The harm is multi-generational, disproportionately affecting M\u0101ori and disabled people, and likely to cost society tens to hundreds of billions of dollars in lifetime impacts. <\/p>\n
This was not one single case of corrupt behaviour or a stand-alone disaster – it was a system-wide betrayal of duty of care over 70 years, involving multiple governments, churches and NGOs, and a near-total failure of oversight.<\/p>\n
Survivors arriving at Parliament for the tabling of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care in 2024.<\/p>\n
What happened next: The Government formally apologised in November 2024, acknowledging the scale and systemic nature of the abuse. <\/p>\n
In Budget 2025, a redress package worth about $774 million was announced, aimed at survivors abused in state care (and some faith-based settings where the Crown had responsibility) between 1950 and 2019. <\/p>\n
A slew of reforms was recommended to redress processes, record-keeping, complaints systems, and current care settings. <\/p>\n
Implementation is ongoing, and survivor groups have already criticised the proposed scheme as too narrow. Legal, financial and cultural consequences will run for years.<\/p>\n
2. Ex-Deputy Police Commissioner Jevon McSkimming<\/p>\n
What happened: Jevon McSkimming was appointed Deputy Police Commissioner<\/a> in 2023. In late 2024 he was suspended after allegations about a sexual relationship with a junior non-sworn staff member<\/a> (\u201cMs Z\u201d) and associated misconduct. <\/p>\n In a separate matter, he later pleaded guilty to possessing child sexual exploitation and bestiality material on a police device. <\/p>\n The recently-released Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) report revealed significant failings and serious misconduct at the highest levels among some of our most senior police \u2013 from former Police Commissioner Andrew Coster down.<\/p>\n It found that some of the most senior police leaders \u2013 including Coster \u2013 made decisions and set processes that effectively protected McSkimming\u2019s interests and succession prospects, including bypassing normal Integrity and Conduct pathways. <\/p>\n How it earned its rank: The scandal sits so high because of who was involved and how power was used. The IPCA found that very senior officers, including Coster and Deputy Commissioner Tania Kura, oversaw processes that treated McSkimming as the \u201cvictim\u201d and sidelined the Police Integrity and Conduct group. <\/p>\n The IPCA found Ms Z\u2019s emails were used as the basis to charge her, and that diversion was offered only on condition she withdrew her complaint. A separate review for the Public Service Commission found Coster and McSkimming failed to disclose the relationship history.<\/p>\n What happened next: The IPCA report has already had cascading consequences. It found serious misconduct by senior leaders in their handling of the complaints and recommended systemic changes to integrity and oversight at the top of police. <\/p>\n Coster, now head of the Social Investment Agency, was placed on leave and another former senior officer leading another agency has also been placed on leave. McSkimming is awaiting sentencing but his fate is almost the least of what is yet to come out of this landmark case.<\/p>\n 3. Assistant Police Commissioner Clint Rickards<\/p>\n What happened: Clint Rickards was the most prominent figure in a series of historic sexual offending cases involving senior police officers. Alongside former officers Brad Shipton and Bob Schollum<\/a>, he was charged over alleged rapes and sexual assaults dating back to the 1980s. <\/p>\n Rickards was acquitted in two separate trials but the allegations and surrounding publicity triggered huge public debate about police culture and power dynamics with complainants. The 2007 Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct by Dame Margaret Bazley examined how police had historically dealt with sexual complaints, including those involving officers, and heard evidence of poor investigation practices, delays and inappropriate attitudes to complainants.<\/p>\n How it earned its rank: This scandal scores highly because of what the wider system inquiry revealed. The Bazley report found systemic failures in how police investigated adult sexual assault and complaints involving officers, including dismissive attitudes, conflicts of interest, and a tendency to protect colleagues. The cases centred on a small group of powerful men inside the organisation, alleged to have exploited their positions with vulnerable women over many years. Until now, this has been the most corrosive scandal in police history.<\/p>\n What happened next: Rickards resigned as Assistant Commissioner in 2007 after being suspended on full pay for an extended period. The Bazley Commission\u2019s recommendations led to changes in police policies and training around adult sexual assault, including dedicated adult sexual assault investigation teams, revised procedures, and increased focus on victim-centred practice. Subsequent cases – the Roast Busters saga and McSkimming – raise questions about how durable those reforms have been.<\/p>\n 4. Operation Burnham and NZ Defence Force<\/p>\n What happened: Operation Burnham was the name that wound up attached to a 2010 NZSAS-led night raid in Afghanistan\u2019s Tirgiran Valley targeting insurgents believed responsible for attacks on New Zealand soldiers. The scandal was revealed in Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson\u2019s 2017 book Hit & Run, which alleged New Zealand forces were involved in an operation that killed and injured civilians and that the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) later misled the public about it. <\/p>\n A Government inquiry found it was likely<\/a> that a young girl was killed and other civilians injured during the raid, but concluded the fatal fire came from an Apache helicopter with a misaligned weapon.