{"id":619085,"date":"2026-09-17T16:40:16","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T16:40:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/619085\/"},"modified":"2026-09-17T16:40:16","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T16:40:16","slug":"africas-red-sea-states-face-growing-risks-as-houthi-rebels-expand-their-reach","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/619085\/","title":{"rendered":"Africa\u2019s Red Sea states face growing risks as Houthi rebels expand their reach"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Houthi takeover<\/a> of parts of the Red Sea gives the armed group a new platform to challenge global shipping<\/a>. The group has taken over the port of Mocha, the island of Mayyun, and the Zuqar and Hanish archipelago about 160km north of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait<\/a>. These areas were previously controlled by Yemeni government forces. <\/p>\n

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait<\/a> is a narrow maritime chokepoint roughly 32km wide. Lying between the Arabian Peninsula to the north-east and the Horn of Africa to the south-west, it directly links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n

This geography matters. Mayyun Island, for example, divides a waterway that is used by international shipping<\/a>. Historically, this passage accounts for about 12% of global trade<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The African side of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait hasn\u2019t been taken over by the Houthis. But the group\u2019s September 2026 advance<\/a> has serious economic and security implications for Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea, with the potential to escalate existing conflicts in Somalia<\/a> and Sudan<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Houthis<\/a> are an Iran-aligned armed movement that controls much of Yemen, and has been fighting the country\u2019s internationally recognised government since seizing the capital in 2014<\/a>.<\/p>\n

I have studied global maritime geopolitics and security<\/a>, including issues involving the Red Sea, for more than two decades. In my view, the Houthi threat is not just a logistical one. It also poses a strategic danger to Africa\u2019s Red Sea states<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The African shoreline is suddenly much more valuable to outsiders who want to monitor, contain or outflank the waterway opposite them. The Houthis now occupy armed posts around the strait, bringing the threat closer to the critical shipping corridor.<\/p>\n

Read more:
\n The Houthis have further tightened their grip on the Red Sea. Here\u2019s what it could mean for the world<\/a><\/p>\n

As it stands, an Iran-backed non-state armed group<\/a> may now be able to deploy missiles, mines and fast-attack craft along an extended length of the eastern Red Sea. At the same time, Iran retains the ability to block the Strait of Hormuz<\/a>. <\/p>\n

This raises the risk of simultaneous disruption at two important maritime chokepoints, potentially leaving ships with no safe route through the Red Sea.<\/p>\n

The risks for Africa<\/p>\n

Disruption on the Red Sea cascades through four channels of African economies: shipping and insurance costs, port revenue, energy and food prices, and maritime security risks.<\/p>\n

Red Sea states<\/p>\n

Egypt<\/p>\n

Egypt bears the highest direct financial risk. In 2024, the decline in Red Sea traffic resulting from Houthi attacks on commercial shipping cost Cairo an estimated US$7 billion<\/a> in lost Suez Canal revenue. Revenue reached US$4.67 billion for the fiscal year 2025-26, which represents a 23% increase<\/a> compared to the previous year. But if the diversion of shipping continues, it will soon reverse the improvement in revenue.<\/p>\n

Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea<\/p>\n

Over 2,000 people<\/a> fleeing the hostilities in western Yemen have crossed over to Djibouti\u2019s northern shores. Renewed fighting has pushed displacement since the escalation began in early September 2026 to nearly 94,000<\/a>. <\/p>\n

Djibouti is also a key external trade conduit for Ethiopia, which is landlocked. Ethiopia conducts approximately 95%<\/a> of its trade via Djibouti. <\/p>\n

Eritrea is also vulnerable<\/a> along the frontlines. Its geographical position makes it attractive to Saudi Arabia and Egypt<\/a>, which want to ensure that Iran and the Houthis don\u2019t have too much influence on the African side of the Red Sea. <\/p>\n

Somalia and Sudan<\/p>\n

The Houthi crisis compounds the existing crises in Somalia<\/a> and Sudan<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The Houthis and Somali terror group al-Shabaab<\/a> have exchanged weapons, drone technology and training in exchange for facilitating piracy off the coast of Somalia. This happens while an African Union mission in Somalia is trying to keep al-Shabaab under control<\/a>. <\/p>\n

As a result, the number of piracy incidents off Somalia\u2019s coast<\/a> jumped to a 10-year high in 2026<\/a>. Somalia approved an anti-piracy bill<\/a> in September 2026, aimed at preventing maritime abductions.<\/p>\n

Read more:
\n Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing<\/a><\/p>\n

In Sudan, Iranian support<\/a> has reached parts of the Sudanese Armed Forces. The army is battling the United Arab Emirates-backed Rapid Support Forces<\/a>. <\/p>\n

By mid-2024, the Houthis had reportedly begun helping Iran supply weapons<\/a> to the Sudanese army. The US Treasury has sanctioned<\/a> key Sudanese figures over these ties to Iran<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The implication is uncomfortable: the Red Sea\u2019s African shore is not only exposed to the Houthis, it has begun to serve them.<\/p>\n

Competition for political control<\/p>\n

The current geopolitical shifts in the Red Sea predate the Houthi offensive. <\/p>\n

In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum<\/a> with the breakaway region of Somaliland for access to its Red Sea coast and a naval base. This was in exchange for a path towards recognition. <\/p>\n

Somalia, Eritrea and Egypt opposed<\/a> the deal. Within a year, they had established a joint security mechanism<\/a>. <\/p>\n

Regional security cooperation has since accelerated. In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks at which 14 countries \u2013 including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia \u2013 established the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The UAE \u2013 following clashes with Saudi-backed forces in Yemen<\/a> in December 2025 \u2013 and landlocked Ethiopia are excluded.<\/p>\n

Read more:
\n Red Sea crisis: expert unpacks Houthi attacks and other security threats<\/a><\/p>\n

At the same time, a competing alignment involving the UAE, Israel and Ethiopia<\/a> has emerged, strengthened by Israel\u2019s recognition of Somaliland<\/a> in December 2025. On the other side are Somalia, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\n

Iran has also sought a military foothold<\/a> along the Red Sea corridor, including in Sudan. Eritrea, meanwhile, is using its strategic coastline to strengthen its regional position<\/a> and counterbalance Ethiopia.<\/p>\n

The result is a growing contest for influence in which Middle Eastern powers are making greater use of Africa\u2019s strategic position. <\/p>\n

What\u2019s to be done<\/p>\n

No single African state can protect the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, but governments can minimise some consequences by diversifying port access and inland trade routes. A more direct lever is improving maritime security capacity at the regional level. <\/p>\n

In August 2026, state signatories to the Djibouti Code of Conduct<\/a> and its expanded Jeddah Amendment<\/a> committed to forming a combined task force<\/a> to combat piracy. <\/p>\n

The success of this initiative will rely on the ability of governments to provide the ships, intelligence, personnel and legal frameworks necessary to make this a functional security mechanism. <\/p>\n

African states are not yet setting the broader strategic agenda, but their control of chokepoints increases their diplomatic leverage. The challenge is to use that leverage without becoming proxies in a wider Middle Eastern confrontation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The Houthi takeover of parts of the Red Sea gives the armed group a new platform to challenge…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":619086,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[42,43,40,38,41,39],"class_list":["post-619085","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-headlines","tag-headlines","tag-news","tag-top-news","tag-top-stories","tag-topnews","tag-topstories"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/619085","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=619085"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/619085\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/619086"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=619085"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=619085"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=619085"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}