When tensions around the Strait of Hormuz began rattling energy markets again, the reaction was entirely predictable. Tanker traffic slowed, insurance premiums rose, and oil and gas prices started climbing. But something else happened just as predictably.
Across Europe, politicians and policy institutions began reviving familiar proposals: reopen gas fields, expand offshore drilling, reconsider domestic reserves that had previously been phased out. In the Netherlands, even the long-closed Groningen gas field has cautiously resurfaced in policy discussions, with institutions like TNO suggesting it could perhaps serve as a strategic backup should disruptions escalate.
Across the North Sea, several former UK energy ministers quickly argued that Britain should accelerate new exploration to protect itself from volatile global markets. If this response feels familiar, it should. We have seen this movie before. And the ending never really changes.
The Crisis That Keeps Repeating
In a recent column, I argued that Europe’s vulnerability to fossil fuel disruptions passing through geopolitical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz was never a secret. Roughly one fifth of global oil trade moves through that narrow corridor. When tensions rise there, global energy markets react.
What is remarkable is not that the disruption occurred. It is how quickly the policy conversation falls back into the same reflex: more drilling and exploration. And sometimes I had being right as it is not bringing us anything worthwhile.
The Groningen Mirage
Consider the renewed debate about the Groningen gas field in the Netherlands. For decades, Groningen was one of Europe’s largest gas reserves, powering the Dutch economy and supplying much of northwestern Europe. But after years of earthquakes linked to extraction, the field was shut down and became politically radioactive. Until, of course, prices rise.
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Now the idea occasionally resurfaces that Groningen could act as a strategic reserve to stabilize markets during crises. Or even be allowed to open again to stabilize prices in a similar situation as we are in now. The problem is that energy economics does not cooperate with that narrative.
Professor of energy economics Machiel Mulder has pointed out that in liberalised European gas markets, changes in supply side concentration — like output adjustments from major fields — have had limited influence on gas price movements. Europe operates within an integrated gas market where prices are determined largely by international supply and demand rather than the output of a single field. Even if Groningen reopened tomorrow, the gas would still be sold at European market prices.
The molecules might come from Dutch soil. The price would still come from the global market. In other words, reopening Groningen might produce gas. It will not magically lower anyone’s heating bill.
The North Sea Reflex
The same logic applies to renewed enthusiasm for drilling in the North Sea. In the United Kingdom, former energy ministers have argued that expanding offshore production would shield Britain from global price volatility. Similar arguments are being made in the Netherlands as well.
But new offshore fields take years, often a decade, to reach meaningful production. And when they do, the oil and gas will again still be sold into international markets. It is also, in total, only a fraction of the European gas demand.
Domestic production does not insulate countries from global commodity prices. It simply determines where the fuel is extracted, not what consumers ultimately pay. If anything, large new fossil investments risk locking Europe further into volatile fuel markets precisely when policymakers claim they want more stability.
A System Built for Volatility
What the Hormuz disruption really highlights is not a temporary imbalance but a structural feature of fossil fuel systems. Oil and gas resources are geographically concentrated. Supply chains stretch across oceans. Critical transport routes become unavoidable chokepoints.
When geopolitics interferes with those routes, prices move everywhere. Europe cannot control Middle Eastern politics. It cannot guarantee free passage through strategic waterways. And it cannot stabilize global commodity markets by drilling a few additional wells closer to home.
The Energy System That Avoids This Problem
There is, however, an energy system that is far less vulnerable to these shocks. It runs primarily on renewable electricity. Wind turbines in the North Sea do not pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Solar panels do not depend on tanker insurance rates. Electricity produced domestically from renewable sources spreads generation geographically rather than concentrating it in a handful of politically sensitive regions.
Even in economic terms, the resilience difference is significant. Analyses from organizations such as TNO show that supply disruptions affecting fossil fuels have dramatically smaller impacts, sometimes around ninety percent less, on renewable-based energy systems, precisely because they do not rely on continuous imported fuel flows. When fossil markets panic, wind and sunlight remain remarkably calm.
Stabilize the Present, Build the Future
None of this means ignoring short-term energy security concerns. Europe still relies heavily on natural gas for heating, industry, and electricity balancing. Maintaining supply through diversified LNG imports, particularly from the United States and other reliable suppliers, is a sensible way to manage current disruptions.
But short-term stabilization should not be confused with long-term strategy. Expanding fossil infrastructure in response to temporary price spikes risks locking economies into decades of continued exposure to the very volatility that triggered the crisis.
The structural solution lies elsewhere: electrification, renewable generation, storage systems, and stronger electricity grids. These investments reduce dependence on imported fuels altogether rather than trying to manage their risks more efficiently.
The Lesson Europe Keeps Relearning
The Strait of Hormuz crisis did not create Europe’s energy vulnerability. It merely reminded us that it exists. And yet every time this reminder arrives, it is completely baffling that the policy debate seems to restart from the same place: drill more, extract more, import slightly less.
It is a comforting story. Unfortunately, it is also the wrong one. Europe cannot eliminate geopolitical risk from global energy markets. What it can do is reduce how much those markets matter to its own economy.
That was the strategic logic behind accelerating the energy transition after previous crises. If the current Hormuz disruption proves anything, it is that the argument was never primarily about climate. It was always about security.
And the next time someone proposes drilling our way out of global energy volatility, it may be worth asking a simple question: If that really worked, wouldn’t it have worked by now?
By Leon Stille for Oilprice.com