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Paramount Skydance takeover bid of Warner Bros. (Photo by Michael Yanow\/NurPhoto via Getty Images)<\/p>\n
NurPhoto via Getty Images<\/p>\n
Washington cleared the deal. A California court paused it. Brussels attached conditions. Britain may rewrite its media law to review it.<\/p>\n
Both parties to the largest media transaction of the decade are now waiting. Only one of them will pay for it.<\/p>\n
The Paramount Warner Deal Delay Has A Price <\/p>\n
Paramount Skydance Corporation has agreed not to close<\/a> its acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery until five days after a ruling on the merits, or June 1, 2027, whichever comes first. That followed a temporary restraining order<\/a> secured four days earlier by twelve state attorneys general.<\/p>\n The delay is not simply procedural. It is priced.<\/p>\n Under the merger agreement, Warner shareholders receive $31 a share in cash. If the deal has not closed after September 30, additional consideration begins accruing daily at a rate equivalent to 25 cents a share every 90 days<\/a>, payable when the transaction eventually completes. <\/p>\n Across WBD\u2019s outstanding shares that is roughly $650 million a quarter, or about $7 million a day. A wait until next June would add something close to $1.7 billion to the purchase price.<\/p>\n Behind that sits a larger number. If the transaction fails under specified regulatory circumstances, Paramount could owe WBD a $7 billion regulatory termination fee<\/a>. <\/p>\n Larry Ellison and his revocable trust have jointly and severally guaranteed that fee, along with $45.72 billion of the merger consideration and the $2.8 billion Paramount already paid Netflix on Warner\u2019s behalf when Warner took the higher offer. Warner, for its part, would owe Paramount $3 billion if it were the one to walk away.<\/p>\n The timing was not lost on the court. In granting the restraining order it recorded that the companies had conceded they would incur no carrying costs from a delayed merger until the end of September, and found they would suffer no apparent near-term harm from waiting.<\/p>\n Who Pays For The Delay: Warner or Paramount?<\/p>\n That structure explains a great deal about how the two companies have behaved since the lawsuit.<\/p>\n Paramount has forcefully argued that the states\u2019 challenge is disconnected from the modern media market and that delay serves large technology platforms rather than consumers.<\/p>\n Warner has been comparatively quiet. It does not need to speak. Its position is written into the contract, which converts every additional month of regulatory argument into a higher price for its shareholders and a guaranteed payment if the whole thing collapses.<\/p>\n One company is buying time. The other is selling it.<\/p>\n Four Regulators, Four Different Markets<\/p>\n The difficulty is that the clock runs against a process no party controls. Four authorities are reviewing this transaction, but they are not measuring the same source of media power.<\/p>\n On June 12, the Justice Department closed an eight-month investigation<\/a> that had drawn more than two million documents from over 80 custodians. <\/p>\n It found the deal “not likely to result in harm to competition or American consumers” in three named markets: streaming video on demand, linear television and the development, production and distribution of films for theatrical release.<\/p>\n On July 20, a federal court in California reached the opposite preliminary conclusion about the third of those markets. Its finding rested on Paramount\u2019s anticipated 27% share<\/a> of wide-release theatrical distribution and the concentration the merger would produce, which the court held sufficient to presume a likely violation.<\/p>\n Brussels was looking at something narrower again. Its conditional clearance on July 22<\/a> is not addressed to streaming scale or theatrical share. It requires Paramount to exit United International Pictures, the European film distribution venture it shares with Universal.<\/p>\n Britain\u2019s Media Law Has Not Caught Up<\/p>\n Britain is doing the hardest thing of the four, because the category it wants to examine is not yet in its statute.<\/p>\n On June 30, Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy told Parliament<\/a> she was minded to intervene under the Enterprise Act 2002 on two public interest grounds. One is conventional, covering plurality of views in news media, which here means CNN International and Channel 5 arriving under a single owner.<\/p>\n The other concerns the number of owners controlling on-demand programming services, and that consideration is not currently specified in section 58 of the Act. The legislation, as Nandy put it, “does not cover the effect of a merger on streaming or video-on-demand services.” She said she would introduce secondary legislation to change it.<\/p>\n That places a British parliamentary calendar inside an American merger timetable.<\/p>\n