With Israel\u2019s Oct. 27 election just over a week away, and given both the intense interest of many of our readers and Israel\u2019s outsized importance to American, European and Middle Eastern politics, this seems an appropriate moment to take stock of an increasingly strange and consequential campaign. The stakes extend far beyond the identity of the next prime minister, touching on Israel\u2019s democratic future, its economic prospects, its international standing and the direction of a region whose upheavals continue to reverberate around the world.<\/p>\n
Most credible polls place Benjamin Netanyahu\u2019s coalition well short of a parliamentary majority, with even relatively favorable scenarios giving it only 53 to 55 seats in the 120-member Knesset. If those numbers hold, the opposition will have a plausible path to power, but one that depends on the support of Israel\u2019s Arab parties, which are projected to win roughly 12 to 15 seats and have already offered their parliamentary backing without demanding a place in government. On paper, at least, the opportunity is there for the taking.<\/p>\n
Yet the arithmetic conceals a political minefield. Jewish opposition parties have, to a shameful degree, accepted Netanyahu\u2019s efforts to portray Arab parties as illegitimate participants in determining Israel\u2019s government. There are also genuine difficulties: some Arab politicians reject Zionism, take positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that are deeply uncomfortable for Jewish parties, and have approached questions of national security, including Israel\u2019s wars with Hamas and Hezbollah, in ways that make cooperation politically fraught. These concerns deserve consideration, although accepting parliamentary support from outside a coalition is a very different matter from sharing a governing program.<\/p>\n
At least one opposition leader, Avigdor Liberman, whose party is polling at around eight to ten seats, has declared that he will refuse such an arrangement. His position raises the extraordinary possibility that Netanyahu could survive despite an electoral result that leaves his coalition far short of a majority. Whether this reflects principle, political calculation or personal ambition is among the questions we will examine below.<\/p>\n
So this is a MEGAPOST which aims to offer information and food for though ahead of the vote. In it which we will examine:<\/p>\n
What an opposition victory could mean
\nThe odd position of Liberman, who proposes to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory
\nThe danger to Israel should Netanyahu stay in power \u2014 including the likelihood of economic sanctions.
\nThe strange new fault lines in Israeli society \u2014 with Haredi Jews and Israeli Arabs at opposing trendlines
\nThe use of AI in the campaign \u2014 with Israel as a harbinger for basically everyone else<\/p>\n
An opposition victory on October 27 would represent a profound change in Israel\u2019s direction, even if it brought little immediate movement toward Palestinian statehood (since no Israeli government can execute more terrotorial pullouts until Hamas is gone). This distinction emerged during a recent appearance I made on Al Jazeera\u2019s <\/a>Inside Story<\/a>, where I sparred somewhat with Merav Zonszein, an analyst with the International Crisis Group and occasional New York Times opinion contributor, over whether Israel\u2019s opposition really offers a meaningful alternative to Netanyahu.<\/p>\n Zonszein argued that the principal opposition figures remain essentially on the right, particularly in their reluctance to endorse Palestinian independence or confront the settlement enterprise. I argued that this assessment overlooks fundamental differences over the nature of the Israeli state. Gadi Eisenkot, the opposition\u2019s emerging leader, understands that indefinite rule over millions of disenfranchised Palestinians threatens Israel\u2019s future as a Jewish and democratic country. He has said as much, although the trauma of October 7 has made explicit advocacy of Palestinian statehood politically hazardous, and any serious withdrawal would require a radically transformed security environment.<\/p>\n The differences extend well beyond the Palestinian question. Netanyahu\u2019s coalition is moving Israel toward a system in which an elected majority can exercise virtually unlimited power, subordinating the judiciary and other democratic safeguards to its will. The opposition broadly favors preserving liberal democracy. It also recognizes the unsustainability of the Haredi arrangement, under which a rapidly growing population receives extensive subsidies while many of its men avoid military service and an education that would enable productive participation in the modern economy.<\/p>\n Even a minority government dependent on outside Arab parliamentary support could begin reversing this trajectory. It could establish a credible inquiry into October 7, restore judicial independence, confront Jewish terrorism in the West Bank, pursue serious reforms of military service and Haredi education, and address the devastating lawlessness afflicting Arab communities.