\n<p>Scenario 1:\u00a0China restricts\u00a0access to raw materials, KSMs, APIs, or\u00a0FDFs\u00a0that go from China directly to the United States.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">China\u2019s influence over U.S. pharmaceutical supply chains runs through two parallel paths: the inputs\u2014raw materials, KSMs, and APIs\u2014that provide the foundation for global manufacturing and finished dosage forms exported directly to U.S. patients. Currently, a relatively small percentage (an estimated 13 percent) of U.S. generic drugs and their inputs are imported directly from China, but this figure underplays the risk in certain vulnerable drugs that are highly dependent on Chinese manufacturers for finished dosage forms sold in the U.S. market.<a href=\"#49818c5e-8034-428a-ab9c-bc3adde54352\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">30<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">The oral solid products are dominated by antihypertensive medications\u2014drugs taken daily by over fifty-five million\u00a0Americans.<a href=\"#72ebe006-a0f8-40f7-ae89-32adfc8724b5\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">31<\/a> Although they would not necessarily lead to an immediate crisis, shortages of these drugs would result in serious public health consequences. As multiple drugs in the same therapeutic class are included in this list from the same manufacturers, supply disruptions are unlikely to be isolated, leading to simultaneous shortages across related medications, thus limiting substitution options.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">The U.S. injectable products imported directly from China include the immunosuppressant mycophenolate, which is critical for preventing organ transplant rejections; some broad-spectrum hospital antibiotics; and an acute heart failure agent. Again, the products are not easily substituted and represent the standard of care in some of the most common and serious conditions used in hospital settings. Mycophenolate is the standard of care in transplant surgery: a shortage would pressure clinicians toward alternative drugs with higher rejection rates and poorer graft outcomes.<a href=\"#b52fc173-7a07-4856-90e5-5b60051115b3\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">32<\/a> Cefepime is one of the most commonly reported antimicrobials to fall into shortage, with hospitals often shifting to less suitable drugs that carry downstream consequences for antimicrobial resistance and patient outcomes.<a href=\"#b02ae624-6b9f-4b3a-b79c-8dfb5e5b8c52\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">33<\/a> Dobutamine is only one of two\u00a0inotropes (drugs used in cases of cardiogenic shock and acute heart failure) accessible in the United States.<a href=\"#a4727f40-59ea-4789-8680-1feb09543f8d\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">34<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Further, although\u00a0the\u00a0volume of direct U.S. imports from China in FDF is currently limited, it is poised\u00a0to increase as China produces more innovative\u00a0medicines\u00a0on which the United States relies.\u00a0Though the bulk of Chinese exports to the United States are in the form of KSMs and APIs, including indirect dependence from foreign manufacturers who source from China, the Chinese manufacturer is in many cases not the entity visible in the U.S. market. Rather, a U.S.-based company holds the drug label and distributes the product domestically but sources the API or the finished medication from a Chinese manufacturer under contract, sometimes without FDA authorization, such as with certain anti-obesity GLP-1 agonists. This structure can obscure the true origin of manufacturing when supply chain analyses rely on label holders\u2019 market share rather than underlying producers. The FDA recognizes and inspects the underlying manufacturer as part of its oversight, but the arrangement means that the concentration of foreign manufacturing risk could be significantly understated in conventional market estimates.<\/p>\n<p>Scenario 2: China restricts\u00a0access to raw materials\u00a0and\u00a0KSMs\u00a0to a\u00a0third\u00a0country\u00a0on which the\u00a0United States\u00a0relies for imports of APIs or FDFs,\u00a0and the United States suffers collateral damage.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Beyond direct imports, China\u2019s upstream dominance creates an additional, less visible, channel of risk: restrictions on raw materials or KSMs shipping to India or Europe could trigger U.S. shortages collaterally, even in the absence of direct trade disruption between the United States and China. Nearly 41 percent\u00a0of KSMs used in U.S.-approved APIs come solely from China and 16 percent from India.<a href=\"#e83c9669-4199-465c-8459-88c27fa9ca9c\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">35<\/a> Accordingly, much of\u00a0the\u00a0supply\u00a0of\u00a0APIs and FDFs that\u00a0the United States\u00a0imports from India or Europe for antibiotics,\u00a0analgesics, steroids, and other widely used essential medicines indirectly comes from China.