<\/p>\n How it earned its rank: Burnham\u2019s ranking is not just about the civilian deaths and injuries \u2013 it spotlighted the lack of candour, accountability and record-keeping failures at the top of defence. <\/p>\n The NZDF made a series of incorrect and misleading public statements between 2010 and 2017 \u2013 including describing civilian casualty allegations as \u201cbaseless\u201d \u2013 that were not adequately corrected once contrary information emerged. Senior commanders were exposed as having made mistakes and misled ministers and the public.<\/p>\n What happened next: The inquiry\u2019s 2020 report recommended changes to NZDF\u2019s approach to civilian harm, operational record-keeping, and public communication, including improved doctrine and better independent legal oversight of operations. The NZDF issued an apology for the errors in its public statements and the distress caused.<\/p>\n 5. Finance company collapses (mid-2000s to early 2010s)<\/p>\n What happened: Between 2006 and 2012, New Zealand saw the collapse of dozens of non-bank finance companies. A parliamentary inquiry estimated that more than $3b was lost, affecting between 150,000 and 200,000 depositors. High-profile failures included Bridgecorp, Hanover Finance and South Canterbury Finance<\/a>.<\/p>\n Many had offered high-yield debentures to \u201cmum and dad\u201d investors, often marketed as relatively secure. Post-collapse investigations revealed misleading prospectuses, poor governance, conflicted related-party lending and, in some cases, outright fraud.<\/p>\n How it earned its rank: This scandal ranks because of culpability and abuse of trust. By January 2015, the Serious Fraud Office had prosecuted officers from 11 finance companies, securing convictions against 20 people and total prison sentences of 707 months. Directors were convicted of offences such as making untrue statements in offer documents, theft by a person in a special relationship, and other Crimes Act and Securities Act breaches. At a structural level, the collapses exposed serious weaknesses in regulation of non-bank deposit takers.<\/p>\n What happened next: We overhauled our financial markets and non-bank deposit taker regulation. The Financial Markets Authority was created, licensing and disclosure rules were strengthened, and a prudential regime for non-bank deposit takers was introduced. The non-bank finance sector shrank dramatically and never fully regained its previous footprint.<\/p>\n 6. GCSB unlawful surveillance of Kim Dotcom (2012\u20132013)<\/p>\n What happened: In 2012 it emerged our electronic spying agency, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), had unlawfully intercepted the communications of Kim Dotcom<\/a> and another linked to the FBI-initiated Megaupload case. A subsequent \u201cKitteridge Review\u201d of the GCSB\u2019s compliance found 88 instances where surveillance of New Zealanders may have been unlawful or questionable.<\/p>\n It revealed widespread confusion inside the bureau about its legal limits. The revelations raised fundamental questions about oversight of secret agencies and the balance between national security and civil liberties.<\/p>\n How it earned its rank: This involved secret state power, unlawful intrusion and systemic legal misunderstanding at the apex of an intelligence agency.<\/p>\n The Kitteridge Review found the GCSB lacked robust internal processes to ensure its activities complied with the law, and that misinterpretation of residency provisions went uncorrected until the Dotcom case exploded. And it wasn\u2019t a one-off mistake – the 88 flagged cases pointed to a pattern of compliance failure.<\/p>\n What happened next: There were swift legal and institutional reforms. The GCSB tightened its internal compliance, and the government initiated a broader review that ultimately produced significant law changes, modernising the legislative framework for the GCSB and the NZSIS.<\/p>\n 7. Leaky homes crisis<\/p>\n What happened: There was a widespread wave of building failures in houses built mainly from the early 1990s through the 2000s. Those failures were associated with monolithic cladding, inadequate weather-proofing, and weak oversight.<\/p>\n Tens of thousands of homes<\/a> were affected, with estimates putting the cost into the tens of billions. Changes to the Building Act 1991 deregulated aspects of design and inspection and saw the use of unsuitable materials and detailing, and under-resourced or inconsistent council consenting and inspection.<\/p>\n How it earned its rank: This was a slow-motion disaster \u2013 thousands of families were left with rotting houses, heavy debt, or negative equity; many unable to recover from losses even with partial settlements. <\/p>\n The entire system of building had failed to ensure basic weather tightness for housing over many years. The state and local systems failed to protect its people and its people carried the cost, the misery and the stress of losing the value of their most-valued asset, the family home.<\/p>\n What happened next: There was a lot of litigation from individual claims to class-style actions. The Weathertight Homes Resolution Services Act created a specialised claims system, but strict limitation periods and cost-sharing arrangements left many owners with only partial relief.<\/p>\n Parliament changed the Building Act, councils tightened consenting and inspection, and industry practice shifted towards more robust cladding and detailing.<\/p>\n 8. Taito Phillip Field MP \u2013 corruption<\/p>\n What happened: Taito Phillip Field, a long-serving Labour MP and minister outside Cabinet, became the centre of New Zealand\u2019s most serious parliamentary corruption case.<\/p>\n Allegations surfaced that he had helped Thai nationals with immigration or residency issues while receiving building and renovation work on his properties in New Zealand and Samoa. A ministerial inquiry led to police laying corruption charges. In 2009, a High Court jury found him guilty on 11 charges of bribery and corruption as an MP and 15 charges of attempting to pervert the course of justice.