{"id":594698,"date":"2026-08-24T18:14:09","date_gmt":"2026-08-24T18:14:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/594698\/"},"modified":"2026-08-24T18:14:09","modified_gmt":"2026-08-24T18:14:09","slug":"how-syrias-skies-are-becoming-a-new-israel-turkey-battleground","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/594698\/","title":{"rendered":"How Syria’s skies are becoming a new Israel-Turkey battleground"},"content":{"rendered":"

On 18 August, Israeli fighter jets struck a northwestern Syrian airfield<\/a> eight times, with Tel Aviv claiming it had pre-empted a Turkish military deployment there.<\/p>\n

While the raid did not result in a clash between the two powerful militaries<\/a>, it nevertheless demonstrated once again how Syria essentially has no control over its airspace.<\/p>\n

The airstrikes hit Syria\u2019s Abu al-Duhur Air Base, causing damage but no casualties. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani said<\/a> that Turkish military officers visited the site days before the strike. Turkey denied that any delegation was at the base before or during the attack<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Israel claimed Turkey was \u201con the verge of breaching\u201d the \u201cstatus quo in security matters\u201d by deploying troops, with Ankara, in turn, describing Israel\u2019s actions as an \u201cunacceptable\u201d and \u201creckless\u201d threat to regional peace and stability.<\/p>\n

Israel previously bombed three airbases in central Syria<\/a> in April 2025 shortly after Turkey scoped them for potentially deploying forces.<\/p>\n

All of these incidents highlight how Syria\u2019s airspace, far from being under its sovereign control, is being contested by its two powerful neighbours<\/a> who both have large American-equipped air forces.<\/p>\n

While Israel appears predominant for now, Turkey may seek to incrementally put constraints on its rival\u2019s aerial supremacy over its southern neighbour.<\/p>\n

The battle over Syria’s airspace<\/p>\n

\u201cThe pressure on Israel\u2019s freedom of action in Syria appears to be increasing, even if it has not yet produced a decisive constraint,\u201d Muaz Al Abdullah, Middle East Research Manager at the non-profit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

He noted that the Trump administration has signalled an effort to broaden the Abraham Accords to include Syria \u201cwhile reducing the scope of conflicts\u201d involving Israel, and the US by extension, in the Middle East. \u201cThat diplomatic backdrop coincides with a visible change on the ground,\u201d Abdullah said.<\/p>\n

ACLED data shows a notable decline in Israeli airstrikes in Syria<\/a> since August 2025. Abdullah assesses that this might mean the \u201coperational window\u201d Israel enjoyed since the former regime of Bashar Al-Assad collapsed in December 2024 is beginning to narrow.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe broader picture, however, is more mixed: Israeli incursions and violence against civilians have continued in uneven but persistent patterns,\u201d Abdullah told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

While Israel appears predominant for now, Turkey may seek to incrementally put constraints on its rival\u2019s aerial supremacy in Syria. [Getty]<\/p>\n

\u201cThe shift suggests that Israel may be relying more heavily on ground incursions and other forms of pressure to meet its immediate security objectives,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n

\u201cAirstrikes, by contrast, appear to be reserved for moments when those measures are deemed insufficient, as reflected in strikes against Abu al-Duhur, T4, Tadmor, and Hama airbases.\u201d<\/p>\n

Replacing Russia’s role?<\/p>\n

Before the dramatic, free-fall collapse of the brutal Assad regime, Russia officially controlled much of Syria\u2019s airspace<\/a> around regime-controlled areas and bombed opposition-held regions like Idlib.<\/p>\n

Shortly after Russia intervened in Syria\u2019s civil war in September 2015, it established a deconfliction mechanism with Israel, allowing the Israeli Air Force to continue striking suspected Iranian assets in the war-torn country.<\/p>\n

US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack said after Israel\u2019s latest strike that the US is working on a similar mechanism between Israel, Turkey, and Syria to reduce the risk of clashes<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Suleyman Ozeren, a lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, doesn\u2019t believe this necessarily indicates that Turkey is replacing Russia\u2019s pre-2024 role in Syria or will ever replace it.<\/p>\n

