As organisations accelerate efforts to deploy AI, access to
large volumes of training data has become essential to maintaining
a competitive edge. But this raises a fundamental legal question;
in the context of the GDPR, how far can businesses go when using
datasets that appear de-identified or pseudonymised,
particularly when training AI models?
On 4 September 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”) issued its judgement in European Data Protection
Supervisor (“EDPS”) v Single Resolution
Board (“SRB”), which introduces a
potentially significant shift to how this question should be
answered. It suggests that in some cases, certain pseudonymised
data may fall outside the scope of the GDPR, depending on the
recipient’s perspective and who holds the means to re-identify
the individuals concerned.
This represents a departure from earlier assumptions (at least,
at a European level) that such data is personal whenever
any party holds the key, which supports a more contextual,
relative (and practical) approach to identifiability, which is more
in line with the ICO’s approach to this topic in the UK (and
the ICO has relied on the CJEU’s judgement in its appeal against an Upper Tribunal ruling before
the Court of Appeal). This shift also arguably aligns with the
EU’s broader digital strategy to facilitate responsible data
sharing.
This position is likely to benefit organisations training AI
models, particularly where they receive large datasets from third
parties, as it supports the argument in some scenarios that such
data may fall outside the scope of the GDPR, provided that the
organisation lacks the means to re-identify individuals.
The key takeaway from the judgment is that pseudonymised data
may not be considered personal data for a particular recipient,
depending on that party’s ability to re-identify
individuals.
Legal backdrop
As a reminder, personal data is defined under the GDPR
– that is, information relating to an identified or identifiable
individual.
CJEU case law and subsequent guidance from the European Data
Protection Board (“EDPB”) has further
clarified that data can be personal if any party even a
third party holds the means to re-identify individuals (and is
reasonably likely to use those means).
For data to be anonymised and fall outside the scope of the
GDPR, it must be processed in such a way that individuals are no
longer identifiable, taking account of all the means
‘reasonably likely to be used’ by anyone to identify
them.
Pseudonymised data falls somewhere in between personal/anonymous
data: it does not directly identify someone (so is often confused
with anonymous data) but if it can still it can be attributed to an
individual using additional information. For example, an online
retailer replacing customer names with customer numbers while
keeping a separate list that links each number back to the real
customer will still be treated as personal data for purposes of the
GDPR, as it will not be considered fully anonymised.
Working out whether data is pseudonymised or fully anonymised is
also problematic for organisations with some experts considering
that total anonymisation is hard to achieve.
So how does the EDPS case help us DP
practitioners?
Background
In 2017, the European Central Bank announced that Banco Popular
Español was failing.
SRB (an institution set up as part of European measures to
regulate banks following the Eurozone crisis) then issued a
resolution decision (before deciding on potential compensation for
affected shareholders/creditors).
As part of its process, the SRB collected comments from
affected individuals, which included survey-style comments,
pseudonymised that data and then shared it with Deloitte.
SRB tagged each comment with an alphanumeric code (i.e., the
‘key’ to the data) and removed directly identifiable data
prior to sharing the data with Deloitte. In other words, SRB had
the ability to re-identify individuals to whom the comments related
via the key, whereas Deloitte did not.
Several individuals lodged complaints with the EDPS, arguing
that SRB failed to name Deloitte as a recipient of personal data,
contrary to its transparency obligations under Article 15 EUI GDPR
(i.e., the version of the GDPR that applies to EU
institutions).
The EDPS concluded that the data shared with Deloitte was
pseudonymous (and personal) data, on the basis that SRB could
re-identify individuals. Subsequently, SRB was in breach of its
transparency obligations.
SRB successfully challenged the EDPS’ decision at the
General Court (“GC”). The GC annulled
the EDPS’ decision that the data was pseudonymous (and
personal) on several grounds, including:
It failed to properly apply the ‘content, purpose, and
effect’ test (applied from previous case law, which requires an
assessment of whether the information, by its content, the purpose
for which it is processed, or its effects, relates to an identified
or identifiable individuals, rather than assuming that data
necessarily relates to individuals merely because it concerns their
views or opinions; and
Wrongly held that the question of whether the data was
identifiable must be assessed from the perspective of Deloitte (and
as Deloitte did not hold that key to that data, it therefore
follows that Deloitte was not a recipient of personal data).
