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<\/a>\n\t\tThen-prime minister Yitzhak Rabin exits a session of the Knesset, June 30, 1976. (State Archive\/AP)<\/p>\n
What changed? Fifty years after the July 4, 1976, surprise operation at Entebbe, a new trove of documents from the State Archive in the Prime Minister\u2019s Office has revealed the minutes of the many government meetings held during the fateful weeklong crisis.<\/p>\n
Also included are diplomatic cables, photos and handwritten notes covering everything from Israel\u2019s attempts to sway Ugandan dictator Idi Amin to a subject that may feel more familiar to the Israel of today: Attempts by the families of hostages to convince the government to cut a deal that would save their loved ones\u2019 lives.<\/p>\n
Rabin and his close circle of advisers changed tacks in real time, with the lives of dozens of their citizens in the balance<\/p>\n
The documents tell a story not of an Israeli government that secretly planned, all along, to stage a dramatic rescue under the ruse of negotiating. Rather, Rabin and his close circle of advisers \u2014 a group that would later become known as the security cabinet \u2014 changed tacks in real time, with the lives of dozens of their citizens in the balance.<\/p>\n
They first hoped for international assistance. When that wasn\u2019t forthcoming, they ambivalently, reluctantly, opted for negotiations with the terrorist hijackers, all the while trying to flatter Amin and prevent leaks to the press.<\/p>\n
\t Only days later did a risky, secret military operation become possible.<\/p>\n \u201cI do not propose this lightly,\u201d Defense Minister Shimon Peres said at a cabinet meeting on July 3, as the government was deciding to send commandos to Uganda. \u201cThis is an operation that the IDF has not experienced. This is the first operation in Israel\u2019s history outside the borders of the Middle East.\u201d<\/p>\n Then, he added, \u201cWhen comparing both risks and results, we have reached a conclusion.\u201d<\/p>\n \u2018I intend to hold the French government responsible\u2019<\/p>\n Rabin got the news of the plane\u2019s hijacking, after a stopover in Athens, in the middle of his weekly Sunday cabinet meeting on June 27, and immediately informed those in the room.<\/p>\n \u201cIt\u2019s apparently hijacked, apparently flying toward Benghazi,\u201d Rabin said of the jet. \u201cEverything is still a matter of speculation. I want to stress that [security] checking of passengers in Israel is serious, but in Athens it\u2019s less serious.\u201d<\/p>\n Shortly afterward, while still in the meeting, Rabin passed a handwritten note to his chief of staff, Eli Mizrahi, making clear that as this was an Air France plane, it was a matter for the French government to address.<\/p>\n \u201cI intend to hold the French government as the responsible party for the fate of the Israelis flying on an Air France airplane, and not to relieve the French government of this responsibility,\u201d he wrote.<\/p>\n Later in the day, Rabin for the first time assembled what he would call the \u201cspecial ministerial staff\u201d \u2014 a group that included himself, Peres, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon and three other cabinet members. The group would meet a total of 18 times during the crisis, and would evolve into what became the security cabinet.<\/p>\n \t The French president communicated to Israeli officials that France was responsible for the safety of the passengers aboard its flagship airline. By the next day the plane was in Entebbe and France was waiting for the hijackers \u2014 including members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and two Germans from the group Revolutionary Cells \u2014 to send their demands so that negotiations could begin.<\/p>\n The terrorists demanded the release of \u201cfreedom fighters\u201d held by Israel and a number of other countries, and set a deadline of July 1. But by June 30, there had been no meaningful progress. Speaking in a Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee meeting, opposition MK Shlomo Tamir pinpointed the issue: No country cared about the fate of the Israeli and Jewish passengers more than Israel.<\/p>\n \u201cWe have the duty to protect the lives of our citizens, and also those of Jews,\u201d he said. \u201cI fear that France is likely to remain the one responsible, and won\u2019t care about this past a certain point\u2026 The issue is an Israeli-Jewish one.