\u201cUnlike Russia, Turkey, at least for now, does not appear capable of deterring Israel from carrying out military incursions and strikes inside Syria,\u201d Ozeren told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

\u201cIsrael\u2019s decision to bomb Abu al-Duhur Air Base, located relatively close to the Turkish-Syrian border, sends a clear message to both the (Syrian President Ahmed) al-Sharaa government and Ankara,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n

\u201cAlthough Turkey responded to the incident with a relatively restrained protest, the strike itself is a troubling indication of how quickly tensions between Israel and Turkey could escalate.\u201d<\/p>\n

Deconfliction and de-escalation<\/p>\n

Kristin Ronzi, a Middle East and North Africa analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE, says the Turkish-Israeli deconfliction mechanism has already helped de-escalate tensions between the two countries in Syria and \u201cmitigate the risk\u201d of miscalculation.<\/p>\n

\u201cAs such, Turkey has maintained significant influence over Syrian airspace in the north, while Israel has influence in the south,\u201d Ronzi told The New Arab.<\/p>\n

\u201cEven so, the early 18 August Israeli airstrikes against Abu al-Duhur military base in northwestern Syria indicate that Israel is able to extend its operations further into Syria.\u201d<\/p>\n

Turkey has maintained significant influence over Syrian airspace in the north, and Damascus is likely to turn to Ankara for help in any attempt to rebuild the country\u2019s air force. [Getty]<\/p>\n

She noted that Barrack\u2019s description of the Israeli strikes as \u201cunnecessary escalation\u201d indicates a limited US tolerance for Israeli airstrikes in Syria in light of warming US-Syria ties<\/a> and concerns over \u201cTurkish-Israeli frictions\u201d.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Trump administration will likely tolerate Israel\u2019s military presence in southern Syria and sporadic ground incursions,\u201d Ronzi said. \u201cBut the United States will likely pressure Israel to restrict airstrikes, especially against targets that do not pose a national security threat and risk elevating Syrian-Israeli tensions,\u201d the analyst added.<\/p>\n

\u201cSyria will rhetorically reject Israeli violations of its airspace; Syria will be unwilling and unable to effectively control its airspace.\u201d<\/p>\n

ACLED\u2019s Abdullah expects that the present status quo of Israel dominating Syria\u2019s southern and central airspace without \u201cdirect contestation\u201d with Turkey in central Syria, where there are overlapping areas of influence, will hold.<\/p>\n

He recalled Israel\u2019s airstrikes against central Syrian airbases<\/a> in April 2025 to deter Turkey from establishing any presence.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe recent strike on Abu al-Duhur does not necessarily represent a contest for dominance between Israel and Turkey in northern Syria,\u201d he said. \u201cIt is better understood as a matter of undeclared areas of influence between the two sides, alongside Israeli political objectives tied to the domestic situation inside Israel,\u201d Abdullah added.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\u201cAt the same time, where Turkish and Israeli influence in Syria begins and ends is a separate question from Israel\u2019s deterrence strategy of preventing Syria from acquiring an effective, modern air force. That strategy is also one of the reasons behind the Abu al-Duhur strike.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ronzi believes Israel will likely reject any Turkish efforts to expand its military influence<\/a> any further in central Syria.<\/p>\n

\u201cEfforts to enhance Syria\u2019s air defence systems would likely be a red line for Israel and Israel would likely obstruct any such efforts, including potentially through pre-emptive airstrikes as Israel has previously done,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n

Dreams of a new Syrian air force<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s post-Assad airstrikes<\/a> destroyed much of what was left of the old regime\u2019s Russian-built air defences and antiquated air force, including its most advanced fighter jets, the Soviet-era MiG-29.<\/p>\n

Syria still has some less advanced flyable jets, including Czech-built L-39 light attack aircraft, two of which performed a flyby<\/a> in a July graduation ceremony for air force cadets, and vintage Soviet-era Su-22s, two of which were spotted over Idlib this August. Israel opposes Syria reconstituting its air force<\/a> and air defence.<\/p>\n