<\/p>\n Such a government would face enormous constraints, particularly on the Palestinian issue, but it could also begin repairing Israel\u2019s international relationships and restoring its credibility as a potential partner for peace. The distinction between Netanyahu\u2019s coalition and its opponents is therefore consequential, with implications for Israel\u2019s democratic survival, economic sustainability and standing in the world. The opposition\u2019s victory would offer the country an opportunity to arrest its decline, even as the harder work of resolving its fundamental conflicts remained ahead.<\/p>\n The greatest threat to an opposition victory may come from within its own ranks. Avigdor Liberman, whose Yisrael Beiteinu party is polling at eight to ten seats, insists he will reject parliamentary support from the Arab parties, even if offered without conditions. This could leave the opposition unable to form a government despite commanding a majority of Knesset seats, allowing Netanyahu to remain as caretaker prime minister and potentially forcing another election.<\/p>\n Liberman\u2019s reservations have some substance. The Arab parties\u2019 positions on Zionism, national security and the Palestinian conflict create genuine difficulties for Jewish parties. Yet the alternative is another Netanyahu government, with all the consequences for Israel\u2019s democracy, security and international standing. Even a temporary minority government could establish an October 7 inquiry commission, confront Jewish terrorism in the West Bank, address rampant crime in Arab communities and begin restoring judicial independence.<\/p>\n The electoral logic of Liberman\u2019s position is perplexing. His supporters overwhelmingly want Netanyahu gone, particularly after years of capitulation to Haredi demands over military exemptions and public subsidies. His categorical rejection of Arab support risks alienating these voters while attracting relatively few new ones.<\/p>\n A more troubling possibility is that Liberman is maneuvering to strengthen his own claim to the premiership, challenging Gadi Eisenkot or demanding a rotation agreement reminiscent of Naftali Bennett\u2019s remarkable ascent to power in 2021. Such a gambit would fit his reputation as a shrewd tactician, but it would also represent an extraordinary gamble with Israel\u2019s future.<\/p>\n The greatest danger, however, may be the destruction of opposition momentum. Elections are driven by enthusiasm, confidence and the contagious belief that change is possible. A clear path to victory could mobilize disillusioned voters, attract undecideds and generate a wave capable of expanding the opposition\u2019s majority. Liberman\u2019s maneuvering threatens the opposite: a corrosive sense of futility among voters who may conclude that even winning an election will accomplish nothing. This could suppress turnout, squander a historic opportunity and hand Netanyahu the lifeline he desperately needs. The opposition\u2019s failure to unite behind a clear candidate for prime minister has already created space for such personal maneuvering, and Liberman\u2019s apparent ambitions could prove especially destructive.<\/p>\n The supreme irony would be that Netanyahu survives because his opponents insist on a government of impossible purity, or because one of them insists on leading it.<\/p>\n A Netanyahu victory \u2014 even just remaining as caretaker due to opposition dysfuntion \u2014 could set Israel on a path toward economic impoverishment, international isolation and military vulnerability, potentially threatening the country\u2019s long-term viability. The danger is far greater than another term of dysfunctional government. An international reckoning is approaching, and the election may determine how devastating it becomes.<\/p>\n The international system is coiled like a spring. My assessment, informed by direct knowledge of discussions abroad, is that governments have delayed potentially devastating economic measures partly to see whether Israelis will change course. Netanyahu\u2019s return with essentially the same coalition would signal that the policies provoking international outrage have received a renewed democratic mandate. The restraint could rapidly disappear.<\/p>\n Europe would almost certainly move first. Britain, France and other countries have already announced restrictions on trade with Israeli settlements, and the pressure to expand sanctions is growing. Measures targeting settlement activity could increasingly affect businesses and financial institutions operating throughout Israel, including banks with exposure to settlements. The distinction between settlements deep inside the West Bank and those near the old border, long assumed by Israelis and Palestinians alike to become part of Israel, could disappear from European policy.<\/p>\n The economic consequences could be profound: a weaker shekel, more expensive imports, declining investment, lost export markets, higher borrowing costs and growing difficulties for Israeli businesses, banks and universities. These are potential consequences rather than inevitable outcomes, but the cumulative effect could substantially impoverish the country.<\/p>\n America would likely follow a different timetable, with pressure building toward the 2028 presidential election. Public opinion has undergone a remarkable transformation: a Pew survey found that 60% of American adults view Israel unfavorably, including nearly 80% of Democrats. Support for restricting military assistance is growing, and an arms embargo is becoming a serious demand within Democratic politics. Israel\u2019s ability to prosecute prolonged wars, as it has since October 7, could eventually be severely constrained.