\u00a0If China were to leverage\u00a0its market dominance in upstream\u00a0supply against that third country, the United States would suffer\u00a0shortages\u00a0too.\u00a0For instance, China recently imposed export controls against shipping dual-use products to Japan, after its prime minister gave public remarks on the Taiwan Strait.<a href=\"#4c417d0f-3d66-4f82-8606-b8458eae6485\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">36<\/a> That list of dual-use products includes chemicals that are also used in pharmaceutical manufacturing, including solvents, reagents, fluorinated compounds, and certain fermentation-derived intermediates. If China imposed such a policy against India, it could result in serious consequences for the United States.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Because this approach would\u00a0affect\u00a0numerous\u00a0countries and, potentially, a variety of medicines\u00a0that incorporate that KSM,\u00a0it would be a\u00a0blunt policy instrument unlikely to align with China\u2019s more targeted\u00a0past behavior.\u00a0Though some Chinese commentators have suggested leveraging the market share of Chinese API producers to serve Beijing\u2019s policy goals, even its rare-earth critical mineral restrictions, in practice, included limited carve-outs\u00a0for medical uses.<a href=\"#fdf2a368-d940-48d3-8df0-9a975f7e22e1\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">37<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Scenario 3: China restricts\u00a0a third country\u00a0from exporting API or FDF products to the United States made with raw materials or KSMs from China. \u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">China could use\u00a0global\u00a0diplomatic pressure, regulatory measures,\u00a0threats to cut off access\u00a0to its market,\u00a0and export controls to prevent\u00a0companies and\u00a0third countries\u00a0from selling targeted KSMs,\u00a0APIs, or FDFs to the United States.\u00a0China has\u00a0leveraged\u00a0such export controls on critical minerals.\u00a0The United States has deployed, with only limited success, related measures to prevent foreign government choke point suppliers\u00a0and non-U.S. companies from exporting\u00a0advanced chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment\u00a0to China. China could\u00a0seek\u00a0to do the same with pharmaceuticals, but it would require the cooperation of\u00a0other producing governments and undoubtedly spur the same all-out push for alternative sources and self-sufficiency as those\u00a0export measures\u00a0in other sectors\u00a0have.<\/p>\n<p>Scenario 4: China restricts\u00a0access\u00a0to\u00a0critical data or R&amp;D infrastructure\u00a0to U.S.\u00a0drug developers and producers.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Increasingly, first-in-human clinical\u00a0trial\u00a0activity\u00a0for\u00a0promising medicines is shifting away from the United States and Europe to China, where those trials can be conducted faster and more cheaply. China\u2019s share of global trial starts rose from 1 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2024.<a href=\"#80992a2b-4099-4425-99cf-31d2c10fb3ad\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">38<\/a> As China gains share in early stages trials and the resulting data grows, it creates a strategic dependence that could undermine U.S. leadership in translational science, and slowly choke off U.S. capacity to engage in preparedness and countermeasure development.<\/p>\n<p>How China Weaponizing U.S. Pharmaceutical Dependence Could Play Out \u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">The likely effect of a U.S. pharmaceutical supply disruption can be assessed across six dimensions: (1) how quickly the disruption reaches the market; (2) where the disruption occurs along the supply chain stages; (3) the average scale of shortages or cost increases; (4) the worst-case shortages at their peak once stockpiles are depleted and panic buying has amplified the problem; (5) the capacity to absorb the shock through excess inventory, alternative suppliers, or substitution; and (6) the time required to recover through approvals for new suppliers, restarted production, or expedited imports.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">The severity of a disruption from China choking off supplies would depend on where in the supply chain it occurred. Restrictions at central, highly upstream points are more dangerous than later-stage supply shocks because they affect all downstream production paths. Therapeutic substitutability can reduce patient impact but can also shift demand to other antibiotics, leading to new shortages and creating secondary effects. Substituting sources at any tier of the supply chains (KSM, API, FDF) requires the FDA to assess and validate new batches, stability data, regulatory filing updates, and inspection readiness; buyers cannot simply switch suppliers without FDA approval. A CFR-New England Journal of Medicine analysis shows temporary importation can mitigate certain generic shortages, but the FDA generally deploys it only after other options are exhausted, even after months of delay. In one benzathine penicillin G case, nearly nine months passed before FDA authorization.