Over the past few months, we have witnessed unprecedented success and cooperation between the US, Israel, and Gulf states, especially with regard to missile defense. Facing renewed retaliatory strikes between the US and Iran, what are the key lessons Israel should take away from its air and missile defense operations against Iran and its proxies \u2014 Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis?\u00a0\n<\/p>\n
My overall assessment is that Israel\u2019s missile defense capabilities performed effectively over the past two years of hostilities, blunting the vast majority of air and missile attacks against the country. But there are several warning signs Israel needs to weigh as it plans for the future \u2014 most importantly, whether it can continue to count on the same level of US support that carried it through the run-up to and duration of the current conflict.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s Missile Defense Architecture\u00a0\n<\/p>\n
In 1991, Israel was repeatedly attacked by Iraq with ballistic missiles in an unprovoked assault. The\u00a0objective\u00a0was not military but political. Iraq\u2019s leader at the time, Saddam Hussein, believed that striking Israel with ballistic missiles would provoke an Israeli entry into the war to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait \u2014 and that Israel\u2019s involvement would in turn force the coalition\u2019s Arab members to withdraw, fracturing the coalition\u2019s ability to prosecute the war effectively.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n
The strategy came close to working. As ballistic missiles began falling on Israeli cities, the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was strongly inclined to retaliate. That it did not is likely attributable to several factors, including intense political pressure from the United States and, critically, the deployment of US Patriot PAC-2<\/a>\u00a0batteries to Israel. Although the Patriot PAC-2 interceptor was not originally designed to\u00a0engage\u00a0ballistic missiles, it was\u00a0modified\u00a0to\u00a0provide\u00a0a limited capability against them. As one analyst has\u00a0observed,<\/a> the deployment of US Patriot systems to Israel following Iraq\u2019s initial Scud attacks on Tel Aviv helped stabilize an already volatile situation.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n At the war\u2019s conclusion, Israel drew two lasting lessons. First, it needed a domestically designed missile defense system tailored to its specific threat environment \u2014 the war had exposed how limited Israel\u2019s own anti-missile capabilities were, and how dependent the country had been on the US military to provide Patriot interceptors for its defense. Israel did not want to find itself in that position again. With substantial technical and financial support from the United States, it spent the next three decades building a layered missile defense architecture capable of intercepting the full spectrum of missile threats it faced. That architecture includes:\u00a0\n<\/p>\n The\u00a0Arrow family<\/a>\u00a0of interceptors (Arrow 2 and Arrow 3) and associated radars, designed to intercept medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, including\u00a0exo-atmospheric threats.\u00a0<\/p>\n David\u2019s Sling<\/a>, designed to intercept\u00a0aircraft, drones, tactical ballistic missiles, medium- to long-range rockets, and cruise missiles at ranges of\u00a0roughly 40\u00a0to 300 km (25 to 190 miles).\u00a0<\/p>\n Well before the wars with Iran, Iron Dome had already accumulated extensive operational experience, intercepting thousands of short-range rockets launched by Hamas from Gaza and Hezbollah from Lebanon.\u00a0With the exception of\u00a0Iron Beam, which\u00a0remains\u00a0in development, every system listed above was fielded in significant numbers by the time Iran\u2019s first direct air and missile strikes on Israel occurred in 2024.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n The second lasting lesson was the value of close operational coordination with the US military. As I noted in a previous article, more than 25 years of joint exercises between the United States and Israel \u2014 most notably the Juniper Cobra<\/a> series \u2014 built the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to rapidly deploy US missile defense capabilities to Israel and integrate them into Israel\u2019s own systems, enabling a coordinated, unified defense rather than two parallel ones operating side by side.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Key Lessons So Far\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Beginning in April 2024, Israel has engaged in a series of air and missile defense operations against Iran and its proxies. Based on those engagements, here is my\u00a0initial\u00a0assessment of the key lessons learned so far \u2014 with the\u00a0caveat\u00a0that this understanding will continue to evolve as more data becomes available.\u00a0Let\u2019s\u00a0start with the positives.