\u201d<\/p>\n \u2018They\u2019re going to blow up the plane\u2019<\/p>\n Israeli officials brainstormed other leaders who might be able to mediate the crisis: Pope Paul VI? Henry Kissinger? And they initiated contact with the one man who, they felt, could intervene directly with the terrorists: Idi Amin.<\/p>\n Amin was no friend of Israel: In 1972, the capricious dictator had cut off relations with Jerusalem, and he trumpeted the Palestinian cause. Soon, the Israelis would learn that he was working with the hijackers.<\/p>\n \t Israel\u2019s former military attach\u00e9 in Kampala, Baruch Bar-Lev, remained on good terms with Amin, and the government tasked him with reaching out \u2014 but only as a private citizen, so that it wouldn\u2019t seem like Israel was negotiating directly.<\/p>\n \u201cHow are you, my friend?\u201d Amin said, according to a Hebrew transcript of the June 30 call, the first of five between the two men during the crisis. Bar-Lev soon began appealing to the dictator\u2019s ego:<\/p>\n \u201cYou have a great opportunity to go down in history as a great peacemaker,\u201d he said. \u201cIf you free the people, you\u2019ll go down in history as a very great man.\u201d<\/p>\n Amin was receptive, but responded with a warning: The deadline was approaching, and the hostages were in danger.<\/p>\n \u201cThey say that if the Israeli government doesn\u2019t respond to their demands, they\u2019re going to blow up the French plane and all of the hostages at 12:00 noon GMT tomorrow,\u201d Amin said. \u201cYour government must do everything possible to free these hostages.\u201d<\/p>\n He said he spoke directly with the Israeli hostages. They were \u201cvery happy,\u201d he claimed.<\/p>\n The hostage families<\/p>\n As the days wore on, government officials reiterated that negotiating with terrorists contravened Israeli policy. A Foreign Ministry cable from the evening of June 29 said that Israel\u2019s position hadn\u2019t changed: It \u201cdoes not capitulate to extortion.\u201d<\/p>\n Around the same time as that cable went out, however, a telegram arrived for Rabin.<\/p>\n \u201cIn exchange for corpses we freed terrorists,\u201d it read, a reference to a 1975 exchange with Egypt for fallen IDF soldiers. \u201cBetter to do so in exchange for the living. Human life outweighs principles, and there are other ways to fight or prevent terror.\u201d<\/p>\n It was signed, \u201cThe hostage families.\u201d<\/p>\n \t The next day, Transit Minister Gad Yaakobi met with the families of the hostages, where they repeated the same demand. That evening, Rabin had his own meeting with editors of Israel\u2019s newspapers.<\/p>\n Among his requests: Don\u2019t publish articles about the hostage families\u2019 outreach to the French government. Publicity, he said, could weaken Israel\u2019s position. But he told his ministers he was sympathetic to the loved ones\u2019 pressure campaign.<\/p>\n \u201cThese are family members,\u201d he said. \u201cYou can\u2019t expect them to act differently.\u201d<\/p>\n In any case, officials realized that with the July 1 deadline approaching, they would need to do something. \u201cEven no decision is a decision,\u201d Rabin said at a June 30 meeting. And a military rescue operation still felt unrealistic.<\/p>\n \u201cThe IDF has the duty to protect every Israeli, wherever they are,\u201d Gur wrote in a note to Rabin on the night of the 30th. \u201cIf the IDF is unable to do that, we must save the Israelis. So if all of the efforts and approaches don\u2019t succeed, the chief of staff recommends giving in to the terrorists\u2019 demands.\u201d<\/p>\n Zero hour<\/p>\n By the morning of July 1, the terrorists\u2019 2 p.m. deadline was approaching, with their threat to blow up a plane full of hostages hanging over the ministers\u2019 heads. Before they voted on whether to enter negotiations, Peres sounded a word of caution, predicting that giving in to the hijackers\u2019 demands would have dangerous ripple effects for Israel.<\/p>\n \u201cWe need to be worried about the fate of people in the future, about what will happen to the State of Israel and its position on the subjects of hijacking, terror, etc.,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n \t But Rabin backed entering into talks, using language strikingly similar to the telegram from the hostage families.