<a href=\"#d00fca65-b406-4af5-815b-e31e1d550836\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">39<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Excess inventory and time buffers could delay the impact of China-instigated supply chain disruptions but in turn create a false sense of stability and surprise effects. Contract rigidity affects whether a shock manifests as higher prices, margin compression, or allocation. Typical human behavior in a crisis\u2014over-ordering, hoarding, inflated forecasts, rationing\u2014further accelerates propagation.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Most scenarios short of complete supply shutoff usually manifest first as price increases rather than immediate shortages: upstream inputs become more expensive, scarce suppliers raise quotes, buyers bid up available volumes, and downstream firms draw down inventory while repricing. In generics, price sensitivity runs through the entire chain: API manufacturers, FDF manufacturers, wholesalers, pharmacies, hospitals, and payers often operate under competitive pricing, tendering, reimbursement limits, or fixed contracts. As a result, upstream cost inflation may not fully pass through, instead appearing as margin compression, delayed replenishment of supplies, or even the exit of manufacturers. For innovative medicines and biologics, product pricing is largely decoupled from cost of goods sold (driven by patent protection, market access, contracting, and payer dynamics), so upstream input shocks are more likely absorbed as margin impact or supply-risk management before becoming visible price changes.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">China controls about 94 percent of 6-APA (the main KSM); API manufacturing occurs in Austria, China, and India; FDF manufacturing occurs in India, the European Union, and sometimes in the United States. A simultaneous Chinese restriction on both 6-APA and amoxicillin API hits two tiers at once: non-China API manufacturers lose KSM access while FDF manufacturers lose both direct Chinese API and, over time, non-Chinese API. Under a 25 percent restriction, effective global API availability falls to roughly 80 percent (around a 20 percent deficit); under a 50 percent restriction, availability falls to roughly 60 percent (around a 40 percent deficit); and under a full ban, availability falls to about 20 percent, essentially Austria plus a small residual (around a 79\u201380 percent deficit). Because API manufacturers normally hold six months of KSM inventory, FDF manufacturers hold three to six months of API inventory, wholesalers hold thirty days, and pharmacies hold roughly fifteen days, the first signals would be API price increases, allocation, delayed replenishment, and tender failures\u2014not pharmacy-level shortages. Once buffers deplete, a threshold effect drives sudden acceleration: peak shortages would arrive roughly within 6 to 9 months after a 25 percent restriction, 5.5 to 8.5 months after a 50 percent restriction, and 4.5 to 7.5 months after a full ban, with hoarding and over-ordering capable of pulling all timelines forward.<a href=\"#7d0b116b-5742-4ecc-a49c-40443143510d\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">40<\/a><\/p>\n<p>An Archetype Approach to Understanding U.S. Pharmaceutical Dependence \u00a0<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">This report aims to create a replicable analytical policy framework\u2014the archetype model\u2014for policymakers, agencies, and researchers to apply to other\u00a0product classes that share the same root causes of dependence on China.\u00a0A one-size-fits-all approach won\u2019t work for redressing the \u201crare-earths\u2019 problem\u201d in the U.S. pharmaceutical supply chain. The root causes of dependence often differ by product class and can arise at different stages of the value chain. Policy solutions must target those particular differences to be effective. Upstream market concentration in KSMs would only be masked by downstream supply diversification. The perilously low margins for older generic pharmaceuticals create sterile manufacturing facility fragility that cannot be redressed by re-shoring or sixty-day stockpiles alone. Country-of-origin labeling (COOL) or Buy America approaches need to account for transshipment, domestic branding, and API repackaging. Research-and-development (R&amp;D) infrastructure capture reflects a systemic competitive erosion via Chinese state-backed integration and coordination that can only be addressed in kind.