The IDF exercise\u00a0that took place on Sunday and Monday includes a rapid transition\u00a0to offensive operations, but its fundamental nature is defensive. The exercise focused on the border areas rather than combat deep inside enemy territory. This is also a message to Iran, intended to prevent it from interpreting the exercise as preparations for an attack on Iran.<\/p>\n
The exercise focused on the Northern and Central Commands, not the Southern Command. In other words, it is not a comprehensive scenario simulating a multi-front war, with all the challenges facing the Southern Command in general and the Gaza Strip in particular.<\/p>\n
The exercise was intended to convey an essentially defensive message: the IDF is preparing to prevent Iran, or organizations supported by Iran or operating independently, such as those in Syria, from disrupting election day.<\/p>\n
As is well known, military exercises can serve as cover for an attack. The best-known example for Israel is how it was caught by surprise at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. However, there is considerable doubt that this is Israel’s intention now. If anything, Israel’s focus is on Iran. A large-scale Air Force exercise involving air defense, the Home Front Command and other units would suggest preparations for an exercise that could serve as the first stage of an actual offensive. The composition of the current exercise, however, which is based on territorial divisions, as well as its nature and objectives, is different.<\/p>\n
The exercise\u00a0took\u00a0place under the Northern and Central Commands. In the Northern Command’s area of responsibility, the new regime in Syria is seeking to consolidate its position, including by building up and strengthening its relatively weak military. Nevertheless, given the uncertainty in Syria and concerns about the regime’s stability, Israel continues to prepare accordingly.<\/p>\n
In Lebanon, Hezbollah<\/a>, which has suffered severe blows, is attempting to recover, but it will take considerable time to regain the strength it had before the last war. At the same time, Hezbollah must address the needs of Lebanon’s Shiite population to ensure its continued support.<\/p>\n The challenges facing the Northern Command are considerably less severe than they were under Assad in Syria and before the last war with Hezbollah. The fronts in Lebanon and Syria are also relatively quiet, yet the exercise remains focused on this area.<\/p>\n Compared with Syria and Lebanon, tensions in Judea and Samaria<\/a> are higher and fluctuate in intensity. They are currently on the rise. A serious terrorist attack in the area prompted increased military activity, including in Hebron, underscoring the importance of the exercise.<\/p>\n In Judea and Samaria, preparations must be made to defend Israeli communities. Various scenarios must also be considered, including some that have been anticipated for a long time. These include the possibility of chaos if Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas dies, followed by internal fighting between Palestinian factions, potentially involving armed clashes, as they compete for control of the PLO, Fatah and, of course, the Palestinian Authority. Such a struggle could also involve attacks on Israelis.<\/p>\n The Southern Command is absent from the exercise. Despite Hamas’s efforts to consolidate its position and rebuild its strength, the threats it poses and the continued friction with the organization, Hamas is not included in the current scenario simulating a multi-front war.<\/p>\n The Southern Command’s absence may also indicate that the likelihood of an attack from Egypt and\/or Jordan into the Negev is considered relatively low. This is despite recent warnings about potential threats to Eilat, including in connection with the Houthis<\/a>.<\/p>\n The exercise involves four divisions, including the 98th Division, while the other divisions are territorial formations. This indicates that the objective is not to test a large-scale maneuver deep into enemy territory.<\/p>\n The aim is to prevent incursions from the ground and the air. The aerial threat includes the ever-present risk of rockets, missiles, UAVs and similar weapons being launched toward Israel. There has been no such fire from Syria, and it is rare from Lebanon. However, Hezbollah is seeking to improve its strike capabilities, including through UAVs. Another scenario involves incursions using hang gliders or other small aircraft, including manned platforms.<\/p>\n There have been no ground incursions into Israel from Syria or Lebanon. However, such incursions remain possible and, in an extreme scenario, could even occur on a large scale.<\/p>\n In this respect, the exercise is intended to test the layered defense system Israel has established. The buffer zones and security belts in Syria and Lebanon constitute the first line of defense, while the border itself is the second.<\/p>\n The maritime arena is not a major focus of the exercise, including with regard to potential incursions from the Gaza Strip or Lebanon. The heavy blows suffered by Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s naval units have significantly reduced the likelihood of such incursions.<\/p>\n The Air Force is participating in the exercise primarily to support ground forces and respond if indirect fire or aerial incursions occur.<\/p>\n The Air Force remains more focused on its ongoing state of readiness vis-\u00e0-vis Iran, with the associated strain on personnel, systems and equipment.<\/p>\n