<\/p>\n I\u2019m not ready to explain to the Israeli public, or anyone else, why we can conduct an exchange for corpses, but not for live people<\/p>\n \u201cI\u2019m not ready, in light of this, to explain to the Israeli public, or anyone else, why we can conduct an exchange for corpses, but not for live people,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n At a 10:00 a.m. meeting, with just four hours to go, Peres said, \u201cThe zero hour is coming, and we don\u2019t know exactly what will happen. We feel that a great effort must be made to break the ultimatum.\u201d<\/p>\n Amin was to be notified that Israel was ready to negotiate via the French. Shortly afterward, the terrorists announced that they would free the non-Israeli hostages.<\/p>\n \u2018The PFLP sees no logic\u2019<\/p>\n By July 2, two things had happened that turned a military operation from fanciful to credible: The first was that Israel quickly hit a roadblock in the talks. The PFLP, communicating via the Somali ambassador, rejected Israel\u2019s overture to discuss the list of terrorists to be released.<\/p>\n \u201cThe PFLP. sees no logic in the requests of the Israeli government to release all detainees in exchange for a certain number of freedom fighters,\u201d the message read.<\/p>\n Also, by July 2, it became clear that the hijackers\u2019 decision to release the non-Israeli passengers meant that Israel had a new source of information regarding where the remaining hostages were held and how to get there.<\/p>\n \t In a meeting on July 2, Gur discussed the possibility of a surprise military operation to rescue the Israelis held at Entebbe.<\/p>\n But it wasn\u2019t a sure thing: One problem was that such an operation necessitated a government decision, and the next day was Shabbat. Any logistical complication because ministers wouldn\u2019t be able to attend the meeting could compromise the operation, Peres argued, warning, \u201cIf we lose the advantage of surprise, we\u2019re sending the boys on a suicide mission.\u201d<\/p>\n Shortly afterward, Rabin issued a directive: Prepare a military operation \u2014 but only as a secondary option to the main track of negotiations.<\/p>\n \u201cJust like I\u2019m in favor of all the [military] preparations that can be done, I suggest to ourselves that we view this as secondary to the main effort of negotiations over some exchange process,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n \u2018The entire operation was built on surprise\u2019<\/p>\n By the following day, circumstances had changed. Ministers were instructed to stay in Tel Aviv for Shabbat, to discuss what Rabin called a \u201cweighty decision.\u201d In the morning, Gur presented a plan for an operation with much improved chances. Peres encouraged the ministers to approve it, despite the risks.<\/p>\n Hopefully, no one will be killed, and I\u2019ll see the finger of God in that<\/p>\n \u201cI certainly and clearly assume that we\u2019ll be risking the lives of civilians,\u201d he said. \u201cI have no doubt in my heart regarding that. Hopefully, no one will be killed, and I\u2019ll see the finger of God in that.\u201d<\/p>\n Then he added, in reference to the two German terrorists, \u201cThis image, of a miserable German man and woman standing with weapons pointed at Jews \u2014 I can\u2019t shake it off. There are also emotional matters, and I know we\u2019re taking on a very heavy responsibility.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/a>
\n\t\tAn Israeli prays at the Western Wall in Jerusalem for the hijacked hostages being held in Uganda, July 2, 1976. (AP Photo)<\/p>\n<\/a>
\n\t\tUgandan President Idi Amin, wearing hat, talks on July 4, 1976 in Nairobi, Kenya with several hostages who were released by pro Palestine hijackers at Uganda\u2019s Entebbe airport earlier in the week. On Sunday, Israel commandos, in a precision raid, struck the airport and freed remaining hostages who had been held for the past week. (AP Photo\/africapix)<\/p>\n<\/a>
\n\t\tPresident Idi Amin of Uganda speaks at a news conference during a visit to Damsacus, Syria, on Oct. 16, 1973. (AP Photo, File)<\/p>\n<\/a>
\n\t\tRelatives of Israeli passengers aboard the hijacked Air France plane in Uganda arrive at the Tel Aviv office of then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, July 1 1976. (AP\/Max Nash)<\/p>\n<\/a>
\n\t\tSome of the 101 hostages freed by pro-Palestinians who hijacked an Air France plane take refreshments at Orly Airport, Paris, July 2, 1976, as they arrive from Entebbe Airport, Uganda, where 110 hostages, mostly Israelis, are still held. (AP\/Michel Lipchitz)<\/p>\n<\/a>
\n\t\tChief of Staff Lt. Gen. Mordechai \u201cMotta\u201d Gur gestures at a press conference in Tel Aviv, on July 8, 1976, during which he gave details of the Entebbe airport raid. (AP Photo\/Nash)<\/p>\n