Israel was even concerned that the installation of an HTRS-100 Air Traffic Control Radar System built by Turkey\u2019s Aselsan at Damascus International Airport in January could challenge its air supremacy over Syria.<\/p>\n

Ronzi noted that while the HTRS-100 has \u201ccommercial and civilian benefits,\u201d it nonetheless \u201craised Israeli concerns\u201d that it could constrain its military operations.<\/p>\n

While Turkey might be able to support \u201climited Syrian air defence infrastructure,\u201d Abdullah predicts that Israel is likely to \u201cdraw a clear line\u201d around any capability that could give Damascus any \u201cmeaningful independent control\u201d over its skies.<\/p>\n

\u201cIsrael\u2019s defence doctrine has increasingly rested on keeping neighbouring states unable to threaten it militarily,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

Analysts tell The New Arab that without meaningful US intervention, tensions between Israel and Turkey could escalate further. [Getty]<\/p>\n

\u201cIn that context, Israel may tolerate Turkey\u2019s deployment of the HTRS-100 radar system at Damascus International Airport, but it is expected to resist any further steps that would allow Syrian forces to own or operate effective air capabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ozeren noted that maintaining control over Syrian airspace remains a \u201ckey security objective\u201d for Israel that increasingly conflicts with Turkey\u2019s ambitions to expand its influence and presence<\/a> on the ground in that country.<\/p>\n

\u201cSyrian airspace, therefore, is likely to become a major arena in which the competing objectives of Israel and Turkey are tested,\u201d he said. \u201cWithout meaningful US intervention, tensions between Israel and Turkey could escalate further.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cIf this competition becomes prolonged, Damascus may eventually seek a more formidable external partner capable of balancing these pressures,\u201d he added. \u201cIn that context, a renewed reliance on Russia, though seemingly implausible today, could become a more viable option in the near future.\u201d<\/p>\n

ACLED\u2019s Abdullah anticipates that Damascus is likely to turn to Ankara for help in any attempt to rebuild the country\u2019s air force. The expanding partnership between the two makes such cooperation plausible. Turkey could provide pilot training, aircraft, and technical support.<\/p>\n

\u201cRecent developments suggest that Syria is already preparing for that possibility,\u201d he said. \u201cThe graduation of more than 1,000 non-commissioned officers from the Syrian Air Force Academy points to a broader effort to restore the country\u2019s air arm.\u201d<\/p>\n

However, what type of aircraft Syria might seek from Turkey remains uncertain. Furthermore, any procurement decision Damascus ultimately makes will likely be shaped by financial constraints and red lines imposed by Israel.<\/p>\n

\u201cSyria may also choose to invest more heavily in unmanned systems rather than trying to rebuild a conventional fighter fleet from the ground up,\u201d Abdullah told The New Arab. \u201cTurkey has a clear advantage in drones, and Syrian forces already have experience that Ankara could help develop,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n

\u201cSuch a strategy would allow Damascus to challenge Israeli dominance indirectly, without attempting to match Israel in the manned-fighter arena.\u201d<\/p>\n

RANE\u2019s Ronzi recalled that Israel\u2019s ferocious attacks<\/a> on weapons caches and the remnants of Assad\u2019s military following the regime collapse significantly degraded any new military threat his successor can pose to Israel.<\/p>\n

\u201cRebuilding the Syrian Air Force is not likely to be a near-term priority for the interim Syrian government as it faces numerous domestic threats, including the Islamic State, as well as the task of developing new state institutions, over time,\u201d Ronzi said.<\/p>\n

Syria will probably attempt to buy new aircraft to improve its military capabilities, most likely from Turkey.<\/p>\n

\u201cEven though Israel would maintain a qualitative military edge over any Syrian air force, Israel will be wary of any Syrian effort to rebuild its air force and concerned about the potential that it could eventually be used against Israel,\u201d Ronzi added.<\/p>\n

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in the Middle East who writes extensively about the region’s affairs, conflicts, and politics<\/p>\n

Follow him on Twitter:\u00a0@pauliddon<\/a><\/p>\n

Edited by Charlie Hoyle<\/p>\n