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n First,\u00a0Israel\u2019s\u00a0layered\u00a0missile defense architecture performed well. Though some drones and ballistic missiles penetrated Israel\u2019s defenses, every element of its layered architecture appears to have performed extremely well against the volume of drones and missiles launched by Iran and its proxies. We don\u2019t have precise figures on the interception rate, but most public estimates put it around 90 percent \u2014 an impressive result by any measure. Deep credit is owed to the Israeli political, military, and industry leaders who built this system, and to their US counterparts who worked alongside them. This is clearly an investment that has paid off.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Second, US-Israel operational cooperation paid dividends. Three decades of military-to-military cooperation have also paid off. Through joint exercises like Juniper Cobra, the two countries built a template for rapidly deploying US missile defense capabilities to Israel and integrating them into Israel\u2019s own defense plan. As I\u2019ve noted elsewhere, this allowed American and Israeli forces to fight as a single integrated system rather than as separate actors dividing up the same battlespace.\u00a0\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Third,\u00a0European and Arab partners helped as well. Though less prominent than the US-Israel relationship, several other partners contributed to Israel\u2019s defense against Iranian air and missile attacks in 2024, including Britain, France, and Jordan.\u00a0\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Fourth, missile defense has become a diplomatic tool for Israel.\u00a0An often-overlooked dimension of this story is how Israel has used its missile defense\u00a0expertise\u00a0to strengthen relationships with Gulf Arab states. According to\u00a0numerous\u00a0press\u00a0reports<\/a>, Israel deployed troops and equipment to the United Arab Emirates to help defend against Iranian drones and missiles.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n While the lessons of the past two years have\u00a0largely been\u00a0positive, there are also several red flags Israeli officials need to weigh.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Fifth\u00a0is the interceptor inventory problem. Although Israeli and partner defenses have intercepted\u00a0the vast majority of\u00a0Iranian drones and missiles,\u00a0according to press reports<\/a>, the US intelligence community assesses that Iran still retains large stockpiles of both in hardened underground facilities that have survived repeated Israeli and US strikes. That raises an uncomfortable question: does Israel have enough interceptors to sustain a prolonged conflict with Iran? \u00a0\n<\/p>\n Based on what Ukraine has learned the hard way with its limited supply of\u00a0Patriot PAC-3<\/a>\u00a0missiles,\u00a0the answer is\u00a0probably not. Going forward, Israel will need to grow its interceptor inventory \u2014 through a combination of increased production of existing systems and investment in\u00a0new technologies\u00a0like directed energy that can help break the missile defense \u201ccost curve\u201d problem. The encouraging news is that Israel\u2019s military\u00a0appears to understand\u00a0this: through Iron Dome and Iron Beam, the Israeli\u00a0Defense\u00a0Forces (IDF)\u00a0have\u00a0already begun developing a response to this emerging threat that is both cost-effective and scalable.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Sixth,\u00a0Israel\u2019s adversaries are adapting as well. As I noted in a recent\u00a0article<\/a>, Hezbollah \u2014 drawing lessons directly from the war in Ukraine \u2014 has deployed fiber-optic drones against Israeli forces in Lebanon, accounting for the vast majority of IDF casualties there since the ceasefire. The lesson is clear: Israel will need to track global developments in air and missile defense, particularly the war in Ukraine, and rapidly evolve not just its systems but its doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to stay ahead of an adaptive threat.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n And the final area of concern is the durability of continued US support. American financial support has been critical to the development of Israel\u2019s missile defense program; without it, it\u2019s questionable whether Israel could have built and fielded the layered capability it has today. The same is true of operational cooperation between the two militaries. As a recent Washington Post article<\/a>\u00a0reported, the United States expended over 200\u00a0Terminal\u00a0High\u00a0Altitude\u00a0Area\u00a0Defense (THAAD)<\/a>\u00a0interceptors \u2014 roughly half the Pentagon\u2019s total inventory \u2014 along with more than 100 Standard\u00a0Missile-3\u00a0(SM-3)<\/a>\u00a0and Standard\u00a0Missile-6\u00a0(SM-6)<\/a>\u00a0interceptors defending Israel, while Israeli forces fired fewer than 190 of their own. Given America\u2019s global commitments, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, and ongoing strains on its defense industrial base, will the United States be able to sustain this level of operational support for Israel going forward? That is a serious and open question.