<\/p>\n<p>Archetype One: Reliance on China for Raw Materials and Upstream Supplies for Generic Drugs<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">The defining characteristic of this archetype is a choke point at the raw material or key starting material stage and at the intermediate level. This archetype is defined by the \u201cN-1 problem\u201d: apparent diversification at one stage often masks near-total concentration at upstream inputs \u00a0where true dependence has quietly shifted up one critical step, the \u201cminus 1.\u201d When all downstream suppliers depend on that same concentrated input, downstream diversification (at the level of APIs or FDFs) provides no protection. It is an end-to-end supply chain challenge, and policy responses need to treat it as such, by mapping upstream tiers and arranging geographic diversification of starting material sourcing with allies.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\"><a\/>Most medicines in the first archetype share a structural vulnerability. As low-cost but essential generics, these medicines no longer generate sufficient economic returns to justify domestic vertical integration. U.S. producers face structural cost disadvantages from environmental compliance, while GPOs concentrate buying power and drive a race to the bottom on price\u2014functioning as embedded subsidies for foreign production. Partial investments at the API or FDF level, without corresponding KSM capacity, leave the core vulnerability intact. Total independence from foreign sources would require an end-to-end domestic supply chain: a solution demanding high capital, lead times of five to ten years, and sustained policy commitment that market forces alone cannot produce. This dynamic\u2014low-margin generics, GPO price pressure, and shortage costs externalized onto patients rather than purchasers\u2014recurs across our four case studies in Archetype One.<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">These case studies all reflect the broader trend of supply risk moving further upstream, where dependence on essential raw materials or intermediates has become a critical vulnerability. The nature of that upstream risk varies, however: certain inputs are synthetically produced, such as fermentation-derived materials, while others are naturally harvested, such as porcine mucosa (from which heparin is derived). The cases also differ in regulatory and manufacturing complexity, including whether they involve combination APIs under Drug Enforcement Administration oversight and whether production depends on sterile injectable capabilities versus more flexible oral solid manufacturing.<\/p>\n<p>Case Study: Amoxicillin<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">Amoxicillin is the most prescribed antibiotic in the United States, with nearly sixty million prescriptions per year, treating infections across hospitals, pharmacies, and clinics.<a href=\"#8d91397a-8f91-4839-896e-772e91823ad6\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">41<\/a> It is especially critical in pediatric care and for seniors over sixty-five, who use it at rates nearly 50 percent higher than younger Americans and depend on it for routine procedures such as hip replacements and cancer surgeries.<a href=\"#a50eeda1-3763-4c82-a597-73cf94a9f7ce\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">42<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Why This Product Is a National Security Concern<\/p>\n<p class=\"rich-text type-serif-body4\">As recently as 2008, nearly all U.S.-administered amoxicillin was domestically manufactured.<a href=\"#f4c361f0-6033-476f-88f2-6965e5aed81e\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">43<\/a> Subsidized competition from Chinese and Indian generic manufacturers drove U.S. producers from 100 percent market share to 0 within twelve years.<a href=\"#96c2214e-9783-4086-81d8-66fe802ae69f\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">44<\/a> Amoxicillin now sits on both the FDA and World Health Organization (WHO) emergency medicines lists, signifying that its uninterrupted supply is considered essential to basic health-care capacity.<a href=\"#f6c4eae2-86e5-483a-8df4-37afbe51c493\" aria-label=\"Go to footnote\" data-state=\"closed\">45<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"A Brief History of the U.S. Response to Pharmaceutical Dependence on China U.S. policymakers have been concerned for&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":476435,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[114,85,46],"class_list":["post-476434","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-business","tag-business","tag-il","tag-israel"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/476434","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=476434"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/476434\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/476435"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=476434"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=476434"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=476434"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}