The Starlink Case: An Appraisal of Technology for Geopolitical Control

This article is part of the essay series: Houston, We Have a Regulator: Starlink, Sovereignty, and India’s Satcom Policy.

On July 25, 2020, around 03:32 UTC, Elon Musk posted on Twitter (now X) that “We will coup whoever we want. Deal with it”.

It was a reply, and Grok, his own AI, confirms this.

Musk was replying to a user (@historyofarmani / Armani) who, in turn, was responding to Musk’s earlier tweet criticising a US government stimulus package.

The user wrote something along the lines of: “You know what wasn’t in the best interest of people? The US government organising a coup against Evo Morales in Bolivia so you could obtain the lithium there.”

Musk’s reply referenced the 2019 events in Bolivia that led to the removal of President Evo Morales (widely described by critics as a coup, linked by some to lithium resources relevant to electric-vehicle batteries).

Musk deleted the tweet within a day or two (around July 26, 2020). But multiple archives and contemporary reports confirm it existed — in our opinion, an indelible imprint of his mindset and abilities.

Our thesis: Musk hardsells Starlink as internet for the underserved, but our findings indicate that its biggest customer is the US military and intelligence community — and that it works as a lever of control over host nations.

Our case, in five hits:

Empire playbook: Citing the Snowden-era record (Merkel’s phone, Airbus, ECHELON), we state that for the US, spying has served commercial interests, even against allies. We point to the CLOUD Act, FISA and the Patriot Act as the legal cover.

Not just a broadband company: We cite a US$70M Starshield task order, a classified NRO contract since 2021 for “hundreds” of spy satellites, and a $150M SDA missile-tracking deal. Shotwell is quoted: “We would launch a weapon to defend the U.S.”

Rules for thee: Across nine jurisdictions (India, Namibia, Cameroon, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Iran, Taiwan), we apprehend the same pattern: operate first, fight the regulator, comply only under coercion.

Brazil complied only after its accounts were frozen!

The kill switch: Elon Musk wrote in March 2025 that Ukraine’s “entire front line would collapse if I turned it off.”

We also cite the 2022 Sevastopol refusal and a February 2026 selective cutoff of terminals used by Russian forces. Our point is that one private decision-maker holds the chokepoint.

Taiwan, the tell: Our report notes that America’s most defence-dependent partner refused to bend its ownership law, and Starlink still hasn’t entered.

India: Starlink holds a GMPCS licence (June 2025) and IN-SPACe authorisation (July 2025), but as of October 2026, it has not been allowed to launch commercially. Our report warns of a “death spiral” for India’s New Space sector and of direct-to-cell competition for Jio, BSNL and Airtel.

The ask: We point to negotiable licence terms for any foreign LEO operator so that:


All Indian traffic lands at Indian gateways.
India holds its own auditable on/off switch.
Interception and data localisation fall under Indian law alone.
⁠No unilateral withdrawal of service in an emergency.

We end by urging India to build its own mega-constellation before 2029.

Ram Divedi is Co-Founder, Kutniti Foundation.

The full report is available here.

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