We provided an initial summary of the GC’s judgement shortly
after its publication, with further analysis available here.
So, what happened here?
The CJEU disagreed in part with the GC’s reasoning,
particularly in relation to how the EDPS assessed whether the data
in question related to identifiable individuals. Drawing on the
Nowak judgement, the Court confirmed that “the particular
nature of personal opinions or views [are] as an expression of a
person’s thinking… necessarily closely linked to that
person” As such, the EDPS was entitled to conclude that
the comments provided by affected individuals related to those
individuals, without needing to apply the ‘content, purpose and
effect’ test.
The CJEU did uphold the GC’s finding that the
identifiability of data must be assessed from the perspective of
the recipient, stating that:
“Pseudonymisation may, depending on the circumstances
of the case, effectively prevent persons other than the controller
from identifying the data subject, in such a way that, for them,
the data subject is not or is no longer identifiable.” [para
86]
Therefore, even where the sender of the pseudonymised data
(here, the SRB) holds the key to re-identify that data, that same
data may be anonymous to the recipient.
That said, the judgement confirmed that transparency obligations
under the GDPR still applied. The SRB retained the ability to
re-identify individuals and therefore remained a controller of
personal data. As such, it was required to name Deloitte as a
recipient under its transparency obligations, even though Deloitte
received only de-identified data from its own standpoint.
EU vs UK: a convergence, but not (yet) a
merger
This decision very much moves the European position closer to
the UK position. To date, previous European case law provided a
long‑standing orthodoxy, suggesting that pseudonymous data
remained personal data so long as anyone, anywhere, held the key
(having regard to the means ‘reasonably likely to be
used’).
Indeed, the draft EDPB guidelines on pseudonymisation even state
that:
Pseudonymised data, which could be attributed to a natural
person by the use of additional information, is to be considered
information on an identifiable natural person, and is therefore
personal. This statement also holds true if pseudonymised data
and additional information are not in the hands of the same
person. (para 22)
This approach contrasts with the UK ICO’s more pragmatic
approach, where the ICO guidance on anonymisation indicates that:
“Pseudonymised data is personal data in the hands of
someone who holds the additional information”
In other words, identifiability can be assessed relative to each
party, meaning data could be personal for an organisation (to the
extent that the organisation holds the ‘key’ which enables
re-identification), but anonymous to another (i.e., to an
organisation that does not hold the key).
It appears at first glance, that the EDPS v SRB judgement is
more closely aligned with the UK’s relative approach to
identifiability, which will be relevant for organisations subject
to both the EU and UK GDPR. We therefore expect that the EDPB will
update its position when it finalises its guidelines. It is of
course possible that the EDPB may double down on its current
approach in the finalised guidelines, and keep pseudonymised data
(subject to limited exceptions relating to ‘reasonably
likely’ analysis) squarely within realm of the personal data
definition (which would limit the practical headroom this judgement
appears to open).
What this means for processing data and particularly for
training AI models
This judgement is likely to be welcomed by DP practitioners and
organisations more generally, as it provides some welcome clarity
and alignment on UK and EU position. It will also be significant
for organisations developing AI models using large volumes of
training data. That said, AI use cases may complicate the analysis.
In particular, the ability of models to memorise, infer, or
reproduce training data may affect whether individuals are in fact
identifiable in practice, and therefore whether data can properly
be treated as anonymous for GDPR purposes.
Going forward, where an organisation holds the means to
re-identify individuals, such as a ‘key’ the data remains
personal data from that organisation’s perspective, even if the
recipient cannot re-identify anyone. This means that GDPR
obligations will still apply to the organisation that holds the
key, including, in AI contexts carrying out a data protection
impact assessment. However, if an organisation does not hold the
key the likely the data might not be considered personal which will
no doubt be welcomed by those recipients.
Of course, even if data is not considered personal, regulatory
obligations will continue under other frameworks, and organisations
that receive data that may be considered anonymous must consider
obligations under other frameworks, such as the EU AI Act and Data
Act.
While the CJEU’s judgment introduces a more practical and
contextual interpretation of identifiability, the key question is
how this will be challenged or clarified in the AI context, given
the global widespread reliance on large volumes of de-identified
data to train, test, and validate AI models. Whether the EDPB will
update its guidance to reflect this shift remains to be seen.
The content of this article is intended to provide a general
guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought
about your specific circumstances.