![\"Japan\u2019s](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/il\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/3078525.png\")
<\/a><\/p>\nMany researchers have tried to find the reason for this disparity, but as yet no definitive cause has been identified.<\/p>\n
This article analyzes the factors driving the fertility rate divide between Hokkaid\u014d\/T\u014dhoku, where there has been a significant drop, and Ky\u016bsh\u016b, which has maintained a relatively high rate, and considers future measures to address the decline in the number of births in Japan.<\/p>\n
Identifying Differences<\/p>\n
Using census data and demographic statistics from 1990 to 2020, I examined the factors behind the changes in the number of births in the two regions.<\/p>\n
This analysis breaks down changes in birth numbers based on shifts in the population of women of childbearing age, the marriage rate among those women, and the fertility rate of married women.<\/p>\n
In Japan, the proportion of children born outside of marriage is relatively low, remaining at around 2.5%. Because the vast majority of children are born to married women, the total fertility rate is roughly equal to the proportion of married women multiplied by the marital fertility rate.<\/p>\n
The graph above shows the positive and negative effects of the three factors. It can be seen that the two regions share common trends. Until 2005, the marriage rate was the primary driver of the decline in births, but from 2010, population became the main driver in both regions. The marriage fertility rate, which was a positive contributor through to 2015, became a negative factor in 2020.<\/p>\n However, a closer look reveals that from 2010, declining marriage rates had a greater negative impact on births in Hokkaid\u014d\/T\u014dhoku than in Ky\u016bsh\u016b.<\/p>\n Similarly, while marriage fertility became a negative factor in both regions in 2020, Hokkaid\u014d\/T\u014dhoku experienced a more pronounced swing and a larger downward impact. Because the marriage rate and marriage fertility rate combine for changes in the overall fertility rate, the sharp drop in the northern region stems from this dual negative impact. In Ky\u016bsh\u016b, by contrast, both factors had a more limited influence, and around 80% of the decline in births can be attributed to the shrinking population of women of childbearing age.<\/p>\n To understand why these shifts occurred, I will examine the marriage and marriage fertility rates separately.<\/p>\n Higher Education, Later Marriage<\/p>\n Few would dispute that trends toward remaining single or marrying later in life contribute to a decline in births. Later marriages are closely linked to the increasing number of women pursuing higher education, and as educational attainment rises, marriages may continue to be pushed back.<\/p>\n I plotted the relationship between the percentage of women enrolling in four-year universities and the marriage rate of 25-year-old women by prefecture for the years 2000 and 2020. The results show that whether women marry young can be almost entirely explained by the proportion who attend university. The values for each prefecture shifted downward and to the right along virtually the same linear path from 2000 to 2020, meaning that as university enrollment increased, the marriage rate at age 25 declined by a corresponding amount.<\/p>\n A comparison of annual weighted averages for women\u2019s university enrollment reveals that although Hokkaid\u014d\/T\u014dhoku lagged significantly behind Ky\u016bsh\u016b in 2000, there is virtually no gap between them today.<\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n<\/a><\/p>\n