<\/p>\n How it earned its rank: Field was the first New Zealand MP jailed for corruption, making this a watershed scandal for parliamentary integrity. The court found that he used public office \u2013 and constituents\u2019 dependence on immigration outcomes \u2013 to obtain private benefits, and then attempted to mislead inquiries and obstruct justice.<\/p>\n What happened next: In October 2009, Field was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. The sentencing judge said his offending threatened \u201cthe foundation of democracy and justice\u201d. The Court of Appeal upheld his convictions and sentence, and the Supreme Court later dismissed his further appeal. Field was released on parole after serving about a third of his sentence and died in 2021. His case remains the clearest example of criminal corruption inside Parliament in modern New Zealand.<\/p>\n 9. Pike River mine disaster \u2013 regulatory failure <\/p>\n What happened: On November 19, 2010 a methane explosion at the Pike River coal mine on the West Coast killed 29 men in what became one of New Zealand\u2019s worst industrial disasters. Multiple explosions made the mine too dangerous to re-enter, and the men\u2019s bodies were never recovered.<\/p>\n A Royal Commission of Inquiry found Pike River Coal had failed to implement adequate ventilation, methane monitoring and emergency egress and that regulators had not properly enforced health and safety laws or stressed the mine\u2019s unacceptable risk profile.<\/p>\n How it earned its rank: Pike River ranks highly on scale and institutional failure. The commission concluded that \u201cthe tragedy was preventable\u201d and that both the company and the regulator (then the Department of Labour) fell well short of reasonable practice.<\/p>\n There was no finding of deliberate killing<\/a>, but a pattern of cost-cutting, production pressure and weak oversight that left workers exposed to catastrophic risk. This didn\u2019t involve corrupt practice but regulatory capture and weakness along with corporate negligence leading to mass fatalities.<\/p>\n What happened next: The disaster prompted a reform of health and safety law including the creation of WorkSafe New Zealand and the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, which adopted a more robust, duty-holder-focused regime. <\/p>\n Criminal proceedings against Pike River Coal and its chief executive ended without a full trial, after charges were dropped as part of a controversial settlement that left many families of the men killed deeply unhappy.<\/p>\n 10. Teina Pora wrongful conviction<\/p>\n What happened: Teina Pora was convicted in 1994 (and again in 2000) of murdering and raping 39-year-old Susan Burdett in her Auckland home in March 1992. He was 17 at the time and had no physical evidence linking him to the crime. The prosecution\u2019s case rested largely on his confession, given after 14 hours of police interview without a lawyer, and despite a later-established neuro-developmental impairment. In March 2015 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council quashed his convictions<\/a>, concluding the trial was unsafe. Serial rapist Malcolm Rewa was subsequently convicted of Burdett\u2019s murder in 2019.<\/p>\n How it earned its rank: This case exposed a collapse in the justice system \u2013 a vulnerable young M\u0101ori man, cognitively impaired, twice convicted of one of the most serious crimes despite no forensic link, and years later shown to be wrongly convicted.<\/p>\n Pora was failed by institutions that should protect rights including police, prosecutors, and the courts. The imbalance of power extreme, the oversight culture shown to be weak and the cost to Pora was huge.<\/p>\n What happened next: After his convictions were quashed, Pora was awarded $3.5m in compensation and received a formal government apology for his wrongful conviction and imprisonment. This and other high-profile cases of systemic error revealed a judicial system that struggled to self-correct and led to the government\u2019s decision to establish the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) in 2020.<\/p>\n How we measured the scandals<\/p>\n The Herald adopted five metrics to rank scandals: seniority and concentration of power; the number of people involved and numbers of those affected; abuse of power; whether people knew what they did was wrong and if they broke the law, and institutional handling and failure of oversight. Each metric was scored out of 20 and the resulting score out of 100 set placement on the list.<\/p>\n David Fisher is based in Northland and has worked as a journalist for more than 30 years, winning multiple journalism awards including being twice named Reporter of the Year and being selected as one of a small number of Wolfson Press Fellows to Wolfson College, Cambridge. He first joined the Herald in 2004.<\/p>\nFormer Deputy Police Commissioner Jevon McSkimming (left) who resigned after objectionable material was found on his work devices, and Police Commissioner Richard Chambers. Composite image \/ NZME<\/p>\n
Former Assistant Commissioner Clint Rickards.<\/p>\n
New Zealand Special Air Service operators on operations in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n
The collapse of South Canterbury Finance featured large among failed finance companies.<\/p>\n
Entrepreneur Kim Dotcom faced off against Sir John Key, then the Prime Minister, during the Intelligence and Security select committee hearing into the GCSB at Parliament in 2013. Photo \/ NZME<\/p>\n
Tens of thousands of homes were affected in the leaky homes crisis. Photo \/ Martin Sykes<\/p>\n
Phillip Field in Parliament in 2006. Photo \/ Ross Setford<\/p>\n
The 29 crosses with mine helmets on the road which leads to the Pike River Mine.<\/p>\n
Teina Pora had his convictions quashed by the Privy Council in 2015.<\/p>\n