<\/p>\n The Gaza war has inflicted enormous damage on Israel\u2019s standing, compounded by the failure to develop credible arrangements for civilian protection, postwar governance and international cooperation. But the deeper problem remains the West Bank. Israel cannot indefinitely rule millions of Palestinians without granting them independence or equal political rights while expecting democratic countries to accept the arrangement. Instead, Netanyahu\u2019s government has expanded settlements and tolerated extremist violence that supplies Israel\u2019s adversaries with a seemingly inexhaustible arsenal of propaganda.<\/p>\n Consider the events of October 16 and 17. Near Abu Falah, masked settlers brutally beat American photojournalist Heidi Levine, working for The Washington Post, leaving her with broken bones and injuries requiring surgery. I have known Heidi for decades. She is a moderate, careful and deeply decent person, an outstanding photographer who has in many ways devoted her life to Israel. The attack on her was a crime and a disgrace.<\/p>\n The following day, near the Christian Palestinian village of Taybeh, settlers attacked olive harvesters and a visiting European delegation, assaulting Bernard Baudoux, a 78-year-old French mayor, and damaging a Belgian diplomatic vehicle. The proximity to a Christian village makes the episode especially damaging in the United States, where allegations that Israel tolerates attacks on Palestinian Christians are already eroding support among some Christian constituencies.<\/p>\n Rather than unequivocally condemning the attacks, Netanyahu\u2019s office emphasized that the European visitors had entered a sensitive area without coordinating with the military, drew attention to the French mayor\u2019s political affiliation, questioned what the available images established and warned of a coordinated campaign to smear Israel and Jewish residents of the West Bank. The images showed a disgusting assault; the government\u2019s instinct was to cast suspicion on the victims.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, the assault on judicial independence threatens Israel\u2019s liberal democracy, while capitulation to Haredi demands for military exemptions, subsidies and inadequate education undermines military readiness, economic sustainability and civic solidarity. These policies also alienate American Jews, whose support has long underpinned Israel\u2019s relationship with Washington. The danger is a vicious circle in which isolation produces economic decline, economic weakness erodes military strength, and growing vulnerability invites aggression. The combination could become existential.<\/p>\n Three years after October 7, Israel remains a country transformed by that day, but perhaps in ways that are harder to categorize than they first appeared. The massacre seemed at the time to sharpen every line in Israeli society: between Jew and Arab, Israeli and Palestinian, those prepared to defend the state and those who stood outside its national project. Yet those lines have blurred in unexpected directions. Israel has always defeated easy categorization. It is a Jewish state in which Jews disagree profoundly about the meaning and even the value of Jewish sovereignty, a Middle Eastern country in which roughly a fifth of the citizens are Arabs, and a Western-style democracy containing religious communities that regard much of Western liberalism with suspicion.<\/p>\n October 7 intensified all of these contradictions because the attack placed the most elemental obligation of a state \u2014 the protection of its citizens \u2014 at the center of Israeli life, while three years of war have demanded extraordinary sacrifices from some parts of the population and exposed the distance that others maintain from the institutions responsible for defending them. The resulting picture is complex, and fault-line is this: who really cares about the country and its people?<\/p>\n Take the Haredi ultra-Orthodox, for example. These are Jews living in the Jewish state, communities whose lives revolve around Torah and Jewish law and whose political parties have participated in Israeli governments for decades. Yet they are \u2013 even while controlling the fate of any right-wing coalition \u2013 essentially in conflict with the state.<\/p>\n In Modi\u2019in this week, even as the country was mourning and remembering, Military Police arrived at an apartment building to arrest an ultra-Orthodox man who had failed to report for military service \u2013 as the vast majority of them do, so far mostly getting away with it. (SEE VIDEO ABOVE)<\/p>\n Word spread through a Jerusalem-based alert network which mobilizes supporters when Haredi draft evaders face arrest, and hundreds of ultra-Orthodox protesters converged on the building<\/a>. Some forced their way inside. The security forces found themselves surrounded, confrontations followed, and civilian police arrived to extract the Military Police.<\/p>\n By the end of the episode, the officers had departed under police protection while the man they had come to arrest remained behind. His supporters celebrated, some referring to him as a \u201chostage,\u201d while others hurled the word \u201cNazis\u201d at representatives of the Jewish state.<\/p>\n At such demonstrations \u2013 encouraged fiercely by the Haredi leadership \u2013 Haredi you carry signs saying \u201cWe\u2019d rather die than serve.