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n There is also the matter of continued political support for Israel among the American public and its elected officials, especially within the Democratic Party. For 50 years, there has been strong, bipartisan support for helping Israel develop missile defense and other capabilities. That bipartisan consensus\u00a0now appears to be\u00a0eroding.\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Political warning signs are emerging in Washington. On April 15, 2026, the Senate considered two Joint Resolutions of Disapproval, introduced by Senator Bernie Sanders, that would have blocked nearly $450 million in arms sales to Israel \u2014 a bulldozer sale and a sale of 12,000 1,000-pound bombs. Both measures failed, defeated by unified Republican opposition. But a majority of the Senate\u2019s 47-member Democratic caucus voted in favor of blocking at least one of the sales \u2014 40 senators on the bulldozer resolution, 36 on the bombs resolution \u2014 more than double the level of Democratic support such measures received as recently as 2024. Neither resolution passed, but the trajectory is unmistakable, and it raises a real question for Israeli planners: can Israel continue to count on the same depth of US political and military support it has relied on for the past three decades?\u00a0\n<\/p>\n Conclusion\u00a0\n<\/p>\n The events of the past two years have proven that Israel\u2019s investment in layered missile defense has paid off significantly, saving potentially thousands of civilian lives. That system was built on strong financial, technical, and operational support from the United States. To stay ahead of the threat, Israel will need to do several things: expand its missile defense interceptor inventory, develop\u00a0new technologies\u00a0to address the inventory and cost-curve problem, and continuously review and integrate lessons from other conflicts, particularly Ukraine. But\u00a0above all, it\u00a0will need to find a way to preserve the strength of its alliance and partnership with the United States. The political challenge ahead may prove harder to solve than the technical one.\n\t\t<\/p>\n \n\t\t\t\t\tFrank Rose is a senior national security leader with more than 30 years of experience shaping US defense, nuclear deterrence, outer space policy, and foreign affairs at the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, as well as on Capitol Hill. His career has focused on advancing US and allied security in an era of accelerating technological and geopolitical change\u2014whether through arms control negotiations, strengthening space and missile defense cooperation, or overseeing critical defense nuclear and cybersecurity operations.
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\nAs Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, he helped lead US engagement with Russia, China, and allies on strategic stability, nuclear deterrence, and the future of space security. He directed US efforts to develop international norms of responsible behavior in outer space and worked to ensure that America and its allies retained a competitive edge in this increasingly contested domain.
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\nAt the National Nuclear Security Administration, he managed physical security for the US defense nuclear enterprise and directed agency-wide cybersecurity, protecting some of the nation\u2019s most sensitive assets. Earlier in his career, he held senior positions at the Pentagon and on the House Armed Services and Intelligence Committees.
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\nToday, he leads Chevalier Strategic Advisors, where he helps companies, investors, and organizations navigate the intersection of geopolitics, emerging technologies, and strategic risk. His advisory work focuses on how innovations in space, missile defense, AI, and autonomous systems are reshaping global security and competition. He also writes regularly for publications like Defense News, Defense One, and the Lowy Institute, sharing insights on the future of defense technology, space security, and geopolitics.\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Over the past few months, we have witnessed unprecedented success and cooperation between the US, Israel, and Gulf…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":533701,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[54,86,85,87,46,155681,88,43],"class_list":["post-533700","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-israel","tag-donald-trump","tag-hezbollah","tag-il","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-israel-at-war","tag-lebanon","tag-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/533700","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=533700"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/533700\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/533701"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=533700"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=533700"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=533700"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}