\u201d This, naturally, outrages non-Haredi Israelis, who generally serve and in many cases spent hundreds of days as reservists in uniform, away from families and jobs, in Gaza and Lebanon, where about 1,000 have been killed. It is, indeed, electoral gold for the opposition, since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is deeply implicated in efforts to cement the draft evasion.<\/p>\n The Modi\u2019in confrontation arrived alongside the resurfacing of remarks by Rabbi Dov Lando, the spiritual leader of Degel HaTorah, a central faction composing the United Torah Judaism party and one of the most important authorities in the Lithuanian Haredi world. His comments carry the argument far beyond the familiar dispute over the outrageous Haredi military exemptions, because Lando reaches backward to the foundational question of whether Jewish sovereignty itself represented progress.<\/p>\n In footage recorded roughly a year and a half ago and aired by Channel 12, he contemplated an alternative history in which the United Nations governed the territory and described the resulting situation as potentially \u201cexcellent.\u201d He recalled Arab rule approvingly, declared that Zionism \u201cmade Arabs hate us,\u201d<\/a> and argued that Zionists had brought \u201cphysical disasters,\u201d along with spiritual ones, upon the Jewish people.<\/p>\n Lando leads a party which props up nationalists and ultranationalists who prolonged wars, refuses to allow its community to help fight those wars, and heaps scorn upon the state that very generously subsidizes their lifestyle.<\/p>\n His sharpest language was reserved for Religious Zionists, the very community that has attempted to reconcile traditional Jewish observance with the responsibilities of Jewish sovereignty and whose soldiers have paid an enormous price in Israel\u2019s wars. Lando described their rabbis as teachers of a \u201cdistorted Torah\u201d and disparaged the idea of dying in defense of the people and the land.<\/p>\n His worldview places Torah study at the center of Jewish physical survival, giving the yeshiva student \u2013 who can remain such deep into adulthood, living off state stipends \u2013 a conception of national defense that critics would argue is positively parasitic.<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s Arabs, meanwhile, occupy their own strange and complicated space: roughly a fifth of the population, they are a classic potential fifth column, share the culture of the surrounding region, and quite possibly its grievances.<\/p>\n These Arabs \u2013 mostly Muslims, some Christians, and many Druze, considered by many separate \u2013 are citizens of a country whose flag carries a Star of David, whose national anthem expresses the ancient yearning of a Jewish soul, and whose founding purpose was the restoration of Jewish sovereignty. The question of how fully Arab citizens can be integrated into such a state has accompanied Israel from its beginning, and the approaching election has once again brought that question into the center of political life.<\/p>\n Netanyahu has seized upon the possibility of Arab political influence as a weapon against his principal challenger, former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot. The prime minister\u2019s campaign has sought to associate an Eisenkot government with dependence on Arab parties, which may very well be necessary, placing Eisenkot under sufficient pressure that he has drawn explicit coalition red lines around them.<\/p>\n The electoral arithmetic nevertheless keeps returning to the same place: in a closely divided country, the center-left needs Arab votes; since 1973 it has never enjoyed an election day majority without them. After Oct. 7, this is a political weakness that Netanyahu had made the center of his reelection effort.<\/p>\n But look more closely at events, and you\u2019ll see that here, too, impressions and even logic can mislead.<\/p>\n Israeli media this week reported the infuriating story of a wounded reservist, a new immigrant and an engineer from the Technion who had been wounded while serving in Lebanon. With his hand bandaged and medical treatment awaiting him, he drove toward the hospital and was stopped for speeding.<\/p>\n The circumstances of his journey were presented to the police officers, along with documentation supporting the medical emergency, yet the encounter produced a fine, a delay that could have cost him his finger, and the accompanying penalty. The columnist Ben Caspit reported<\/a> in Maariv that the officers \u2013 who were Jews \u2013 were at times mocking the soldier, identified only as G, in accordance with army rules.<\/p>\n It is a story that, after three years of war, would boil the blood of most Israelis. And indeed, upon appeal to the court system the fine was canceled, with the decision describing the original enforcement as falling short of a reasonable, proportionate and fair exercise of administrative discretion.<\/p>\n The judge who reached that conclusion was Rasha Saadi Atamna, an Arab. Her ruling treated the wounded Jewish reservist\u2019s service and circumstances as deserving serious consideration while simultaneously insisting upon a higher standard from an institution of the Israeli state: the citizen owes duties to the country, while the country owes fairness to the citizen.<\/p>\n